


THE
INTELLIGENT MAN'S
WAY TO
PREVENT WAR

Edited by LEONARD WOOLF

THE INTELLIGENT MAN'S WAY TO PREVENT WAR

by

SIR NORMAN ANGELL
PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY
C. M. LLOYD
C. R. BUXTON
VISCOUNT CECIL
W. ARNOLD-FORSTER
PROFESSOR HAROLD J. LASKI



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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION By THE EDITOR *page 7*

Chapter I. THE INTERNATIONAL
ANARCHY

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL 19

Chapter II. REVISION OF THE PEACE
TREATIES

By PROF. GILBERT MURRAY 67

§1 The Treaties and the Fourteen Points

2 The Question of War Guilt

3 War Criminals and Reparations

4 The Territorial Clauses : the Minorities

5 The German Colonies

6 Exclusion and Disarmament

7 Conclusions

Chapter III. THE PROBLEM OF RUSSIA

By C. M. LLOYD 154

Chapter IV. INTER-CONTINENTAL PEACE

By CHARLES RODEN BUXTON 199

§1 Introduction

2 Asia

3 Africa

4 America

Chapter V. THE LEAGUE AS A ROAD TO
PEACE

By VISCOUNT CECIL 256

§1 The Will for Peace

2 Renunciation of War

3 The League of Nations

4 Lessons from the League's History

5 What Unofficial Organisations and Individuals can do

Chapter VI. ARBITRATION, SECURITY,
DISARMAMENT

By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER *page* 314

- §1 Pacific Settlement of Disputes
- 2 Peaceful Change
- 3 Security
- 4 Disarmament

Chapter VII. EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL FACTORS

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL 456

Chapter VIII. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDA-
TIONS OF PEACE

By PROF. HAROLD J. LASKI 499

- §1 The Fundamental Causes of War
- 2 The Modern State
- 3 Economic Imperialism at Work
- 4 The League's Weakness
- 5 The Economic Road to Peace
- 6 The Sovereign National State
- 7 A World Order of Socialist Societies

Appendix. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS

549

INTRODUCTION

By the EDITOR

THE SUBJECT of this book, the prevention of war, is of enormous importance. That sounds like a truism and five, ten, fifteen years ago it would have been accepted as a truism by almost every one. But we are living in an age in which civilization is fighting for its life and in the last ten years the fight has gone steadily against civilization. During the war of 1914 to 1918 Europe took a big step on the road back to barbarism ; in the years 1923 to 1933 it has taken another and even bigger step. In the interval between 1918 and 1923 there was a temporary ebb in the tide of European barbarism and the forces of civilization began to reassert themselves, largely because thousands of people were shocked when they began to realize what the war and the peace which followed the war really meant. But the ebb was a short one and about 1925 the process of breakdown or break up of European civilization began again. You may observe it at work in the economic crisis, in the general political instability, in the growing tension between various nations, in the rise of "ruthless" and savage dictatorships, in the glorification of Fascist mass murders, in the suppression of liberty and all freedom of thought, in the barbarous persecution and torture of Liberals, Socialists, Pacifists, and Jews in Germany. You may finally also observe it in the changed attitude towards war. In Italy, Germany, and several other countries the prevention of war is no longer considered important ; on the contrary war is glorified and peace derided. "Fascism," writes Mussolini in 1932, "repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism—born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of

nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. . . . Thus a doctrine which is founded upon this harmful doctrine of peace is hostile to Fascism."¹ "An alliance whose aim does not include the intention of war is worthless nonsense," wrote Hitler in *My Struggle*, and his Vice-Chancellor, von Papen, tells the Germans that "they must try to make the world understand why Germany on January 30th, 1933, had struck the word pacifism from its vocabulary."

When leaders of the forces of barbarism, the heads of powerful states, openly proclaim their savage policies and doctrines, the subject of the prevention of war only becomes the more important for an intelligent man. The process of completely breaking up a civilization is no new phenomenon in the world's history. It has frequently recurred in Europe during the last 2,500 years. Civilization, i.e. an ordered society of humane, educated, intelligent, free, prosperous, and cultured individuals, is a delicate organization and has never yet firmly established itself anywhere in the world. We are all of us still half-savages, and these instincts of the animal or the savage to kill, dominate, persecute, torture other people (which the Fascist and Hitlerite glorifies) find themselves uncomfortable in such an ordered and humane society. They rebel at the first opportunity and they have again and again rebelled with success—in ancient Greece, in the Roman Empire, at the Renaissance, in the 18th century at the first sign of humanism and humanitarianism gaining the upper hand, and again at the beginning of the 20th century when for the first time in European history it seemed to be just possible that civilization might establish itself firmly and the world become prosperous, happy, intelligent, and peaceful.

What we are now witnessing and living through is a rebellion of all that is savage in us, of all the savages in our midst, against civilization. The war was the first stage in

¹ Article on "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," by Mussolini, in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, a translation of which was published in *The Political Quarterly*, July-September, 1933.

this decline and fall of western civilization, and the shock which that war gave to the whole of our society offered an opportunity to the barbarians to carry their work of destruction a stage further. We are at present in the middle of this second stage. The barbarians are already in the ascendancy ; they have broken through the frontiers of civilization and they are now destroying it from inside. Whether they succeed or whether the forces of civilization reassert themselves and regain control of European society, depends upon two things : first, whether Western society is able to solve its economic problems, a subject with which this book is not concerned ; second, upon the attitude of ordinary people towards war, which is the subject of this book. For if anything in the future is certain, it is certain that civilization cannot survive another " world war." If there is another war, the barbarians will finally triumph—which is one reason why they have " struck the word pacifism from their vocabulary."

On the other hand there is no reason why there should be another war. War is not a " natural " catastrophe like a tidal wave or an earthquake. It is not inevitable ; it is preventable in Europe like cannibalism, cholera, or witch-burning, all of which, though once common in this continent, have been abolished by civilization. War depends upon the human will, upon what goes on inside the heads of human beings, upon how they decide to order their society and to arrange their relations with their fellows. If people decide to behave in one way or to allow their rulers to behave in one way, there will inevitably be war ; if they decide to behave in another way and to compel their rulers to behave in another way, there will inevitably be peace. Any intelligent man can with a little trouble understand the problem of preventing war. Though it is not a simple problem, it is not nearly so complicated as that of making a six-cylinder engine for a motor-car, and it is child's play compared with the intricate mass of problems which have been solved to make modern broadcasting possible.

The object of this book is to make this problem intelligible

to the ordinary intelligent man, to show him how, if he wants to prevent war, war can be prevented. It is not a book for experts, but for laymen. It puts before them, in the first place, the facts, a knowledge of which is necessary for forming a rational opinion on the subject. It further attempts to deal exhaustively with the whole problem of preventing war, approaching it from different angles, discussing all its various aspects, in order to determine, if possible, what conditions are essential for ensuring peace. There are seven different authors, it will be observed, of the chapters which follow, and their outlook and even their opinions on important questions are not always identical. No attempt has been made to conceal or reconcile any such divergence of views. Each author is a recognized authority upon that part of the subject allotted to him, and it seems to me to be one of the advantages of a book of this kind, written by several authors, that, where there is legitimate difference of opinion, both sides can be fully and fairly stated and the jury of ordinary men can be left to form their own opinion on the evidence and arguments. Each author is responsible *only* for his own contribution and the opinions expressed in it. But any one who reads this book from cover to cover will find that there is surprisingly little difference of opinion among its seven authors on points of primary importance. It is another proof that the problem of preventing war is essentially simple.

I propose to explain very briefly the scheme upon which the book has been designed. War is a social phenomenon, a characteristic of human society, like cannibalism, witch-burning, murder, drunkenness. It is a product of human behaviour. The problem of preventing it depends upon discovering the conditions which cause this behaviour and then, if possible, discovering the conditions which would make it extremely unlikely or impossible. The first chapter in this book is, therefore, devoted to a general discussion of those fundamental conditions in human society to-day which are the ultimate causes of war. It is written by Sir Norman Angell. He shows that it is not human nature, as

many people argue, which makes war "inevitable." War in the modern world springs from what has aptly been called the international anarchy. Within the state we have learnt by experience that civilized life is not possible unless human nature submits to the restraints of law and order. In the course of a few hundred years we have completely altered human behaviour, and the civilized man lives in peace with his next door neighbour, or if he quarrels with him or disagrees with him, does not claim to be judge in his own case or club his neighbour over the head or stick a knife into his back or shoot him ; he either settles his dispute by compromise or arbitration or takes it to the courts for decision of a judge according to rules of law. And in order to make it quite certain that he shall behave in this way, he and his fellow citizens maintain a police force which will prevent him " taking the law into his own hands." But in international relations, in the relations *between* states, we adopt an entirely opposite method. There we maintain a system of anarchy. Each state claims to be sovereign and independent ; it claims to be judge in its own disputes, to use its own armed forces to enforce " its rights." The result is a perpetual danger, if not threat, of war and the tragically absurd spectacle of every nation trying to achieve " security " by making itself stronger in army, navy, and air force than its neighbour.

Sir Norman Angell shows that if we continue to tolerate this system of international anarchy, war is indeed inevitable, but that the anarchy itself is not inevitable. The problem of preventing war is the problem of substituting a different system, a system of international law and order, for this anarchy. The whole of the rest of the book is concerned with the methods by which order may be substituted for anarchy. The discussion falls roughly into two parts. The main problem is dealt with in the four last chapters, Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII, namely the general conditions which must be established in human society throughout the world if war is to be prevented. What human beings have to do, if they wish to ensure peace, is to subject the

sovereign, independent state, claiming to be absolute judge of its own "rights" and relying for its "security" upon its own military strength and upon armed allies, to a universal world order, an ordered society of nations in which, if there is a dispute over "rights," right is not determined by the relative military strength of the disputants, but by the impartial conciliation or decision of those who are not parties to the dispute. In such an ordered society of nations, too, it is essential that each nation should look for security against aggression, not to the strength of its own arms and allies—the arithmetically impossible security of every one being stronger than everyone else!—but to the whole society of nations, the collective guarantee and pooled security of all nations.

Now there is no mystery about all this or about the main outlines of the world order necessary if the world is to live in peace. It is indeed already in existence embryonically in the League of Nations. The last four chapters of this book are really concerned with the question of how this universal embryonic world system of the League may become a fully developed organization which will effectively prevent war. I shall say a word or two more about the contents of those four chapters, but before I do so, I wish to deal with the contents of Chapters II, III, and IV. These chapters discuss certain special problems of peace or problems of peace peculiar to certain portions of the earth, and it is important to understand and form an opinion on them before one approaches the general problem of preventing war and of developing a world organization. Let us take a rapid and superficial glance at the contents of these chapters.

In Chapter II Professor Gilbert Murray deals with an important, but special and preliminary question, the revision of the Peace Treaties. Nearly everyone to-day agrees that the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties imposed upon the defeated nations in the late war were in very many respects disastrously unjust and vindictive. It is, therefore, frequently maintained or assumed that there can be no permanent peace in the world until the treaties are revised

and the more flagrant injustices abolished. It is obvious that this preliminary question must be got out of the way, before we can usefully consider the form of a general world order for preventing war ; for it is no good establishing such an organization upon foundations which themselves contain the seeds of inevitable war. Professor Gilbert Murray considers the treaties in detail with this object in view, namely to see whether and in what respects revision is necessary for the maintenance of peace. His conclusions may surprise a good many people who are not intimately acquainted with the facts. It is that time and the ruthless logic of events have already revised or nullified most of the worst and most dangerous provisions of the peace treaties. There are particular points in his analysis of the treaties and the effect of certain provisions with which not every one will agree, but these important facts seem to me to emerge clearly from his discussion : that the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties have already largely revised themselves, that, in the interests of peace or for psychological reasons, it is desirable that some further modifications or changes should be made ; but that any large-scale revision of the territorial clauses of the treaties is not only unnecessary as a preliminary to establishing an effective world organization for preventing war, but would itself be a menace to the world's peace.

In Chapter III Mr. C. M. Lloyd deals with another preliminary question. The position of Russia is peculiar in the world of states and nations. It is, as Mr. Lloyd says, an "alien element," partly because it is the only Communist state in a world in which all other states are organized on a basis of capitalism and partly because the principles and aims of Communism "are a challenge to the very basis of capitalist society." There are many people who maintain that this isolation of Soviet Russia and the aims of the Soviet Government constitute in themselves a formidable obstacle to peace. It is, for instance, alleged by some that from its very principles the Soviet state desires war and is only waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack, or

foment an attack upon, its capitalist neighbours. Other people, without going as far as this, are convinced that the Soviet state will never enter any world organization for preventing war, such as the League of Nations, and that the mere fact of its standing out must make it impossible for the rest of the world to disarm and establish peace upon a firm basis. It is obvious that here again we have a particular problem which it is essential to deal with before we consider the possibility of any general organization of international society for preventing war. Mr. Lloyd analyses both the theory and practice of Soviet foreign policy. His analysis shows, I think, that the maintenance of peace is by no means inconsistent with the aims pursued by the Soviet Government and that in practice their policy has been pacific. There is no point at which one can say that they are pursuing a policy which threatens war upon their neighbours. On the other hand, it is extremely improbable that the Soviet state would enter the League of Nations or any other similar organization, so long as its other members were all, or the great majority of them, capitalist states. The security of peace would certainly suffer by the exclusion of a state like Russia from the world organization, but it must be remembered that Russia has already shown its willingness to co-operate in the work of the League, although refusing to become a member. This particular part of the main problem should however be considered in relation to the questions discussed by Professor Laski in the last chapter of the book.

The last series of preliminary or particular difficulties are dealt with by Mr. C. R. Buxton in Chapter IV. In each of the Continents of Asia, Africa, and America one finds peculiar conditions, due to their political organization or development, which complicate the general problem which the book discusses. In a world organized for peace these conditions would almost certainly require special treatment. Some of the difficulties are due to the relations which have developed between Continents, e.g. the penetration and domination of Africa by imperialist European States, others

are due to the different stages of political and economic development and the different cultures to be found in the various Continents. Mr. Buxton explains the nature of these inter-continental complications, examines how far they militate against the success of such an organization for preventing war as the League of Nations, and suggests ways and means by which a world organized for peace might meet some of the dangers and difficulties.

And now we come to the general problem of organizing the world for peace and getting rid of the international anarchy which makes war inevitable. It is dealt with in the last four chapters of the book. Chapters V and VI are closely related. Taken together they show the structure and working of such an organization, existing embryonically in the League of Nations, and how it may and must be developed if it is effectively to prevent war. In Chapter V Viscount Cecil deals with the actual League as a road to peace. He examines its objects, structure, and working ; he analyses its successes and its failures. The chapter shows that fundamentally the League system attempts to substitute world order for anarchy by requiring the several states so far to accept a curtailment of their sovereignty by a renunciation of the right of war. Mr. Arnold-Forster carries the analysis of the League system to its conclusion in Chapter VI. He shows that there are four corollaries to this renunciation of the right of war and to the League or any other system which is to prevent war. A world order in which states really renounce the right of war must also (1) ensure that states renounce the right to be judge in their own disputes and provide an efficient system of settling international disputes equitably ; (2) provide a system by which necessary changes in the relations between states and peoples can be made equitably and peacefully ; (3) give to each state a real security guaranteed by the whole world or League of Nations in place of the illusion of security which it perpetually seeks after in trying to make itself militarily stronger than its neighbours ; (4) make the keeping of the peace secure by ensuring that all nations disarm.

These two chapters describe the structure and organization of a world order which would prevent war. The structure and organization are those of the League or rather of a fully developed League. That is because the League, despite its many defects and its obvious failures, has grown out of the inevitable logic of events. It has grown inevitably out of the world's desire for peace. The world—that is, the individual men and women in the world—may not desire peace with sufficient passion and intelligence to insist upon getting it, and in that case the League will fail. But whether the League, as we know it, fails or succeeds, it is absolutely certain that, if, during the next 100 years or so, international peace is to be secured, some world organization of states will be required based upon the principles examined in these two chapters.

But structures, organizations, systems are not enough either for peace or war. Such social machinery is of immense importance, but it is only the machinery of human intercourse and its working will always depend upon what goes on inside the heads of those who work it. Ultimately it is human psychology, the beliefs and desires of human beings, which makes international anarchy persist and war inevitable. A world order to prevent war requires a different psychology, a psychology of peace which will make peace inevitable. In Chapter VII Sir Norman Angell considers these psychological factors and the part which education must play in creating the psychology of peace.

Chapter VIII, by Professor Laski, is the last and the most controversial of all the chapters in the book. Its conclusions would not be accepted by several of the other contributors, but there can be no question about the importance of the subject which he discusses. Professor Laski maintains that the ultimate causes of war are economic and that it is the capitalist organization of finance, industry, and commerce within each nation that drives each state into a policy of economic imperialism. Both the cruder and subtler types of nationalism, militarism, *machtpolitik*, hostile alliances, the armaments race and huge armies, navies and air forces, and

finally war are the logical and inevitable result of this policy of economic imperialism. If this diagnosis be true, a world organisation of the League of Nations type, even if developed to the point indicated in the chapters by Viscount Cecil and Mr. Arnold-Forster, could never by itself be an effective guarantee against war. The renunciation of war requires the renunciation of sovereignty which the capitalist state, by its nature, cannot accept, and a League of capitalist states, though it may do something to mitigate the danger of wars, cannot create the kind of international society in which war will be almost impossible. It is obvious that one might have a world of Socialist sovereign states pursuing much the same international policy of imperialism as do the capitalist states of to-day and producing the same result—war ; but Professor Laski argues that, though this might happen, there is nothing inherent in the organisation of Socialist states, as there is in capitalist states which makes the pursuit of such a policy inevitable. Hence though war cannot be prevented in a capitalist world, it might be prevented in a Socialist world.

The functions of an editor are performed when he has introduced his contributors and explained the scheme of the book edited by him. But there is one word more that needs to be said in the case of the present book. A discussion of the League of Nations, disarmament, arbitration, international co-operation, and the prevention of war will seem to many people at the moment academically utopian. The League of Nations, in the opinion of the majority, is a failure ; the world is turning, it seems, to Fascism and Hitlerism and the more violent forms of nationalism ; disarmament has proved impossible ; Japan has just waged a successful war against China ; the self-sufficient state and economic nationalism are to be the world's ideals for the next decade. In such a world pacifism, liberty, democracy, Socialism can have no place. Even in the interval between the planning and the writing of this book, there has been an immense change in the political landscape both in Europe and America, a tremendous acceleration of the movement

towards nationalism and violence and dictatorship and away from the ideas of internationalism and the League. In the teeth of this nationalist blizzard to discuss methods of preventing war will seem to many people futile. I do not think it is. The majority of people are, I believe, still opposed to war and anxious to prevent it. It is possible or even probable that they will continue to hold certain beliefs, desire certain desires, and support certain policies which will make war inevitable. Even so it is salutary and reasonable to record the fact that they have it in their power to prevent war if they choose other aims and other policies. That is what this book records. Moreover, there is nothing to be ashamed of in refusing to hurrah with the barbarians in those periods when the world turns back in full cry to barbarism. In such a previous period the voice of Erasmus sounded futile and academic, but looking back over history I would rather have been on the side of Erasmus than on the side of Luther.

CHAPTER I: THE INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL

IMAGINE a community cursed with a perpetually recurring and devastating pestilence. Concerning its cause and cure great differences of opinion exist. But one fact stands out clearly: a certain condition invariably accompanies the pestilence; the disappearance of that condition almost invariably brings the pestilence to an end.

Now that fact alone would not justify the conclusion that this coincidence indicated either the cause or the cure. The condition which accompanies the disease may prove innocuous given a different set of circumstances; avoidance of the provoking condition may be beyond the power of the community; or too costly; or less troublesome cures may be promised. But if the coincidence were indeed as stated then any wise community would examine it very carefully as indicating one proved means of avoidance. The feasibility and cost of the condition of proved immunity would be exhaustively analysed.

It sounds absurd to say that we know perfectly well the condition that will give us practical immunity from the scourge of war. But it is true. We know the truth not merely as a logically demonstrated theorem, but as a fact revealed on numberless occasions in the history of man. We know the price at which we may have peace. It may be a price which man is justified in refusing to pay. But plainly in an enquiry of this kind we should start by being clear as to just what that price is.

Commonly we think of the civilised world as never having known general peace. That is not true. There have been periods, one as long as that which separates us from Queen Elizabeth, in which nearly the whole civilised world, as it

then existed, was indeed "lapped in universal law"; in which the dream of Isaiah, of the time in which nations should beat their spears into plowshares and should learn war no more, actually was realised. Furthermore, for still longer periods, in great areas in which for unnumbered centuries previously war had raged, the scourge was brought to an end and peace secured by essentially the same means which had secured it once, for the Western world as a whole.

The first reference is, of course, to the *pax Romana*. Of the reality and significance of the achievement historians are agreed.

A multitude of contemporary writers testify to the order that then obtained. Tertullian, writing about A.D. 290, says "the world is more cultivated and richer than before. Every place is accessible and busy. Smiling fields have replaced deserts, and cornfields the forests; lambs have driven away the wolves, and the sand has been made fertile, rocks broken, swamps drained: there are as many cities as there once were hovels. The islands are not barren nor the cliffs terrifying: every nook teems with ordered life." Cicero proclaimed a "universal society of the human race"; Lucan foretold a time when "the race will cast aside its weapons, and all nations will learn to love"; Seneca said, "My country is the world," and Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius declared themselves citizens of the world.

Ludwig Friedländer¹ tells us that "The Empire gave two and a half centuries of peace, only occasionally and locally interrupted; a condition since unrealised.

"Contemporaries acknowledged these boons of peace, and security and regularity of intercourse. . . . Rome had similarly stayed the endless confusions of incessant warring states; she had united peoples and dynasties into one organisation of peace, one unbreakable ring. In the first two centuries after the death of the first Cæsars the imperial revenue rose rapidly; and peace

¹ *Roman Life and Manners*, translated by Leonard A. Magnus, Routledge, p. 269.

secured prosperity. Hill and dale were cultivated ; the mercantile marine increased, and trade between all countries. Nowhere were there wars or battles or bandits or pirates. This was the majesty of the *pax Romana*, which made Rome a sacred home, an eternal source of life, a secure anchorage ; as though the gods had renewed the life of the world ; all peoples prayed for the eternity of this gift of Rome."

The means by which the result was brought about was, of course, the establishment of a common authority, strong enough to end the anarchy of many conflicting local authorities which had reigned previously. As the power of that authority to uphold a common law declined, so that we had once more an aggregation of separate authorities, each a law unto itself asserting such claims as its power enabled it to enforce and so coming into conflict with the claims of others similarly asserted—as that "state of nature" replaced the common law of the empire, war once more became rife.

An essentially similar process is revealed in the means by which peace has been secured over large areas where originally war was endemic. In India, where nation had fought nation for countless generations, the *pax Britannica* for over a century has afforded peace between these heretofore warring states. In that area we know as Germany, and which our grandfathers knew more commonly as "the Germanies," where for centuries war between the separate kingdoms and principalities had raged, the German Union of 1871 secured peace between them. In Italy where for centuries not only did states which considered themselves nations fight each other, but the very cities went to war with one another, this chaos and the resulting wars were brought to an end by the Unification. It is the story of the ending of conflicts between Feudal chieftains by the growing power of the King, a process we see at work in history under many different forms.

So far the conclusion is plain enough : the existence of a

number of independent sovereignties side by side, each a law unto itself, with no general "rule of the road" governing their intercourse, has always involved war. This condition in which each member of a community is independent and sovereign, so that, when two differ as to their respective rights, there is no overriding authority to restrain the one who by his strength attempts to impose his view on the other, is of course a condition of anarchy, of "no government." The wars which invariably accompany this condition have, as an historical fact, only been brought to an end by substituting for anarchy the principle of authority, or a Federal bond, an organised society. It is arguable, of course, that the peace secured in these cases has been purchased at too great a cost, that the bond which secured it was quite unnecessarily burdensome, that it is no longer necessary (as so many authorities allege to be the case in India), but as a matter of simple historical fact the condition of anarchy alike in mediæval Europe, in eighteenth-century Germany, Italy, and India brought war; and the limitation of independence and sovereignty by some federal bond or overriding authority secured peace.

It was not, be it noted, in every case an imposed authority: the Federal bond in Germany has been partly an agreed bond. That which united the American colonies after their revolt (concerning which a word presently) was a consciously devised one, due largely to the influence of a very few men, but for whom we might have had in English-speaking America as many unlimited sovereignties as there are in Spanish-speaking America—with the consequent greater frequency of war. Nor indeed in the *pax Romana* was the element of coercion undiluted. Historians as a whole are agreed that for most of the conquered barbarian populations, the oppression of Rome fell most heavily upon the chiefs, and less heavily upon those whom we should call the common people, for whom the native rulers were often less benign than the distant one.

"Conquest was robbed of much of its sting by the extension of civic privileges, the reward of barbarians for services,

and the opening of a door of escape from slavery. Wide distant provinces, as more than one writer has pointed out, which could never have been held by force of arms alone, were placated by the double expedient of establishing colonies, civil as well as military, and extending the franchise, above all by opportunities of peace and exchange of goods, which made the grandchildren of Julius Cæsar's Gallic enemies most loyal servants of Rome."¹ Latin became the universal language in the West, and through it Roman and Greek ideas flowed from the Mediterranean lands far into the dark North.

The fact that a strong Federal bond and a strong resulting Federal authority may arise from purely voluntary arrangements between separate units is illuminated by the history of the British colonies of America after their separation from the Mother Country, a story which gains in significance when we compare it with the history of the revolted colonies of Spain. In the discussion of the causes of war the contrast between the two cases prompts some exceedingly interesting reflections.

Suppose that the efforts of Washington to keep the original thirteen colonies together had failed ; and that after the defeat of Britain they had divided into several different independent nations, as they so very nearly did. There may well then have arisen north of the Mexican border as many separate nations as there actually are south of that border, each with its own army and navy, customs barriers, with perpetual disputes concerning access to the sea and the lakes, the coal and gold and oil fields, the use of the rivers. In that case there would, of course, have been war between Ohio and Pennsylvania or Massachusetts and the Hudson Valley State, or each with its neighbour, as there has been many wars between the independent states of Spanish-speaking America.

What would have been the cause of those wars, which in fact have not taken place ? We should have discussed the

¹ *A Short History of War and Peace*. G. H. Perris. (Williams and Norgate, p. 69-70.)

causes much as we have lately been discussing the causes of the war between Paraguay and Bolivia ; as formerly we discussed the causes of the wars between Chile and Peru. There would have been allegations and counter-allegations of violation of territory ; disputes as to the respective rights on rivers ; rivalry of interests of all sorts ; the working of concessions. . . . But plainly the real reason why Bolivia and Paraguay *do* fight, while Pennsylvania and Ohio keep the peace is that the latter pair make part of an organised Society of States and the former do not.

The contrast is the more striking because it bears upon so many other alleged causes of war : differences of outlook, culture, language, capitalism, the profit system. Peace has been very badly kept as between the nations of Latin America ; militarism has marked not only their international but their domestic relations ; and it has been well kept as between the States of the American Union. Yet the whole of Spanish America speaks a common tongue, possesses a common religion, has common cultural origins, is less diluted by the mixture of immigrating peoples than in the case of the United States, which is, in fact, far less homogeneous, has had to absorb more diverse elements, while capitalism is certainly as ruthless in Pennsylvania as in Bolivia and Paraguay.

Again, it is the Federal bond, the existence of an organised Society of States, which explains the maintenance of peace between the States of the North American Union ; and it is the absence of any such bonds which explains the frequency of war between the Latin states of America.

Now that bond did not create itself. It very nearly did not get created at all. Its forging was the result of heart-breaking toil, discussion, argument, conference ; and having been created, broke, and was restored only at the cost of one of the bloodiest wars in history. It was an entirely conscious effort of the human will, put forth because the necessity for a definitely organised Society of the American States, as an indispensable condition of the welfare of the American people, was recognised by those who gave real

thought to the matter ; who managed to secure influence in politics and who carried others with them.

Those who fought the early battles on behalf of the American Union were bitterly opposed by the "isolationists" of their time—"isolation" then meaning, of course, the isolation of Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania. Nor, of course, were the eighteenth century battles the last that had to be fought on that issue. Another phase was to face the country eighty years later when Lincoln believed that the principle of the Union¹ was the condition under which alone democracy in the new world could survive.

In the ten years' discussion which separated the Declaration of Independence from the formation of a Federal Union, the issue lay as between the freedom and independence of each unit and the power of the central authority : the old debate between order and liberty. The various States then resented deeply the idea of giving power to the centre. "The jealousies and the dislike of any strong central governing body seemed insuperable," writes Truslow Adams.² The country was drifting to anarchy. "The men in country taverns on a Saturday night might declaim about liberty till they were hoarse or asleep, but if the States were to leave their debts unpaid, become a mere

¹ It is surely hardly necessary to interrupt this exposition to point out that the breakdown of a given constitution is no argument against the principle of a constitution. Suppose after the civil war Americans had argued : "Our constitution failed to prevent a party difference from becoming a civil war. Constitutions are no good. Let every election be a civil war." If the Americans of the north had so argued—and Americans of the south do tend so to argue—the internal conditions of the United States would to-day resemble those of San Domingo or Guatemala. Our international constitution may fail ; we should argue from that failure as we argue from the failure of national constitutions : that it is reason for remedying the defect which occasioned the failure. The disadvantages of government do not make anarchy or militarism more workable.

² *The Epic of America*, by James Truslow Adams. (Routledge & Sons, 1932, p. 101.)

One New England farmer, Adams relates, voiced his opposition to central authority in these terms : "We do not need any Guviner but the Guviner of the univarse and under him a States General to Consult with the wrest of the united states for the good of the whole."

pack of small republics quarrelling among themselves until gobbled up singly by some European power, there would be little liberty worth declaiming about." But there were a few who were determined to fight the anarchy ; and it was characteristic of America at that time that there had been developed a stronger political sense in the real meaning of the term than the country—or any country—has known since. (The capacity had not yet been drained off to money-making and industrial adventure. Even forty years after the Declaration of Independence Sydney Smith could write to this effect : " In America you get great political capacity, but carriages without springs ; in England the carriages are good, but the politics are abominable." It is not quite the distinction which would be made to-day.) " Constitution making had been a favourite sport in all the colonies for the preceding fifteen years," says Adams.¹ Broadly one might say that America achieved her Union—and preserved it—because the need of Union was sufficiently realised. The need of world union is not yet realised ; we do not believe that an organised society of nations is a real necessity at all.

The problem for Europe, for the world, is to do consciously, of set purpose, what the less conscious forces of history did for North America, or more properly, aided her early statemen to accomplish.

This should not be taken as meaning that the price of

¹ " The group of fifty-five men who met at the appointed time to consider the momentous problem of devising a Constitution for the nation was the most distinguished which has ever been gathered on this continent. The character, ability, and broad mental attainments which they possessed provide an amazing commentary upon the quality of American civilisation in the eighteenth century. We must recall that the entire free white population of the States at that time was scarcely double that of the mere city of Los Angeles to-day. Yet out of a colonial population equivalent to twice that of Los Angeles came a George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, Robert Morris, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, C. C. Pinckney, John Dickinson, William Paterson, Rufus King, James Wilson, and others. In 1931, with forty times the population and many thousand times the wealth of 1787, could we have forty groups of similar capacity sitting simultaneously now ? " *Epic of America*, p. 102.

peace is a surrender of sovereignty by the nations of the world as complete as that made by the States of the American Union ; nor the formation of a Federal authority as overpowering as that of Washington. Nothing is more misleading in this connection than to talk in harsh absolutes, to divide the forms of association or Federalism into watertight categories neatly labelled. For we know from experience that political machinery and method may take an infinity of forms ; that one form may merge into another almost imperceptibly ; that a common authority sufficiently recognised to ensure the ends of peace may be sometimes little more than a symbol, as witness the function of the crown in the relationship of the otherwise completely independent Dominions of the British Commonwealth. The observance of a common rule of the road for international life, sufficiently complete for the avoidance of collision, may be secured as the result of a partnership of the nations bearing very lightly upon national independence and sovereignty.

Our main difficulty is that we have made of national sovereignty a god ; and of nationalism a religion, so that even when the most solid advantages for international co-operation are offered they are rejected impulsively. There is no weighing of the advantages of one course as against another : the decision is apt to be made by explosion of popular feeling. Thus a very popular London daily a year or two since dismissed the League of Nations and all its efforts in these terms :

“ In other words, Britain blotted out, her historical identity merged in some fantastic and nebulous world-State, her sovereignty gone, her power to shape her own destinies taken from her, her interests placed in the keeping of foreigners, her whole scheme of existence regulated for her from the outside—is there a single Briton with any patriotism or sense of realities at all who will not instantly turn in disgust from such a mushy and spineless ideal ? ”

Professor Arnold Toynbee has expressed the opinion that our popular protestations of devotion to Nationalism are really a sign that we are about to surrender it. In a recent address he says :

" I think we can fairly say that, in these last dozen years, we have made more progress towards overcoming the anarchy in the relations between states than our predecessors made during the previous four centuries.

" If we are frank with ourselves, we shall admit that we are engaged on a deliberate and sustained and concentrated effort to impose limitations upon sovereignty and independence of the fifty or sixty local sovereign independent states which at present partition the habitable surface of the Earth and divide the political allegiance of Mankind. The surest sign, to my mind, that this ancient and blood-stained fetish of local national sovereignty is our intended victim is the emphasis with which all statesmen and publicists protest with one accord, and over and over again, at every step forward which we take, that, whatever changes we may make in the international situation, the sacred principle of local sovereignty will be maintained inviolable. This, I repeat, is a sure sign that, at each of these steps forward, the principle of local sovereignty is really being encroached upon, its sphere of action reduced and its power of evil restricted. It is just because we are really attacking the principle of local sovereignty that we keep on protesting our loyalty to it so loudly. The harder we press our attack upon the idol, the more pains we take to keep its priests and devotees in a fool's paradise—lapped in a false sense of security which will inhibit them from taking up arms in their idol's defence."

Professor Toynbee seems to feel that internationalism is fated by *la force des choses*, whatever the stupidity of man. He imagines the defeat of the internationalist effort :

"When we study history we perceive that the political problem with which we are grappling, in our generation of society, is by no means unprecedented. The curse of political anarchy which comes from the distribution of sovereignty among a plurality of local states has afflicted other societies before ours ; but, in all these other cases in which the same situation has arisen, it has always been transitory. For anarchy, by its very nature, cures itself, sooner or later, by one means or another. The cure may come through a voluntary, pacific, rational constructive effort, such as we are making in our day—an effort to deprive the local states of their sovereignty for the benefit of society as a whole, without at the same time depriving them of their existence. Alternatively the cure may come through a blind, violent, irrational and destructive clash of material forces. Refusing to surrender their sovereignty, the local states may continue to collide with one another in war after war, until this political struggle for existence is terminated at length by a "knock-out blow." On this alternative, all the local sovereign states except one are doomed eventually to forfeit not only their sovereignty but their very existence ; for, on this alternative, the anarchy will be ended not by agreement but by force ; not by the organisation of a pacific League of Nations but by the imposition of a universal empire through the victory of one militant nation over all the rest."

And the question which, in Professor Toynbee's view, really confronts us, is this :

"Shall we cure our international anarchy by voluntary organisation, or shall we leave it to cure itself by the blind operation of force ? Shall we cure it now, while our social vitality is still strong, or shall we leave it to cure itself by a process of exhaustion ? That, I believe, is the great issue which confronts us, in our time, on the political plane of international affairs. I do not believe

that any other choice is open to us. In particular, I do not believe that, either by taking thought or by *laissez faire*, we can secure the continuation of the peculiar conditions of the last two or three centuries, during which sovereignty has been dispersed among a number of independent political entities."

But that forecast takes too little account, perhaps, of the fact that the military struggles of the past, which wiped out an infinity of small units and enabled a central authority like Rome to establish some sort of order, took place in a world in which war could go on without the destruction of the apparatus by which daily life was sustained. War used to be an affair of armies : it is now the conflict of armed nations, with the distinction between soldier and civilian wearing thinner and thinner. Until the nineteenth century the bulk of the civil population carried on their life pretty much as usual in war-time. To-day war instantly dislocates the machinery by which millions sustain life. That machinery has become so intricate as to make its management almost beyond us at the best, and we may reach a point of chaos in which the thing actually is beyond us. Further, it gives into the hands of those who resist authority instruments capable of infinite damage. Rome never had to face the kind of resistance which an India with its commercial boycott, its terrorism of train-wrecking and no-rent campaigns, is able to sustain. An Ireland can defy an empire a hundred times its size and population. Only a recognition of the folly of non-co-operating nationalism by the Nationalist himself, whether British, German, American, French, Indian, Canadian or Irish, can save us from chaos.

Ultimately, perhaps, the thing which stands in the way of sustained effort towards the creation of an international society is a failure to recognise its need, especially its need as an instrument of self-preservation, defence. We seem to feel that the balance of advantage in terms of security is on the side of isolated individual action. There seems to be extremely little general comprehension of the process by

which a state of anarchy must necessarily produce general insecurity.¹ We feel, as noted above, that if war results from this condition of anarchy it must be because someone has been wicked, "aggressive," a "mad dog"; has not played the game, has not shown the necessary good will, and that what is needed is not constitutional machinery but good behaviour.

The guilty nation theory of war was, of course, particularly dominant in the last war. No less a man than the late Lord Cromer commenting on a book which attempted objectively to establish the cause of war, wrote in reply: "There is only one cause of war—Germans." This view, momentarily at least, quite obscured the view that an inherent defect in the political mechanism of the world's life had produced the catastrophe, not merely some double dose of the original sin on the part of one particular people. The opening sentence of a five volume history of the Peace Conference (published under the auspices of the Institute of International Affairs) is as follows:

"The war was a conflict between the principles of freedom and autocracy, between the principles of moral influence and material force, of government by consent and government by compulsion."

This was an all but universal view of the time. Mr. H. G. Wells wrote as follows:

"We fight because a whole nation has become obsessed by pride, by the cant of cynicism and the vanity of violence, by the evil suggestion of such third-rate writers as Gobineau and Stewart Chamberlain, that they were a people of peculiar excellence destined to dominate the earth. . . .

¹ As these lines are being written a "two million a day" London daily carries on the front page an appeal, signed by the paper's proprietor, headed "Isolation" and making a plea for complete breaking away from all international co-operation and for withdrawal from the League.

"On the back of it all, spurring it on, are the ideamongers, the base-spirited writing men, pretentious little professors in frock coats, scribbling colonels. They are the idea. They pointed the way, and whispered 'Go!' They ride the world now to catastrophe. It is as if God in a moment of wild humour had lent His whirlwinds for an outing to half a dozen fleas.

"And the real task before mankind is quite beyond the business of the fighting line, the simple, awful business of discrediting and discouraging these stupidities, by battleship, artillery, rifle, and the blood and courage of seven million men. The real task of mankind is to get better sense into the heads of these Germans, and therewith and thereby into the heads of humanity generally, and to end not simply a war, but the idea of war. What printing and writing and talking have done, printing and writing and talking can undo. Let no man be fooled by bulk and matter. Rifles do but kill men, and fresh men are born to follow them. Our business is to kill ideas. The ultimate purpose of this war is propaganda—the destruction of certain beliefs, and the creation of others. It is to this propaganda that reasonable men must address themselves."¹

Substantially the same view is expressed again and again in the leading articles of the Press. Here are typical passages from leaders of *The Times* :

"Peace cannot come till the theories of the Prussian Junkers and of the German military party, the theories of which men like Von Treitschke and Bernhardt are the frank exponents, the theories which are summed up in the principle that 'Might is the highest right,' have been universally renounced."²

"The spokesmen of the nation realise to the full that this, in Mr. Asquith's words, is a 'spiritual conflict.' We

¹ *Nation*, August 29, 1914.

² August 10, 1914.

have not entered on this war for material gain or for military glory. We have gone into it, and we will fight it out, to defeat the monstrous code of international immorality which a certain school of German professors and German soldiers have long been teaching, and which the German Government have adopted to the horror of mankind."¹

"The Allies will go to Berlin to settle accounts, and not to lay waste the Fatherland. They have to say to the German people: 'This worship of war must cease, and the sword you have forged must be broken.' . . . Not until the capital is reached will the sword be struck from Germany's hands, and not until they see the conquerors in their midst will the Germans turn from Treitschke and Nietzsche to Luther and Goethe once more."²

Mr. Thomas Hardy also gives testimony to the immense influence of a little group of professors:

"What a disastrous blight upon the glory and nobility of that great nation has been wrought by the writings of Nietzsche, with his followers! I should think there is no instance since history began of a country being so demoralised by a single writer."

It is useful to recall this if only because, among other things, it enables us to judge to-day how far a war, completely successful in a military sense over Germany, has been successful in destroying ideas which it was its purpose for ever to wipe away; whether the post-war Nazi Germany is better than the pre-war Germany.

As a matter of fact, of course, in every war the enemy is that kind of being, and every nation which goes to war believes that it is fighting that kind of cause. The late Lowes Dickenson put the case more justly, thus: "that struggle for power which Germany practised, all States that had the opportunity have practised." They could not,

¹ September 5, 1914.

² September 15, 1914.

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indeed, practise anything else. For it is as true of an aggregation of States as of an aggregation of individuals that, whatever moral sentiments may prevail, if there is no common law and no common force, the best intentions will be defeated by lack of confidence and security. "Mutual fear and mutual suspicion, aggression masquerading as defence and defence masquerading as aggression, will be the protagonists in the bloody drama ; and there will be, what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence of such a situation, a chronic state of war, open or veiled. For peace itself will be a latent war ; and the more the States arm to prevent a conflict the more certainly will it be provoked, since to one or another it will always seem a better chance to have it now than to have it on worse conditions later. Some one State at any moment may be the immediate offender ; but the main and permanent offence is common to all States. It is the anarchy which they are all responsible for perpetuating."

While this anarchy continues the struggle between States will tend to assume a certain stereotyped form. One will endeavour to acquire supremacy over the others for motives at once of security and of domination, the others will combine to defeat it, and history will turn upon the two poles of empire and the balance of power. "So it has been in Europe, and so it will continue to be until either empire is achieved, as once it was achieved by Rome, or a common law and a common authority is established by agreement."

"In this long and bloody game the partners are always changing and as partners change so do views. One thing only does not change, the fundamental anarchy. International relations, it is agreed, can only turn upon force. It is the disposition and grouping of the forces alone that can or does vary."¹

In any indictment of the international anarchy, and in urging the case for international organisation, it is important

¹*The European Anarchy*, p. 16.

to be clear at the beginning as to whether the parties to the dispute are driving at the same objective.

We may take it that broadly, we are all sincere in our desire for peace. The differences arise when we consider (a) the price we are called upon to pay for it—whether for instance it demands surrender of material or moral values which even for the cause of peace we are not prepared to surrender ; and (b) whether the alternatives to anarchy so far attempted or suggested, like the League of Nations, will in fact end the anarchy and secure peace.

It will clarify the discussion to say at once that the right of defence, national self-preservation, is here accepted ; and that the international anarchy is condemned on the ground that it is fatal to national security ; that only by the organisation of some form of international society can national security be achieved. By "national security" is meant the preservation of nationality, of cultural nationalism ; of the means of economic life, and the particular economic system which a nation may choose for itself. A word may be added to the foregoing.

Despite our preparation for war all the evidence goes to show that the general will to peace is much more conscious and decided than before the war.

The warning of what may happen to our civilisation, to our daily commonplace securities ; to our possessions ; to the means of feeding and clothing ourselves ; to our safety from stark famine and the violence of starving multitudes—all this is too plainly writ in recent experience as the all too probable outcome of war, to say nothing of the annihilation, the artificially created pestilence and hostilities likely to accompany it, to make the desire to avoid war other than a genuine one.

It is very commonly argued, it is true, that though the people do not want war, their "masters," capitalist and other, do. But the present economic system and the present social order have been shaken more profoundly by the war than by any event of modern times. The capitalist system, especially on its financial side, lies nearly in ruins. Vast

fortunes have melted away, historic businesses brought to ruin, the commercial pre-eminence of countries like Britain ended, great governments brought to bankruptcy, and revolutions provoked almost everywhere. And the next war will be worse. If the "masters" are deliberately promoting it, it is because they have deliberately decided upon suicide. It is more reasonable to suppose that they, too, far from being masters of circumstance, have, by failure to understand their situation, by muddle and incompetence, become also the victims of drift, confusion, incomprehension and illusion.

But even if we assumed that the "master class" for some not very explainable reason had decided upon a war which must certainly sweep their order away, the point is that they can only carry the multitudes with them into war, make the people the instrument of the capitalist will, by appealing to certain motives, and aims, fears, pugnacities, desires, ideals.

And the main motive to which appeal is made is that of national safety, fear of subjugation to the foreigner. It is evident that, even yet, the peoples as a whole, or very many of them—the French in their attitude to the Germans, the Germans to the French and the Poles, the Hungarians to the Rumanians, the Bulgarians to the Greeks—are still prepared to see their governments maintain national armaments and take all the risks of future war, rather than surrender in cold blood the right of national defence. The whole story of the Disarmament Conference, as indeed of the other international Conferences, show that we must still assume that nations will use their power as an instrument of what they deem self-defence.

Now that determination, that impulse, would constitute the strongest support for the international as opposed to the national employment of force if the issue were not obscured by quite elementary confusions. When the nations go into a Disarmament Conference each begins to talk of the "sacrifices" which it is prepared to make for the cause of peace, as though the result of the Conference would be to

make each less secure. But surely the real object of such Conferences is greater security, the elaboration of more effective defence ; an effort which we make because the old method of defence has utterly broken down. " That old method fails even when it succeeds." We were successful in the last war, but our success did not defend our lives, our means of livelihood, our prosperity, our trade, our property. We had to burn down our house to prevent it being burgled—and then most of its remaining contents were taken from it.

The failure to see that the purpose of international organisation is more effective defence arises largely from the confusion as to what the international proposals are ; what the " collective " or co-operative system is. It is not a proposal to deprive us of power but to render it more effective for defensive purposes.

We have still no vivid realisation of why the international anarchy should not work. Yet we grasp easily enough that anarchy within the frontiers would instantly break down, however much good will were applied to making it work. Suppose we said : " Our people are good people, for the most part ; their hearts are in the right place. Why all this paraphernalia of law and statutes and judges and regulation ? End Parliament ! Close the law courts ! Dismiss the police ! Let all these matters of debts, financial liability, money, banking, currency, gold standard, property rights, railway franchises, trespass, sewage disposal . . . be settled amicably between the parties directly concerned." Well, we know that it simply would not work. Take the problem of traffic, say, as a tiny part of it ; that of motor traffic. Suppose we applied the principle of " no government " there : no rules, no regulations ; each to drive as he sees fit, or as the mood takes him ; to the Right if he is a Continental, to the Left if a Britisher, just guided by the light of nature and a good heart. We know that, whatever the goodwill, there would be death at every crossing ; not because of immorality, nor because anyone wanted collisions, but because the views of two individuals, based upon

different circumstances and experience as to what is safe and fair driving, would honestly differ.

We recognise, when we are dealing with the traffic of the national highways, that general security thereon can be achieved only if those who use the road, the community, decide what the traffic rules shall be, and then by such suasion as they can devise restrain the road hog and violater of the rules. We realise in that circumstance that if defence of our lives and property is to be effective, it cannot possibly be a purely individual function ; that only by collective effort can each be defended. But when we come to deal with the traffic of the international highways, with those rules of the road upon which so much of the life of the world depends, we seem to believe that the best means of safety is for each to have a bigger car than any he is likely to collide with. Of course, when each follows that method the result is inevitably hopeless confusion and traffic jams—mutually destructive tariff competition, or competitive currency depreciation, or the maldistribution of monetary gold, or some other form of disastrous economic or political nationalism.

We fight ultimately for our "rights." But in our complicated world rights are not self-evident things which each can settle for himself, nor in a rapidly changing world are they unchanging things. And this fact, the fact that "right," the right way as distinct from the wrong way, is not, at least in the type of contact we are here discussing and which is of the type which usually occasions disputes between nations, an absolute thing, easily recognisable by every party concerned, but is a rule of conduct that has to be arrived at by a give and take adjustment, necessitates the recognition of a principle without which no complicated society whose members are in frequent contact can possibly run smoothly. This principle is that the party to a dispute must not be its judge. It is even more obviously necessary in questions of "rights," property, trespass, debts, damage.

But that principle has a corollary. If you are not to be

your own judge of your own rights, and enforce that view, then society must ensure you some necessary minimum of right. Otherwise you will be compelled in sheer self-defence to enforce by your own strength recognition of your rights—your view of your rights ; which, again, may honestly differ from the views of others ; and out of that honest “ conflict of two rights ” comes the chaos we associate with anarchy, comes, in the case of nations, war.

It is this relationship of defence to that perpetuation of international anarchy which lies at the core of the international problem. Upon its understanding more perhaps than upon the understanding of any aspect whatever of international affairs, the future of peace depends.

Each nation declares that its armaments are purely for defence ; that in no circumstances will it use its power aggressively, “ as an instrument of national policy.” But if there is no one to commit aggression, what is the need for defence ? Nevertheless each goes in fear, clinging feverishly to every last ounce of its armament.

Now this does not imply necessarily a cynical disbelief on the part of each in the other's sincerity. It is rooted in the realisation of those in any close contact with international affairs that “ national defence ” must involve a good deal more than the mere defence of the nation's soil.

What is “ national defence ” ?

Rhetorical association of the term with such phrases as “ hearth and home ” seems to suggest that the picture which the word brings normally to the mind, is that of a soldier opposing a foreign invader bent upon violation of the national territory. Listen to the discussion of war and peace in any railway carriage or smoking-room and it is plain that for the immense majority of those who use the word “ defence ” the matter is thus simple. The world over, one may hear men of various nations say : “ Well, of course, if war comes, it won't be our fault anyhow. We are not going to invade anyone's country. And as we are prepared to keep out of theirs, all we ask is that they shall keep out

of ours." Defence usually means, in the minds of those using the word, defence of the national soil. Indeed, Mr. Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, in the discussion of the Kellogg Pact suggested that the criterion of defence should definitely be resistance to invasion. His successor, in another connection, made a similar suggestion.

But that criterion would have condemned as aggressive every foreign war in which America has been engaged, and it is extremely doubtful whether Americans as a whole would agree that all America's wars have been aggressive. Yet although her history as an independent State is so brief a one, and although she prides herself upon isolation from the rest of the world ; and although her foreign policy has been directed consciously at keeping free from the entanglements in the affairs of other nations, the simple historical fact is that not one of the wars which she has fought or been near to fighting arose out of resistance to invasion, or indeed was related to the defence of the national soil. Very shortly after the recognition of American Independence the nascent Union was virtually at war with France mainly over questions of sea rights. The Union had hardly lived a decade before it was sending its embryo navy into the Mediterranean in order to enforce an American right, a claim also related to sea communications—that had nothing whatever to do with the protection of American soil. The war of 1812 began not with resistance to the invasion of American soil but with the invasion by the American army of Canadian soil. That war was also concerned with sea rights. The war with Mexico (which Abraham Lincoln as a young Congressman strenuously opposed) certainly did not arise out of the protection of the soil of the Union ; the final outcome of the dispute with Mexico was the addition of a large part of the Mexican Republic to the territory of the Union. Nor was the Mexican War by any means the last time upon which American troops found themselves upon Mexican soil the issues of the dispute being not at all invasion of the United States. A second war with Mexico was nearly occasioned by

the attempt of Maximilian to establish a Mexican Empire. The war might have taken place if the incident had not arisen at the end of the North and South War, when the American people were deadly weary of all war. (And Abraham Lincoln put it to his Cabinet: "One war at a time, please gentlemen.") If that war had come, it would have been over no question of soil, but of the political principle known as the Monroe Doctrine, which a generation later very nearly brought America to war with Great Britain over the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. The American people, it would be fair to say, at this time were blazing with war fever,¹ a fever which a few months after the close of the dangerous Venezuelan issue actually did involve the country in war with Spain over Cuba. Certainly no American pretended that America was in danger of invasion by Spain. But the country fought Spain and sank the Spanish fleet on the other side of the world at Manilla. And the Spanish War was followed by another American war—that of the United States against the "rebels" of the Philippines who had refused to accept American sovereignty. Again, America could hardly argue that the tattered troops of Aguinaldo threatened the sanctity of American soil, four thousand miles away. The next generation saw the United States once more at war with a foreign power on the other side of the world, and certainly not because the German army was threatening invasion. It was otherwise engaged at the time.

Some historian has calculated that in the relatively short period of America's history as an independent nation her troops have landed in various parts of the world—in Europe, in Africa, in China, in the Philippines, in Cuba, in Mexico, in Nicaragua, in Canada—about one hundred times. And yet, again, America's whole foreign policy has been directed to the avoidance of foreign entanglements and her boast was, and is, that she is able to live unto herself, isolated from the rest of the world.

¹ See Roosevelt's letters to Senator Lodge in the memoirs of the latter.

But, of course, America's record in this matter of exercising her power at the uttermost ends of the earth has been altogether outdone by older countries and Empires like those of Britain, France, Holland and Spain. Someone has calculated that there is only one country in the world that has never seen either the British army or the British navy : Greenland. There is, however, one country where for several hundreds of years the British army has never had to fight a foreign foe. That country is Britain.

Are we to conclude, therefore, that all those American wars, all those British wars, were aggressive in any complete sense? Would Mr. Kellogg accept that verdict because they did not arise out of the actual repelling of invasion?

If we accept the right of defence at all, we must accept the fact that in the case of great nations, with contacts all over the earth, defence cannot merely be the defence of the nation's soil. It will necessarily involve such matters as the security of its citizens and their property at sea (questions which have arisen again and again in international disputes), if not indeed the defence of their persons and property in the territory of states that have undertaken by definite treaty adequate protection. Obviously defence must in the nature of things mean the defence of interests as well as soil. And interests may come into conflict in all the four corners of the world. National defence must mean defence of the nation's rights; ultimately, of course, in a condition of international anarchy, defence of the right of each to be his own judge of what his rights are.

This surely is plain enough. A statesman in effect says to a neighbour :

"I have no means of defending my nation's rights except with my nation's power. There is no international society; no policemen to see that my people's rights are respected. In order to give effective defence, therefore, to national right, I must be in such a position of power that any State with which we may happen to get

into dispute will not have the temerity to challenge these rights. For this purpose it is true that we ask a greater power than yours ; but we give you our most solemn assurance that that power will be used only for defence. That is to say, when we get into a dispute with you as to what your rights are and what our rights are in a given matter, all we ask is that we shall be judge of the dispute and so much stronger than you that you will have to accept our judgment without question."

But what, in that case, becomes of the rights of the other party to the dispute ? He is without defence. Under this system the security of one is the insecurity of the other. "Justice" for one is injustice for the other.

A British Cabinet Minister once summarised the position under anarchy in some such terms as these :

"There is just one way in which you may have peace and make your nation secure, and that is to be so much stronger than your prospective enemy that he won't dare to attack you."

This was before the war and he was asked at the time whether that was the advice he was giving Germany. It comes to this : Here are two nations likely to quarrel. How shall they keep the peace and be secure ? Both will be secure and keep the peace when each is stronger than the other.

As has so often been pointed out, it defies arithmetic. But it also defies morals, in that a nation which defends itself by the method of preponderant power in its own hands claims for itself rights which it refuses to the other party ; if one litigant is to be judge, the other cannot be. There can be no equality of right in such a situation. If both submit to third party judgment the risks or advantages are alike for both ; and power used for the purpose of upholding that principle of third party judgment is power used for the purpose of enforcing equality of right.

It indicates the difference which will be more fully developed in a moment between the function of an army or navy (which, so long as it is a purely national instrument, is an instrument in the hands of the litigant), and that of police-power (which in fact is an instrument in the hands of the judge, the law).

The situation, sketched above, of power used nationally for purposes of defence as involving necessarily a denial to others of the rights we claim for ourselves, is not in the least altered—except for the worse—if instead of two nations there are two alliances. For in that case, to the competition of arms is added the competition of alliances. A nation feeling that a rival, by making an alliance, is becoming preponderant, also seeks alliances. But if we are to have the military support of an ally we must not question too closely his political conduct. The ally in effect says : “ Unless you sanction or wink at my annexation of this province or my rectification of that frontier, I will not fight for you.” And as self-preservation is the first necessity, and necessity knows no law, why, of course, the condition is accepted. If, before the war Great Britain acquiesced in certain acts of French policy in Morocco (say), it was from the two-fold reason that Britain in her resistance to growing German power needed an alliance with France and could not be too critical, and because Britain herself desired to be free from interference in her own policy in Egypt. This manœuvring for preponderance of power sufficient to guarantee “ defence ” means the submergence of moral considerations altogether.

Note this element in the situation : The preponderance of power which each State desires to establish under the old political dispensation is an irresponsible power. That is to say, it accepts no limitation of the purposes for which it can be used. If a rival combination becomes more powerful than we are, just how will it use its power against us ? Will it close territories which it may conquer to our trade ? We do not know. What general rule of international life will it stand for ? We do not know. Nor do foreigners

know how *our* power will be used. The Englishman feels quite sincerely that foreign nations can surely trust to our sense of fairness not to misuse the preponderant power, naval or other, which we may happen to possess. We argue that we want nothing, that we are a "saturated" nation, and that our power need be to no nation in the world any sort of menace. Yet it was our power which made possible the Versailles Treaty, now almost everywhere admitted to be a treaty so unjust that there can be no peace until it is revised. We were the part authors of that treaty. It could never have been enforced upon Germany except for our power. The German takes the view that he suffers to-day the injustices of a treaty, which even we now condemn, because we managed to become more powerful than Germany. By our condemnation of the Versailles Treaty we justify German resistance to the growth of British—or French—power. Of course, if Germany had won there would have been the same—or worse—injustices on the other side of the frontier. For even if Germany were better able to be judge in her own cause than France and Britain are in theirs, she would find herself caught by the same necessity of "standing by allies." If she did not meet the demands of allies, they would drop off; become the allies, it may be, of the hostile group, and Germany once more find herself in a position of inferiority, without defence of her rights at all, without defence against the kind of wrongs which she has been suffering for fifteen years because she committed the mistake of being beaten.

The first duty of a State living in a world of anarchy, if it desires to be protected from victimisation by Treaties of Versailles, is to gain power; to be in a position to defend its own rights, which, of course, is necessarily its own view of its own rights—as the only alternative to being the victim of a decision given by the other party to the dispute.¹

¹ It is hardly necessary to explain, perhaps, that I do not take at all the German view that all the sufferings of Germany are due to the Treaty of Versailles. (See Chapter II, where this question is fully discussed.) Many of the sufferings of Germany—the depression, the unemployment, many aspects of the financial upheaval, the general

This brings us to the confusion which one so commonly meets between power as exercised by one party to a dispute over the other one of the litigants, as it were, and power as exercised by an organised society in the defence of a common law or "rule of the road." This is a vital distinction if we are to understand the mechanism of society at all, and one which is commonly ignored.

Again and again one may hear the argument: "Of course, we must have arms for the same reason that we have police." I have known a cultivated man of rather profound classical attainments remark after a lecture on disarmament: "Well, I suppose I may safely go home and 'disarm' by leaving my doors unbolted and inducing the County Council to discharge the police and save my taxes."

Yet, it is not difficult to show that the purpose of national arms, as we have known them in the past, is the exact contrary to the purpose of the police. The differences are even apparent on the surface. Police forces are not organised for the purpose of arresting each other. Armies are. The purpose of the police is to prevent each individual member of a society from enforcing his own view of his own rights in a dispute. If, following a difference arising out of such

economic chaos—are sufferings which the victors have felt hardly less than the vanquished. Germany is suffering less from defeat than from the fruits of war also gathered by her enemies.

The Treaty of Versailles was an exceedingly bad and foolish treaty. But much of it has been a dead letter. Reparations have been virtually abandoned. The total paid by Germany has not on balance been very great. The victors have managed to get from the defeated enemy in the way of indemnities rather less than what they lent him for the purpose of paying. If we take into account the purchases of German currency, subsequently to prove worthless, made by speculators in the Allied countries, it is fairly certain that, leaving material out of account, Germany has had more of the Allies' money than they have had of hers. Furthermore, the occupation of German territory was terminated sooner than the Treaty required. Germany was not merely admitted to the League but given a permanent place in the Council; the principle of the equality of status, even in arming, was recognised. Mr. Walter Lippmann, the American journalist, writes: "All that remained of the treaty were the new frontiers, and in respect to them there was from all parts of the world increasing moral pressure for revision. The belief that there must be some revision of frontiers before Europe could become

things as disputed rights of way over my neighbour's property, I go to his house, enter it, help myself to his goods as reparation for the damage which I allege he has done, he will say : " The fault may be on my side or on yours. The damage I have done may be as you say ; the goods which you are now seizing may be no more than sufficient to indemnify you ; but you, party to the dispute, are not going to be judge of those things, and if you persist I shall call the police." If he does so, and the police come, they do not settle the matter ; they merely prevent me from settling it. They restrain me from being my own judge of my own rights. But the function of the nation's army and navy, all this competition for preponderance of power, is, as we have seen, to enable one of the parties to the dispute to be its judge ; a purpose which is the exact contrary to that of the police. Force as used by an army in the international anarchy is force used by one litigant as against another. Force as used by the police is used to cancel out the power of a recalcitrant litigant by preventing his coercion of the other ; used to give equal rights to both litigants.

The problem which faces the world at this juncture is to transfer power from the litigants to the law.

This must not be taken as an implied argument in favour

stabilised had been accepted as the premise of the policy of all the principal governments, excepting France and her allies. Thus, the British Government, when at Locarno it guaranteed the Franco-German frontier, refused to guarantee the Polish-German frontier. The Italian Government, for reasons of its own as well as for general reasons, was openly in favour of territorial revision. Neutral opinion in Europe was virtually unanimous in supporting revision. American opinion and American policy moved in the same direction, and at the time of M. Laval's visit to Washington in the autumn of 1931, Senator Borah, then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, gave an interview to the French Press in which he made it plain that the United States could not co-operate in the organisation of peace if peace meant the rigid maintenance of the existing frontiers. This interview was a blazing indiscretion which correctly revealed what the responsible American statesmen were then saying privately to M. Laval."

But the point here, of course, is *not* how far a bad treaty might with patience have been amended, but the fact that from the German point of view its evils and humiliations, such as they are, are due to the superiority in power of her enemies.

of a centrally organised police force for the world, an international army. By "police-power" is here meant power under the control of the community ; used to support the community's law, and restrain the violator thereof. Such power in the case of the community of nations may come into being as the result of agreement between the nations to use existing armies and navies for that purpose ; by, for instance, making Article XVI of the Covenant a diplomatic and political reality. The difference between police force and army is not in the organisation but in the function. The military power of the world may be so pooled by international agreement for supporting a common rule of life for the nations as in fact to make it the police power of civilisation. The important thing for the purpose of establishing that confidence throughout the world which is now so much needed is to be clear as to " what armaments are for."

If, in the competition for power, one group or alliance tells the other : " In forming this group of nations we are asking for it no rights which we are not prepared to grant to any who care to join it. We are not seeking, that is, to place you at a disadvantage, to deprive you of defence of any rights which we ourselves claim ; the purpose of the combined power of this group is to sustain the rule of the road which shall be fair to all, operate equally for the protection and the restraint of all."

If that were the offer implied in alliance arrangements the dilemma sketched above, in which the defence of one party is secured by depriving the other of it, would be avoided. The offer would immediately set up the consideration of what the rules were to be ; power would no longer be " irresponsible," but the implement of a bargain and contract. There would have taken place that transfer of power from the litigant to the law which has been indicated.

In some form or other this principle of defence, by which each upholds a general rule designed for the safety of all, must be introduced into international relations unless

national armaments are inevitably, in the future as in the past, to lead to conflict.

Let us see how these general principles are exemplified by European experience in the generation which preceded the war.

In 1879 Germany and Austria formed an alliance to guarantee the two States against an attack by Russia.¹ Italy acceded to the Alliance in 1882. The engagement is defensive. Each of the three parties is to come to the assistance of the others if attacked by a third party.

The treaty of Germany with Austria was supplemented in 1884 by a treaty with Russia, known as the "Reinsurance Treaty," whereby Germany bound herself not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This treaty lapsed in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is presumed, prepared the way for the *rapprochement* between Russia and France.

The text of the Treaty of 1894 between France and Russia has never been published. It is supposed to be a treaty of mutual defence in case of an aggressive attack. The Power from whom attack is expected is probably named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. It is probably for that reason that the treaty was not published. The accession of Great Britain to what then became known as the "Triple

¹ Its terms were as follow : " 1. If, contrary to what is to be expected and contrary to the sincere desire of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires should be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound reciprocally to assist one another with the whole military force of their Empire, and further not to make peace except conjointly and by common consent.

" 2. If one of the high contracting Parties should be attacked by another Power, the other high contracting party engages itself by the present act, not only not to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the other contracting party. If, however, in the case supposed the attacking Power should be supported by Russia, whether by active co-operation or by military measures which should menace the Power attacked, then the obligation of mutual assistance with all military forces, as stipulated in the preceding article, would immediately come into force, and the military operations of the high contracting parties would be in that case conducted jointly until the conclusion of peace."

Entente" is determined by the Treaty of 1904 with France, whereby France abandoned her opposition to the British occupation of Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco; and by the Treaty of 1907 with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated their relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There is no mention in either case of an attack, or a defence against attack, by any other Power.

Yet inevitably, as Lowes Dickinson explains,¹ the drawing together of the Powers of the Entente did in fact appear to Germany as a menace. She believed that she was being threatened by an aggressive combination, just as, on the other hand, she herself seemed to the Powers of the Entente a danger to be guarded against. The policy of the Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, come into collision with that of Germany. The arming and counter-arming was continuous. "And the very fact that from the side of the Entente it seemed that Germany was always the aggressor, should suggest to us that from the other side the opposite impression would prevail. That, in fact, it did prevail is clear not only from the constant assertions of German statesmen and of the German Press, but from contemporary observations made by the representatives of a State not itself involved in either of the opposing combinations." The dispatches of the Belgian ambassadors at Berlin, Paris and London during the years 1905-1914 show a constant impression that the Entente was a hostile combination directed against Germany.

On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, writes as follows :

"Call it an alliance, entente, or what you will, the grouping of the Powers arranged by the personal intervention of the King of England exists, and if it is not a direct and immediate threat of war against Germany (it would be too much to say that it was that), it constitutes none the less a diminution of her security. The necessary pacifist declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated

¹ *The European Anarchy* (The Macmillan Company), pp. 20-23.

at Reval, signify very little, emanating as they do from three Powers which, like Russia and England, have just carried through successfully, without any motive except the desire for aggrandisement, and without even a plausible pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the Transvaal, or which, like France, is proceeding at this moment to the conquest of Morocco, in contempt of solemn promises, and without any title except the cession of British rights, which never existed."

On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador at London, writes :

"A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow Press, bears to a great extent the responsibility for the hostile feeling between the two nations. . . . It is plain enough that official England is quietly pursuing a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and that King Edward has not hesitated to use his personal influence in the service of this scheme. But it is certainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public opinion in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible journals."

Again, on July 28, 1911, in the midst of the Morocco crisis, Baron Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador at Paris, writes :

"I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of the Emperor William, in spite of the too frequent exaggeration of some of his gestures. He will not allow himself to be drawn on farther than he chooses by the exuberant temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, in general, less faith in the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would not be sorry to see the others eat one another up. . . . As I thought from the beginning, it is in London that the key to the situation lies. It is there only that it can become grave. The French will

yield on all the points for the sake of peace. It is not the same with the English, who will not compromise on certain principles and certain claims."

The war was, as our publicists have frankly enough avowed, a Balance of Power war. By Balance of Power we mean that no one Power shall dominate the Continent. The reasons are instructive. Our interests are not directly on the Continent at all : they are overseas. We can pursue those interests unchallenged as long as the power of any one State on the Continent is counter-balanced by the power of another. But should a continental State—a France under a Napoleon, a Germany under a Kaiser Wilhelm—so rid itself of continental rivalry as to be able to turn its whole power, unimpeded, against us, then our overseas world-wide security would, in terms of the Balance theory, be menaced. It is a perfectly intelligible doctrine : We can only be safe by a virtual predominance of power secured by the cancelling out of the power of rivals, the one by the other.

It would be infinitely better, and there would be some chance of our understanding the nature of the international situation better, if this were frankly avowed. But, whenever war looms on the horizon it never is avowed. We are fighting, not because we must have predominance in order to defend a world-wide empire, but because some wicked foreign State is plotting invasion (our popular Press for some years before the war rung with stories of how Germany was planning to invade Great Britain ; books and plays were written on that theme) ; or because its culture or its ideas "menace the world's freedom" ; or because it has invaded a little State. We have already forgotten the rôle played by "little Belgium" in the war drama. But it is useful to recall it in order to realise how a process of "heroification" hides the real nature of our policy.

"Why are you so whole-souly for this war ?" asked the interviewer of Mr. Lloyd George.

"Belgium," was the reply.

The Prime Minister of the morrow continued :

“The Saturday after war had actually been declared on the Continent (Saturday, 1st August), a poll of the electors of Great Britain would have shown ninety-five per cent against embroiling this country in hostilities. Powerful city financiers whom it was my duty to interview this Saturday on the financial situation, ended the conference with an earnest hope that Britain would keep out of it. A poll on the following Tuesday would have resulted in a vote of ninety-nine per cent in favour of war.

“What had happened in the meantime? The revolution in public sentiment was attributable entirely to an attack made by Germany on a small and unprotected country, which had done her no wrong, and what Britain was not prepared to do for interests political and commercial, she readily risked to help the weak and helpless. Our honour as a nation is involved in this war, because we are bound in an honourable obligation to defend the independence, the liberty, the integrity of a small neighbour that has lived peaceably; but she could not have compelled us, being weak. The man who declined to discharge his debt because his creditor is too poor to enforce it, is a blackguard.”

A little later, in the same interview, Mr. Lloyd George, after allusion to German misrepresentations, said :

“But this I know is true—after the guarantee given that the German fleet would not attack the coast of France or annex any French territory, I would not have been party to a declaration of war, had Belgium not been invaded, and I think I can say the same thing for most, if not all, of my colleagues. If Germany had been wise, she would not have set foot on Belgian soil. The Liberal Government then would not have intervened. Germany made a grave mistake.”¹

¹ Interview published by *Pearson's Magazine*, March 1915.

This interview compels several very important conclusions.

If indeed it would have been entirely safe for Great Britain to have kept out of the war, provided only that the invasion of Belgium could have been prevented, then indeed would be the account against the Cabinet, of which Mr. Lloyd George was then a member, and (after modifications in it) was shortly to become the head, a heavy one. It is unlikely that anyone to-day believes that Belgium was the sole cause of our entrance into the war. But when they entered the war the nation did believe it to be for a cause of which Belgium was the shining example and symbol ; the right of the small nation to the same consideration as the great. That objective may not have been the main inspiration of the Governments : it was the main moral inspiration of the British people, the sentiment which the Government exploited, and to which it mainly appealed.

"The purpose of the Allies in this war," said Mr. Asquith, "is to pave the way for an international system which will secure the principle of equal rights for all civilised States. . . . To render secure the principle that international problems must be handled by free people and that their settlement shall no longer be hampered and swayed by the overmastering dictation of a Government controlled by a military caste." We should not sheathe the sword "until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation." Professor Headlam (an ardent upholder of the Balance of Power, by the way), in a book that is characteristic of the early war literature, says the cardinal principles for which the war was fought were two : first, that Europe is, and should remain, divided between independent national States, and, second, that subject to the condition that it did not threaten or interfere with the security of other States, each country should have full and complete control over its own affairs.

How far has our victory achieved that object ?

It is here suggested, that our commitments under the

Balance of Power policy which we had espoused¹ deprived our national force of any preventive effectiveness whatever in so far as the invasion of Belgium was concerned and that the very nature of the operation of the Balance of Power policy sets up in practice a conflict of obligation : if our power is pledged to the support of one particular group, like the Franco-Russian group of 1914, it cannot also be pledged to the support, honestly and impartially, of a general principle of European law.

We were drawn into the war, Mr. Lloyd George tells us, to vindicate the integrity of Belgium. Very good. We know what happened in the negotiations. Germany wanted very much to know what would induce us to keep out of the war. Would we keep out of the war if Germany refrained from crossing the Belgian frontier? Such as assurance giving Germany the strongest material reasons for not invading Belgium, converting a military reason (the only reason, we are told, that Germany would listen to) for that offence into an immensely powerful military reason against it, could not be given. In order to be able to maintain the Balance of Power against Germany we must "keep our hands free."

It is not a question here of Germany's trustworthiness, but of using her sense of self-interest to secure our object of the protection of Belgium. The party in the German councils opposed to the invasion would say : "If you invade Belgium you will have to meet the hostility of Great Britain.

¹ *The Times*, March 8, 1915. "Our honour and interest must have compelled us to join France and Russia even if Germany had scrupulously respected the rights of her small neighbours and had sought to hack her way through the Eastern fortresses. The German Chancellor has insisted more than once upon this truth. He has fancied apparently that he was making an argumentative point against us by establishing it. That, like so much more, only shows his complete misunderstanding of our attitude and our character. . . . We reverted to our historical policy of the Balance of Power."

The Times maintains the same position five years later (July 31st, 1930) : "It needed more than two years of actual warfare to render the British people wholly conscious that they were fighting not a quixotic fight for Belgium and France, but a desperate battle for their own existence."

If you don't, you will escape that hostility." To which the general staff was able to reply: "Britain's Balance of Power policy means that you will have to meet the enmity of Britain in any case. In terms of expediency, it does not matter whether you go through Belgium or not."

The fact that the principle of the "Balance" compelled us to support France, whether Germany respected the Treaty of 1839 or not, deprived our power of any value as a restraint upon German military designs against Belgium. There was, in fact, a conflict of obligations: the obligation to the Balance of Power rendered that to the support of the Treaty of no avail in terms of protection. If the object of force is to compel observance of law on the part of those who will not observe it otherwise, that object is defeated by the entanglements of the Balance of Power.

Lord Grey's account of that stage of the negotiations at which the question of Belgium was raised, is quite clear and simple. The German Ambassador asked him "whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral." "I replied," writes the Foreign Secretary, "that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

"If language means anything," comments Lord Loreburn,¹ "this means that whereas Mr. Gladstone bound this country to war in order to safeguard Belgian neutrality, Sir Edward would not even bind this country to neutrality to save Belgium. He may have been right, but it was not for the sake of Belgian interests that he refused."

Compare our experience, and the attitude of Sir Edward

¹ *How the War Came*, p. 238.

Grey in 1914, when we were concerned to maintain the Balance of Power, with our experience and Mr. Gladstone's behaviour when precisely the same problem of protecting Belgium was raised in 1870. In these circumstances Mr. Gladstone proposed both to France and to Prussia a treaty by which Great Britain undertook that, if either of the belligerents should in the course of that war violate the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain would co-operate with the other belligerent in defence of the same, "employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to ensure its observance." In this way both France and Germany knew, and the whole world knew, that invasion of Belgium meant war with Great Britain. Whichever belligerent violated the neutrality must reckon with the consequences. Both France and Prussia signed that Treaty. Belgium was saved.

Lord Loreburn (*How the War Came*) says of the incident :

" This policy, which proved a complete success in 1870, indicated the way in which British power could effectively protect Belgium against an unscrupulous neighbour. But then it is a policy which cannot be adopted unless this country is itself prepared to make war against either of the belligerents which shall molest Belgium. For the inducement to each of such belligerents is the knowledge that he will have Great Britain as an enemy if he invades Belgium, and as an Ally if his enemy attacks him through Belgian territory. And that cannot be a security unless Great Britain keeps herself free to give armed assistance to either should the other violate the Treaty. The whole leverage would obviously disappear if we took sides in the war on other grounds."¹

¹ Lord Loreburn adds : " But Sir Edward Grey in 1914 did not and could not offer similar Treaties to France and Germany because our relations with France and the conduct of Germany were such, that for us to join Germany in any event was unthinkable. And he did not proclaim our neutrality because our relations with France, as described in his own speech, were such that he could not in honour refuse to join France in the war. Therefore the example of 1870 could not be followed in 1914, and Belgium was not saved but destroyed."

This, then, is an illustration of the truth above insisted upon : to employ our force for the maintenance of the Balance of Power is to deprive it of the necessary impartiality for the maintenance of Right.

Much more clear even than in the case of Belgium was the conflict in certain other cases between the claims of the Balance of Power and our obligation to place " the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe upon an unassailable foundation," which Mr. Asquith proclaimed as the object of the War.

The archetype of suppressed nationality was Poland ; a nation with an ancient culture, a passionate and romantic attachment to its ancient traditions, which had simply been wiped off the map. If ever there was a case of nation-murder it was this. And one of the culprits—perhaps the chief culprit—was Russia. To-day the Allies, notably France, stand as the champions of Polish nationality. But as late as 1917, as part of that kind of bargain which inevitably marks the old type of diplomatic Alliance, France was agreeing to hand over Poland, helpless, to her old jailer, the Tsarist Government. In March, 1916, the Russian Ambassador in Paris was instructed that, at the then impending diplomatic conference,¹

" It is above all necessary to demand that the Polish question should be excluded from the subjects of international negotiation, and that all attempts to place Poland's future under the guarantee and control of the Powers should be prevented."

On February 12th, 1917, the Russian Foreign Minister informed the Russian Ambassador that M. Doumergue (French Ambassador in Petrograd) had told the Tsar of France's wish to get Alsace-Lorraine at the end of the War, and also " a special position in the Saar Valley, and to bring about the detachment from Germany of the terri-

¹ See the Documents published by the Russian Government in November 1917.

tories west of the Rhine and their reorganisation in such a way that in future the Rhine may form a permanent strategic obstacle to any German advance." The Tsar was pleased to express his approval in principle of this proposal. Accordingly the Russian Foreign Minister expressed his wish that an Agreement by exchange of Notes should take place on this subject, and desired that if Russia agreed to the unrestricted right of France and Britain to fix Germany's western frontiers, so Russia was to have an assurance of freedom of action in fixing Germany's future frontier on the east. (This means the Russian western frontier.)¹

Or take the case of Serbia, the oppressed nationality whose struggle for freedom against Austria was the immediate cause of the War. It was because Russia would not permit Austria to do with reference to Serbia, what Russia claimed the right to do with reference to Poland, that the latter made of the Austrian policy a *casus belli*.

Very well. We stood at least for the vindication of Serbian nationality. But the "Balance" demanded that we should win Italy to our side of the scale. She had to be paid. So on April 20th, 1915, without informing Serbia, Sir Edward Grey signed a treaty (the last article of which stipulated that it should be kept secret) giving to Italy the whole of Dalmatia, in its present extent, together with the islands north and west of the Dalmatian coast, and Istria as far as the Quarnero and the Istrian Islands. That treaty placed under Italian rule whole populations of Southern Slavs, creating inevitably a Southern Slav irredentism, and put the Jugoslavia, that we professed to be creating, under the same kind of economic disability which it had suffered from the Austrian Empire. One is not astonished to find Signor Salandra describing the principles which should guide his policy as "a freedom from all preoccupations and

¹ It is not clear whether the undertaking to Russia was actually given. The spokesman of the Government in the House of Commons on July 24th, 1917, said: "It will be for this country to back up the French in what they desire. I will not go through all the others of our Allies—there are a good many of them—but the principle (to stand by our Allies) will be equally there in the case of all and particularly in the case of Serbia."

prejudices, and from every sentiment except that of Sacred Egoism (*sacro egoismo*) for Italy."

To-day, it need hardly be said, there is bitter hatred between our Serbian Ally and our Italian Ally, and most patriotic Jugoslavs regard war with Italy one day as inevitable. Yet, assuredly, Lord Grey is not to be blamed. If allegiance to the Balance of Power was to come first, allegiance to any principle, of nationality or of anything else, must come second.

The moral implications of this political method received another illustration in the case of the Rumanian Treaty. Its nature is indicated in the Report of General Polivanov, amongst the papers published at Petrograd and dated 7th-20th November, 1915. It explains how Rumania was at first a neutral, but shifting between different inclinations—a wish not to come in too late for the partition of Austria-Hungary, and a wish to earn as much as possible at the expense of the belligerents. At first, according to this Report, she favoured our enemies and had obtained very favourable commercial agreements with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Then in 1916, on the Russian successes under Brusilov, she inclined to the Entente Powers. The Russian Chief of the Staff thought Rumanian neutrality preferable to her intervention, but later on General Alexeiev adopted the view of the Allies, "who looked upon Rumania's entry as a decisive blow for Austria-Hungary and as the nearing of the War's end." So in August, 1916, an agreement was signed with Rumania (by whom it was signed is not stated) assigning to her Bukovina and all Transylvania. "The events which followed," says this Report, "showed how greatly our Allies were mistaken and how they overvalued Rumania's entry." In fact, Rumania was in a brief time utterly overthrown. And then Polivanov points out that the collapse of Rumania's plans as a Great Power "is not particularly opposed to Russia's interests."

One might follow up this record and see how far the method of the Balance has protected the small and weak nation in the case of Albania, whose partition was arranged

for in April, 1915, under the Treaty of London ; in the case of Macedonia and the Bulgarian Macedonians ; in the case of Western Thrace, of the Serbian Banat, of the Bulgar Dobrudja, of the Southern Tyrol, of German Bohemia, of Shantung—of still further cases in which we were compelled to change or modify or betray the cause for which we entered the War in order to maintain the preponderance of power by which we could achieve military success.

The moral paralysis exemplified in this story is already infecting our nascent efforts at creating a society of nations—witness the relation of the League with Poland. No one in 1920 justified the Polish claims made against Russia. Our own communications to Russia described them as "imperialistic." The Prime Minister condemned them in unmeasured terms. Poland was a member of the League. Her supplies of arms and ammunition, military stores, credit, were obtained by the grace of the chief members of the League. The only port by which arms could enter Poland was a city under the special control of the League. An appeal was made to the League to take steps to prevent the Polish adventure. Lord Robert Cecil advocated the course with particular urgency. The Soviet Government itself, while Poland was preparing, appealed to the chief constitutional governments of the League for some preventive action. Why was none taken ? Because the Balance of Power demanded that we should "stand by France," and Polish Imperialism was part of the policy quite overtly and deliberately laid down by M. Clemenceau, who, with a candour entirely admirable, expressed his preference for the old system of alliances as against the newfangled Society of Nations. We could not restrain Poland and at the same time fulfil our Alliance obligations to France, who was supporting the Polish policy.¹

By reason of the grip of this system we supported (while

¹ Lord Curzon (May 17, 1920) wrote that he did not see how we could invoke the League to restrain Poland. The Poles, he added, must choose war or peace on their own responsibility. Mr. Lloyd George (June 19th, 1920) declared that "the League of Nations could not intervene in Poland."

proclaiming the sacredness of the cause of oppressed nationalities) or acquiesced in the policy of Tsarist Russia against Poland, and incidentally Finland ; we supported Poland against republican Russia ; we encouraged the creation of small border States as means of fighting Soviet Russia, while we aided Koltchak and Denikin, who would undoubtedly, if successful, have suppressed the border States. We supported the Southern Slavs against Austria when we desired to destroy the latter ; we supported Italy (in secret treaties) against the Southern Slavs when we desired the help of the former. Violations and repressions of nationality which, when committed by the enemy States, we declared should excite the deathless resistance of all free men and call down the punishment of Heaven, we acquiesce in and are silent about when committed by our Allies.

This was the Fight for Right, the war to vindicate the moral law in the relations of States.

The political necessities of the Balance of Power have prevented the country from pledging its power, untrammelled, to the maintenance of Right. The two objects are in theory and practice incompatible. The Balance of Power is in fact an assertion of the principle of *Macht-Politik*, of the principle that Might makes Right.

Before the war the rebellion of Liberal and peace sentiment against Balance of Power commitments expressed itself in a policy of political isolationism, "non-interference." But it is evident from what precedes that isolation plus national armaments is in practice impossible. The isolation is purely temporary. A few years before the war we were talking of "our splendid isolation." A few months before the war our statesmen were assuring us that our hands were free, and that we were uncommitted by foreign entanglements. And yet in fact we were inextricably involved. Our commitments were not less entangling because they were semi-secret, unavowed and ill-defined. They were more entangling.

It is worth while spending a little time on this aspect of the problem because the issue is so often confused. It is the

issue, moreover, upon which the internationalist movement threatens to shipwreck. Again and again this past few years, as in the Sino-Japanese dispute, one has seen a curious alliance of two extreme positions—the absolute pacifist and the absolute nationalist combining against the internationalist position : the pacifist objecting to pledge power to an agreed law because he objects to force altogether ; the militarist because it limits the nation in employing its own forces. The greater part of those who support “ Isolation ” insists that it must be coupled with a national force “ adequate for defence.” What “ national defence ” may mean we have seen. What is “ adequate ” ? If we have two ships and our potential enemy one, we are strong. But if we have two hundred and he has three hundred, we are weak. Whether we are armed depends upon the force that is likely to be brought against us.

But the force that is likely to be brought against us depends upon whether our enemy is to be one nation or several. And that depends upon the political and diplomatic situation. A degree of armament entirely adequate if we have to meet, say, Germany or Russia alone will be inadequate if we have to meet these two powers in combination. If having based the extent of our defensive force upon the power of, say, Germany, we then learned one morning that Germany has formed a strong alliance with, say, Italy, we must do one of two things : ourselves form an alliance, or pass from a one-power standard in armaments to a two-power standard. In fact, of course, we should come to alliances, for the simple reason that if we adopted a two-power standard other States would begin to fear our power and would in fact insist upon allying themselves either with our rival or with us. Situations similar to this occurred again and again before and during the war. We should if possible make the unattached State an ally in order to prevent our rival doing so. Alliances are an arm like submarines or aeroplanes or poison gas, and if we demand “ adequate national defence ” we cannot leave it to our potential enemy and decline to use it ourselves.

Isolation and "adequate national defence by our own power," is in fact a contradiction in terms, because, again, adequate power depends upon what we have to meet; and we must always be in a position of inferiority if we leave the powerful weapon of an alliance to a prospective enemy and decline to use it ourselves.

So long as nations arm there will be alliances. The real question is whether the alliance shall be for the purpose of creating a preponderance of irresponsible power over a rival group so that when we have beaten him he is at the mercy of *our* group, as was the case with Germany when her representatives entered the barbed wire enclosure at Versailles; or whether our alliance shall be for the pre-defined purpose of supporting a common rule of the road. By using arms for defence in that way, everyone, the weak equally with the strong, is defended. It does not involve a situation in which the defensive strength of one means the weakness of another; nor that one claims what he denies to another; nor that rights are secured to one by depriving another of all means of defending *his* rights.

But this method of defence cannot operate at all except by the co-operation of the members of the community of nations; and unless, and in so far as arms are retained by the nations at all, they are pledged to defend the law in question. For see what happens if all retain their arms, but none is pledged to the law. A nation says: "My neighbour is increasing his arms and making extravagant claims against me. I am disturbed. I fear that the claims are of such a nature that this neighbour has no intention of submitting them to third party judgment; I wish to goodness he would, for I am ready at any moment to have them adjudicated. Suppose he refuses impartial judgment and proceeds to enforce his claims by military action? What is society, the community of nations, going to do?" The community says it will do nothing. "Then," says our threatened State, "I know where I am. In order to defend my most elementary rights, I must look to my own strength alone; it must therefore be great. If I am to be really safe it must be

greater than that of my reckless and unscrupulous neighbour." The neighbour, of course, drilled to think that he must always "stand up for his country," believes, not only that his claims are fair, but the very essence of justice, and says exactly the same thing. There is a collision of two rights. First, because in the international sphere there is no ready test of right, such as willingness to submit to third party judgment ; no rule of law in that sense at all ; and secondly because by the very mechanics of the situation as sketched above the security of the one must invariably involve the insecurity of the other.

If, however, in the above situation, the Community of Nations in reply to the question put above says : "Our power is pledged to the purpose of making violation of the general law as difficult as possible. If you are willing to arbitrate and your neighbour is not and attacks you, we will make his transgression costly. Commitment beforehand to defined military action is a complicated and dangerous thing ; but at least you can be sure that your assailant will never be able to count upon our military alliance ; that if our military power is brought into play at all it will be against him and not against you. Nor will the aggressor be able to count upon our financial aid ; nor upon our supplying him with munitions ; nor war material, if we can possibly help it. If boycott is feasible it shall be applied ; and if he makes frontier changes they will not be recognised."

Now if that sort of pledge by the nations as a whole were clear and unmistakable ; if it were clear, not necessarily that military power would be used instantly in elaborately defined situations, but that the ultimate purpose of it all was to defend the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, then any prospective violator of that principle would certainly think twice—and second thoughts are of themselves often sufficient to stop war. The kind of war which alone could threaten Western civilisation is war like the last—a world war, a war of alliances. And a nation which knew that in a war of such dimensions it would

either be isolated or placed in a position of hopeless political inferiority unless it arbitrated first, would certainly find it more advantageous to accept arbitration. And if it accepts arbitration, war can be ruled out of account. Put it thus : If the nations as a whole had adopted a line of foreign policy which showed that they were converted to the view that force could only be used effectively for defence at all by defending the law, then we should know that we were on the road to the gradual elimination of force. But we know also that so long as nations say (1) We shall use force ; (2) We shall not use it to defend any general rule or law or code of rights, but (3) To defend " our country," that is to say its rights ; that is to say our view of what its rights are, and (4) We insist that it shall be adequate for that purpose—that is to say stronger than any likely to be brought against it—we know that so long as nations say that, force is not on the road towards gradual elimination ; it must increase and the end must be war.

CHAPTER II: REVISION OF THE PEACE TREATIES

By PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY

1. The Treaties and the Fourteen Points
2. The Question of War Guilt
3. War Criminals and Reparations
4. The Territorial Clauses : the Minorities
5. The German Colonies
6. Exclusion and Disarmament
7. Conclusions

§ I. THE TREATIES AND THE FOURTEEN POINTS

THE PROBLEM of the revision of treaties falls into two parts, one of vast permanent importance but not pressing, the other extremely pressing but likely when examined to prove disappointing in its results. There must be in the League of Nations system some practical method for recognising the changes which take place in the world, without recourse to war. Human society moves, and any bonds which attempt to confine it, if kept absolutely rigid, must break. A treaty is the record in unchanging letters of some agreement which suits, or is meant to suit, the circumstances of a particular moment : imperceptibly and continuously the circumstances change and the minds of men change, but the written record remains fixed until it is deliberately revised or violently torn in pieces.

Article XIX of the Covenant consists of two clauses, of

which the second, though less discussed, is really the more important. The article runs :

“The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”

The particular problem of reconsidering “treaties which have become inapplicable” is only a special form of considering “international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”

There has been great reluctance to put into force this power of revising treaties or existing conditions which is contemplated in Article XIX. (See Chapter VI, Section 2.) The reasons for this and the possible methods for dealing with the difficulty are discussed more fully elsewhere in this volume. It is seldom safe to prophecy what exact method may be found most practically convenient when the League has to deal with a new problem, but, roughly speaking, one may expect that when a fair case is made out before the Assembly for some modification of existing arrangements, the Assembly will appoint first a commission of enquiry to report upon the facts on the spot, as the Lytton Commission did in Manchuria, and next an arbitral tribunal to consider their report and to make recommendations. How unanimity is to be attained or how the obstinacy of a recalcitrant minority is to be overcome are questions which will be solved by different practical measures in different cases. The coercive power of a really general and convinced world opinion expressed through the Assembly of the League would be difficult for any nation to resist, and for a European nation practically impossible. Some system for the peaceful alteration of conditions which, if unchanged, would fetter the development of civilised society is, we repeat, an absolute necessity if civilisation is to continue.

What is commonly meant, however, by the demand for

the revision of treaties is a specific revision of the peace treaties of 1919, and particularly of the treaty of Versailles, in the interest of Germany. All Germany is aflame with this demand, and many persons of goodwill in other countries sympathise with the German claim. The Treaty, they argue, was notoriously unjust, and as long as it remains unaltered Germany will be an angry and dangerous nation. Revise the injustice : satisfy Germany's claims ; and there will at last be concord and peace in Europe. In the opinion of the present writer, this line of thought is a delusion. It is quite true that the Treaty of Versailles and, more particularly, the manner of its application, constituted, when taken together, a gross and crying injustice ; but, on the other hand, there is now nothing, or almost nothing, to revise. The treaty itself had many unjust or oppressive clauses. The application of the treaty and the actions by which it was accompanied were still worse, but as a matter of fact nearly all the grave injustices have by now either run their course, or have proved to be impracticable or have been altered by definite international decisions. As far as Germany is concerned, at any rate, the expectations of those who place their hopes of a new and better world in the revision of the Treaty of Versailles are as little likely to be realised as those who place the same hopes in the extirpation of the Jews or the burning of democratic or pacifist books.

I may quote here some words which I wrote in 1919.¹

It was the great hope of English Liberals and those who agreed with them that, contrary to almost all precedent, this war might be ended by a peace so high-minded and statesmanlike and far-seeing, so scrupulously fair to the vanquished and so single-mindedly set upon the healing of national wounds and the reconstruction of a

¹ *The Problem of Foreign Policy*, Allen & Unwin, 1919. By kind permission of the publishers I repeat here large sections of the criticism of the Treaty of Versailles which I made in the first chapter of that book.

shattered society, that the ordinary motives for a war of revenge would not exist, and the nations might really co-operate with one another to save all Europe from a common ruin. In 1914 and 1915, when war still seemed to Englishmen an almost incredible horror, and it was still necessary to appeal to men's consciences if we wished them to fight, volunteers were invited for a "war to end war." The statesmen who, in those days, were still the leaders of the country, were emphatic in stating that we were not engaged in any attempt to destroy or oppress the German people, but only "the military domination of Prussia." Even later, when the Liberal and idealist elements in the country withered in the poisonous air or had been supplanted by more robust forces, it seemed as if President Wilson was upholding, with even greater insistence and emphasis, the banner of ultimate reconciliation as the goal of the war. For the war itself he prescribed "Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint, or limit, righteous and triumphant Force, which shall make Right the Law of the World and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust" (April 6th, 1918); but, as soon as the Hohenzollerns were overthrown, he was for what he called "peace without victory," a peace with no element of revenge, "a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice" (February 11, 1918). Especial emphasis was laid on our good will towards the German people. "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship" (April 2, 1917). "They did not originate or desire this hideous war . . . we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own" (Flag Day, 1917).

It is not clear that this ideal was an impossible one. The war of Prussia against Austria in 1866 was unscrupulous and aggressive in its origin; but Bismarck meant it to end in a reconciliation after victory, and so it did. He secured a

peace which left no sting of injustice behind it. Lincoln did not live to make the settlement with the South after the American Civil War ; but enough is known of his intentions to make us sure that he intended to carry through at all costs a peace of reconciliation, extremely different from that which took place when he was gone. The British war against the Boers in 1899-1902, though open to the severest criticism in its origin, ended in a genuine peace of reconciliation in the settlement of 1906, for which the reward came rapidly and in full measure at the outbreak of the Great War. Had things been a little different in 1918, had President Wilson had the same support from his own people that he had from the best elements in Europe, had a wiser Government been in power to make a settlement of the Great War like the settlement which followed the Boer War, had the popular influences of the time been better guided, Europe might have had a genuinely Liberal peace. Indeed, it seemed at the last moment almost certain that a Liberal peace had been secured. In an address to Congress on January 8th, 1918, President Wilson laid down his memorable Fourteen Points to be observed in any treaty of peace with Germany. The first five may be especially noted :

1. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall always proceed frankly and in the public view.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
3. The removal as far as possible of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
5. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.¹

The Fourteen Points were not only acclaimed by Liberal opinion in England ; they were vigorously circulated by our Government propaganda in Germany and Austria, as were all other statements considered likely to induce the enemy peoples to weaken or surrender. On October 5th, 1918, the German Republican Government proposed peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points. "They requested President Wilson to take into his hands the task of establishing peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points contained in his message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and on the basis of his subsequent proclamations, especially his speech on September 27th, 1918." Later on they asked the President to inquire if the Allied Governments also agreed to them. In response to his inquiries the Allied Governments sent in to him an identical memorandum :

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace

¹ Other points were briefly : evacuation of Russia ; restoration of Belgium ; of France ; transference of Alsace-Lorraine ; territorial settlement of Italy ; autonomy of peoples in Austria-Hungary ; settlement of Balkan States ; of Turkey ; Restoration of Poland with an outlet to the sea ; and lastly a League of Nations — though President Wilson never used that somewhat inaccurate phrase.

with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that what is usually described as the Freedom of the Seas is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference."

One further "qualification" was made by the Allied Powers : by the "restoration" of the invaded territories they understood "that compensation would be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

Thus the Fourteen Points were converted into a solemn international agreement. The Allies agreed that the treaty of peace should consist of the application in detail of that fundamental document. On that understanding the Germans laid down their arms and surrendered their means of defence.

It is always difficult in the affairs of a democratic country to determine the exact point where mere inconsistency and laxity of thought, or even mere lack of co-ordination between the various organs of government, merge into something like deliberate perfidy. It may so easily happen that one set of individuals give the promise and quite another set act in breach of it. But an Englishman who wishes seriously to understand the present international situation must begin by realising clearly that the treaty imposed on the Germans at Versailles, after they had surrendered their arms, appears to them and to a large number of neutral observers as a monstrous breach of faith. It contravened in spirit and in detail much of what they understood by the Fourteen Points. I confess that, after reading carefully the German protest and the Allied Reply, it seems to me that the German reading of President

Wilson's terms was in some points the natural one ; and, apart from the treaty itself, that the action taken against the Germans when they were disarmed was not consistent with the language and the pledges addressed to them while they were still in the field. As a matter of fact, certain of those responsible, or partly responsible, for the negotiations on the Entente side, when they saw the way things were going, recalled bitterly the great historic perfidy by which Rome trapped Carthage to her doom.

Two broad facts stand out clearly to one who studies the documents. First, the Governments which accepted President Wilson's Fourteen Points as the basis of peace with Germany were from the start quite out of sympathy with his spirit. Why, then, did they accept them ? Because they had really no choice. To refuse would have been not only to reject a long delayed and desperately needed peace. It would have been to alienate Mr. Wilson, without whom victory was impossible. They were bound to accept.

But Mr. Wilson's language was often rather lacking in definiteness. Who knows exactly what "justice" is, or what may be regarded as consideration for "the true interests" of the German people ? The statesmen accepted the terms ; but they felt themselves free to use all permissible ingenuity in interpreting a document which they had not drawn up, and which had been forced upon them in a time of need.

Furthermore, one who labours through the four hundred and forty articles of the treaty, with their innumerable subdivisions, will find not merely that the treaty represents broadly the victory of the right side over the wrong, and is a charter of emancipation to large parts of Europe. He will find also that four hundred or more of the detailed articles are reasonable and many of them excellent. The injustice arises in two ways. First, that on every doubtful point, and there are many, the decision—for a reason to be shown below—is apt to be given against the enemy ; and next, that behind the respectable structure of the treaty there existed in fact a flood of white-hot war-passion—

revenge, hate, terror, suspicion, and raging covetousness-- which poisoned the atmosphere and here and there made a breach in the protecting wall.

Behind the statesmen who had pledged their words, however unwillingly, remained masses of ignorant, violent and war-maddened people, many of them with terrible wrongs to avenge and no guide or leader to help them against themselves. We need not recall, though few sensitive people will ever forget, the horrors of the propaganda of hate. It is only worth realising that the mob-inspired journalists and journalist-inspired mobs who clamoured for an utter and all-devouring peace of revenge, including the starvation and enslavement of half Europe for thirty or fifty or a hundred years, had never themselves signed the Fourteen Points and felt no personal inconsistency or turpitude if they compelled the Supreme Council of the Allies to break its faith.

The first step in this policy lay outside the treaty. The third of the Fourteen Points established "equality of trade conditions" and the "removal of economic barriers" between all the nations consenting to the peace. Immediately after the armistice a proposal was made, and met with strong American support, that the Allies should set themselves at once to attempting to cope with the threatened famine and lack of raw materials in Central Europe, and thus get European trade on its legs again as early as possible. This would relieve a vast amount of distress, serve as a stepping stone to reconciliation, save many nations from the danger of irremediable collapse, and also make far more possible the restoration of the invaded areas and the payment of large reparations by Germany. It was proposed to follow the analogy of the peace of 1871 : to draw up a preliminary peace agreement, stating principles and limits but not details. For example, it might be agreed that Germany must surrender some territory in the West and in Poland, but not beyond certain geographical lines ; must pay an indemnity to be fixed on certain principles, but not to exceed a certain sum, and the like. The territorial

agreement, again, might be based on the elaborate statement of war aims issued by the British Government on January 10th, 1917. The Germans could have accepted this, and the work of reconstruction been begun immediately. Incalculable distress and suffering would thus have been saved.

But another view prevailed. With the shortsightedness that so often accompanies brutality, the German High Command had, in the very last months of the war, when their defeat was certain, tried systematically to cripple the industry of Belgium and France by destroying mines, breaking machinery, carrying off movable plant and the like. Their own manufacturing plant was undamaged, and they indulged in the fatuous expectation that they might recapture their lost markets and spring into prosperity, while France and Belgium were still too crippled to commence work. Of course, this could not be allowed. Several remedies were possible ; but the one chosen was the policy of deliberately ruining Germany, after her surrender, by a long blockade in time of what, to the ordinary man, appeared to be peace, and immediately after a promise of " the removal of economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions." This was not a technical breach of faith ; technically we were still at war with Germany, and we had never promised not to starve our enemies after their surrender. The promise of equality of trade conditions only applied to conditions after the peace. Nevertheless, a historian will probably regard the establishment and continuance of this blockade of the enemy lands after their surrender as one of those many acts of almost incredible inhumanity which have made the recent Great War conspicuous in the annals of mankind and have shaken thoughtful men's faith in the reality of modern civilisation.

Thus the Fourteen Points, besides a regrettable indefiniteness of phrasing, had the dangerous fault of being utterly out of touch with the feeling of most of the belligerents. As time wore on this feeling asserted its influence on the terms of the treaty.

The first concession to this public outcry was on a point of form. The language of the Fourteen Points and the accompanying documents implied that the treaty, like most treaties, would be a matter of discussion and negotiation. It was perfectly clear that the German Army had surrendered on explicit conditions, signed and agreed to by every government concerned. Nevertheless, the mob demanded "unconditional surrender" and it was decided at Versailles that the treaty as drawn up should not be discussed with the Germans but "imposed." Terms which had been drawn up with a view to bargaining and leaving possible concessions were suddenly enforced as a whole. Secondly, the profound and furious indignation of simple men at what they felt to be the incredible wickedness of the war produced a demand for punishing the authors of it or, as the common phrase went, "hanging the Kaiser." If indeed those guilty, in their various degrees, of bringing about the war itself and of exacerbating it by those crimes and cruelties which have given it a terrible prominence among wars, could by any means be discovered and brought before some competent tribunal, the conscience of the world might well demand their punishment. But all thoughts of equal justice disappeared in derision when it was found that only those crimes were to be punished which were committed by enemies of the Entente. Crimes committed by British, French, Italian, Serbian or American criminals were privileged acts to which justice had nothing to say! This proposal fortunately in the end came to nothing.

More serious were some of the economic clauses. The German accusation that England entered the war in order to destroy a trade rival, though utterly untrue at the time, seemed to receive some colour by the terms of peace. German industry was wrecked by immense demands upon her coal. She had deliberately destroyed the coal mines of Belgium and France; in return the mines of Lorraine, the Saar Valley, and, subject to plebiscite, of Silesia, were handed over to other States, and out of the remainder

Germany was condemned to pay an amount of coal which proved on investigation to be beyond her powers. She had systematically sunk all enemy and neutral shipping that she found upon the seas lest it should be secretly bringing aid to her enemies ; in return, all her overseas trade was annihilated by the seizure of all the vessels of her mercantile marine exceeding 1600 tons gross and a large proportion of her small vessels and fishing boats, combined with a demand upon such ships as she might build in future. The mendacity of her News Service had been enormous—though perhaps not conspicuously greater than that of some other nations—so all her telegraphic cables were seized. Her colonies had all been taken from her in the course of the war, and none were restored. She was forbidden to set up any tariffs in her own protection. Lastly, though with a strange outburst of hypocrisy, the Allied Governments announced their noble refusal to exact from their conquered enemy any “war indemnity” whatever, they managed to send them a bill for “reparations” which—even when reduced—was thirty times as large as the indemnity which Bismarck had exacted from France in 1871.

The mind of the mob which made these fantastic and terrible demands probably worked on the mythological conception that “Germany” was a person and that individual Germans were part of her. “Germany” had not only caused losses to the Allies which reached, or possibly even exceeded most of these figures ; she had also, in their belief, deliberately caused the war, rejoiced in its extreme cruelty and up to the last moment exercised a malignant ingenuity in ruining both the present and the future prosperity of all the territories from which she was forced to retreat. The mob’s great anxiety was that the criminal should not escape. It did not care so much if the punishment and reparations imposed were here and there somewhat excessive.

Thus, or to this effect, I wrote in 1919.

If these clauses of the treaty were still in operation, the

case for revision would be overwhelming, but as a matter of fact they have either lapsed or been repealed or proved impossible to carry out. The territorial arrangements still stand, and will be considered in detail later. Some of them were seriously wrong, but not on the whole those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. That which rouses the wildest feeling in Germany at present is the establishment of the Polish Corridor, giving Poland access to the sea and thereby cutting off East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Yet this arrangement formed originally one of the Fourteen Points, which stipulated that : " an independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured free and secure access to the sea." The colonial question remains, but it must be treated separately. But in any territorial revision of Europe, Italy, Roumania, Poland, Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, and possibly Great Britain, might lose, but Germany has on the whole very little to lose or gain. In the immensely important matter of Disarmament what is wanted is not a revision of the Treaty but simply its faithful observance.

It must always be remembered in speaking of these excesses against Germany, and, in a lesser degree, against her allies, that the Peace Treaties as a whole do represent an approximation to the Wilsonian ideal and undoubtedly constitute for many nations a charter of emancipation or even of national life. One of the best governed and most successful of European States, Czecho-Slovakia, owes its whole existence to the treaties ; so do the small States about the Baltic and the great Republic of Poland. If Jugo-Slavia and Roumania have on the whole gained too much, still they possess a real national life, and the treaties have brought millions of their citizens from foreign domination into freedom. The condition of Europe, from the point of view of nationality and self-determination was made vastly better by the treaties of peace and is probably now more satisfactory than it has ever been in modern history. True, there are said to be thirty million persons now living under

alien rule, protected by the Minority clauses of the treaties ; before the War there must have been more than fifty million with no treaty to protect them, though it is true that before the exasperation caused by the war, they had much less need of such protection. In their general lines the treaties are good treaties. The territorial arrangement is broadly speaking an improvement on that which existed before. Any general revision of the treaties, which aimed at a restoration of the *status quo ante* would not only be utterly impossible, but, if it were possible, would produce far greater injustices than those which now exist. What makes the evil of the peace conditions is not the provisions of the treaties, but that exasperation of men's minds which is calculated to poison any settlement and which, like the economic distress which accompanies and embitters it, is a result of the war itself. Before the war a man or woman of alien race or religion could live in any country in comparative peace, possibly a little despised or a little disliked, but not hated as an enemy who has done the country infinite wrong and now lies at its mercy. We may well try to revise the psychology of nations, as left by the war ; that is an enterprise requiring much patient labour and unremitting faith : but to hope much from mere revision of the treaties is, I fear, a delusion.

But let us consider the problem more in detail.

§2. THE QUESTION OF WAR GUILT

IT HAS sometimes seemed a little surprising that a nation which a treaty has condemned to the loss of immense territories, to the payment of unlimited reparations and to prolonged military insecurity, should have singled out for the very heart of its main grievance a few paragraphs implying moral condemnation of the past actions of its former political leaders. Yet this is what Germany has chosen to do. She has concentrated her campaign against the Treaty on one particular Article, No. 231, which runs as follows :

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and *Germany accepts*, the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed on them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

The Austrian and Hungarian Treaties contain articles which are identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with the above, while Bulgaria "recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifice of all kinds, for which she ought to make complete reparation."

This is the article which constitutes the famous "*Kriegsschuldfrage*," the "war-guilt-lie," against which such a vehement campaign has been waged ever since, particularly in Germany. Of the other ex-enemy Powers only Hungary has taken very much interest in the question, and has pointed out with insistence that the protocols of the decisive Austro-Hungarian Cabinet meetings in July 1914, show that Count Tisza, the all-powerful Hungarian Minister-President, was opposed to forcing war upon Serbia. But in Germany the agitation has been unceasing since 1919. The violence of it is, indeed, partly due to the fact that it is also a question of internal German politics. The German Government of 1919, which was a Government of the Left, signed the Treaty, including Article 231, although under protest, and in their letter addressed to the Allies on May 30th, 1919, they accepted the guilt of having invaded Belgium in breach of their treaty and with no provocation, and in consequence admitted some guilt in their invasion of France. More than that, the parties of the Left were in fact convinced that the Germany of 1914 had been imperialist and militarist, and had by its policy been largely responsible for the war. They published the German official documents relating to the fateful days expressly in order to prove this point, and thus to help discredit the old ruling classes. The

latter's vehement assertion of their innocence is, conversely, not only a means of repudiating the validity of the Treaty obligations which Germany was forced to undertake, but it is also a means of combating social-democracy within Germany.

It is perfectly clear to-day that many of the charges made against Germany and her allies in 1919 were unfounded—or at least exaggerated. The Note of June 16th, 1919, sent by the Allied and Associated Powers to the German Delegation goes much further in this respect than the Treaty itself. The rulers of Germany, it says, "required that they should be able to dictate and tyrannise to a subservient Europe, as they dictated and tyrannised over a subservient Germany." "They kept Europe in a ferment by threats of violence and when they found that their neighbours were resolved to resist their arrogant will, they determined to assert their predominance in Europe by force." They "plotted for" the world war. "The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human history. The terrible responsibility which lies at her doors can be seen in the fact that not less than 7,000,000 dead lie buried in Europe, while more than 20,000,000 others carry upon them the evidence of wounds and sufferings, because Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to War."

Certainly a spirit of hate shines through these words. I think such terms indefensible ; and I think, too, that the insertion of Article 231 in the Treaty was indefensible. The whole guilt for the war did not lie upon Germany and her allies. That guilt is something utterly beyond computation or conception ; traces of it can be found in every nation. There were cheers and public acquittal in France for the man who murdered the Socialist leader, Jaurès, lest he should succeed in preventing war. There were English newspapers which printed articles with the heading *Delenda est Germania*, and Admirals who spoke publicly of the advantage of attacking Germany without a declaration of war. In Russia there were high officials who simply wanted war for motives of ambition, and intrigued against Sassonov

and the unfortunate Czar ; there were high officials actually in the pay of the enemy, who wanted war and had arranged to confuse the war material so that the shells supplied with the guns should not fit the Russian guns but should fit the German, so as to come in handy when captured. In every large mass of people, such as a modern nation, there are numbers of criminals, numbers of lunatics, numbers of violent and immoral human beings ; and there were doubtless in 1914 nations in which the general level of probity and morality was much lower than in Germany. Beyond this one cannot help feeling that it was a mere piece of insolence for the victors to say that the war was entirely due to the crimes of the vanquished, and a cruel mockery to hold the vanquished down and starve them until they were forced to admit the charge themselves. Protests were made against these clauses at the time in England, France and America, and a few years afterwards a letter of protest was drawn up by a hundred French politicians and publicists and sent to the Press, asking for the withdrawal of Article 231, or at least for some public retraction of it by the principal Governments concerned. I took part in an identical protest in this country, and a number of prominent public men, including Lord Grey of Fallodon, took an opportunity of expressing disapproval of the clause.

For all that, although I think that it ought to be stated clearly, publicly and officially that Germany and her allies are no longer thought guilty of having "plotted to bring about a world war," the common sentiment of Germany to-day, which has now transformed the Fatherland into an innocent victim of aggression, is even more deeply and dangerously at fault.

If one reads and re-reads the negotiations of the fatal fourteen days which preceded the war, it is plain that the British Government worked day and night with intense activity and no lack of diplomatic skill to avert war ; the French Government accepted every proposal for peace that was suggested to them, and looked with terror upon the prospect of a German invasion. Even in Russia, amid

the intrigues of a militarism as vicious, if not as efficient, as that of Germany, Sassonov never refused any concession which Sir Edward Grey asked of him, while the Czar sought desperately to preserve peace. Germany and Austria, on the other hand, though there was one moment of hesitation towards the end, refused every proposal made to them, and met conciliation by threats. The German Emperor's MS. comments on the various state papers leave one marvelling how a man of such colossal vanity and such unstable character can have been left so long in a position of the gravest responsibility. The immense mass of special pleading which has issued from the *Fichtebund* and other patriotic German societies month by month since 1919 does not shake the impression left by the original publications of the various governments. The three great military empires did, by habit and tradition, take quite a different attitude towards war as an instrument of policy from that of the French, British and Belgian democracies. The successor of William I and of Frederick the Great was consciously and proudly a "War-Lord," which certainly Mr. Asquith and M. Briand were not.

The particular quality of militarism may have been latent elsewhere, but it was open and dominant in Germany. No other Government would have so systematically wrecked the Hague Conference and openly referred to the "danger of peace." No other could, I think, have eluded with such consistent ingenuity the repeated efforts of Great Britain to reach a friendly understanding. The head of no other State spoke so continually of "mailed fists" and "shining armour" or told his soldiers to emulate Attila and his Huns. There is a particular style of oratory which commands much domestic admiration and world-wide disgust which we have heard from M. Mussolini in Italy, from General Araki in Japan, and recently from Herren Hitler and Goering in Germany : it is all of the same brew and comes from the stores of the late German Emperor, who, in his turn, had learnt something from Napoleon.

If, instead of considering only the last few months before

the war, one looks back over the previous twenty years, the same impression results. It is absurd to say for a moment that Germany is always to blame and other powers innocent. France was provocative again and again. England got herself justly detested in Europe by her war against the Boer Republics. Russia was constantly held up to the indignation of the world for pogroms, for the unspeakable iniquities of the secret police, for the suppression of all freedom. Austria, though less oppressive than the other empires, had some pretty black pages in her past, such as the seizure of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the forging of state documents.

But militarism is a phenomenon quite different from general public immorality, though it leads to such immorality. It is a thing which other nations have a right to condemn, and against which they have a right to guard themselves, because it is directed against them. It is impossible to forget that when parties were in power in Germany which believed in and supported the cause of international peace, while they repudiated of course the insults poured by the Allies on Germany, they did accept some measure of blame for Imperial Germany's policy and actions; whereas it is a government which has inscribed on the banners of the ceremony installing it the blatant motto "No Honour without Battle"—whose Chancellor has proclaimed that "I am for force, because in force I see strength, and in strength the eternal mother of rights"—which is now crying to heaven about the cruel slander perpetrated by the Treaty of Versailles in saying that the previous German Government acted upon the same principles.

The question of war guilt, and of the general guiltiness and immorality of Germany and her allies does not, of course, stand alone. Very unwisely, the Allies in their reply to the German observations on the draft peace terms, practically admitted that much of the German Treaty was penal in character. "The Allied and Associated Powers," they wrote, "believe that they will be false to those who have given their all to save the freedom of the world if they

consent to treat this war on any other basis than as a crime against humanity and justice." They gave too easy a handle here to the opposition ; for German propaganda has not ceased to proclaim that, by virtue of Germany's innocence, the whole Treaty is founded upon a lie, and every clause of it morally invalid. This is, of course, an equally crass over-statement of the case, since a considerable proportion of the Treaty consists of provisions which even to-day can be considered as just, and as a matter of fact, the Treaty itself—more cautious than the Note—contained very few provisions which were explicitly penal. Even the famous Article 231 itself abstained from accusing Germany in set terms of sole responsibility for the war. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a very large part of the Treaties depend wholly or in part on this central doctrine. There are not only the clauses relating to war criminals and reparations ; there are also those which deal with strategic frontiers, demilitarised zones and disarmament, and with colonies. There is, in fact, little in the Treaties upon which this central problem does not bear directly or indirectly.

Thus there is good reason for the demand that if we are to secure a really stable peace, which must be, in President Wilson's phrase, " a peace founded upon justice," we need to make a fresh start. We need to dismiss from our minds the whole conception of a criminal nation. It does seem to me inadmissible that any moral stigma should be allowed to rest upon a nation, whatever its past, or indeed, its present policy ; the more so in cases such as this when there do, as we know, exist strong elements which are sincerely opposed to any imperialist or aggressive action. Any provision which has for its sole justification the hypothesis that the German, Austrian, Magyar or Bulgar belongs to a lower race of men ought to be cancelled. On the other hand, this is not to say that a nation ought to be allowed to commit acts of aggression with impunity. The world is fully justified in demanding reparation, where such acts have occurred, and safeguards that they will not occur again, where a danger seems to exist.

It might be well to take some opportunity, such, for example, as the Disarmament Convention, for a declaration by the ex-Allied and Associated Powers that they acquit the Central Powers of having deliberately schemed to precipitate a world war in 1914 ; and further, that Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the corresponding Articles in the other Treaties, are not to be taken in that sense. This should not, of course, be so phrased as to suggest that the German Government were innocent when they invaded Belgium, the Austrian when they deliberately drafted an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia, and refused the Serbian reply practically unread ; nor the Bulgarian when they invaded Serbia without any provocation whatever, purely for the sake of conquest. The effect of such a declaration, as I see it, should be to establish a true scale of judgment between the nations, irrespective of whether they were victors or vanquished by force of arms ; equality of rights, and also equality of responsibility.

§ 3. WAR CRIMINALS AND REPARATIONS

IF, NOW, we take the Treaties chapter by chapter, we find that their provisions fall under a few main headings. In this survey these provisions will not be taken in the order in which the respective clauses stand, but in another which seems more fitting for our purpose : those which deal with the past, the present and the future—or more accurately, speaking from the point of view of 1919, with the liquidation of the past war, the immediate rearrangement of the world, and the future organisation of world peace. To each of these we must endeavour to apply the tests of which I have spoken—equality of treatment, based on equal rights and equal responsibilities, so as to secure a stable peace founded on justice. In the measure to which the various clauses meet that test, in that measure are they worthy to stand.

The main clauses which deal with the liquidation of the past are those relating to war criminals, and to reparations.

The "war criminals" clauses, of all the chapters in the Treaties, are those which have already been most completely revised, or have, perhaps, revised themselves. They are generally regarded as a ridiculous and unsavoury business, best forgotten. In my opinion, this is a mistaken view. So long as we have laws of war, the principle of punishment for those offending against them is a sound one. What was absolutely unsound was the application of it. One of these clauses stands alone. It is Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, under which "the Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." Owing to the refusal of the Dutch Government to extradite the protagonist in the proposed drama, the famous pledge to "hang the Kaiser" could never be put into effect; and most fortunately. History, undoubtedly, reveals William Hohenzollern as one of the vainest and most irresponsible creatures who ever, unhappily for the world, was placed in a position to affect its destinies on so gigantic a scale. Judged by enlightened standards, his irresponsibility was indeed criminal, and if guilt is to be measured by the amount of suffering caused, no punishment could be severe enough for him. But it is quite clear to-day that the sole responsibility was not his. Even if all the guilt for the war had lain unmistakably on the side of the Central Powers, the Kaiser was not all-powerful among his own people; and public opinion to-day generally recognises the difference between criminal offences and political follies, however grave.

The other "war guilt" clauses suffered largely from the same error of application. The first lists sent in contained the names of most of the prominent military and naval commanders, whose offence had perhaps been, not so much breaking laws, but conducting war too successfully. The lists were finally reduced to the names of a few persons who do seem genuinely to have offended against morality. Here the criticism remains, that the same rule ought to

have been applied to all countries engaged in the war. It is a queer kind of justice which permits the victors to condemn and punish the vanquished, while they themselves escape unscathed and even uncriticised.

This chapter of the Peace Treaties is, however, long since closed, and there is no need to re-open it. Fortunately, we may hope that the same thing can be said of the far more complex and important question of reparations.

Here again, I see nothing to be condemned in the principle of reparations. If any country attacks another wantonly and without cause, it is only fair that it should be compelled to pay for the damage. In certain circumstances, even penal reparations may be the most satisfactory settlement of a dispute. They have often been exacted on a small scale in the past, for injuries inflicted upon individual nationals of the complaining Government ; they were even applied by the League of Nations on a larger scale as damages for the unprovoked Greek invasion of Bulgaria in 1925. The first essential is, of course, that the justice of the case should be quite unequivocal. A second consideration arises under modern conditions. The damage which can be inflicted by modern weapons of destruction is so enormous that it may well be impossible to repair except at a cost which lowers for whole generations the standard of living in the country making reparation. It seems repugnant to justice and an unnecessary occasion of bitterness when scores of millions of men are penalised for actions in which they could not possibly have had any hand, and which were, perhaps, committed before they were even born. The ill-feeling which must so be generated certainly helps to perpetuate antagonisms and to keep alive old memories which were better dead, and thus for higher political reasons, it may seem both generous and wise not to exact the whole pound of flesh. At the same time, there is the sufferer's point of view to be considered, and it does not seem fair that he should be imperfectly compensated for sufferings of which he was the innocent victim.

It is true that the reparations chapters are about the

most unpopular part of the whole Treaties in England today, but our reasons are not of a sort of which we need to be particularly proud. At the end of the war the cries of making Germany pay to the last penny, "squeezing her till the pips squeak," and so on, were as loudly applauded in England as anywhere. The sobering which has succeeded this mood of intoxication is not perhaps, much more creditable to our hearts than the intoxication itself, although it does rather less injustice to our heads. What has happened is simply that we have come to realise that, given the present economic and social structure of Western Europe, it is not possible to receive large political payments without industrial disorganisation, unemployment and actual impoverishment afflicting not only him that gives, but him that receives also. We, as a matter of fact, are the country of which this is most generally true. Our industrial system was more highly perfected than that of any other country fighting on our side during the war, and we suffered the least material damage. We were therefore obliged to fit what we received into our general economy, which had but little room for it. With our Allies the case was different. France and Belgium, though highly industrialised countries, had obvious need of reconstruction, for which they could welcome raw material and even labour, while to an undeveloped country like Serbia, reparations were a positive blessing and indeed a dire necessity. It is rather ironical to consider now that it was we who are chiefly responsible for having inflated the first reparations bills against Germany to their enormous figures ; for it was we who insisted on including in them the two vast items of pensions to all naval and military victims of the war, and to their dependents, as well as the separation allowances paid to the families of mobilised persons during their period of service with the forces. These two items more than doubled the reparations bill, but the British got them included against the vehement protests of the Germans and strong opposition from Wilson, because if the bill had been made out only in accordance with the Fourteen Points, which called for the

evacuation and "restoration" of the occupied portions of the territories of France, Belgium, Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro, Great Britain would have received no reparation payments at all.

As things were, our title to reparations was very difficult to estimate. Taking the view, which is at least part of the truth, that the war was simply forced upon us by the Central Powers—that without their action there would have been no war, but that with it, we were bound to go to war in pure righteousness—then all our demands fell far behind what we should be entitled to ask. No payment could compensate for a tithe of the physical and moral destruction, the wastage, loss and agony that our nation underwent. And this was roughly the attitude which was taken up in 1919. But if we are going to stand on this ground, we must be very sure of it. A nation like Belgium has a pretty clear case. It was treacherously attacked without provocation. And the position of France was not very different. But most nations had a considerable mixture of self-interest among their motives: even we were a good deal actuated by a fear of the future rather than a compulsion in the present—a half instinctive feeling of the necessity in our own interests of maintaining the balance of power—while other nations, such as Italy, may be said to have entered the war simply from *sacro egoismo*, selling themselves to the higher bidder after weighing what each side had to offer. Almost always one could find some taint of provocation marring the most pacific of defensive attitudes. It seems pretty clear that we should do well for the future to lay down the rule that in this matter as in many others no State should be judge in its own cause. In time the League of Nations will perfect its machinery and establish its authority sufficiently to be able to exact exemplary reparations from an aggressor—and by that time the economists may have devised a method by which the reception of unearned wealth may be as much of a material blessing to a nation as it is to an individual.

On the most modest assumption, reparations would have

been confined to the "restoration" of those portions of the Allied territories which were occupied by the armies of the Central Powers, i.e. to repairing the damage actually done to the civilian populations of those territories and their property. But it is not clear that this criterion would be altogether a fair one, for a country which has been spared actual invasion may conceivably have suffered greater material losses than one which has been invaded.

It was probably some consideration of this sort which caused the Allies to make a reservation when accepting Wilson's original Fourteen Points. (In this matter see above, p. 73.) Few economists have knowledge or daring enough to risk even a guess at the total to which this damage amounted—the more so as the accounts of the amount actually spent on the restoration have never been rendered. The records tell us that the Reparations Commission fixed as the total sum for which the Central Powers were to be held responsible, the figure of 132 billion marks, or about £6,600,000,000. This was, of course, made on the larger basis which included in the calculation the cost of war pensions and allowances. It was an estimate, not of what Germany was thought to be able to pay, but of what the creditor powers considered that they had a title to recover; some of the claims had been admitted by the debtor governments, but many had been very sharply questioned, and a great number of them were, beyond doubt, exaggerated. Of this vast sum, only a small proportion has been paid. Germany, by far the largest of the debtors, has paid a sum estimated by herself at about £2,700,000,000, by neutral powers at nearly £2,000,000,000 and by the Allies at about £1,000,000,000.¹ The formidable discrepancy between these various estimates is due to the very different valuation set by the different parties upon the property seized by the Allies immediately after the armistice, and upon the earlier deliveries in kind. The other debtor countries have paid very much smaller amounts. Bulgaria's payments have, indeed, proved a heavy drain on her small resources, but

¹ All these figures are given in pounds at par of exchange.

Austria's payments in kind amounted to less than £1,000,000 (mainly cattle to Yugoslavia) and her money payments to nothing at all, while Hungary has come off only a little worse. It is worth mentioning that the elaborate apparatus set up by various schemes, such as those of the Dawes and Young Committees extracted only a comparatively small amount of payments. The great bulk of what the Allies received was comprised in the early seizures, liquidations and payments in kind. A great many of these payments resulted in real economic benefit to those who received them. There is no doubt that the railway material handed over was badly needed to replace the losses caused to the Allies' rolling-stock in the war. The cattle and horses given to Belgium, France, and particularly Serbia were equally welcome ; so was the repairing of the lines and bridges in Serbia ; so was the merchant fleet, of which we got so large a share (although one of the results was to accelerate the collapse in the ship-building industry), while a new and prosperous industry has been built up in Great Britain at the expense of the German dye and chemical industries, which had formerly held something like a monopoly. However, the moral justification for many of these "useful" payments is more than questionable, while others were admitted as justified by Germany herself. The item on which most people would look back with perhaps the greatest satisfaction (perhaps I should say, with the least qualms) of all, is that of 13,758,585 marks for the rebuilding of the University of Louvain. There were a certain number of other special items which were exemplary and, on the whole, thoroughly right. Thus although it is not usually a good plan to make permanent cessions of territory in order to compensate for temporary acts of destruction, it is hard to say that the cession of the dominial forests in Moresnelt to Belgium was not just. Belgium urgently needed forests to make up for those of her own which the German authorities had destroyed quite systematically and cold-bloodedly, and with no military object in view, on their retreat. Similarly, though the general arrangements in the Saar basin are open

to much criticism, the cession of the coal-mines to France was only an act of justice to make up for those French mines which were wrecked by the Germans, not through the accidents of war, but as a deliberate means of weakening the French nation and preventing their economic recovery. To go further than this, and assign the whole basin permanently to France would have been indefensible, and even to place it under the League of Nations for fifteen years—good though the League administration there has been—was not satisfactory. Everyone will be glad when the population of the Saar is free to return to its natural fatherland. Still all these acts of compensation for deliberate damage, done without military necessity—and more such acts were committed than most of us remember to-day—were fair and necessary enough. One can hardly be so happy about the cession of the secret formulæ used in the chemical industry, nor about the surrender of the merchant fleet. As soon as the Allies went beyond acts of strict reparation, the door was opened to much that was questionable. It was whispered at the time—as I wrote in 1919—“that trade interests of not quite unimpeachable character had some influence with members of the French, the Italian and even the English Governments; and the old German accusation that England entered the war in order to destroy a trade rival, utterly untrue at the time, seemed to receive some colour by the terms of the peace.” I see little reason to alter what I wrote then—so little that I repeat it here quite unchanged. “Germany,” I said, “depended for her prosperity on her industry and her overseas trade. Her industry was wrecked by an immense demand upon her coal. The mines of Lorraine, the Saar Valley and, subject to plebiscite, of Silesia, were handed over to other States; and out of the remainder Germany was condemned to pay an amount of coal which proved on investigation at Spa, two years later, to be beyond her powers. Her overseas trade was annihilated at a blow by the seizure of all the vessels of her mercantile marine exceeding 1,600 tons gross and a large proportion of her small vessels and fishing-boats, combined

with a demand upon such ships as she might build in future. Her voice was stifled by the seizure of all her telegraphic cables : news henceforth was to be a monopoly of the conquerors. At the same time all her colonies were taken from her. She was forbidden to set up any tariffs for her own protection. Her navigable rivers were put under the control of international commissions on which the Germans or Austrians were a small minority. And while it was somewhat unctuously explained to Germany that in a virtuous world trade would be free and untrammelled, and that the commissions only intended to see that she did not erect barriers against her innocent neighbours, there was no provision whatever made to debar the Allies from erecting what barriers they pleased against Germany. 'It would appear to be a fundamental fallacy,' declared the Allied Reply, 'that the political control of a country is essential in order to procure a reasonable share of its products. Such a proposal finds no foundation in economic law or history.' It has found plenty of foundation in history since.

"The triumph of penal ingenuity, however, was the indefinite indemnity. It was agreed on both sides that Germany was to pay an indemnity. She did not demur. Indeed, her mouth was closed by the monstrously oppressive and inhuman proposals various Germans had themselves put forward when they expected to win the war. She had openly intended to 'bleed France and England white.' Now that she was beaten she was prepared to pay. She accepted the duty of 'restoring' the invaded territories. This was defined as 'reparation for all damage done to the civil population of the Allies by German aggression.' The Germans probably understood this to mean the damage done to civilian life and property by invasions or raids ; but they were told that this view was too narrow. Every soldier killed or wounded had civilians dependent on him ; nay, he himself was really a civilian forced by German aggression to desert his business. All his business losses, the separation allowances to his wife, the pensions to ex-soldiers or to their dependents, all damage to anyone's 'health or honour,' were ultimately

'due to German aggression' and should be paid by Germany. No such terms had ever been heard of before, true ; but the British electors had been promised that 'Germany should pay the whole cost of the war' ; and the sense of the solemn contract was distorted to suit the election cry. After 1871 the Germans had imposed on France what was then considered the extremely severe indemnity of two hundred million pounds sterling. Some experts now proposed two thousand million sterling as an adequate indemnity to be paid by Germany, others three thousand million. That was emended by popular orators to ten thousand million ; thirty thousand million ; fifty thousand million. Absurd to say that Germany could not pay ! If all German property were confiscated and all Germans for seventy-five years were made to work for the Allies at a bare subsistence wage, a well-known English public man was prepared to get more than fifty thousand million out of them.

"The Americans bluntly refused to endorse demands which they considered extortionate. The indemnity was left unspecified. It should depend on Germany's capacity to pay. Let the Germans get to work at once and do their best. The more they produced, the more the Allies would take ; and if, after two years or so, it became necessary to fix the sum, the less the Germans had produced in those two years the less they would eventually have to pay. It is said that some of the British Ministers, secretly anxious to be more reasonable than was consistent with popularity at the moment, wished to postpone the fixing of the indemnity until the rage of their own Khaki Election should have cooled down. But their calculation was a bad one. As the German Delegation observed : 'The German people would feel themselves condemned to slavery, because everything they accomplished would benefit neither themselves nor even their children, but merely strangers. But the system of slave labour has never been successful.'

"For the purpose of raising money the proposal was merely fatuous. It took away from the Germans every possible motive for producing wealth. But its object in some

minds was not money ; its object was the permanent ruin of Germany. It was feared in France that, though the Germans were now exhausted and beggared, their notorious industry and ingenuity might in time enable them to pay off their indemnity and rise again to affluence and strength. So it was arranged that, for some years at least, they should be deprived of every motive for industry.

“ Lastly, a new provision was made about private property. The rule hitherto observed in the land wars of civilised States was that enemy private property was respected, and if seized during the war was restored at the conclusion of peace. This rule was of course enforced in favour of any property belonging to nationals of the Entente countries situated in enemy lands ; but reciprocity was not admitted. The private property of any German situate in any part of the world which was under the control of the Entente was *ipso facto* confiscated. ‘ The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all ’ such property. Every German, however innocent, who had settled in our territory before the war was thus exposed to be robbed of everything he possessed. Nay, it seems almost incredible, but in the original form of the treaty which was put before the enemy for signature the stipulation seems actually to have been laid down that any property which a German might hereafter make or acquire in Entente territory should be liable to confiscation at the will of the Entente Governments ! This clause was too much even for the atmosphere of Versailles, and in response to the German Protest the stipulation about the future was dropped.¹ For the rest of the confiscation, the Entente Reply brazens it out with the remark that the property is not really taken from the individual, as his own Government can always pay him back ! And in case the private property of Germans in neutral countries should have an

¹ See Keynes, pp. 60-102. A provision was kept enabling all such private property to be confiscated in case the German Government should “voluntarily fail” to fulfil its engagements. But this was also dropped by the British Government in October 1920.

unfair advantage, the Reparations Commission obtained special powers for confiscating that too, up to the limit of £100,000,000."

Fortunately, however, it is not necessary to go at very great length into this subject of reparations because, like the War Criminals clauses, it has largely revised itself. For several years after I wrote, it seemed as if the policy of deliberately holding Germany down and keeping her economically impotent was still popular among some of her enemies, particularly France. I am afraid that this was the chief motive at the back of the disastrous Ruhr adventure. But even by 1923 Great Britain was beginning to see what nearly all the world sees to-day, that the existence of obligations to make large political payments is at least as detrimental, under existing conditions, to the country which has to receive these payments as to the country which has to make them. We see this so clearly to-day that the very newspapers which a dozen years ago were loudest in their cries for "squeezing" Germany for fantastic sums, are now most vociferous in their despair because the stupid United States somehow cannot perceive this elementary fact of economics.

Year after year Germany's creditors reduced their demands, not, perhaps, because they had become very much more generous at heart, but because they were coming gradually to a realisation of the disastrous effects which the burden of reparations was exercising on their own economy. When in June 1932 the Lausanne settlement practically wiped German reparations out for ever, a sigh of relief arose from all Europe, and any proposal to revive them would, I am sure, be resisted as vigorously from England as it certainly would be from Germany. With Lausanne, a bad chapter in the Peace Treaties was closed. I repeat that I consider the principle of reparation to be absolutely sound, so long as it is genuinely the restoration of damage done, and not an act of chicanery and vengeance. For all that, it seems to me that the modern age has not yet learnt the technique of exacting reparations, and

one cannot but be glad that the whole question, which was sordid from the first, is now closed.

§4. THE TERRITORIAL CLAUSES: THE MINORITIES

BY FAR the most important of those parts of the Peace Treaties which dealt neither with reparation—in its broadest sense—for the past, nor with the future organisation of the world, but with the adjustment of its conditions in 1919 and 1920, were the territorial clauses under which the map of Europe was redrawn. To nearly all the smaller nations of Europe, indeed, the Treaties mean this and little else; they are the instruments by which the independence of one nation was recognised, or the territorial integrity of another was curtailed. And to a great many people, not only in the States directly affected by the new frontier lines, treaty revision means, almost exclusively, the redrafting of those frontiers. It is a matter of extreme importance, and although it is obviously not possible here to go into the merits of each particular case, I must devote most of my space to considering this question in its general outlines.

Here, again, I think that the principle holds good that if we are to hope for a stable peace, we must seek for a peace founded upon justice. Unfortunately, exact justice is no easier to find in this question than it is in others. The ideas of our forefathers regarding the justice of territorial claims were very different from those held by most people to-day. Not long ago the only relevant point to be considered regarding the attribution of a given piece of territory was the legitimacy of the ruler's claim to it; and this legitimacy depended almost exclusively on his or her family relationships, involving minute researches into such questions as whether the claim of the daughter of a sister's son was better founded than that of the son of a wife's brother's daughter. The wishes of the inhabitants of the territory in question were entirely irrelevant to the point at issue.

Even to-day, as we shall do well to remind ourselves, no State—or none in practice, and only one in theory—has recognised the absolute and theoretical right of any “nation,” or any other body of individuals, to self-determination. Probably the nearest approach to such a doctrine has been made, almost certainly unconsciously, by the authors of the Commission of Enquiry into the present Far Eastern dispute, and following them, by the League Assembly, who have adduced, as one of their reasons for rejecting the validity of Japan’s action in Manchuria, their conviction that the “autonomy movement” in the State of Manchu-kuo was not the spontaneous outcome of the people’s own feeling. This suggests, though it does not actually imply, that if it had been spontaneous the States Members of the League would have been ready to recognise the Manchu-kuo State. I doubt whether so unanimous a recognition of the right of national self-determination has ever before been given in history, even by implication.

Nevertheless, there did grow up in the nineteenth century a doctrine, which was very widely held both by the peoples themselves concerned and by much Liberal thought, that a people ought to be allowed to determine its own sovereignty. It was a natural product of the general spread of democratic ideas ; for if a nation is to control its own internal affairs, as democracy admits, there is no reason why it should be denied a voice in the choice of its rulers, perhaps the most important of all issues concerning it. This doctrine of the “right of national self-determination” was, and is, very widely held to-day, and most people will admit that it is the doctrine most in accordance with liberty, justice and true democracy. We cannot, however, shut our eyes to the fact that it is often very difficult to apply, and that the application of it cannot, in any case, be unlimited, if reasonable life is to go on. A given group of people cannot at any moment demand, as an absolute right, to constitute themselves as an independent sovereign state, nor, whatever the circumstances, can that right be granted to every unit which makes such a demand ; for this would lead to pure anarchy.

During the nineteenth century, however, the world seemed to have reached agreement on the nature of the unit which had a certain right to demand at least a degree of self-government; it was generally agreed that such a right resided in the "nation"—a conception notoriously not susceptible to definition, but fairly easy of recognition. On each side in the War there were whole "nations" which were discontented with the status which they then possessed, and demanded freedom, and there were in addition a great many fragments of "nations"—national minorities—living outside the States in which the majority of their co-nationals were united. The aspirations of these peoples towards freedom were a great and permanent source of weakness for the governments ruling over them, even in peace-time. All of the countries chiefly affected before the War, which were Russia, Austria, Hungary, Germany and Turkey, were kept in a more or less constant state of turmoil by the struggles of these subject nationalities, and most of them used methods to hold them in check which revolted the feelings of all liberally-minded men. When the war broke out, both sides took advantage of these weak spots in their enemies' armour and bade for the support of the subject nationalities by promising them liberty. A certain number of definite promises were made by our own side and by the Central Powers, to certain specific nationalities, and certain treaties were made in which the territory of the enemy was disposed of in advance, not always in accordance with nationality. The offers made by the Central Powers lost their importance, as they could not be fulfilled. We on our side made promises to Russia (at the expense of Turkey), Roumania (at the expense of Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary) and Italy, to whom we promised territory which was inhabited by Germans, Yugoslavs and Albanians. Luckily for ourselves, the Russian revolutionary government washed its hands of the first of these treaties, Roumania invalidated hers by concluding a separate peace, and France and ourselves were left only with our promises to Italy. These had nothing to do with

justice ; they were unwilling surrenders forced upon us, by our desperate need, lest Italy should accept the offers of Germany, instead of ours. Wilson, on the other hand, was not bound by any of these treaties, of which, indeed, he afterwards professed ignorance, and in his series of speeches in 1918 he set out a perfectly general doctrine of national self-determination. This was repeated in slightly different forms in several of his pronouncements, but most clearly in his speech before Congress of February 11th, 1918, when he said that :

“ Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected ; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘ Self-determination ’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. . . . What we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right or fair, an act of justice rather than a bargain between sovereigns. . . .

“ The principles to be applied are these :

“ *First*, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

“ *Second*, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in the game, now for ever discredited, of the Balance of Power ; but that,

“ *Third*, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States ; and

“ *Fourth*, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded

them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world."

There were in addition a few special instances cited by Wilson. These were rather examples of the way in which the above principles should be applied, than an exhaustive statement of his programme, and in some cases did not go so far as the general principles. They included the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, territorial readjustment for Italy "along clearly recognisable lines of nationality"; a free access to the sea for Serbia; and an independent Polish State "which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea." In his Fourteen Points Wilson offered no more than "the freest opportunity of autonomous development to the peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured"; and similarly, "an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development" to the non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, in his Note of October 18th, 1918, in reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note of October 7th, Wilson said that since the "Fourteen Points" speech, the United States had recognised the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a *de facto* belligerent Government, and had also "recognised in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Yugo-Slavs for freedom." The President was therefore "no longer at liberty to accept a mere 'autonomy' of these peoples as a basis of peace," but that they must themselves be judges of what would satisfy their demands.

So far as the territorial readjustment of Europe was concerned, these were the principles which were explicitly accepted by Germany, and by which, one cannot well doubt, the Allies were morally bound also in their dealings with the other enemy powers. As Italy also accepted them, it is perfectly possible to argue that she thereby renounced

her claims to any territorial readjustment which went beyond "clearly recognisable lines of nationality," and thus conflicted with the above general principles. This was, indeed, the point of view taken up by Wilson, and although it was difficult for our own Government and the French to support it in view of the promises which they had given Italy in the secret Treaty of London, yet a disinterested critic must feel that Wilson's pronouncements had the higher claim. Not only were they an obligation undertaken towards the enemy, who laid down his arms on the faith thereof, but they also set out the broad principles of what most people to-day would be inclined to describe as justice, and therefore provided the only secure foundation for a permanent peace.

When the Peace Conference opened, it was inundated by scores of deputations and hundreds of petitions from national and other groups the very names of which were often unknown to the statesmen who had to be responsible for the final settlement, if not to their experts. I think that even those who believed themselves to have some idea of the complexity of conditions in Central and Eastern Europe were astonished and appalled to find how far the real facts transcended their most pessimistic beliefs. Exotic gentlemen appeared claiming to be representatives of nations whose names had been forgotten for centuries, and there were a few cases in which the names had in fact never been heard before, but had been invented *ad hoc* either by the persons concerned, or by some neighbouring State which had an interest in confusing affairs across its borders. If the Conference had had to deal with Russia, it would probably still have been at its task to-day. Fortunately for its patience and perhaps its sanity, it was only engaged in concluding treaties of peace with the four, or rather five (since Hungary had now separated herself completely from Austria) defeated ex-enemy Powers. That task was bad enough, but within its limits, the broad outlines of the coming map of Europe had already been drawn by the peoples themselves. In two of the most doubtful cases, the Czechs and Slovaks

had decided to form a single State, and so had the various branches of the Yugoslav people—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins. There was undoubtedly in many of these territories a strong opposition, not only among the minority peoples, to the decisions which had been reached, but in the light of such information as was available to the Peace Conference, it is hard to see how they could have taken any other decision than they did on the general issue of what peoples, in principle, were to be included in these two States.

There were only two genuine cases in which the Conference really had to take a decision whether an independent State should be formed or no. These were the cases, respectively, of the Ukrainians and of the Germans of German Austria and of Northern Bohemia ; and neither of them was easy. The Ukrainians with whom the Conference had to deal were those inhabiting Eastern Galicia and the Bukovina, both formerly Austrian provinces, and the district now known as Carpatho-Ruthenia, or Sub-Carpathian Russia, comprising several counties in the extreme north-west of the old Hungary. They were only an outlying part of the Ukrainian nation, the bulk of which had formed part of the old Russian Empire, and was at that very time engaged in a desperate struggle for its independence against Bolshevik Russia. On the other hand, the Ruthenes, as the ex-Austrian Ukrainians are called, are separated from the Ukrainians of Russia by historical, religious and social differences, and had not shown any clear determination to work with them, although at one time they concluded a short-lived arrangement for some sort of a federation. Besides this, the majority of the Diet of the Bukovina had already voted for union with Roumania ; the leaders of the Ruthenes of Hungary had shown the utmost fluidity of ambition respecting their own political fortune, voting for complete independence if possible, or failing that, incorporation in a larger Ruthene State, or failing that again, autonomy within Czecho-Slovakia. Thus the main problem was narrowed down to that of Eastern Galicia, and it is genuinely doubtful whether Eastern Galicia could

have stood as a stable sovereign State. It is true that the Allies made the Galician Ruthenes many promises which were afterwards broken. In particular, when, on June 25th, 1919, they authorised Polish troops to occupy East Galicia, they stipulated that the civil Government which Poland was to establish at the same time should "guarantee, as far as possible, the autonomy of this territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of its inhabitants. This agreement shall be based on the right of free disposition, which, in the last resort, the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia are to exercise regarding their political allegiance." Later on the Conference gradually whittled down its proposals, until on March 15th, 1923, the Powers recognised Poland's sovereignty over East Galicia, on condition, it was stated, that "Poland recognised that the ethnographical conditions make autonomy necessary in that region." They omitted, however, to stipulate that a detailed statute of autonomy should be put into force immediately.

The results of this negligence have been deplorable. The statesmen who took the fateful decision may have forgotten that the Poles and Ruthenes are hereditary enemies, and that no peace could ever be attained by handing the one over, without reasonable protection, to the mercies of the other. Neither the Ruthenes nor the Polish State have benefited by what was at best an act of extreme weakness, dictated largely by panic fear that the Ruthenes might join their kinsmen in Russia and thus bring the frontier of Bolshevism up to the Carpathians.

With regard to the Germans of Austria, two decisions had to be taken. In the first place, the German portions of Bohemia had declared themselves to be part of the Austrian Republic. The Conference decided against them, on the ground that the State thus formed would be of an impossible shape—an important part of German Bohemia lies in the extreme north-east of the province, without any territorial connection with the old "inner Austria"—and secondly, that Bohemia and Moravia were old-established historic units, which could not be broken up politically

without irreparable loss to all parties. One is inclined to feel that this argument was sound, the more so since the German minority thus allotted to the new State of Czecho-Slovakia was so large and powerful that it did not seem possible that it could ever suffer serious oppression. Much more questionable was the decision regarding the inner Austrian provinces which had constituted themselves into a "German-Austrian Republic," and had proclaimed that Republic to be a part of the new German Republic. In their fear lest Germany should receive so substantial an access of strength, the Allies vetoed this arrangement by forcing both Germany and Austria to sign clauses (Art. 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, Art. 88 of that of St. Germain) declaring the independence of Austria to be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League. This was, of course, tantamount to a permanent prohibition, since a single adverse vote on the Council would suffice to prevent its permission being given, and France was a permanent member of that body. It would have been more honest, I think, not to bring the League into this sorry business at all, for whatever may be said, from various points of view, for or against the *Anschluss*, there is no doubt that the prohibition of it was in flagrant contradiction to Wilson's principles.

The other cases in which the Treaties departed from the rule of self-determination were all much smaller, if some of them were very grievous both for the populations transferred and for the States at whose expense the mutilations were made. The worst of them, in my opinion, were those made on strategic grounds. These included some minor cessions to Belgium (glossed over by a show of a plebiscite), the attribution of the Alto Adige, or South Tyrol, the Slovene hinterland, the Dodecanese, and some Adriatic islands to Italy, some districts on the western frontier of Bulgaria to Yugoslavia, and several areas, notably in Southern Slovakia, taken from Hungary. The Allies managed to find a justification for these settlements by quoting another of Wilson's principles—stated in his Mount Vernon address of July 4th,

1918—"the destruction of every arbitrary power everywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence"; but the excuse was, at best, a lame one.

It is, of course, natural for every country to wish to possess an easily defensible frontier, and it is perhaps of advantage for the peace of the world if no country need fear that its position is naturally so weak as to expose it to a possible sudden attack from a neighbour whom it has cause to distrust. A small rectification which would make a political frontier coincide with some formidable natural barrier, such as a mountain crest, equally difficult of passage from either side, might be desirable in the interests of all parties. But when this is done at the expense of ethnographical considerations, one must be clear that one is sacrificing the few to the interests of the greater number, and that the sacrifice demanded of the population of the territory transferred is not likely to be a very heavy one; for it is precisely in frontier districts that the hand of the State is liable to weigh most heavily, and that suspicion of all elements not heart and soul in sympathy with the ideals of the State is most anxious. In such cases it is especially necessary to be scrupulously fair; not to allow annexations for which the cry for strategic security is merely an unreal plea, and not to allow any State to find its own defensive security in a position whence it can easily attack its neighbour. Nor, when one of the two States concerned is by far the larger, is it necessary or just to arm the lion, beyond what nature has given him, against the mouse. In the particular case of the Peace Treaties of 1919 there was no single instance in which one of the defeated powers was given an addition of territory to increase his strategic security against the victors, although there was one instance in which this principle might very well have been applied, since it would have answered the demands of racial justice as well. This is the case of the Southern Dobruja, with Silistria, a country inhabited purely by Bulgarians or Turks

and Tatars who were friendly to Bulgaria, which was seized by Roumania in 1913, re-occupied by Bulgaria in the war, and re-ceded to her under the Treaty of Bucarest between Roumania and the Central Powers. While the Allies were not imposing peace terms on Roumania, yet they were granting her such a vast increase of territory to the west that they might well have insisted on the recession of this strip, the cession of which was one of the most unjust that have been made in Europe in modern days.

There is also another consideration to bear in mind. President Wilson's "Four principles," which were accepted by both sides at the Armistice as regulating the territorial settlement, contained no suggestion that the principle of self-determination was to be qualified by strategic needs. Strategic needs are generally double-faced. The strategic security demanded by one State nearly always involves the strategic insecurity of its neighbour. The ex-enemies had reason to complain that the peace settlement systematically took account of the security of the victors and their allies while disregarding that of the other side—as if the world could be permanently divided into "aggressive" and "peaceful" nations. Of course on principle this is absurd. Yet in the circumstances of the moment it was justified. The victorious nations had on the whole got what they wanted and only wished to be left at peace. The defeated nations were burning with a sense of grievance and a desire for revenge. A settlement, for example, which had left Hungary superior in military power to Roumania or Germany capable of delivering a crushing attack upon France, would not have lasted many months.

There are also strong objections against giving a country territory on the score of economic necessity which it would be unable to claim on any other grounds. There is a distinction to be drawn here. There may be some area—the valley of a tributary river, or a mountain slope—which quite clearly forms part of the economic system of a certain country, even if its inhabitants may belong to a race other than that of the majority in that country. In such cases it is

probably to everybody's interests to allow ethnographical considerations to be over-ridden. Indeed, when a plebiscite has been allowed in a situation of this kind, as it was, for example, in Carinthia, the local inhabitants themselves will probably vote for union with the State to which their economic interests link them. It is a different question when a wealth-producing area is allotted to a State solely with a view to making it economically independent and powerful. There can be no justification for simply strengthening one State at the expense of another. To do so is to violate the principle of equality, and it may well be, to little advantage, for the ill-feeling which must result may easily nullify the advantage which it was hoped to gain. Incidentally, in a world suffering from an excess of economic nationalism, the benefit to the world of making every State economically self-sufficing would be very doubtful.

The other territorial arrangements made by the Conference in Europe, with one or two exceptions, hardly deserve the disrepute into which they have now fallen. Doubtful as was the attribution of Macedonia to Yugoslavia, it was not the work of the Peace Conference. The Conference was not engaged in concluding a peace treaty with Serbia, which had already acquired the disputed area in 1913. On almost all the other points the Conference undoubtedly attempted to apply Wilson's principles. Their reply to the German observations on the draft terms of the peace contains the following striking passage :

"The Allied and Associated Powers emphatically reject the suggestion that there has been any 'bartering about' of peoples and provinces. Every territorial settlement of the Treaty of Peace has been determined upon after most careful and laboured consideration of all the religious, racial and linguistic factors in each particular country. The legitimate hopes of peoples long under alien rule have been heard ; and the decisions in each instance have been founded upon the principle explicitly enunciated in the same address ; that

“ ‘ All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.’ ”

It would probably be unfair to question the general sincerity of that statement. There were no doubt on many of the territorial commissions men who secretly were endeavouring to secure the last inch of territory for a certain country on which their government looked with favour, or to cripple another, which their government feared, but in the main the work was done with an almost painful conscientiousness.

The difficulty was that the situation did in fact allow of a very great number of different solutions, each of which could be interpreted as according with Wilson's principles. There were literally dozens of races and racial fragments inhabiting Central and Eastern Europe. Some were so small and weak that it was out of the question to set them up in independent, sovereign States of their own. Others were so ill-defined as to make it genuinely doubtful whether they ought to be counted as separate nations, or as slightly differentiated cousins of some neighbouring nation. With these, a triple problem arose. Should they be allowed complete independence ? Should they be considered as a nation of their own, but too weak to form a State ; and if so, was there any reason for severing them from the body politic to which they had previously belonged ? Or should they be reckoned in with their own cousins, and formed into a single State with them ?

A second series of difficulties arose out of the fact that in most cases the ethnographical boundaries cut right across the lines of the natural geographical and economic units. To follow the former strictly would have produced a series of perfectly impracticable frontiers, within which no reasonable national existence would have been possible. Very

often, it would have been necessary to create a whole series of enclaves, similar to those which used to adorn the map on the boundaries of Warwickshire and Worcestershire, or even to create States consisting wholly of small enclaves, like the county of Cromarty. It was absolutely indispensable to make concessions to economic and administrative convenience, and consequently whatever States were set up were bound to contain large numbers of minorities.

Now, once this principle was admitted—and it had to be admitted—equally good cases could clearly be made out for very different, indeed contrary, territorial arrangements. There was, for instance, quite a strong movement among the allied countries, until late in the War, for leaving Austria-Hungary intact (with the exception of Galicia and the outlying Italian-speaking districts), only stipulating for some form of autonomy for the minor nationalities. From the economic point of view, there was an especially strong case for leaving untouched the old Hungary—a country which possessed a remarkable natural economic unity. If, on the other hand, such units as this were to be broken up, where was the process to stop? Was Hungary to be disintegrated and Bohemia, a very similar but somewhat smaller natural unit, to be left intact? Again, if it was admitted that Hungary was to be resolved along ethnographical lines, how far was it justifiable to go beyond the strict ethnographical boundaries in order to ensure for the new units, which consisted mainly of the mountainous territories along the periphery, some sort of viability?

There were thus almost unlimited opportunities for choice between two or more decisions, any of which could perfectly well be justified as according with Wilson's principles. If to-day the decisions of the Conference are bitterly attacked by Hungary and Germany, this is due to the fact that in most cases where a doubt existed, the benefit of it was given to that nation which was in favour at the Conference. Thus Czecho-Slovakia was allowed to keep the whole of Bohemia and Moravia, with their large German

minorities, on historical and economic grounds ; but at the same time, the Slovak districts of Northern Hungary were attributed to her, in defiance of those same considerations, on the ground that the ethnographical argument must be taken here as over-riding the rest. More than this : some purely Magyar territory in the south of what is Slovakia to-day was given to Czecho-Slovakia on economic and strategic grounds, to assign the new State an outlet to the Danube, ensure her lateral communications and make her defence possible.

There was an inequality of treatment here which cannot be denied. To a large extent, this was due to entirely praiseworthy motives. The rule exercised by the Germans and Magyars over the races within their States had been harsh and tyrannical, and socially as well as politically retrograde. The national aspirations of the subject races represented a democratic movement, a revolt against every kind of oppression, social as well as national, and the Conference felt that if the scales had to be weighted, it would be serving the interests of humanity in weighing them on the side of the more liberal governments. Practice has given some justification to this line of argument. In particular, the new States have carried through important schemes of agrarian reform and also, in some cases, of social and industrial legislation, which have provided for the poorer classes of the minority thus transferred advantages which, on their own admission, they would not exchange for reincorporation within their own national State. In general, however, it would seem that discrimination along these lines is rather a dangerous principle. Particularly in recent years, we have seen such violent social actions and reactions in many countries that it does not seem at all safe to reckon that one nation is going to be permanently more progressive or more reactionary than any other ; and to make such an assumption comes near to constituting an inequality against which the victims of it have a right to protest.

Another fault into which the Conference certainly fell was its excessive confidence that racial or linguistic kinship

alone would necessarily guide the wishes of a people. This belief had been spread by the immense amount of propaganda carried on at the Conference by those in whose interest it lay, and the Conference was too ready to listen only to one side of the case. Where plebiscites were held, they did not by any means always go in favour of the national State. The most striking instance was that of the Masurians in East Prussia, who, although racially and linguistically akin to the Poles, voted by an overwhelming majority for continued union with Germany. The Germans claim that if the same opportunity for voicing their wishes had been given to the Kashubs of the present Polish Corridor, the vote would have gone the same way ; and Hungary (who again succeeded in the only plebiscite allowed to her, that in the town of Sopron) believes firmly that she would have lost far less territory than she did if the peoples concerned had been allowed real " self-determination."

Nevertheless, the work of the Conference which related to the political re-arrangement of Europe was in many respects the most important which it accomplished. If some of the details are questionable, yet the Treaty as a whole does constitute the essential charter of their liberties to very many millions of peoples. The dismemberment of Hungary, far-reaching as it is, was yet done in the interests of the non-Magyar nationalities, who ardently desired their freedom and constituted the majorities in the areas taken away from Hungary. The Conference perpetrated nothing like the crime of the partition of Poland, which had been a permanent source of unrest in Europe since its commission over a century previously. It was, on the whole, an honest attempt to secure permanent peace by setting Europe on a basis of satisfied national aspirations.

The Polish Corridor affords the spectacle of a complete conflict of principles. It is commonly spoken of as the type of the "unjust frontiers." Yet from the standpoint of nationality it was probably just in 1919 and it is certainly fair now. The pre-war German figures give it a Slav

majority, if to the Poles are added the 115,700 Kashubs who inhabited the bottle-neck of the Corridor. Had a plebiscite been held, it is likely enough that the Kashubs might have voted German, and if the frontier had been drawn by communes the Corridor might not have existed. As it was the Allies used the racial criterion, and no plebiscite was granted. If one were held to-day, there is not the slightest doubt which way it would go. German emigration, encouraged by the Polish official harassing of the minority, has been more than replaced by Polish colonisation ; and even the German figures now claim only some ten per cent of the population. Economically, the Conference insisted that " Immediate and unbroken communication with Danzig and the remainder of the coast by railways which are entirely under the control of the Polish State is essential." It dismissed the inconvenience to East Prussia, whose trade with Germany proper was mainly sea-borne, as negligible. Hence the attribution to Poland of the Corridor and the Vistula, including even the formerly German part of the East bank, coupled with those political rights of Poland in Danzig which have caused perpetual friction ever since. Here it may fairly be argued that Poland would have been better served commercially by the German project of an efficient international control of the Vistula and a secured access for Poland to Königsberg, Danzig, and Memel. The inevitable quarrels over privileges in Danzig, fought out with sordid publicity in the League Council, have resulted in the construction of Gdynia, a rival port on the sea-end of the Corridor, into which Poland has poured great sums. It is difficult to-day to imagine any alternative scheme which would compensate Poland for Gdynia. Some minor ameliorations could well be made. Danzig should be allowed to decide by plebiscite whether it should continue its uneasy but prosperous existence as a free city and the main port of Polish trade, or join East Prussia and sacrifice its commerce to nationalism. Certainly the German inhabitants of the Vistula bank should be given access to the river by shifting the frontier to mid-channel : and the upkeep

of the riparian works should be internationalised. Strategically, of course, the Corridor is useless to Poland ; in case of a war with Germany, the two Prussias would nip it off instantly. Indeed it constitutes a danger to the Polish State, through the sense of grievance, however unreasonable, which it engenders in the German mind. The division of Germany into a " mainland " and " island " is repulsive to modern nationalism, which is based upon the concept of the territorial State. The German grievance is not ethical, but geographic and sentimental ; but it is not the less acute for that, and in fact the Corridor has become the symbol of Germania Irredenta. Poland, on the other side, feels quite as strongly about a territory which she has rendered effectually Polish. It must be realised that the only remedy for this dangerous condition of feeling lies in the relaxation of economic barriers and of political tension between the two countries, of which before the Nazi revolution, there was some sign.

There is, of course, no reason why these treaties should claim any greater immunity from peaceful revision than any of their predecessors. The political map of Europe has never remained unaltered for many decades since history began. The difference between the present settlement and all those that went before it is that those were founded for the most part on naked force, and were subject to immediate readjustment so soon as the balance of forces on which they depended had altered. The present settlement was meant to stand on a footing of justice, and should therefore be unaffected by the relative forces of the parties interested. This very fact, however, makes the claim for revision all the stronger where it is apparent that there was a miscarriage of justice, intentional or accidental. Nor can those who press for revision be dismissed as mere disturbers of the peace. The Covenant of the League expressly provides the possibility of treaty revision in its nineteenth article. It is true that the wording of that article is exceedingly cautious, and it has not yet been found possible to utilise it effectively. Yet it is there, and is as much a part of the Covenant as

Article X or any other of the conservatory articles. Indeed, in thus providing explicitly for the possibility of revision the Covenant has gone a great deal further than most earlier treaty settlements which, whether their actual duration proved to be one year, or ten, or twenty, or fifty, have usually been concluded for all perpetuity, and without any provision for modification.

It is true, however, that frontier revision is not a thing to be undertaken rashly. All States appear, for some reason, to be abnormally sensitive on this subject. This state of mind may be an atavistic survival, but it is one with which we must reckon. The mere mention of the possibility of losing a strip of territory, however small, however valueless, however dubiously acquired, arouses the most violent national passions and induces a situation which is of itself a danger to peace. Moreover, a change of sovereignty is nearly always a painful operation. Quite apart from the ill-will which is almost always engendered between the two States concerned, the territory directly affected usually suffers from consequences which, if they are not always lasting, are generally very disturbing. Officials are displaced, trade connections are broken, communications have to be readjusted, and there is invariably a loyalist party opposed to the change which will suffer from it morally, and in most cases socially and financially also. For these reasons there is much, I think, to be said for abstaining from any attempt to revise frontiers except where the injustice has been very manifest and the resulting hardships real and unallayed, and for attempting rather to bring about a condition in which revision will be unnecessary, because the existence of the frontier has become unimportant. This is, indeed, a far-distant ideal, although even in Europe to-day there exist a few frontiers which have practically ceased to matter to the inhabitants on either side of them—before the war there were many more. One great step forward could, however, be made by the creation and enforcement of a proper machinery for the protection of minorities.

This is a question of the first importance, and its urgency is increasing almost daily, as the blind worship of national feeling becomes more widespread and more fanatical. The fashionable idol of to-day, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, is the national State ; but the plain fact is that the intermingling of races, particularly in that part of the world, is so great that no State could possibly be formed, by any effort of human ingenuity, which did not contain large numbers of racial, religious and linguistic minorities. Before the War, the German Empire contained French in Alsace, Danes, Poles, Lithuanians and Wends ; Hungary, Roumanians, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Ruthenes, Jews and other smaller minorities ; Turkey had a score of different races, and the Russian Empire a full hundred, some of them mere fragments, but others, such as the Poles, very important nations. It is somewhat pathetic to remember that, in a very large number of cases, all through the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century there was no noticeable discontent or acutely felt oppression. But as nationalism grew in the nineteenth century the problem of large minorities became increasingly acute. On the one hand, there was crude racial and religious antagonism, which found vent from time to time in frightful outbreaks such as the Armenian massacres in Turkey and, at an earlier date, the massacres of Bulgarians, or earlier still, in the excesses on both sides which disfigured the Greek War of Independence. Again, there was the less blood-stained but hardly less intolerant oppression to which the Jews were subjected in Russia, where they were officially classed as "second-class citizens" and subjected to every kind of economic and social restriction, or in Roumania, where successive governments denied them the right of citizenship at all. More recently, particularly in the Balkans, there was a new aspect of minority oppression, where the expanding Christian nations were staking out in advance claims to the territory which, it was known, Turkey would soon be forced to evacuate, and were using every means to strengthen their own claims to Turkey's inheritance by

assimilating doubtful elements, or by driving out or massacring the champions of a rival nationality.

Throughout the nineteenth century there had been a gradually increasing recognition of the fact that with the growth of national feeling, and the growing vehemence of its demand for political recognition, it was necessary to provide some sort of safeguard for those minorities to whom the satisfaction of their national ambitions would have to be denied. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the three Powers benefiting by the partition of Poland gave a general assurance of their intention to respect Polish national institutions. More systematic steps were taken in the Balkans, following on the successive wars of liberation. On each occasion the State achieving independence, or gaining acquisitions of territories, was required to sign a treaty guaranteeing religious freedom and equality of treatment for all its nationals, irrespective of their religion. In some cases the State concerned was not recognised by the Great Powers until this treaty had been signed.

These treaties, however, were of more value for the principle which they incorporated than for any practical or effective protection which they afforded to the minorities concerned. They contained, strictly speaking, no guarantee for their enforcement. Any of the signatories to them had, of course, a right to protest if they were disregarded, but this was hardly ever done, although some pressure was put upon Roumania on account of her continued ill-treatment of her Jews. But they had another disadvantage—or so it was classed by the States which were forced to sign them : that they were used by other States as an excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of the chief signatory, intriguing with its subject races and stirring up disaffection among them. Russia's record, in particular, was not at all clean in this respect ; and as regards the Armenians certainly, and probably some other nationalities, these earlier minority treaties may well have done more harm than good.

When the Peace Conference first assembled, its attention was drawn very urgently to the necessity for an improved

system of minorities protection. The prime movers were the big international Jewish societies, who were very anxious firstly that the disabilities under which they still suffered in Roumania should be effectively removed, and secondly, that in the new Poland and Lithuania they should receive guarantees that the discrimination exercised against them by the Government of Czarist Russia should be removed. At the same time, the Jews, while particularly interested in their own case, as was natural, also acted as spokesmen for all other minorities.

In truth, the minorities position was exceedingly complicated. There was the Jewish question, in which all liberal elements took an active interest. Then there was the old religious question between Christian and Mahomedan, which had been the first to bring home to the civilised world the need for minority protection—in particular, the protection of religious minorities, which had been the aspect of the problem which had chiefly occupied men's minds in the nineteenth century. According to the provisions of the original Treaty of Peace with Turkey, a great deal of Turkish territory was to have been transferred to Greece, and the protection of the Mahomedan minorities in these territories was clearly a matter of the gravest importance. But there was a third aspect of the question which was no less weighty: the purely national. Very large changes were being made in the frontiers of Germany, Austria and Hungary. Linguistic and national minorities were being incorporated in new and enlarged States in which the fever of nationalism was running exceedingly high. These new States were obsessed with the idea that their internal solidarity and their external security could only be assured by national unity, involving the expulsion or the assimilation of their minorities. More than that: the minorities now being transferred were for the most part members of those nations which had occupied a privileged position in their old States. They had lorded it over the other nationalities which had then been in the position of national minorities, in a fashion which had often

been high-handed and ruthless enough, and it was greatly to be feared that the new majorities would take the opportunity of paying off old scores.

Perhaps I may recall here some words which I spoke on this subject at the Second Assembly of the League.

"Before the War," I said, "when we spoke of this subject, we were thinking chiefly of those small helpless minorities scattered about the territories of the old Ottoman Empire, partly in Europe and partly in Asia. The abuses to which they were exposed were often violent and bloody. They were perpetrated often in remote places to which the eye of civilisation could not reach. Those dangers still continue. Centuries of internecine war leave effects which do not pass away in a generation. Those difficulties still remain, and all I have to say concerning them is that any attempt to deal with them without vigorous enquiry actually upon the spot would be futile.

"But I want to speak chiefly of quite a new form of the problem. As the result of the war, there have been placed, in various parts of Europe large, powerful, intelligent and conspicuous minorities in the midst of populations in whom there are still moving, even if below the surface, the resentments and antagonisms of the War. These minorities are not exposed—we do not pretend it for a moment—to the same sort of bloody or violent dangers, but they are in a situation which is disagreeable and which, if not attended to, may become dangerous. These minorities consist of people who, until lately, were accustomed to a position of superiority. They now find themselves in a position of something rather like subjection. They are bound to feel, they cannot but feel, a sense of grievance. The people round them have, until lately, been in a position of inferiority. They now find themselves suddenly in a position of power. Human nature being what it is, it is only too probable that, in spite of all the care that may be exercised by the Governments, there will occur excesses and abuses of power."

To-day there are probably not much less than thirty millions of members of minorities in the new and enlarged

States of Eastern Europe and the Near East. There is not one of these States which is nationally homogeneous. In several of them the minorities form a quarter or more of the whole population, and in some, the minorities form a large proportion of the wealthiest and most cultivated classes. There was also another aspect of the problem. National feeling had become so intense that a minority was apt to feel that its only real chance of salvation lay in joining its own national State, and a State felt that it had a perfectly legitimate right to extend its frontiers to include all areas adjacent to them inhabited by members of the same nationality as its own inhabitants. This claim had, in fact, been the basis for all the wars of national liberation and irridentist movements which had culminated in the drafting of the new frontiers in 1919. But those frontiers were now meant to be permanent. No more irridentism was to be allowed, and under Article X of the Covenant, all States Members of the League were undertaking a solemn obligation to respect and maintain one another's frontiers. Thus, if that peace was to mean anything else than licence to commit acts of tyranny with impunity—if it was to be a true peace and not a mere fastening of shackles upon the defeated States—it was absolutely necessary that the minorities should be ensured such treatment as would take away from them all valid excuse for disaffection and irridentism.

For these reasons, the Peace Conference decided to impose upon the new and enlarged States a genuinely effective system of minorities protection. It was no easy task. The States concerned, led by Poland and Roumania, put up a vehement resistance, in the course of which the original proposals were watered down very considerably. In the end, however, they were signed, and a system was established which was extended, with slight variations, over all the smaller States of Eastern Europe, with Turkey and Iraq. I need not describe these Treaties and Declarations in detail here. The general principles underlying all of them were that members of minorities were to receive

equal treatment in law and fact with all other citizens of the State concerned. They were not to be subjected to adverse discrimination on account of their race, language or religion ; they were to be allowed free exercise of their religion and of their language in all private and non-official spheres of life, including the Press ; they had full liberty to found and administer their own private educational, religious and charitable institutions ; and although the language of the majority might be made the official language of the State, they were to receive adequate facilities for the use of their own language before the Courts, and where a " considerable proportion " of them were to be found, their children were to receive primary instruction in their own mother-tongue.

Besides this, most States were required to accept special provisions adapted to the needs of particular minorities in their territories. Poland and Lithuania agreed to allow the Jewish communities to administer certain State funds, and not to hold elections on a Saturday. Czecho-Slovakia had to provide higher education also in the mother-tongue of the chief minorities. Roumania agreed to grant cultural autonomy to the Saxons and Szeklers of Transylvania, and Greece to the Vlachs of the Pindus. The countries with Moslem minorities accepted special provisions whereby those minorities might regulate questions of family law and personal status according to Moslem usage ; and so on.

There is a very carefully drafted guarantee, which was designed to ensure that these treaties should be effective in a way that their predecessors had never been. Any Member of the Council may refer any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of the articles of the Treaty to the Permanent Court as a dispute of an international character under Article XIV of the Covenant ; and the Court's award is final, and has the same force and effect as an award under Article XIII of the Covenant. Again, any Member of the Council has the right to bring to the notice of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of the obligations contained in the Treaties, and

the Council "may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances." This gives the Council the widest possible freedom of action—how seriously the guarantee of the Treaties was taken by those who drafted them is shown by the fact that the wording is practically the same as that of Article XI. In some respects, indeed, it is even stronger than Article XI, since it seems as though the Council would be automatically seised of the dispute by the action of any one of its Members.

The institution of these minority treaties is a very remarkable thing. The treatment of minorities by their Government is by their provisions recognised to be a matter of "international concern." This places minority questions in a quite exceptional position, for no other aspect of the relationship between a Government and its own citizens is explicitly so recognised in the Covenant, the Peace Treaties or the other Treaties concluded in connection with them, unless the social question, as it is described in the Labour chapter of the Peace Treaties, might be taken as a parallel.

There can be little doubt that the authors of the Treaties were absolutely in the right path when they arranged these safeguards. As explained above, it was physically out of the question to satisfy all the national aspirations of all groups which demanded independence. Many people may be inclined to think, in the first place, that the Conference went too far in creating such a large number of little national States. This was inevitable—for indeed most of the States had created themselves out of the tumultuous ruin in which Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire disintegrated under the strain of four years of war, and except on points of detail the Conference was often doing little more than giving official sanction to *faits accomplis*. The real calamity lay deeper. It was a pity both for the world in general and the nations concerned in particular, that they should all alike have felt no other solution to be tolerable than that of shutting themselves off, each in its own separate sovereign State. Any other arrangement

of the frontiers would not have eliminated discontent, but simply have shifted the centres of it. While we ought to see that any particular case is remedied where injustice has clearly been done, we have to face the fact that, nine times out of ten, to remove a territorial grievance felt to-day by the Germans or the Magyars would simply mean creating another perhaps equally serious and equally legitimate, for the Poles or the Roumanians. The ultimate solution for these territories in which the population is so excessively mixed can only lie in making nationality a factor of less essential importance in the State.

One is bound to admit that this new machinery for the protection of minorities has not, hitherto, fulfilled the hopes which were placed in it. The League as guarantor of the Treaties was placed in an exceedingly difficult position. The League is, after all, an association of States, and includes among its members a very considerable number which are signatories to minorities obligations. Those States frankly dislike the position in which they are placed. They are acutely sensitive, and resent bitterly anything which they regard as interference in their internal affairs, the more so since they consider that they have been placed in a position of inequality by the fact that the Treaties were not imposed upon all members of the League alike. Some Governments bound by the Treaties actually sit upon the Council, in which the execution of the guarantee is vested, and those governments are not anxious to see the League display any excess of zeal in enquiring into minority cases. Moreover they have complained from the first that the Treaties were misused to blacken their names by hostile propaganda ; and it is true that the possibility exists that they could so be used, unless great precautions were taken. For these reasons and others the Council has shown great regard for the susceptibilities of the Governments. It has worked out a very elaborate procedure for the execution of its guarantee which, in practice, safeguards Governments from every danger, but too often at the expense of the minorities. This procedure need not be described in detail.

Briefly, any member of a minority, or, indeed, anyone speaking on his behalf, can petition the League against an infraction, or danger of infraction, of a treaty. The petition is most closely scrutinised to ensure that it is genuine and suitably expressed in every respect, and is then handed over to a Committee, usually consisting of three members of the Council, who, with the help of the Secretariat, negotiate privately with the Government concerned. In nineteen cases out of twenty, the matter never gets beyond this stage. Either it is dropped altogether on the Government's assurance that the complaint was unfounded, or has been remedied, or that the petitioner was a factious and ill-conditioned man; or else some sort of compromise is arranged, whereby the petitioner is granted a modicum of satisfaction. Only a few very flagrant cases have come before the full Council, and even then, the complainants have seldom received anything approaching what they claimed. Indeed, the Council itself has few real weapons at its disposal beyond the pressure, for what it is worth, which may be exerted upon a State by the feeling that it has incurred the moral reprobation of its fellows; and if a State is in such a fever of national exaltation as to be unaffected by moral pressure, and if it calculates, as it may do with some justification, that the members of the Council are unlikely to commit definitely hostile acts against it in the cause of its minorities—then it can, in practice, defy them. It may accept a polite resolution suggesting that this or that law or administrative measure might be altered or repealed; but it can delay taking such action almost *ad infinitum*, or carry it out in so half-hearted a way as to bring no true remedy to the complainant's grievance, and the chances are that the Council will not question its action.

Thus it would be mere hypocrisy to pretend that the League Treaties have solved the minorities problem in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it would be a counsel of despair, and quite unjustified, to abandon the system as a failure. On the contrary, I am firmly convinced that the ideas upon which the present system of minority protection

is based are absolutely sound, and that the very salvation of Eastern Europe depends to a large extent—a far larger extent than is commonly understood to-day in England—on going forward and not back, and developing and reinforcing the system until it becomes practically effective.

There are a good many improvements which could be brought about even within the limits of the present system: the elimination of unnecessary delays, the collection of fuller information, greater publicity, a reasonable opportunity for the petitioner to hear the Government's answer to his case, a more judicial procedure, and less willingness to accept every compromise offered by a Government even when it is manifestly inadequate. There are other, rather more far-reaching proposals which have often been advocated by the Federation of League of Nations Societies and other bodies which have studied this question deeply. Chief among them is the proposal for the institution of a Permanent Minorities Commission, much on the lines of the Mandates Commission, composed of independent experts, whose duty it would be to study all complaints and to deliver reasoned reports on them to the Council. This would not only reduce the present congestion of work, reduce delays and allow every petition to receive proper consideration, but it would substitute for the present political atmosphere of negotiation and compromise a quite different and wider political atmosphere which in the long run would be far preferable, not only for the minorities, but for the Governments themselves. Another suggestion which I myself made and almost carried at the Assembly of 1922 was for the appointment of resident League of Nations Commissioners in certain areas where conditions are particularly troubled. Their duty would be not only to report impartially to the League on the behaviour of both, or all, parts of the population, but also to act as a preliminary court of conciliation (from whose decision there would, of course, be a right of appeal) which should succeed in saving the members of the Council from having to attend to many comparatively trivial complaints which to-day come before them.

By such reforms as these, and others on points of detail into which we need not enter here, the protection of minorities by the League could be made a reality, if all the parties concerned agreed to co-operate in genuine good faith in making it so. There are, I think, signs that this co-operation, which has too often been lacking in the past, may shortly become something more of a reality. The recent debates on the subject in the Assembly have reached a very high level, both in tone and matter, and show that the ideas underlying the League system are beginning to be more generally appreciated. More hopeful, even, than anything which has been done through the League machinery—which is, after all, only a last resort, an appeal to a third party after all hope of direct agreement has broken down—have been the developments in some States in which minorities and majorities have reached working agreements which practically obviate the need of appeal to the League. The Estonian Government has granted those of its minorities which desire to take advantage of the concession a measure of cultural self-government going far beyond the modest requirements of the Treaties. The German and the Jewish minorities in Estonia already exercise this autonomy, with results which are said to be completely satisfactory to both sides. It is in this way, not by grudgingly allowing the minimum upon which the Treaties insist, but by going generously beyond the letter of their requirements and by welcoming their minorities as equal citizens whose co-operation in the public and private life of the State is desired, that Governments can take the sting out of the demand for territorial revision of the treaties. I would add that there is no other way in which they can do it. If the nineteenth century taught us any one lesson, it is surely this, that a State which oppresses its minorities and denies them freedom of development for their legitimate national and cultural aspirations is doomed to extinction. Neither its size and power among the nations of the world nor the force of its bayonets can save it.

If an equitable solution for every problem of minorities

could be found, a great part of the cry for treaty revision would die away ; for we have advanced so far to-day in our appreciation of the importance of self-determination that few States would claim any area on ethnographical grounds if it were quite apparent that its inhabitants did not wish to change their political allegiance. The best proof of this lies in the respect with which the independence of the Swiss Confederation is regarded by Germany, France and Italy alike. In other cases, the desire for revision might disappear if only a genuine economic and moral disarmament could be brought about. There will, admittedly, remain certain cases, albeit not nearly so many as is very often alleged, in which the common feeling of the world will agree that the demand for territorial revision is just. I repeat, and emphasise, the word "just," for it is of the utmost importance for the future peace of the world that any revision which may be undertaken shall be based solely upon the justice of that particular case. It must not in any circumstances be given as a mere sop to Cerberus, an attempt to placate some powerful and discontented State at the expense of a weaker one which is not in a position to withstand the pressure which might be brought upon it.

In reviewing this whole subject and considering the eager demand for a complete revision of "the iniquitous Peace Treaties" as a principal and almost infallible method of restoring peace to Europe, it is somewhat ironical to reflect what real injustices in the territorial settlement were made in the Treaties. If revision on grounds of justice and self-determination were ever to be realised, the first change would be some large surrenders by Italy ; a great part of the South Tyrol should go back to Austria ; some Slovene districts at the head of the Adriatic to Yugoslavia ; and the Dodecanese, where Italian rule has been particularly oppressive, to Greece. Cyprus also should, on grounds of self-determination, undoubtedly be given by Great Britain to Greece. The South Dobruja should go back from Roumania to Bulgaria, together with some districts on the Yugoslavian-Bulgarian frontier ; some Slovakian districts, now

attributed to Czecho-Slovakia, should be reconsidered and perhaps some small strips of Magyar territory which are now allotted to Roumania and Yugoslavia. Germany at most would get some slightly improved arrangement about Danzig and the Polish Corridor, a reconsideration of Eupen and Malmédy, and some revision of the Upper Silesian frontier, which should take more account of economic necessity. There could certainly be no large transfer of territory and it would be out of the question to give Germany the Corridor, the population of which is now almost exclusively Polish. An even more ironical thought suggests itself—that one of the first results of self-determination applied to-day might be the secession of Bavaria and other South German states from the Nazi domination in order to form a separate *anschluss* with Austria.

There are bad cases which should be dealt with but which would not be helped by any revision of frontiers. Autonomy is the only remedy, and even autonomy could scarcely become real in a world like the present, exasperated by political and economic nationalism. Real autonomy for East Galicia, for Macedonia, for the Szeklers and Saxons in Transylvania, would remove a great amount of oppression and unnecessary human suffering. When the nationalist storm is over one might hope to see much larger units formed on a more or less federal basis—a great Balkan Federation, a large Danubian State round Hungary, and a big Baltic State in connection with Poland—but such possibilities lie very far off and may perhaps only come about as part of the United States of Europe.

§5. THE GERMAN COLONIES

THE QUESTION of the colonies stands on rather a different footing. The various German Colonies (this is a question which affects Germany alone, of the ex-enemy Powers) were conquered by one power or another in the course of the War, and it would have been difficult or

impossible at the end of the War to rend them from their respective conquerors and give them back to Germany. The South Africans would simply have refused to give up German South-West. The Australians under "Billy Hughes" would have fought rather than resign German New Guinea. No one could have coerced Japan into abandoning her three small archipelagoes in the North Pacific. There was also another consideration. In German East Africa and the Cameroons the natives, some sooner, some later, had all turned against their German masters and made submission to the enemy. Consequently, they regarded the possible return of their old masters with the utmost alarm. They thought it must bring with it some terrible punishment for themselves, and were prepared to leave their homelands and simply march away through Africa, driving other tribes before them, until they found safety. The continent might well have been filled with bloodshed. I may mention that I was personally engaged in getting support for a movement for restoring at least German East Africa to its former owners, when this danger was brought to my notice by persons whose good faith was above suspicion, and I stayed my hand.

We must recognise that in the wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century there would have been no criticism or searching of conscience about these colonies. A war was then fought for colonies; the victor took the colonies, and there was an end of it. But the situation was different when the Treaty of Versailles was being concluded. The Allies were bound to apply Wilson's principles. The fifth of his Fourteen Points had referred specifically to colonies in the following terms:

"A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined."

Besides this specific reference, there were the general principles, applicable to the whole settlement, that the peace should be a just one and there should, in particular, be no annexations.

The solution adopted at the Conference was one which might be very good or very bad, according to the way in which it was interpreted. The Allies paid at least lip-service to Wilson's principles. Germany declared that their interpretation of them was mere hypocrisy. Even hypocrisy, in international affairs, is a great advance on the complete indifference to justice which used to prevail, though not enough of an advance to satisfy the conscience of any honest man. But in so far as the system inaugurated at the Conference was interpreted not hypocritically, but honestly, it was a great advance indeed.

What was done was that the conquerors made no annexations, but only took over such territories as they found in their possession and assigned them to certain "advanced" or competent nations as mandatories, to be administered under the League of Nations. The governing Article of the Covenant is Article XXII which lays down that "there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples forms a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the Covenant." Certain principles of government were enumerated, such as "the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic," and the prevention of the use of the territories, or of the natives, for military purposes other than the defence of the territories themselves; and it was further laid down that equal opportunities were to be given to the trade and commerce of other Members of the League, beside the Mandatory. Furthermore, a strict system of supervision was set up. Each mandatory has to report annually to the League, and these reports are examined by a Permanent Commission of independent experts.

Once the point of view is adopted that the mandated areas are in fact not annexed territories, but territories held

as "a sacred trust of civilisation"—and it must be recognised that the Mandates Commission has shown great firmness in insisting on it—then it does seem curious that the victorious powers simply handed these territories to one another. It seems arbitrary, if not positively unjust, that a nation so highly civilised and efficient as Germany should be permanently debarred from taking her share in it. No doubt German colonial administration has been much criticised. Under the old imperial government, with its enthusiasm for the strong hand and even the "mailed fist," it certainly erred on the side of harshness. The Allies in their reply to the German protest laid great weight on this fact. They pointed out that

"reference to the evidence from German sources previous to the war of an official as well as of a private character, and to the formal charges made in the Reichstag, especially by Messrs. Erzberger and Noske, will suffice to throw full light upon the German colonial administration, upon the cruel methods of repression, the arbitrary requisition, and the various forms of forced labour which resulted in the depopulation of vast expanses in German East Africa and the Cameroons, not to mention the tragic fate of the Hereros in South-West Africa, which is well known to all.

"Germany's dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilisation has been revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers consenting to make a second experiment and of their assuming the responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them."

Nevertheless, it would be absurd for those who remember the stories of the Congo or of St. Thomé to say that German methods were markedly worse than those of the Belgians and the Portuguese. It must also be remembered that safeguards exist to-day which were not

present in 1919. There is first and foremost the Mandate System, there is the Slavery Convention, which Germany has already ratified, and the Forced Labour Convention of the I.L.O., which she could be required to ratify before any change was made. Subject to these safeguards for the interests of the native population, there ought, in principle, if it could be found possible, to be some revision of the Treaty in respect of the adjudication of Mandates.

Three possibilities suggest themselves. First, the Portuguese colonies in Africa have often been felt by Portuguese statesmen to be rather too heavy a responsibility, both financial and otherwise, for the comparatively slender resources of Portugal, and the Portuguese Government might be willing at some time to sell them to Germany, or rather to sell them to the League of Nations in order to provide a mandate for Germany. An arrangement of this sort was already contemplated before the war. Sir Edward Grey was sounded on the subject, and answered that this country had no objection to Germany's acquiring the colonies provided it were done with the free consent of Portugal. The Kaiser's government, however, had quite other objects. They wanted to take the colonies without payment, and they wanted a secret agreement with England which they might afterwards allow to get out, and so damage the credit of England throughout the world. They rejected an open agreement about the Baghdad Railway for the same reason. So the proposals fell through. An occasion, however, might well arise for renewing them.

Secondly, the Japanese have broken the Covenant of the League in a very flagrant manner, and it is not clear whether, as a sequel, they have not actually annexed the Pacific Islands which were granted to them by the Allied and Associated Powers under mandate. If they have rejected the Mandate the islands are no longer under their care and the annexation is an illegal act. It is not likely, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers will try to recover the islands by force of arms, and even if in the financial collapse that will probably follow Japan's

Manchurian aggressions a Japanese government were to give up the islands, they are hardly important enough to satisfy Germany's claims, besides being geographically inconvenient for her to administer.

Thirdly, there is the suggestion that Great Britain should hand back the territory of Tanganyika, formerly German East Africa. It was the one part of Africa in which the German administration was generally good, so it would not imply recurrence to an old bad tradition, such, for example, as would constitute a strong objection to the restoration of German South-West. On the other hand the existence of the mandated territory of Tanganyika under the same administration as the British colonies of Kenya and Uganda, which are not subject to the rules of the mandate, constitutes a very important protection for the native races. In Kenya especially, where the competition between the natives and the white settlers for land and wealth has led to constant friction and very grave abuses, the example of Tanganyika and the close association with a well-administered Mandated territory is perhaps the only means of preventing disaster. If the Tanganyika Mandate were given to Germany we cannot be sure that the administration would be so good, and in any case the territory would no longer form part of a whole with Uganda and Kenya.

Another difficulty which may be extremely serious when the time comes is the claim put forward in emphatic language by Italy, that, if any more colonial territory is in the market, Italy's right comes first. The Portuguese possessions are fortunately extensive enough to provide a field for both.

At present, therefore, the solution of this particular inequality is not clear. Much depends on the course of events, and much on the temper of the German nation itself. No other nation would be disposed to make sacrifices in order to put more territory under the present German régime. But if the Mandate system is duly carried out and the principle of the "Open Door" fully accepted by all colonial Powers, as it ought to be if the world is to be spared

bloodshed, any practical disadvantage which Germany may now be suffering would disappear. The Germans might well insist as an interim measure on an "Open Door" policy for both Mandates and tropical colonies ; for though it is difficult at the present time to find Germany a suitable Mandate of her own, it is intolerable that she should be deprived of all her tropical possessions and then shut out, by special "obstacles to commerce" from access to those of the Colonial Powers. Yet here again one cannot but reflect that Germany's real grievance is not lack of a Mandate but simply unemployment and economic distress. If her five million unemployed could find work they would not trouble much about the lack of colonies ; if she had colonies but the same unemployment she would be no nearer satisfaction. And in the present state of the world the acquisition of colonies would probably prove utterly ineffective as a remedy for unemployment.

I now come to the third group of provisions in the Treaties : those which were designed to create a better world after the horrors of the war. I include among these not only the supremely important creation of the League of Nations itself, with the International Labour Organisation and the Permanent Court of International Justice, but also certain other measures of lesser importance, such as the internationalisation of certain great waterways, and the question which many of us place above all other problems of to-day—that of disarmament.

§ 6. EXCLUSION AND DISARMAMENT

HERE, INDEED, there is little in the way of treaty revision which remains to be done, although much in the way of action both by the Allies and the defeated nations. The clear principle here, as in the other parts of the Treaty which I have discussed, is that true equality is essential. When the Treaties were first concluded, the Allies created a position of inequality, deliberately and of set purpose.

On mere grounds of expediency this material and economic disarmament of the beaten nations was not only excusable but almost inevitable. The victors, having got what they wanted, wished only to be left in peace. The conquered, having lost what they considered their rights, were pretty sure to try to recover them as soon as they felt able to do so. It was essential to the safety of Europe that Germany and her allies should not be left strong enough to begin another war, and a series of temporary disabilities directed confinedly to this purpose would have carried with it no particular sting of dishonour. But unfortunately the Allies chose to base the disarmament of Germany on moral grounds. Their attitude was that Germany in particular, but her allies also, had shown themselves to be criminals of so dark a character as to render their promises totally unreliable and their society unfit for that of law-abiding nations. Thus disarmament, with certain of the economic provisions, was carried through unilaterally, being imposed immediately upon the vanquished while the victors announced their intention of following suit later; and the vanquished nations were told that they could not enter the League until they had reformed their ways, and faith could be placed in their pledged word.

The terms in which these decisions were conveyed were blunt, not to say insulting. Germany was reminded that her recent revolution brought with it "no guarantee that it represents a permanent change. In the present temper of international feeling, it is impossible to expect the free nations of the world to sit down immediately in equal association with those by whom they have been so grievously wronged. To attempt this too soon would delay and not hasten that process of appeasement which all desire." The Allies further recalled Wilson's statement that "Germany will have to redeem her character not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows," pointed out that one of the conditions for admission to the League was that a State should give "clear proofs of its stability as well as its intention to observe its international obligations," and added:

"In the case of Germany, it is hardly necessary to say that the record of the last five years is not of a character to justify an exception, at the present time, to the general rule to which reference has just been made."

Thus, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria were branded as outcasts and degraded to a category which included also Soviet Russia—at that time torn by the most frightful revolution—Mexico and a few midget States such as Monaco and San Marino, but not the weakest and most palpably corrupt State of Central or Southern America, Asia or Africa, which could lay claim to a nominal independence.

This discrimination was profoundly unjust, and as profoundly unwise. It created a group of *frondeurs* outside the League, practically driving Germany into the arms of Russia. It weakened, very gravely, precisely those elements in the ex-enemy countries to which the Allies themselves looked for the possibility of future co-operation and smoothed the path for the reaction which did not fail to raise its head in each of those countries; and it weakened the League itself, since it gave a large degree of justification, for several years, to the allegation that the League was not a true League of Nations to ensure peace and justice, but a League of victors banded together in defence of their common spoils.

Fortunately this part of the Treaty also revised itself within a few years. As regards the Labour Organisation, indeed, it was found expedient to invite the attendance of the ex-enemy Powers from the first; and even the last of the Peace Treaties themselves—that concluded with Turkey at Lausanne—was based on the assumption of Turkey's early entry into the League; so quickly had the theory of the two world categories of States been jettisoned. Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria were early admitted to the League, and Germany's admission followed in 1926.

Germany would, indeed, probably have been admitted earlier if she had been willing to enter simply as an ordinary member of the Assembly and had not claimed the privileged

position of a permanent member of the Council. Personally, I more than once advised German friends that their Government should accept plain membership of the Assembly. Once a member of the League, Germany would have stood for election to the Council, and would certainly have been elected. She would then have been the only Great Power sitting on the Council by the will of the Assembly and not by mere self-assertion. This would, I think, have given her a unique position of authority and made her the chosen leader of the smaller nations, and the champion of League principles when those were imperilled by the action of particular Great Powers. However, such a policy would have had in it an element of risk, and perhaps no German Government could have expected its people to consent to it. One must always remember that there was in Germany a strong current of opinion which was against League membership at all, and wished rather for an open alliance with Russia. She came in at last, after much arguing and intriguing, as a permanent Member of the Council in September 1926. To have brought her in at all was a great achievement on the part both of Stresemann and of his "opposite numbers," M. Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain, and while Stresemann was in charge of her foreign policy, the results of her entry were extraordinarily beneficial. Unfortunately one must admit that after Stresemann's death, Germany on the whole disappointed those who hoped that she would take a bold line on the Council as the champion of international right. The German representatives as a rule took little interest in the League, and almost ostentatiously followed the Italian lead of caring for nothing except their own national interests. They were not even active on behalf of oppressed minorities, except German minorities. There can be little doubt that they missed a great opportunity, and missed it the more conspicuously because Austria and Hungary, labouring under far greater difficulties, yet seized the occasion in such a way that their representatives have been among the most honoured members of the League.

However, so far as the Peace Treaties are concerned, the period of exclusion is past and gone. If any of the ex-enemy Powers again leaves the League, it will be of its own will. Meanwhile, they are co-operating in the League on the same footing of complete equality as all other members. The only further revision for which one might hope in this direction—and it would not affect any treaty but only modify the unwritten “gentleman’s agreement” now operating—would be that the elections to the Council should be so arranged as to give Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria their turn of membership on the Council.

There is little to be said of the minor clauses in the Treaties relating to waterways and similar matters. In some cases the international control which was instituted was at first one-sided, in so far as a beginning was made with the territories of the ex-enemy Powers. This inequality was, however, never serious and has now largely disappeared owing to the painstaking and inconspicuous work of the League’s Transit and Communications Organisation. Here, again, no further revision is necessary.

We come lastly to a subject which must be treated briefly, not because it does not most deeply occupy the minds of us all, but because a special section of this book is being devoted entirely to it. (See Chapter VI, Section 4.) I speak of disarmament. Here, again, a position of inequality was deliberately, and with good reason, created under the Peace Treaties (except that of Lausanne, where the Allies were, in fact, treating with an equal), but it was most expressly stipulated that the inequality should be only temporary. Four several statements to this effect were made by the Allies when the Treaty of Versailles was signed. Article VIII of the Covenant contains the famous admission that :

“the Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.”

The preamble to Part V of the Treaty states that Germany accepts the prescribed limitation of her own armaments "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations," and Article 164 bounds the duration of Germany's limitation. It is to last until "the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of the League of Nations," after which it will be modified by the Council of the League. Finally, the covering note of the Allies contains the following most explicit statement :

"The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

Nearly fourteen years have gone by since those words were written, and that "general reduction and limitation of armaments" still remains an "intention." The ex-enemy nations still remain disarmed in a world much of which is armed to the teeth. It is on this point, more than any other, that the cry for equality is really passionate to-day, and we must recognise its justification. It is true that the disarmament of the defeated nations at the end of the war was an absolute necessity. To allow them after their defeat to re-arm and test their fortunes once more would have been sheer madness. We have had one example—a small one, but very poignant,—of the results which would have attended general re-armament on a far larger scale, in the fate meted out to the Armenians when Turkey found herself able to defy the Allies. Nor can it be said that on the whole the ex-enemies lost more than they gained by the restriction. As a matter of finance, they were relieved from an expense which has weighed heavily upon their enemies and would have crushed them completely. In policy, their weakness

provided them with every inducement to follow a course of justice and persuasion instead of the incessant threats and sword-rattling which had caused the old German Empire to be detested in Europe and has, since the war, exposed some of the victors to a similar dislike. There was a wonderful opportunity open to any Great Power which should boldly take up the policy of peace and insist upon making the ideas of the League of Nations a reality. If only Germany had produced, or had been willing to follow, one strong and liberal statesman, a man like Branting or Nansen, who could have stood out at the head of a great, powerful, unarmed nation and appealed to the civilised world, particularly to Great Britain and America, against the militarism of France and her Allies, she had the game in her hands ! Briand would have carried through his policy of appeasement and disarmament, perhaps even his policy of European Union, and the world by now would have been a safe and civilised place. But this was perhaps asking too much of human nature. Stresemann for some years worked with Briand ; he was a wise " realist " ; but the special quality that gave Stresemann his power in Germany was that by temper and past history he was a nationalist and no believer in Liberal ideals. After Stresemann's death instinct triumphed to an increasing degree over intelligence. An ever-growing movement urged Germany to rattle her poor wooden sword and to care for nothing except what was forbidden, and she did so the more passionately because the prohibition had been insultingly couched and was enforced by humiliating methods. But whatever her justification, it remains quite true that her old enemies were never allowed to feel sufficiently secure to throw off the domination of their General Staffs and carry out the universal disarmament which had again and again been promised.

Now, however, at long last, the principle of equality has been admitted as an essential aim of the present Disarmament Conference. This is undoubtedly a step forward, and a step of supreme importance, for the inequality imposed

in 1919 could no longer be maintained. The principle once admitted, the essential is that this equality should be realised in the right way. What is wanted is not revision of the Treaties on this point. Here and there a prohibition imposed upon the vanquished might well be expunged, where they were deprived of purely defensive weapons which could not possibly be used for aggression. But what is needed is not revision of the Treaties, but conscientious observance of them. The Powers bound by those Treaties to disarm must definitely fulfil their pledged word and bring about a real reduction and limitation of armaments, binding upon all nations equally. As a corollary to this agreement they should insist upon the effective supervision and inspection of all armaments by an expert commission of the League, a precaution without which there could be no certainty that various nations were not secretly re-arming, and consequently no security.

Whether the demilitarised area along the Rhineland should be abolished is a difficult question. It is true that the existence of this demilitarised zone still constitutes an inequality against Germany. It was clearly a wise provision to establish between France and Germany a stretch of territory in which no military formations should be permitted, no forts, no barracks, no soldiers. The element of injustice came in when the area selected was taken entirely on the German side of the frontier. German soldiers had to go fifty kilometres back behind the frontier ; French soldiers might come up to the frontier itself. This is not strictly fair, yet it would be a thoroughly bad step to abolish the demilitarised zone. The ideally right policy would be to establish a similar zone on the French side. But unfortunately the French, fearing another possible invasion, and taught by the last war that their strongest forts were not impregnable, have spent colossal sums on a new system of forts all along the exposed edge of their territory. Such forts are, of course, purely defensive. No one can blame the French Government for its expenditure on them. And I fear it would be totally impossible to induce

any French government to destroy the buildings and excavations on which they have lavished so much money and skill merely in order to provide full theoretic "equality" for a Germany which, in its domestic speeches at any rate, continues to breathe fire and slaughter. Possibly a careful survey of the actual topography may suggest a practical solution of this point. Otherwise it seems that the present demilitarised zone must simply remain.

It must, after all, be remembered that this is not the only demilitarised area in Europe. Even peaceful Finland is bound not to fortify the Aaland Islands; and there are other examples. Here again, the true solution would seem to be in the direction of extending the principle of demilitarisation, and not of abolishing the all too rare examples of it which we possess to-day.

§ 7. CONCLUSIONS

WHAT, THEN, remains to be done in the way of Treaty revision? Far less, I think, than is commonly supposed by those who so glibly ascribe the ruin of Europe, if not of the world, to the injustices of the Peace Treaties. It is not often realised to what an immense extent the Treaties have already been revised. The war criminals chapter was closed long ago. To-day, I think, we may take it that reparations also are a thing of the past, together with the innumerable temporary measures which were decreed for the immediate reconstruction of the devastated areas, and with the punitive provisions under which the Allies occupied the Rhineland. In all matters relating to the present and future organisation of world affairs, victors and vanquished meet to-day on equal terms. It must remain a ground for deep regret that during the past dozen years, while these clauses of the Treaties were in fact in the process of continual revision, the concessions made by the Allies were in the main so grudging, so ungenerous and so tardy.

Had they been made less reluctantly in each case, opinion among the defeated States would have been less bitter. As it is, Germany and her former Allies have inevitably got the impression that none of the injustices committed against them would ever have been righted except under extreme pressure. The two parties have met throughout, not as friends negotiating on the basis of agreed principles to reach an agreed end, but as opponents, the one pushing sullenly forward, the other reluctantly yielding. There has been, also, far too little mention or even remembrance of the great underlying principles of justice and equality on which each party should have based its case. Revision has been granted or refused purely according to the relative degrees of importance attached to the particular question by the countries concerned, and not according to the degree of injustice to be remedied.

Nevertheless, revision has taken place, to quite an astonishing extent. We must not of course forget or neglect the due fulfilment of those clauses in the Treaties which told in favour of the vanquished powers; notably the Minority Treaties signed by certain States, and the obligation to disarm incumbent upon us all. But apart from that there remain to-day, so far as I can see, only three matters in which revision is still required or even possible. These three are the question of war guilt, that of Germany's colonies, and that of any territorial re-arrangement which may be found desirable.

I have indicated in earlier sections of this chapter the possibilities which I foresee as regards the first two of these three. I think that in strict fairness some public and official statement might well be made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the subject of war guilt. Charges which cannot clearly be sustained ought to be withdrawn. These refer less to the Treaty itself—for the wording of the famous "war guilt article" does not charge the Central Powers with sole responsibility for the war, but only condemns them to make reparation for their aggression—than to the covering note sent by the Allies in reply

to Germany's protests. At the same time, I cannot conceal my impression that the wording of any such announcement is a very delicate matter. Retracting of wrongful accusations is one thing; palliation of real guilt is another; and, if moral standards are to be admitted at all into the realm of international politics, a historian is forced to admit that, both for lack of scruple and for the kind of blundering that is due not to lack of brains but to sheer moral insensitiveness, the late German Imperial Government has a decidedly bad record. Unfortunately the course of events, aided by the errors of the Allied Governments, have had the effect of stimulating the national resentment and pride of Germany to a point of self-glorification at which it will brook no reasonable criticism, while the economic distress which has been so marked under the good government of the Republic has made the Germans idealise the bad government of the old Empire. The nationalist propaganda which has been active ever since the war and has now apparently captured the whole educational machine has been directed to inculcating three separate and not quite consistent doctrines: that Germany has no share whatever in the guilt of the war, but on the contrary was the victim of scheming enemies who planned and achieved her downfall; that Germany was never defeated but came out of the war victorious both on sea and land, though she was afterwards cheated of the fruits of victory by Wilson and his allies, aided by the Jews and Socialists; and that Germany is only her true self when she acts up to the principles of Frederick the Great and aims ruthlessly at war and conquest. Doubtless other nations, under similar conditions, might have worked themselves into some similar state of mind; and doubtless also there remain large masses of intelligent Germans who are not the dupes of Nazi or Nationalist propaganda; but the prospects are certainly not good for any general understanding on the question of "War-Guilt." The best policy would perhaps be to issue at the end of the Disarmament Conference, as part of the general convention then concluded, a joint statement on the line of those already made by Viscount Grey and

others, definitely rejecting the doctrine of Germany's sole guilt, and showing how some outbreak of war was almost inevitable under the pre-League system of sovereign independent states with conflicting policies and competitive armaments. True, no such statement would be likely to satisfy the demands of the Nazi propagandists or the Fichtebund ; but it is a great mistake to refuse to satisfy reasonable people by removing real grievances merely because unreasonable people will remain unsatisfied.

As regards the restoration of Germany as a colonial power, the possibilities and the difficulties have been outlined above. The chief difficulty is not, I believe, the mere impossibility of inducing any nation to give up a piece of its territory. What was impossible a generation ago may be far from impossible under the League system. During the war Mr. Bonar Law was as emphatic as Sir Edward Grey in expressing his reluctance to accept any increase of British territory. Since the war we have seen Denmark steadily refusing to accept as a gift from the Allies any part of her old possessions in Schleswig-Holstein which was not clearly and preponderantly Danish. Russia has willingly allowed her Polish territories to return to Poland. Austria, if she had not much real choice, at least abandoned gracefully her hold over her Polish Czech and Slovene provinces. The United States refused to look at a Mandate for Armenia or for Constantinople. And, if the Mandate system is strictly administered, the acceptance of the "sacred trust" must sometimes be more of a burden than an asset to the mandatory. One may even feel that, if some cession of territory would solve this question, it would be a positive advantage for Great Britain to perform the generous act. It would set a memorable example and put us in a strong position when it becomes necessary to urge similar sacrifices upon other powers. At the same time I must confess that I do not see what actual cession of territory by Great Britain would be practically advantageous in this matter ; and, as far as Africa is concerned, the future of that continent is so full of difficulties and so vastly important that it must be

considered for itself and by itself. It must not for a moment be made merely subsidiary to considerations of German prestige or to the conveniences of European politics. If one could dare to hope that the Mandate system, as now applied to Tanganyika, could be extended over all or most of the regions not suitable for permanent white settlement, a possibility would be opened both of securing a tolerable future for the natives and of giving Germany her share in administration. But such speculations lie outside the range of this chapter.

There remains the question of territorial revision. Here again it would be theoretically possible to dispense with Article XIX of the Covenant, and to remedy particular grievances by bringing pressure to bear on the States which benefited by the arrangements now condemned or questioned, in order to induce them to give up what they now possess. There are, however, reasons which make this a less satisfactory way of proceeding. The demand for revision, and the resistance to it, are like some element confined in a space too small for it, which must be given more room. But where shall the concession be made? Where the demand for rectification is best justified, or where the resistance is weakest, because the beneficiary is physically small and impotent? If we are to proceed by a process of private bargainings and negotiations, there are grave fears that the latter course may be chosen. The rumours that got about after the visit of Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon to Rome, whether well-founded or not, showed at least what the general public expected would be the result of such negotiations. Neither Great Britain nor Italy was to lose one inch of the former's mandated area in Africa, nor of the latter's non-Italian possessions, while by far the greatest brunt of the revision was to be borne precisely by that State with which Italy lives notoriously on the least friendly terms. It was quite impossible to read into these rumoured plans any evidence that the question of justice had been considered at all.

It would be absolutely fatal to proceed upon the system of

trying to satisfy the loudest complainant by concessions at the expense of the State least able to resist it. It is, in the first place, extremely doubtful whether, in the temper in which Germany, in particular, finds herself to-day, she could ever be "satisfied" at all. We may admit that this present sad situation is largely of our own making. Such a comment may particularly be allowed to those who, like the present writer, have incessantly laboured since 1919, both as a Delegate at the Assembly of the League and in political work at home, to induce the dominant powers to show more generosity and helpfulness towards the German Republic and so to strengthen those more liberal elements in Germany which had so long been trodden down by the militarists. If the Allied Powers had helped the Republic instead of covering it with insults in its early years and continuing to crush it with reparations until no more could possibly be paid, they might have induced the German people to regard their escape from the despotic militarism of the Hohenzollerns as a move into freedom and peace. As it is, the Republic is associated with misery and shame, and the old bad system is being exalted in memory, even by those who at the time loathed its cruelties and iniquities, into a sort of golden age, just as men in Turkey are now speaking of the "good old days" of Abdul Hamid ! Yet it would be easy to overstress this complaint. Germany has for many years met with great sympathy abroad, especially throughout the north of Europe. In this country the average popular feeling, always ready to admire a brave enemy, has been to a positively sentimental degree pro-German and anti-French. The crash of British finance in 1931 was very largely due to the excessive efforts of the Bank of England and other bodies to help Germany out of her difficulties. And certainly for many years back every discussion-group of Englishmen in which I have taken part at Geneva or at home has been eager to find out ways of "satisfying Germany." To-day, one is really inclined to agree with the final word in which a very open-minded Frenchman summed up one of these discussions : "the

way to satisfy Germany is to make her have won the War. Nothing else will do."

Secondly, to satisfy one of the ex-enemy Powers, if it could be done, at the expense of justice would not bring about permanent peace. Leaving old injustices unremedied, it would only add new ones to their number; and if there is one truth of which the experience of the past twelve years has convinced me more firmly than ever, it is that without justice peace cannot endure.

I should therefore like to see the whole question of frontier revision handled openly by the Assembly, and treated in the light of those principles of public morality and fair-dealing upon which the League of Nations rests. It would be well, I think, if all nations which profited by the war were to make a public declaration that they recognise that Article XIX is an integral part of the Covenant, and that they do not intend that it should remain a mere dead letter. A single declaration bearing on the subject was, indeed, made by a recent Assembly, on the initiative of China; but it was a singularly cautious one, and might well be repeated in very much stronger form. This might be followed up by an enquiry into the best means of making Article XIX practically effective. There is no denying that in its present form it is but a weak antidote to the rigidity of Article X. It is, in the first place, only advisory. The Assembly has no power whatever to decree the modification of any treaty; it can only "advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

A question has been raised whether this "advice," in order to be effective, must needs be unanimous. According to the letter of the Covenant it must; and the history of the drafting of the clause shows clearly that this was also the intention of its authors. But in reality the question is an unreal one. "Advice" is not compulsion; "advice" can at best only have moral authority behind it and the degree

of that moral authority will vary according to the number and weight of the nations which concur in the advice. If ever the Article is put in force it will probably be the second clause that is appealed to, not the first. Some "international condition" will have arisen, which may or may not be the result of a particular treaty, but which seems likely to "endanger the peace of the world." The danger may be generally admitted, but the problem of finding a solution remain unsolved. Then, under Article XIX, the Assembly may undertake to "advise." It would presumably set up a committee of experts to study the question, and if they reached a unanimous result the Assembly would almost certainly adopt it by a very large majority. One of the disputants would no doubt agree to accept the recommendation; the other would be exposed to the pressure of world opinion, which might vary from something hardly distinguishable from compulsion to a mere statement of opinion unbacked by any pressure, like the recent judgment unanimously given against Japan. In normal circumstances one would expect that the nation which was expected to make a sacrifice would begin by refusing but eventually, if the leading powers of the League were in earnest, would consent to make the required change.

The process may seem both slow and uncertain; but it is difficult to see any that would be an improvement. To make the "advice" compulsory would be futile where it was not dangerous: dangerous if it implied the threat of armed force, futile unless the nations were, as a matter of fact, ready to use armed force. At any rate the advantage over the pre-League system is both great and obvious. Formerly changes were made by war or the threat of war, and depended not upon justice but upon the will and strength of some interested nation. The disinterested nations, the only ones who cared for justice, had no concern in the matter. Under the League system any international condition which gives rise to friction or uneasiness can be brought before the Assembly and discussed, and the opinion of the civilized world can be brought to bear with whatever

degree of pressure the Assembly finds suitable. An inconvenient or unjust situation with only local consequences will probably be condemned and tolerated ; an atrocious situation or one causing widespread trouble will not be allowed to continue. For the coercive power of world opinion, when sincere and strongly felt by the Governments of the leading powers, is something which no nation can permanently resist.

In some respects a valuable lesson may be learnt from one of the League's great failures. The Manchurian Question went all wrong because Japan was allowed to take the law into her own hands. This was an utter disaster. Yet the action of the Assembly in the Sino-Japanese dispute does provide a useful indication of how treaty revision might be worked in the future. First there should be an injunction upon both sides to do nothing to alter the *status quo*. Then a neutral expert commission might be appointed to report fully and impartially into the facts of the case. Following the reception of the report, the Assembly should make recommendations to the parties, *ex æquo et bono*, as was done by the Special Assembly in February 1933.

It is by some such means as these that we may hope to see treaty revision effected peacefully in the future. I would repeat that the task is not easy, nor one which should be lightly undertaken. Probably, when the mass of complaints is sifted, only a comparatively small proportion would be found to be really so grievous as to require so drastic a remedy. It is even possible that here and there some very unexpected situations would arise, and the revision recommended would be against and not for the present complainant. It is also an operation which should be undertaken only with the most anxious and scrupulous care. But whether revision be granted or whether it be refused should be decided by no pandering to force on either side, no cowardly anxiety to placate the violent. Those who undertake it should bear graven on their minds those words of Wilson's which I quoted at the beginning of this essay.

"An evident principle runs through the whole programme. . . . It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.

"Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand."

CHAPTER III: THE PROBLEM OF RUSSIA

By C. M. LLOYD

War and Revolution. Russia, it has often been said, is the greatest obstacle to a world peace. Such a statement, since the advent of Hitlerism in Germany, is obviously absurd. But apart from that, how much truth is there in it and how much fancy? In the collection of sovereign States of to-day which we ironically call the comity of nations, Soviet Russia is an alien element. Not merely has it strange social institutions and a system and methods of government that shock the modern world—or at least the liberal-minded part of it, for another part has no compunction about the use of despotic and ruthless methods. The antagonism is more fundamental. The philosophy and aims of the Communists are a challenge to the very basis of capitalist society. Their ideal is a society in which inequalities of wealth, privileges of birth or rank, rights of private profit-making, have been abolished. And their business, as Communists, is to spread their gospel and inspire all mankind with their ideal. It is not surprising, therefore, that Soviet Russia has aroused widespread fear, hatred and distrust, and it was inevitable that in such an atmosphere there should be the gravest doubts about the possibility of universal and permanent peace. The Russians themselves would be the last to deny that; they would only deny that they are to be blamed for it. The fault, as they would insist, lies with the Capitalist States, indeed with capitalism itself, which leads to war as a matter of course. "War," in Stalin's words, "is necessary to the 'Imperialists,' for it is the only means of bringing about a redistribution of the world and its markets, of sources of raw materials, of spheres of influence, of capital." The one sure guarantee of the

universal brotherhood of peace is the establishment of Socialism.

But this fundamental antagonism, with the mutual fear and distrust that it breeds, does not necessarily mean that the Soviet State desires war or meditates armed aggression on its capitalist neighbours. In fact it means nothing of the sort, say the Communists ; and an examination of their principles and the policy they have pursued for the past fifteen years will show that in that sense, at any rate, Russia cannot fairly be called an obstacle to peace.

The Communists put their faith, of course, in revolution—World Revolution. They believe that Socialism will be brought about, that is, by violent means in every country, though the revolution need not, and evidently will not, take place in all at the same time. But the war which they envisage in this process is civil, and not international, war. It is no part of their purpose to invade other peoples' territories as did Napoleon, or to impose their doctrines with fire and sword, as the successors of the Prophet imposed Mohammedanism, or the Crusaders Christianity. "The Socialists," as Lenin put it in a pamphlet as far back as 1915, "have always condemned wars between peoples as barbarous and bestial. Our attitude towards war, however, differs in principle from that of the bourgeois pacifists and anarchists. We differ from the first in that we understand the inseparable connection between wars on the one hand and class-struggles inside a country on the other ; we understand the impossibility of eliminating wars without eliminating classes and creating Socialism, and in that we fully recognise the justice, the progressivism and the necessity of civil wars—i.e. wars of an oppressed class against the oppressor, of slaves against the slave-holders, of serfs against the land-owners, of wage-workers against the bourgeoisie." The Communist aim, therefore, is wherever possible "to turn imperialist war into civil war." The Red Army¹ is not designed for foreign adventure ; it is a purely defensive force. For its offensive against the capitalist world

¹ See Note on the Red Army at end of chapter.

Communism relies upon propaganda, upon the encouragement of class-strife, upon the moral, intellectual and financial support that it can furnish to the proletariat in its struggle with the bourgeoisie.

This subversive propaganda has, as everybody knows, given intense anxiety to the capitalist governments, and has proved a difficulty in the making of treaties and trade agreements. Attempts to stop it by prohibition, or by extracting pledges against it from the Soviet Government, have met with only moderate success, particularly because the Soviet Government can argue that it has nothing to do with propaganda abroad. It is, in fact, the Comintern, the Third International, which is responsible.¹ The Comintern is an organ—the supreme organ—of Communism, and as such has no direct connection with the constitution of the U.S.S.R. Actually, of course, the Communist Party rules the U.S.S.R., by the simple method of ensuring that its members occupy all the key positions in the country, political, economic and military. Technically, then, the Government is correct in saying that it does not control the Comintern. In practice it can exercise a great deal of control, if it chooses, since the leading members of the Government are also leading members of the Party. On

¹ The Comintern, or Communist International, was founded in opposition to the Second—the orthodox Socialist—International, which the Communists despise as a futile “reformist” body.

The Communist International was conceived in Switzerland in 1915 and 1916, by a group of Left wing and anti-war Socialists, which included Lenin and other prominent Russians. It came into being after the Bolsheviks were established in power. At its first Congress in Moscow in 1919 it provided itself with an ideology and a programme. A year later the programme was broadened and a constitution drawn up, which was subsequently elaborated.

Its general mission is, in the words of Lenin, “to organise the working classes throughout the world in order to destroy the capitalist order and to propagate Communism.” Its members are the Communist Parties of all countries, plus the “Young Communist International.” Its supreme body is a congress representative of all these affiliated parties, which meets every two years. The executive committee is elected by the congress, and wields absolute authority in the intervals between congresses.

The Comintern is thus not a purely Russian affair, though in fact it is dominated by the Russian Communists by virtue of their overwhelming power and prestige.

the other hand, it is true that the Foreign Office in Moscow cannot dictate to the Comintern, and that their policies have on a number of occasions been at odds. The one has been concerned to promote "World Revolution," the other to establish normal diplomatic and commercial relations with foreign countries. But neither has made war a part of its programme.

As regards the World Revolution, though the Communists' faith in it has never been abandoned, their belief in its immediacy has notably diminished. Early hopes—in the Baltic States, in Germany, in Hungary—were disappointed, and so again were later hopes which sprouted from time to time (e.g. on the occasion of the German rising in the Ruhr in 1923, and again in the Chinese upheaval in 1926). Trotsky tried to revive the old zeal, but Stalin beat him, and for the last five years all the energies of Russia have been concentrated on the policy of economic development at home. This does not, of course, mean that Communist propaganda is not being carried on—there are Communist Parties in every country to see to that, and they would continue their work, though doubtless under a severe handicap, even if the Soviet régime collapsed in Russia. But it does involve some change of attitude which we shall observe when we examine in more detail the foreign policy and relations of the U.S.S.R.

Russian Foreign Policy. Soviet foreign policy was from the outset a curious mixture of idealism and realism. The Bolsheviks had certain principles of international morality, which they lost no time in putting into practice. They denounced the secret diplomacy of the capitalist and imperialist States. They unearthed and exposed to the world a number of secret treaties that the Tsarist and other Governments had made, not a few of them of a disreputable character. They renounced concessions and privileges which their predecessors had enjoyed in foreign countries. In some cases, it may be said, they were only making a virtue of necessity. They were in no position, for example,

to uphold the "unequal treaties" in China in 1918; their enemies had not left them a foothold anywhere in the Far East. Be that as it may, however, they were acting on principle. And in general the principle had its practical advantages. It won them friends in the weaker States, who could be used to embarrass the stronger.

The supporting of weak States, as well as of "rebel" movements in dependencies and colonies was, indeed, a prominent feature of Soviet policy, especially in the earlier phase. In this it was following the line laid down by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* in 1848: "The Communists support everywhere every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political conditions." The results in Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia, where the prime object was to distract and damage the arch-imperialist Power, Great Britain, and to fortify Russian influence in the Middle East, were very encouraging to Moscow. In China a similar policy was pursued on a more ambitious scale a few years later, and for a time gave promise of a still more startling success; but it ended in disaster.

Yet it must not be supposed that the Soviet Government was ever wholly, or even mainly, engaged in activities of this sort. It has never, indeed, lost sight of its mission of defending and extending the Revolution. But for that it is essential first and foremost to defend and consolidate Russia itself. Soviet foreign policy has therefore set itself to protecting the territory of the Union against attack, by arrangements with its neighbours, by treaties of neutrality and non-aggression, whilst carefully avoiding anything in the nature of entangling alliances, or associations with other Powers which might involve it in difficulties. And it is noticeable that no sentimental or idealistic considerations have been allowed to stand in the way of guarding Russia's interests. Hateful as Fascism is to Communism, Moscow has been careful not to offend Mussolini, and it hastened (to the scandal, it must be said, of many in the Party) to put itself on good terms with Hitler in the hour of his most savage attack on "Marxism" in Germany.

At the same time strenuous efforts have been made to strengthen the economic position of the country by trade agreements and by a persistent pressure for credits. The negotiation of these trade agreements was in fact the most urgent business that faced the Bolsheviks when they had at last disposed of foreign invaders and native counter-revolutionaries, and their maintenance and extension has been a cardinal point of policy ever since.

The next stage was the securing of *de jure* recognition and the establishing of normal diplomatic relations with the capitalist world in general. Down to 1924 this had been achieved only with the Baltic Border States and Poland and Germany in Europe, and with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan in Asia. In that year the list was extended to cover all the Great Powers except the United States, and most of the minor Powers of any consequence. The relations thus established were not as a rule cordial—for Soviet Russia continued to be a pariah—and they have been marred by a number of more or less serious disputes, and by one or two temporary ruptures (e.g. with Great Britain in 1927, and with China in the same year). But they have been sufficiently good—or, as some might prefer to say, sufficiently bad—to stimulate Russia to further advances towards international co-operation. She has, in this last stage, while pursuing her own independent line and maintaining her opposition to the League of Nations, taken a part, and a prominent part, in the Disarmament Conference. Of this we shall have a good deal more to say presently; but first we must survey in a little detail the relations of the U.S.S.R. with a number of different States—the neighbours that ring it round in Europe and in Asia, and the Great Powers that lie behind the ring. We shall see throughout this picture the constant interplay of fear and hope—fear of attack and hope of trade—the conflict of dogma and expediency, of international revolutionism and national economic needs. While Lenin lived, his was the guiding hand in foreign, as in domestic, policy. What course Russia might have shaped but for his premature death in 1924, it

is idle to conjecture. In the spectacular struggle for the succession both sides posed as the true Leninists—Trotsky standing for the World Revolution thesis, Stalin for concentration on the building of Socialism in the national State. Stalin's victory resulted in the Five Year Plan. A Trotsky victory would almost certainly have resulted in something similar—for he claims to have been the real author of the Plan—but its international reactions might have been very different.

The Baltic States and Poland. On the European side Russia is flanked by a row of new Sovereign States which were formerly part of the Tsar's Empire. There was naturally plenty of trouble between them and the Bolsheviks in the first year or two after the Revolution, and the antagonism of "Red" and "White" has persisted since, particularly in Finland. But any hopes which the Russians had of re-absorbing the Baltic provinces in the form of Soviet Republics were abandoned by 1920, when treaties were signed with Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The independence of each was recognised "by virtue of the principle proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of the Russian Soviets, which establishes the right to self-determination for all nations, even to total separation from the States with which they have been incorporated." It was a peace which still left room for many diplomatic difficulties, and it was threatened by Polish intrigues for an anti-Russian "Baltic *bloc*." But the Poles overplayed their hand. Finland preferred to look after herself, and was strong enough to do so. Esthonia and Latvia are economically close to Russia, and Lithuania has a deep-seated political feud with the Poles, who have filched Vilna from her. A policy of prudence therefore has been pursued, and treaties of non-aggression have been concluded by all four with the U.S.S.R. Save in the event of a general upheaval there seems no ground for serious anxiety in this quarter.

Poland was more formidable. With her 1920 brought not peace, but war—a war which was certainly not of Russia's

seeking. The Poles were intent on the extension and consolidation of their eastern frontiers, and they were egged on by France. They had considerable success at the outset ; but the tide turned after they had occupied Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, and the Red Army drove them back to the gates of Warsaw. Then the Russian strategy failed, and peace was very soon made, in which Poland got good terms, both as regards her boundaries and in other ways. Polish-Soviet relations nevertheless continued to be awkward, and for this the reasons are not far to seek. There were the secular hostility of the two peoples and the mutual fears of Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks ; the incurable ambitions and pretensions of Poland to extend her dominion over the Baltic States and the Ukraine ; her position as the outpost of the capitalist West and the vassal of France. But with the cooling of French ardour for the Poles, Russo-Polish tension was considerably eased, and a pact of non-aggression and a conciliation convention were ratified towards the end of 1932. The Nazi upheaval in Germany a few months later brought Warsaw and Moscow still closer together.

Rumania and the Bessarabian Question. Between Russia and Rumania the Bessarabian question is an old bone of contention, and it has been the principal obstacle to Rumanian recognition of the Soviet régime. Bessarabia has had a chequered history. Under the Ottoman Empire it formed part of the principality of Moldavia. It was ceded to Russia by the Turks in 1812, and later in the nineteenth century it became a Rumanian "irredenta." In 1917, after the Bolshevik Revolution, a national "Moldavian Committee" sprang up in Bessarabia. It began by demanding Home Rule within the Russian Empire, and then proclaimed an independent Moldavian Republic, and invited Rumanian troops to enter the country to preserve order. They came, and they stayed ; for the Revolutionary Government in Petrograd was then in no position to do more than protest. The occupation was supposed to be only temporary ; but, though Rumania had actually agreed to hand Bessarabia

back to Russia, she held on to it, basing her claim on the pre-1812 position, and her sovereignty was recognised by Great Britain, France and Italy. There have been various negotiations over the question, and Russia has even proposed a plebiscite of the inhabitants, but this was refused by the Rumanian Government. In international law, Bessarabia does not belong *de jure* to Rumania, and the Russians appear to be justified in maintaining their claim to it. They have, however, shown no sign of a desire to recover it by force, and the signature in July, 1933, of a non-aggression pact between the two countries (see p. 186 below) is a guarantee that, even if Bessarabia remains a bone of contention, it will be kept on the shelf. It is quite likely, too, that this pact may be the prelude to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Rumania and the Soviet.

Turkey. To the south, Russia is concerned principally with three States—Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia. With these she put herself on good terms at an early stage. Soviet diplomacy was, as we have said, both realist and idealist. It had one eye on the recovery of Russia's traditional influence in the Near and Middle East, and the other on the fomenting of discontent and the infliction of damage on the capitalist and imperialist Powers, which in this case meant mainly Great Britain. The lines of this latter policy were laid down at the Second Congress of the Third International in August 1920, and a month later a congress of the Peoples of the East was convoked at Baku, whence the message was trumpeted to Asia. At the same time Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was discussing with Kemal Pasha the resumption of diplomatic relations. Turkey and Russia, who were both struggling against the Allied Powers and their satellites, found themselves in a natural sympathy. Kemal pressed for an alliance, but Russia was not disposed to add fighting with the Greeks to her other burdens, and she contented herself with supplying arms, money and advice to the Turks. Relations presently

became awkward, when the Turkish army occupied Batum ; but this was very soon returned to Russia in exchange for Kars and Ardahan (which had been taken from the Sultan in 1878 and retroceded to Turkey by the treaty of Brest Litovsk), and a treaty was signed in the middle of March 1921. It laid the foundations of friendship between the two States, regulated the Caucasian frontiers,¹ abolished the capitulations which Russia had enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire, and cancelled old indemnities and debts due from the Turks. The new Russia and the new Turkey appeared now to be hand and glove. Some of the more optimistic Communists even had hopes that Kemal and his " People's Party " would find their spiritual home in Moscow. But it was soon evident that he had his own ideas, and his dictatorship developed on a quite different pattern from the Russian. In 1923, at the Conference of Lausanne, there was a triangular duel over the Dardanelles question between Turkey, Russia and Great Britain, in which the Russians were worsted. Nevertheless, though the Turks no longer lean on Russia, the friendly relations, which were confirmed by a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression signed in 1925, and renewed in 1929, have not been disturbed. Kemal Pasha was, it may be believed, speaking sincerely when not long ago he declared in the National Assembly at Angora : " We have deeply appreciated the warm welcome which our Foreign Minister received from our great neighbour and friend, Soviet Russia, on the occasion of his recent visit to Moscow." The secular struggle

¹ Russia and Turkey were both vitally interested in one way or another in Transcaucasia, and had been greatly embarrassed by the setting up of the three independent Republics of Georgia, Erivan, and Azerbaijan. These unfortunate States found themselves threatened by Turks and Bolsheviks, and also by Denikin and his counter-revolution ; they were at odds with one another ; and they were exploited by the Allied Powers for their own purposes. The three States had a short life. Russia recovered control of Azerbaijan, with the oilfields of Baku, in the spring of 1920. Erivan (the old Russian Armenia) was attacked by the Turks a few months later, and ultimately was broken up between Turkey and Russia. In 1921 Georgia, which was under a Socialist but anti-Bolshevik régime, lost the independence which had been guaranteed by Russia in the previous year.

of Tsar and Sultan, which centred on Constantinople and the Straits, has been abandoned, and in this corner of the world there seems to be no reason to anticipate trouble.

Afghanistan. The Third Anglo-Afghan war in the summer of 1919 gave the Bolsheviks their opportunity to ingratiate themselves with the Ameer Amanullah. Unfortunately for them the war was all over in a couple of months, and their efforts to persuade the Afghans to launch another attack on India were unsuccessful. Amanullah, however, by the terms of the peace with Great Britain, had gained full independence for his country, though he had lost the subsidy which we had paid to his predecessor, and he showed himself friendly enough to Russia. Throughout 1920 Kabul was a hive of agitation and intrigue. This, so far as the Russians were concerned, was directed to the subverting of India ; it was complicated by Turkish agents, who were at one with the Bolsheviks in their hostility to Great Britain, but were less interested in rescuing the "toiling Indian masses" than in Pan-Islamic and pro-Turkish schemes. All this, however, came to nothing, and the Russians had to be content with establishing themselves on a firm footing in Afghanistan. By a treaty signed early in 1921, diplomatic and trading relations, as well as boundaries, were settled ; Russia undertook to supply technical experts and to construct a telegraph line ; and both parties pledged themselves not to enter into any agreement with any third State which would be detrimental to either Russia or Afghanistan. The Soviet Government also promised to subsidise Amanullah.

Relations were soon seriously strained by an anti-Bolshevik revolt in Turkestan, which received considerable Afghan support. But after this had been suppressed, the tension was relaxed, and a further treaty of non-aggression was concluded three or four years later. The Russians made much of Amanullah when he visited Moscow in 1928 (though they were under no illusions about his character) ; but they dropped him when he was fighting

for his throne on his return home, and made friends at once with his successor, the present Ameer. This prince, though he is not in the pocket of Moscow, declared his intention of cultivating the friendship of the Soviet Union "as the nearest and most useful neighbour of Afghanistan." And as Afghanistan is equally useful to the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks are not likely to do anything to disturb the harmony.

Persia. Persia was a stiffer task for the Bolsheviks. The end of the Great War found Britain in control there, and the Anglo-Persian Agreement which Lord Curzon tried to impose on the country in 1919 shut Russia completely out—and also let the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in. But in 1920 the Red Army entered the country in pursuit of fugitives from Denikin's forces, and occupied Resht; and a Communist régime was set up by one Kuchak Khan in Ghilan, in the north-west, under Russian auspices and was actually maintained for over a year. After a long and confused struggle, the British forces withdrew from the north; the Anglo-Persian Agreement went into the waste-paper basket (save for the oil concession) and a Soviet-Persian treaty took its place. In this, as in the treaty with Turkey, Russia both gave and gained. Tsarist encroachments were abandoned; all previous agreements and concessions, as well as old debts, were cancelled; the Bank of Persia was handed over to Persia; frontiers were regulated. As a result, though few Persians, whether proletarians or bourgeois, showed any leaning towards Communism, Russian influence became dominant—except in the south, where the British still maintained their hold. There was a change, however, when Riza Khan became Shah at the end of 1925. This shrewd and masterful soldier before his ascent of the throne was a Russophile in action, whether or not he was so at heart. But now his independent and nationalistic policy gave offence to the Soviet Government, and a year and more of wrangling passed before the tension was eased and a new treaty was signed in October 1927.

Japan. The Far East has long been one of the danger spots of the world, and there is every prospect of its continuing to be so. The Soviets had from the outset to take stock of Japan's strength and China's weakness. The former has enjoined a consistent policy of caution ; the latter has involved them in many difficulties and one remarkable adventure.

As far back as the seventeenth century Russian pioneers had reached the Pacific coast. But it was not till two hundred years or so later that their position was consolidated and legalised. Though weakened by her defeat in the Japanese War that the Tsar's Government so rashly plunged into in 1904, Russia was still powerful in the Far East at the outbreak of the Great War. When the Bolsheviks got into the saddle, the situation was very different. The Japanese were in control of the Maritime Province and Vladivostok, and all Siberia was a battle-ground swarming with foreign interventionists and White Russian counter-revolutionaries. Japan was the most active and persistent of the interventionist Powers, and it was not until 1922 that she completely evacuated Russian territory. Even then relations remained difficult. They were, however, improving in 1924, and the irritation caused to Japan by the passing in that year of the Oriental Exclusion Act in the United States, which was skilfully played upon by the Russians, greatly helped towards the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese treaty in 1925. By this treaty the Soviet Union gained *de jure* recognition, a Russian trade delegation was established in Japan, and various outstanding disputes were more or less settled. It was, however, a general *modus vivendi* rather than a cordial peace. Japan continued quietly to extend her influence in Manchuria, and especially her hold over the railway systems there ; Russia could do little or nothing to prevent this. There was nothing in the nature of a serious quarrel, and there even were one or two occasions when the realists of Tokio and the realists of Moscow seemed to be on almost brotherly terms (as when, e.g., Japan took the Russian side in the big Chinese Eastern Railway dispute

between Russia and China in 1929). But the Japanese invasion of Manchuria created an extremely delicate situation for the Soviets, and in the summer of 1932 they feared that, despite all their conciliatory efforts, they were going to be forced into war. The scare passed, but in the spring of 1933 they were involved in another ugly dispute with Japan's puppet State of Manchukuo over the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was evident that the Japanese meant to force the issue ; the Russians, equally determined against fighting, offered to sell their interest in the railway and, after some diplomatic shufflings, negotiations to that end were begun. No doubt Japan will get what she wants, and get it cheap. But her designs will not cease to give anxiety to Russia.

China. When the Bolsheviks came into power they found China among their enemies ; but she was in a different category from the rest, and they lost no time in making friendly gestures to her—or at least to those elements in China which they thought they could approach with any chance of success. In 1919 the Soviet Government issued a manifesto, which was renewed the following year, to "The Chinese Nation and the Governments of Southern and Northern China." In this they proclaimed the right of all peoples to self-determination ; announced that territory seized by the Tsarist Government from China would be returned, that the Boxer indemnity and all privileges (including extraterritoriality) hitherto enjoyed by Russia would be renounced ; and urged the Chinese to realise that their "only allies and brothers in the struggle for liberty are the Russian worker and peasant and the Red Army of Russia."

"Young China" was favourably affected by all this, especially as it was plain that the Paris Peace Conference was doing little to protect Chinese interests. Official circles, however, were cautious, and there was a considerable period of agitation and friction before Soviet influence succeeded in establishing itself in China. During 1923 there

were comings and goings between the Chinese Nationalists and the Russians, and 1924 saw the signature of an "Agreement on General Principles for the settlement of questions between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R." One of the questions so settled was that of Outer Mongolia. There, after a long period of confusion and fighting, a "People's Revolutionary Government" had been set up in 1921, with the help of the Russian Red Army, and this was tantamount to a declaration of Mongolia's independence. The treaty of 1924 recognised Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Chinese Republic, and withdrew the Soviet troops, but left a Mongolian "Red Army" in their place. China thus got, and continues to enjoy, the shadow, whilst the U.S.S.R. has the substance, since Outer Mongolia is for all practical purposes outside Chinese control, and lives—perhaps to its advantage—under Russian influence. A portion of Mongolia, which had in 1923 formed itself into a separate State on the Soviet pattern, retained its independence, and is, under the name of the Tanu Tuva Republic, one of the constituent units of the U.S.S.R.

After the *rapprochement* of 1924 China offered a tempting opportunity to the Bolsheviks to carry out their principles. They might help to liberate the Chinese people from its bondage, and deliver a blow at the capitalists and imperialists of the West. The result, as the more optimistic spirits in Moscow hoped, might eventually be the establishment of a Socialist Republic in China, beside which the little outpost in Mongolia would be a bagatelle.

Michael Borodin, the chief Soviet emissary, had arrived at Canton in the autumn of 1923, and the Russians set to work patiently and methodically to develop the Chinese Nationalist movement. It was Borodin who drew up a programme on radical and democratic lines, for the first Kuomintang Congress in 1924. He and his fellow advisers also gave effective aid in reorganising the civil administration, and in training the Chinese "National Army" at Canton; and when this army (accompanied by a "political department," with a printing press, posters, proclamations

and propagandists galore) set out in 1926 on its triumphant advance against the North, the Russian influence was at its height. But immediately after the victories on the Yangtse, violent dissensions broke out between the Left Wing of the Kuomintang, who had established their seat of government at Hankow, and Chiang Kai-shek, the Commander-in-Chief. This was not surprising to those who knew the situation from the inside; the Kuomintang had quite early been a house divided against itself, and Chiang had previously shown anti-Communist proclivities in Canton. But it was ominous for the new régime and for the Russian plans. The military position was precarious; Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord, was coming down from the north; Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian General," was playing a game of his own on the left flank; and in Hankow itself the generals, the bourgeois, the proletarians and the peasants, formed anything but a united front. At the same time Trotsky and his friends in Moscow were pressing for a definite Communist policy in China—the arming of workers and peasants, the creation of a Red Army, the organisation of Soviets. That, in existing conditions, would have been a hopeless enterprise.

Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. was involved in difficulties over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. A dispute about Chang Tso-lin's claim to transport his troops free of charge led to his arresting the Russian general manager of the line and a number of other officials. He yielded to an ultimatum from Moscow and released the prisoners; but before long he had started a fresh quarrel and seized the river steamers of the C.E.R. The trouble dragged on, and in the spring of 1927 there were raids on the Soviet Embassy in Peking and on the Consulate and a number of Russian offices at Shanghai. The Soviet Government thereupon broke off relations with the Peking Government.

In the south the rupture came a few months later. Borodin had left the country; the Hankow Government was dispersed, and Chiang Kai-shek and the "moderates" were in control at Nanking. In December 1927 there was

an abortive Communist *coup d'état* at Canton, which was ascribed to Russian propaganda. This was followed by a raid on the Soviet Consulate, the summary execution of several of its staff and many others, and a general campaign against Soviet citizens up and down the country. At the same time the Nanking Government repudiated relations with the U.S.S.R. ; and thus ended the whole revolutionary adventure, as it had shaped itself to Russian—or at least to some Russian—eyes. The doctrinaires in Moscow had miscalculated, though Borodin on the spot, and Stalin and many others at home, knew better. China was not ready for Communism. What the prospects of Communism may be in the future, whether or not it will ever prove acceptable to the Chinese masses in general, what significance the native Communist Party has in China to-day—these are matters of controversy which it is not our business to discuss here.

In the last five years Russia, with her energies directed to economic development at home, has been concerned but little with China—except at one point. The Chinese Eastern Railway continued to be a source of trouble, and its seizure in 1927 by Chang Hsueh-liang, the son and successor of Chang Tso-lin, brought Soviet troops into Manchuria. There was a good deal of desultory fighting, in which the Chinese proved no match for the Russians, and eventually Chang Hsueh-liang capitulated. Russian prestige was enhanced and Russian control of the railway was restored. But it was not to be for long ; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 opened a new chapter.

Meanwhile “independent” China is regarded, in Stalin’s contemptuous phrase, as an arena in which “hordes of counter-revolutionary Kuomintang partisans, headed by their generals, fight with each other, ruin the country and the people, and carry out thereby the will of their masters from the imperialist camp.” With one of these “hordes,” however—the National Government at Nanking—the U.S.S.R. resumed diplomatic relations in 1933.

Great Britain. We must turn now to the Great Powers of the West—Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States.

Anglo-Soviet relations have had a chequered history. No country has enjoyed a larger share of Russian abuse than Great Britain, and none has had its friendship more sought after by Russia. Political prejudice and bad psychology on both sides have again and again hindered an understanding, or upset it when it has been reached. There have been constant disputes on one matter or another—propaganda, debts, oil, religious persecution, the “dumping” of Russian corn and timber, the arrest of British subjects.

The original Anglo-Russian trade agreement of 1921 was followed three years later by the *de jure* recognition of the Soviet accorded by Mr. MacDonald's Government. Negotiations for a settlement of all outstanding questions and a comprehensive treaty proved difficult. There was haggling over the payment of the British bondholders. The Bolsheviks repudiated liability for debts incurred under the Tsarist régime; but they were prepared to make a composition with the creditors, in return for a loan which should be guaranteed by the British Government. After many hitches, an agreement was reached and a draft treaty prepared; but the defeat of Mr. MacDonald's Government at the general election relegated this treaty to limbo. The Conservatives would have nothing to do with it, and they maintained an attitude of bare toleration of the Soviets. In 1927 the Arcos offices and the headquarters of the Russian Trade Delegation in London were raided by the police, under the orders of the Home Secretary, and the result, as had been intended, was a rupture of diplomatic relations. Trade, indeed, went on between England and Russia, but under awkward conditions and in a greatly diminished volume. In 1926, the year before the raid, the value of exports and re-exports from the United Kingdom to the U.S.S.R. was, according to the Board of Trade returns, £14,401,000, and of imports from the U.S.S.R.

into the U.K. £24,100,000. In 1928 the corresponding figures were £4,800,000 and £21,500,000.

The second Labour Government in 1930 restored diplomatic relations and concluded a new trade agreement. Discussions of the debt question were resumed, but came to nothing. Fresh trouble occurred after the Ottawa Conference, when the British Government announced that it must cancel the Anglo-Russian trade agreement. This, however, need not have been serious, for it was intended to draw up a new agreement, and negotiations were actually going on and promising well, when in March 1933, they were upset by the arrest and trial of the Metropolitan-Vickers engineers and the imposition by the British Government of an embargo on Soviet imports. There were a couple of months of deadlock, before this unfortunate episode was ended by the exercise of common sense on both sides. Although the situation is now easier, anti-Russian prejudice is still rampant in the Conservative Party.

France. French policy towards the Soviets has been, like British policy, in turns hot and cold—or to put it more accurately, lukewarm and icy. France has always had her fanatical anti-Bolsheviks, not quite so vociferous perhaps as ours, but equally eager to isolate or destroy Soviet Russia. Her diplomacy has, like ours, been complicated, though by different considerations. British Governments have been worried by the subversive activities of Communism in Asia; French Governments have been concerned with Russia as a factor in the Central European problem, and especially in connection with Germany and with Poland. But the outstanding cause of difference between Paris and Moscow has been the debt question. An immense amount of French money (something like fourteen milliards of gold francs, it is said, or £560,000,000) was invested in pre-war Russia, sunk in railways and other public utilities, as well as in private enterprises. The Bolsheviks would not acknowledge these Tsarist debts, and they had moreover confiscated a great deal of French-owned property.

Attempts at a comprehensive settlement were made in 1926, but with the same result as those in London a couple of years before. The agreement which looked near was destroyed by a change of Government. The new Prime Minister, M. Poincaré, was implacably hostile, and though negotiations were resumed in 1927, they soon broke down ; Rakovsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, was recalled, and relations settled down once more to their normal state of chilliness. But they improved later, and in 1933 pacts of non-aggression and conciliation¹ were concluded between France and the U.S.S.R. At the moment when the British Government was at daggers drawn with Moscow, M. Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister, was hailing the renewal of Soviet friendship. " Without its being a revival

¹ The main points of the Franco-Soviet Conciliation Convention (which is typical of others) are as follows.

All disputes arising between France and the U.S.S.R., which cannot be regulated by ordinary diplomatic means, shall be passed to a Conciliation Commission for amicable settlement.

The Conciliation Commission shall consist of four members—two French and two Soviet citizens—appointed for each session by their respective Governments.

The Commission will meet alternately in Paris and Moscow, once a year. In urgent cases it may hold extraordinary meetings.

A session is not to last more than fifteen days, unless both Governments agree that it shall be prolonged.

The Commission will determine its own procedure. At each session it will elect a president from among its members who is to be a citizen of the country in which the meeting is being held.

Either Government may appoint experts who will participate in the work of the Commission in an advisory capacity ; and the Commission itself may by general agreement demand to hear any person whose evidence it thinks may be useful.

The whole of the members must be present at meetings of the Commission, and decisions must be unanimous.

The Commission must study all questions referred to it by both Governments, and before the end of each session it will present to both of them its report, together with a draft plan for the regulation of such questions. If unanimity cannot be reached on any question, that question may, at the request of either of the parties, be brought up again at an extraordinary session which shall be held within four months.

The two Governments are bound to facilitate the work of the Commission, especially by furnishing it with all relevant documents and information. They are also bound to refrain, during the period of the conciliation process, from any measures likely to prejudice the proposals of the Commission.

of the former Franco-Russian alliance," he said, in a speech in the Senate, "it rendered a new service to the cause of peace. What would give it its value was the commercial agreements which were to form its complement, and with regard to these the hands of France were entirely free. He hoped that good relations might be re-established with a great nation which would play its part in the world."

Italy. With Italy, as with the other principal Powers, a commercial agreement was concluded in 1921, but it was only a temporary affair. A full trade treaty was signed, and *de jure* recognition accorded to the Soviet Government, in 1924. Though Fascism and Communism are mortal enemies, Mussolini is a realist. He had no interest in quarrelling with Russia. He was not afraid of Bolshevik propaganda nor had he any Tsarist debt problem to worry him. There was no conflict of markets between the two countries; Italy wanted food and raw materials from Russia, and could supply machinery and other goods to Russia. Soviet purchases in Italy, according to the U.S.S.R. customs returns, reached the figure of 30,000,000 roubles in 1931, and 27,000,000 in 1932. A storm threatened in 1927, when Mussolini's Balkan policy led him to recognise Rumania's sovereignty over Bessarabia. This gave great offence to Moscow; but there was no rupture. In May, 1933, a new trade agreement was signed, which was regarded by both sides as eminently satisfactory. It contained a tariff convention with a reciprocal "most favoured nation" clause, and also increased credit guarantees for Russian orders placed in Italy.

Germany. In Germany the Russians were deeply interested from the first. Germany was the principal victim of the Great War, and it was a cardinal point of Bolshevik policy, as has already been said, to support the victim against the victor States. Germany, moreover, was valuable as a counterweight to Poland and France. And last but not least, the friendship of Germany was very important

economically. German machinery and German technical experts of all kinds have played a big part in the reconstruction of Russia.

The Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 established a connection which gave great satisfaction both to Russia and to Germany, with corresponding annoyance to France and Great Britain. There were tiffs from time to time between the two Governments over various matters, but eventually Russo-German relations were put on a firm basis by the Treaty of Berlin in 1926 and have not since been seriously disturbed. The Treaty of Berlin was renewed in 1931, and again with the Hitler Government in May, 1933. There was also renewed at the same time the Conciliation Convention, which had been concluded in 1929. This Convention is of great interest, for it was the first to set up the new form of machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, which we have just described. How far it, or any other agreement, will prove effective against the sinister designs harboured by Nazi Germany, is a matter on which we cannot speculate here.

The U.S.A. In their grandiose schemes of industrialisation the Russians have taken the United States as their chief exemplar. They have copied American methods; they have been bitten with the American love of bigness; they have used American engineers and experts and American machinery. It may seem odd, therefore, that the United States should be the only important country in the world which has persistently refused to recognise the U.S.S.R. That has not been for want of trying on the part of the Russians and of a considerable section of American opinion. But Washington, supported by various interests, ranging from the bankers to that highly respectable and conservative body the American Federation of Labour, has stood firm. Apart from general political and moral prejudice, debts and propaganda have been the most prominent factors in this attitude—though American claims on Russia are relatively small, and Communist propaganda

is mere bugaboo. "The menace of Bolshevism in the United States," as an American newspaper magnate wrote a few years ago, "is about as great as the menace of sunstroke in Greenland or chilblains in the Sahara."

The absence of official relations, however, has by no means prevented trade between the two countries. The total Russo-American trade turnover stood in 1923 at only 13 per cent of its pre-war figure. But it went up by leaps and bounds in succeeding years, and in 1930 was more than treble the pre-war value. (It had dropped again heavily in 1932.) The Russians, of course, lay stress on the importance of this development, and no doubt they are right in urging that it could be still further advanced by official recognition. But it has seemed a great deal less important to Washington and New York and Chicago than to Moscow. And American coolness is very largely explained, as Mr. Louis Fischer pointed out two or three years ago in *The Soviets In World Affairs*, by the belief that "the United States does not need the Soviet Union. Even though trade has increased far beyond pre-war limits, the total still plays too small a rôle in America's tremendous trade turnover to affect foreign policy. And, although the Soviet Union might be a profitable field for investment, American lenders still find plenty of borrowers elsewhere."

But this question it is not our business to pursue. Whatever may be the state of commerce, or whether or not the United States presently changes its mind about the recognition of the U.S.S.R., neither country has any designs that threaten a breach of the peace between the two. The only spot where their interests have a direct point of contact is the Far East. That, to be sure, is an important spot, where it may well be that incalculable trouble is brewing. But a clash between America and Russia is not one of the probabilities. There is even a likelihood, as some think, of a *rapprochement* based on a common hostility to Japan.

Russia's Fear of War. It is clear enough from our survey that, whatever faults it may have, Soviet policy cannot be

accused of jingoism. Russia has no desire for war against any nation. She has ample grounds, not only of principle, but of expediency, for avoiding it. A foreign war would mean the dislocation, and perhaps the utter ruin, of the economic planning and development which she has been pursuing with such concentration of her energies and resources for the past five years, and which she must pursue for many years to come. And whether the Plan is going well or ill, war would be equally disastrous. Even preparations for defence against attack may create grave embarrassments; the provisioning of troops on the Far Eastern frontier in 1931 and 1932, for example, was a contributory cause of the shortage of food from which the home population has suffered so severely. Nor even from a military point of view is the Soviet Union adequately equipped for any serious contest abroad. It has an immense man power; its troops are of high morale, and its armaments may be reasonably strong. But communications are poor and could not stand any severe strain. Soviet policy is summed up with perfect sincerity in Stalin's words to the Sixteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party, in 1930: "Our policy is a policy of peace and of a strengthening of commercial relations with all countries. . . . We do not claim one inch of foreign land, but neither will we give up a single inch of our own land."

Nor is this last sentence a mere rhetorical flourish. The Russian Communists have a very lively apprehension of other people's designs on their land, and still more on their régime. They are in fact obsessed by the fear of attack from the capitalist Powers. That fear seems to many of us absurdly exaggerated—and on occasion quite baseless (as e.g. after the Arcos Raid in London and the collapse in China in 1927, when all Russia thought war was imminent). But it is not inexplicable. Russians have not yet got the taste of the early years of the Revolution out of their mouths—the years of foreign invasion and counter-revolution. And if it is pointed out to them that circumstances are very different now, they will reply that the feelings of hatred

and jealousy in the capitalist world have not diminished, have indeed even increased as the challenge of Socialism has become more formidable. How much truth and how much error there is in that view is a matter which need not be argued here. What it is important to realise is the strength with which it is held and the effect which it has on Moscow's international policy. It makes the Soviet Government at once eager to come to terms with the capitalist Powers, sceptical of their good faith, and fearful of the risk of putting its head into the lion's mouth.

Russia and the League of Nations. Isolated as she has been, partly through the general enmity and partly from her own choice, Russia has striven to insure herself against attack by treaties of non-aggression with this State or that. But all these are more or less precarious, and more comprehensive and firmer guarantees are obviously needed for real security. What then is, and may be, Russia's attitude to the League of Nations and to other attempts at concerted action against war? These are questions that we must now examine fully. So far as the future is concerned, there must be a large element of conjecture in our estimates, as the reader will understand. Nobody yet knows whether Germany is going to turn the world upside down.

Russia and the United States of America are the two Great Powers which are not members of the League; and their absence has been one of the chief weaknesses of the League. That, of course, was realised from the outset and deplored by everyone in the case of the U.S.A. But Bolshevik Russia was another matter; there was no question, in early days at least, of this outcast entering the polite company at Geneva. Later there was a change of mind, and Russia's entry would have been welcomed by many, if only on the ground that she would be less dangerous inside than outside. This, indeed, was the ground on which it was favoured by M. Briand and the French, and by some of the Baltic States. But in vain was the net spread in sight of the bird; the Russians never showed the slightest disposition

to come in. Not only were they averse, like the Americans, to entangling themselves in other people's affairs. They had objections of a moral order. Those "other people" were the enemies of Russia, and their character and their aims were abominable to the Communists. "The Soviet Government," said a Note from the Moscow Foreign Office to the Secretary-General of the League in 1923, "regards the so-called League of Nations as a coalition of certain States endeavouring to usurp power over other States, and masking their attempts on the rights and independence of other nations by a false appearance of groundless legality and in the form of mandates issued by the Council or the Assembly of the League. . . . The Soviet Government maintains its conviction that this pseudo-international body really serves as a mere mask to conceal from the masses the aggressive aims of the imperialistic policy of certain Great Powers or their vassals." That view, however erroneous or short-sighted it may appear, was natural enough in all the circumstances and given the basic political assumptions of Communism. And though it might be less cynically expressed, and might have to be somewhat qualified to-day, since Germany and the other "victim" States who were excluded in 1923 are now members of the League, it has remained substantially the view of the orthodox Communist. In 1926, after Germany's entry into the League, despite the desperate efforts of the Russians to dissuade her, Rakovsky warmly repudiated rumours that Russia was going to do likewise. "Our whole social organisation is against it," he said. "Germany's economic and political structure is similar to that of the other Great Powers, and she can fit herself into the League. For us there can be no question of it." And four years later, we find Stalin speaking contemptuously of the "decaying League of Nations."

Nevertheless, the Russians, while continuing to ridicule or abuse the League, were prepared to associate themselves with certain of its activities, where that was clearly to their own advantage and involved them in no risky commitments.

As far back as 1922 the Soviet Government collaborated with the Health Commission of the League in its efforts to combat epidemics, especially typhus (which was scourging Russia after the civil war and the famine). They took part also in international congresses on the questions of transport, of "intellectual co-operation," and even of economic co-operation in general; their delegation played an active rôle at the Economic Conference at Geneva in 1927. It was here that they stated explicitly and publicly their belief that peace and collaboration were possible between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist States. Indeed, collaboration was, in Chicherin's words, "imperatively necessary in the interest of general economic reconstruction." That was obvious to every sensible person, though there were many anti-Bolsheviks who sneered at the conciliatory attitude of Moscow, alleging that it was inspired merely by the aim of wheedling trade credits out of the capitalist Powers.

The Disarmament Conference. But it was disarmament which brought Russia into the closest touch with the League. She was invited in December 1925 to take part in the Preparatory Commission. There was no doubt about her interest in the question; Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had tried to get it on to the agenda of the Geneva Conference in 1922, and in the same year a conference of the Border States—Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia and Poland—for the reduction of armaments was actually held at Moscow, though without any results being achieved. It was in reference to this conference that Trotsky said to Dr. Nansen in 1923: "Russia would nothing rather than to be able to cut down her army. She has proposed to reduce it to 200,000 men on condition that the other countries also effected a similar reduction. But this proposal was not accepted. . . . Part of Russia's programme is the formation of a force of militia, something like what Switzerland has; but up to the present the situation has not allowed this programme to be realised. Complete disarmament could not be contemplated before the day when

Europe united in a federation of States, which appears the sole means of withstanding America's hegemony." (See *Russia and Peace*, by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen.)

Eager as the Soviet Government was to join in the work of the Preparatory Commission, it objected to meeting in Geneva, owing to its quarrel with the Swiss Government over the assassination of the Russian delegate, Vorovsky, at Lausanne in 1923. It was not represented, therefore, at the first three sessions of the Preparatory Commission; but it came in eventually in November 1927, and Litvinov at once proceeded to flutter the dovescotes, by proposing the very thing which, according to Trotsky a few years earlier, "could not be contemplated." He prefaced his proposals by the statement that his Government "adheres to the opinion it has always held that under the capitalist system no grounds exist for counting on the removal of the causes which give rise to armed conflicts. Militarism and big navies are the natural and essential consequences of the capitalist system." Nevertheless, he was going to put his programme on the table. It was in fact a demand for the abolition of all armaments whatsoever, and the measures recommended included the following :

- (1) The dissolution of all land, sea and air forces, and a ban on maintaining any of them in any concealed form.
- (2) The abolition of all existing military supplies, means of chemical warfare, and other methods of destruction.
- (3) The scrapping of all warships and military and naval aeroplanes.
- (4) The destruction of all fortresses and naval and air bases, military plants and factories, and war industry plants in general industrial works.
- (5) The abolition of military, naval and air Ministries, and the dissolution of general staffs, departments and institutions of all sorts.
- (6) Legislative prohibition of the patenting of any kind of armaments.

(7) The abolition not only of military service, whether compulsory or voluntary, but of any species of military training or education or propaganda.

This holocaust, it was suggested, should be carried out within a year after the adoption of the Convention. If that was considered to be too short a time, it might be done in gradual stages spread over four years.

But of course there was no chance of the capitalist States taking such a scheme seriously. Some laughed at it, or sighed over it, as Utopian. Others treated it as a piece of impudent Bolshevik propaganda. All of them could see—though few stressed the point—that, if the Communist theories of the class-war are valid, total disarmament would be the salvation of the proletariat in every country and the doom of the bourgeoisie. With the disappearance of armies, and of the guns, bombs, and bayonets by which the ruling classes maintain their position, the workers would promptly turn the tables on their oppressors. And even on a rather less desperate view of the situation, there would be, as one delegate at the Conference pointed out, “an extremely serious danger of internal disorder, insurrections, risings and revolutions.” In short, the abolition of war between nations would not automatically produce peace within each nation’s boundaries, but strife; and sufficient troops (call them armed police, if you will) would be necessary to hold society together. Even in Soviet Russia the dictatorship of the proletariat might find it awkward to be without the means of enforcing its will—at least until the establishment of the classless society!

Litvinov, of course, never expected his scheme to be welcomed; but he insisted that the Soviet Government was quite sincere in proposing complete disarmament, and that such a proposal could hardly be ruled out of order in a Disarmament Conference. It was in fact debated at some length before being rejected as impracticable. Litvinov thereupon produced a new scheme for partial and gradual disarmament. Reduction was to be automatic and

proportional ; the Great Powers would at once cut down their armaments by fifty per cent, the medium by thirty per cent, and the weakest by twenty-five per cent. This found some favour with the Germans and the Turks, but the overwhelming majority of States treated it in cavalier fashion, and the Russians covered their disappointment (if they really felt any) by renewed mockery of the dilatoriness, timidity and insincerity of the Preparatory Commission. They did not, however, shake the dust of Geneva off their feet, as they presumably would have done had they themselves only been playing a game. They continued to participate both in the work of the Preparatory Commission and in the subsequent sessions of the Disarmament Conference itself. Here, in February 1932, Litvinov again expressed the Soviet Government's readiness to agree on measures for substantial reductions. Those would include the abolition of all aggressive weapons, including tanks and long-range artillery ; ships of over 10,000 tons ; naval guns of more than 12 inch calibre ; air-craft carriers ; military dirigibles and heavy bombing planes ; chemical and bacteriological warfare.

There is, indeed, no ground for suspecting Bolshevik trickery in all this zeal for disarmament. There is no necessity, even, to assume that the Russians are swayed, either more or less than other people, by moral or sentimental motives. They have in point of fact, a double reason for wanting to get rid of armaments. Armaments are costly, and Russia is poor ; she needs every rouble she can save for her own economic and social development. Russia also lives, rightly or wrongly, as we have already said, in perpetual dread of attack by the capitalist world. And though an all-round reduction of armaments, even on a drastic scale, would not be an absolute guarantee of peace, it would do much to diminish the danger of war—especially if it averted the gravest menace of to-day, the re-armament of a bellicose Germany.

A year later the Russians came into the limelight again with what is probably the most exhaustive and ingenious

definition of the "aggressor" ever devised. It ran as follows :

1. The aggressor in an international conflict shall be considered that State which is the first to take any of the following actions :

- (a) Declaration of war against another State.
- (b) The invasion by its armed forces of the territory of another State without declaration of war.
- (c) Bombarding the territory of another State by its land, naval, or air forces, or knowingly attacking the land, naval, or air forces of another State.
- (d) The landing in or introduction within the frontiers of another State of land, naval, or air forces without the permission of the Government of such a State, or the infringement of the conditions of such permission, particularly as regards the duration of sojourn or extension of area.
- (e) The establishment of a naval blockade of the coastal ports of another State.

2. No considerations whatsoever of a political, strategic, or economic nature, including the desire to exploit the natural riches, or to obtain any sort of advantages or privileges on the territory of another State, no references to considerable capital investments or other special interests in a given State, or to the alleged absence of certain attributes of State organisation in the case of a given country, shall be accepted as justification of aggression as defined in clause one.

In particular, justification for attack cannot be based upon—

- 1. Political, economic, or cultural backwardness of a given country.
- 2. Alleged maladministration.
- 3. Possible danger to life or property of foreign residents.
- 4. Revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, civil war, disorders, or strikes.

5. The establishment or maintenance in any State of any political, economic, or social order.
6. Any acts, laws, or regulations of a given State, as for instance—

- (i) The infringement of international agreements.
- (ii) The infringement of the commercial concessional or other economic rights or interests of a given State or its citizens.
- (iii) The rupture of diplomatic or economic relations.
- (iv) Economic or financial boycott.
- (v) Repudiation of debts.
- (vi) Non-admission or limitation of immigration or the restriction of rights or privileges of foreign residents.
- (vii) Infringement of the privileges of official representatives of other States.
- (viii) The refusal to allow armed forces transit to the territory of a third State.
- (ix) Religious or anti-religious measures.
- (x) Frontier incidents.

3. In the case of the mobilisation or concentration of armed forces to a considerable extent in the vicinity of its frontiers, the State which such activities threaten may have recourse to diplomatic or other means for the peaceful solution of international controversies. It may at the same time take steps of a military nature analogous to those described above without, however, crossing the frontier.

This created considerable interest at the time, particularly in view of its applicability to the situation in Manchuria, and there were some who were disposed to treat it as nothing more than a malicious gibe at Japan. But it was quite serious on the Russians' part, and was concerned primarily, if not entirely, with their fears of an attack on the U.S.S.R., and their desire to guard against every possible pretext for such an attack. It was naturally too elaborate for the Conference, and a shorter and simpler

definition was drawn up—which did, however, retain the essential points of the Soviet text.

In July 1933 the Soviet Union actually embodied the gist of this definition in conventions with a number of States¹ (with some of which it already had treaties of non-aggression).

The Kellogg Pact. Russia signed the Kellogg Pact early in 1929, after a good deal of preliminary wrangling. The Bolsheviks viewed it with considerable suspicion, and even contempt, at the outset. The Pact was another “scrap of paper,” it was said—an empty pledge, with no undertaking to disarm or even to limit armaments. Some thought it would tie the Soviet Union up with the capitalist Powers. Others raised objections to the reservations made by the British and French Governments—the former of which claimed freedom of action in “certain regions of the world” (presumably Egypt, Mesopotamia, Afghanistan and China, and perhaps others), while the latter appeared, to the Russian critics at least, to crystallise and extend the scope of the Locarno Pact and the French alliances. Possibly little would have been heard of these objections if Russia had been among the States which Mr. Kellogg originally invited to sign this Pact. But she was not, and the Bolsheviks were annoyed by the slight. Chicherin, indeed, went so far as to say that the author of the Pact was deliberately aiming at making it “an instrument for the isolation and encirclement of the U.S.S.R.” However, after some diplomatic exchanges and hard pressure from the Germans, who were anxious to get Russia in, Mr. Kellogg agreed that she should be allowed to adhere to the Pact directly after it was signed in Paris. The Soviet Government thereupon promised its adherence, though it still complained of the absence of any pledges of disarmament and refused to accept the reservations made by certain Powers. The British reservations in particular it regarded “as an attempt

¹ Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia.

to take advantage of the Pact itself as a weapon of imperialist policy." Nevertheless, said Litvinov, "inasmuch as the Paris Pact does impose on the Powers some external obligations before public opinion, and gives the Soviet Government another opportunity to place before all participators in it the most important question for peace—the question of disarmament, the solution of which is the only guarantee of the avoidance of war—the Soviet Government declares its consent to subscribe to the Paris Pact."

Not many months later, when Russia and China were engaged in hostilities over the Chinese Eastern Railway, Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, made an effort at intervention and invoked the Kellogg Pact (December 1929). Whether the circumstances justified this or not, it is not easy to say. But there was great annoyance in Moscow at what the Soviets considered the unwarranted interference of America, and other signatories of the Pact were disinclined to take any action. No action in fact was necessary, as the trouble in Manchuria was already on the point of settlement. But the incident was significant as showing plainly the difficulty of enforcing a Pact which was really no more than a pious resolution on the part of each of its signatories. This difficulty has since been seen in a more glaring light, in the case of Japan's invasion of Manchuria—though in that case the Kellogg Pact was overshadowed by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Covenant has the machinery of sanctions which the Pact has not. The League Powers might have used this machinery effectively had they had the will or the courage to do so.

Is Communism a World Menace? Soviet Russia, then, has given ample proof of her desire for peace. She has been assiduous in making treaties of non-aggression; she has signed the Kellogg Pact; she has not been amongst those who have put spokes in the wheel of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. It is possible that, in a different set

of circumstances, she might adopt a less exemplary attitude. But so might many other States—and some pretty certainly would. If, however, we rule out the chances of the Bolsheviks being false to their philosophy, and pursuing a policy of militarist imperialism, there remains the danger of their being true to their philosophy, and fomenting revolution and civil war abroad. How real is that danger? The history of recent years, as we have seen, shows that it has receded. World Revolution is still an article of the Communist creed; but it seems to have become, for the moment at least, a pious aspiration rather than a call to action; and while the Russians pay lip service to it, their hearts are in their own Five Year Plans. Communist propaganda goes on, here, there and everywhere; but how much headway does it make? All too little, according to the frank admissions of the Party zealots themselves. And if it is effective anywhere, that is not due to the Satanic powers of the Comintern, but to the existence of misery, oppression and discontent, which capitalist Governments cannot, or will not, remedy.

In any case the fear of Communist agitation and civil war is not a valid pretext for refusing to reduce armaments. It might have more validity if total disarmament were contemplated. But total disarmament is not contemplated—save in a more or less remote future—and the reason for that, if we are to be honest about it, is not that the capitalist Powers are frightened of Russia, but that they are frightened of each other—and, in some cases at least, of their own proletariat. It is not, in a word, the Socialist State, it is the capitalistic national sovereign State which is the villain of the piece.

Russia and Nationalism. But, it may be asked, is not the Soviet Union a national sovereign State, like the rest of us? It is—but with a difference, and that difference, if we are to avoid misconceptions, it is important to understand. The Soviet ideal is not a Balkanised world—a medley of principalities and powers, each in its watertight compartment, pursuing a policy of economic nationalism. The

Communists stand for internationalism, not nationalism. They envisage a World State, not on the pattern of the Roman Empire, but an all-embracing union or federation of peoples, organised on a common basis of Socialism. Such a unification, however, need not, and should not, mean complete uniformity; there is ample room for local autonomies and many variations of culture. Especially in the transitional stage from the present to the new order, the Communists say, national differences must be respected, and even encouraged. "The period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building up of Socialism in the Soviet Union is," as Stalin has put it, "the period of the flowering of the national civilisations, which while intrinsically socialist are national in form." And Lenin himself had declared that "national and state differences between peoples and countries will endure for a long time even after the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world-wide scale." The Communist Party, therefore, like the Russian Social Democratic Party out of which it developed, has always proclaimed "the right of nations to self-determination and to an independent State existence," whilst hoping and working at the same time for the unifying process that we have referred to.

In dealing with their own national problem the Bolsheviks were no doubt actuated by prudence as well as principle. The vast territory of the Russian Empire that they had taken over contained something like two hundred different national groups. A few of the most important—the Poles, the Finns and the Baltic peoples—had broken away and established their independence. Of those that remained the great majority were small and weak; but several (e.g. the Ukrainians) were strong alike in numbers and national sentiment, and their separatist desires had to be reckoned with. Lenin and Stalin, resisting the counsels of those in the Party who were dubbed "Pan-Russian Chauvinists" to russify everybody and everything, preferred conciliation to coercion. They found the solution of the problem in the ingenious and complex federal system which is known as

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—"a military-economic-political union of peoples into a single multinational Soviet State." This federation comprises the seven Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, White Russia, Transcaucasia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan),¹ and within these are various subdivisions, known as "autonomous republics" or "autonomous areas." The constitution of the U.S.S.R. gives what we should call "parliamentary representation" in the All-Union Congress of Soviets to the citizens of the whole country, and it contains besides a special organ (a sort of Second Chamber) representing the nationalities. This "Soviet of Nationalities" is composed of delegates from each of the Republics and autonomous regions.

But to discover the real degree of local autonomy in any federal system, we must see what powers are reserved to the central authority and the parts respectively. In the U.S.S.R. the central, or federal, authority is exclusively responsible for foreign affairs, defence, transport, posts and telegraphs, currency and credit systems, the establishment of the basic principles of justice and of the social services, and last but not least, for the whole of foreign trade and of the national economy. Not much, then, of any substance is left to the units—except in the sphere of culture, and in that sphere the only real freedom which exists is the freedom of each nationality to use its own language. That is not merely allowed, but fostered, and it is unquestionably of great importance. But while the Georgians, the Armenians, the Ukrainians, and the rest may talk in their own tongues, they must keep within the lines prescribed for them—not indeed by Great Russia, but by the Communist Party. What is aimed at, in short, is a common culture, a common ideology, political and economic.

The U.S.S.R., therefore, *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world is

¹ These are of unequal size and strength. Great Russia comprises more than 92 per cent of the total area of the U.S.S.R., and nearly 70 per cent of the total population. The three biggest nationalities are Russians (over 50 per cent of the whole 160,000,000 of the population of the U.S.S.R.), Ukrainians (over 20 per cent), and White Russians (over 3 per cent).

a unitary State, just as the United States of America is. But what is peculiar to it is that it is an "open" federation; though it takes the form of a national State, it is in theory and by intention a supra-national State in the making. It wants to accrete to itself other nations—not merely attaching them by alliances, but assimilating them on the basis of Communism. In this the Communists are inspired by the same general ideal as other schools of Socialism; only they have pursued it more resolutely and by more definite and truculent methods.

The original ardour for the World Revolution has, as we have seen, diminished since the inception of the Five Year Plans and under the guidance of Stalin. Stalin, indeed, has met with much criticism inside the Communist Party for his nationalistic policy, and there are many who believe that, however strong may be the arguments for building up a self-sufficient Socialist State in Russia, the end of it will be that Communism will lose its international outlook, and compromise disastrously with the capitalist world. That is doubtless a possibility; but there is as yet no warrant for treating it as a certainty, or even as a probability. The deep-rooted antagonism between the Socialist and the capitalist States will continue, though it may not express itself for the present, and perhaps for a long period, in violent forms. The abandonment, or suspension, of active hostility should lead, as has already been said, to a less suspicious attitude towards Soviet Russia on the part of the other Powers, and it ought to ease the way to disarmament.

Security and Arbitration. But that clearly will not solve the whole problem. If the maintenance of peace requires more than a reduction of armaments, more than promises not to resort to war—if, in short, we visualise a system involving joint action against aggressors as well as the submission of all national disputes to the judgment of an international tribunal—then Russia presents a real difficulty. It might be feasible to operate such a system with Russia outside. But assuming her entry is desired, would she

come in? The answer must be that without very drastic changes, either in the Soviet régime or in the rest of the world, or in both, she would not.

With the Covenant of the League, Soviet policy comes into conflict on three points in particular. There is Article X, requiring mutual guarantees of the frontiers and the independence of States-members against aggression. There are Articles XII to XV, enjoining recourse to the Council, to arbitration, to the Permanent Court of International Justice, for the settlement of disputes. There is, lastly, Article XVI, which provides for collective measures of security, for the application, under the auspices of the League, of military or economic sanctions. All this involves—or should involve, if the spirit of the Covenant were loyally observed by its signatories—not only an entanglement in other peoples' affairs that Russia has always been averse to, but commitments which she would regard as both repugnant in principle and dangerous to her own interests. It is true that members of the League to-day find excuses for avoiding the full implications of the Covenant. But that is hardly an argument that can be used to persuade Russia to come in, particularly if what is aimed at is faithful observance of the Covenant. And, in any case, Russia's position as the one Socialist State among the host of capitalist States would still be a misfit, whether her obligations were tight or loose.

That Russia would be a party, in the present state of the world, to any scheme for a "League Army" or an "international police force" is inconceivable. Lord Davies, in his book *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, talks cheerfully of Russia being given a seat on the Council "when her people evince a desire to join the commonwealth and can furnish proofs of their loyalty to the cause of international justice." But obviously the Bolsheviks would say that the onus was on the rest of the world to furnish such proofs to Russia. And the idea of contingents of the Red Army being handed over to an organisation of capitalist States, and used, as they very well might be, for the

purpose of putting down Socialist revolutions, is quite fantastic. We need not pursue this point, however; even without Russia, the project is not practical politics. An international army, as M. Léon Blum, the French Socialist leader, has argued very cogently, cannot co-exist with national armies. "An international army in Europe really implies a political unity of Europe. But this is incompatible not only with standing national armies, but also with the idea of national sovereignty. An army is an expression and an instrument of political power; and an international army would have some sense, and a practical chance of existing, only if one single political power actually governed Europe. When this happens war will have become an impossibility."

Nor does there seem much more likelihood, under present conditions, of Russia participating in a lesser scheme of pooled security—a general, or regional, pact of mutual assistance. The Soviet Government was averse to joining the League States in 1932 in condemning the Japanese action in Manchuria. This was not because it approved of Japan's aggression. It was actuated by prudence, which in all the circumstances was understandable enough. For suppose the Japanese had turned on Russia, as they very well might have done, is it likely that she would have got any support from the League Powers, which had already left China in the lurch? Some, if not all of them, we may be sure, would have regarded it as a very happy event. And Russia's danger in the Far East will not, she believes, be lessened by any tightening up of machinery which might associate her with allies whom she could not trust, and bind her to taking measures that might prove suicidal. Nor, if we turn from the East to the West, is her position any easier. Fascism is waxing, and no one can foretell what new alignments of forces there will be. Nazi Germany may defy the League as successfully as Japan has done—or it may put itself on good terms with the League. In either case, Russia will be disposed to cling to neutrality, to trust to her own treaties, for what they are

worth, and to avoid embroiling herself in any European quarrel.

It may be objected that all this only refers to to-day, and that we ought to be thinking of the brighter possibilities of to-morrow. But what are the possibilities, the Russians will ask, of the capitalist States of Europe, whether of the Fascist or the "Liberal" variety, uniting honestly to protect each other—and Socialist Russia into the bargain—against aggression? It is not necessary to be a Communist to share their scepticism about pacts of mutual assistance and collective sanctions in any foreseeable future.

And what finally of arbitration? There was an attempt in 1923, when Finland and Russia were at loggerheads over the province of Eastern Karelia, to refer the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice for a judicial opinion. Russia, however, refused to take part in any examination of the question by the League or by the Permanent Court on the ground, among others, that she could not regard the "so-called League of Nations" or the Court as impartial, especially when most States refused to recognise the Soviet Government. The case actually was referred to the Court by the Finns, and they appeared at the Hague to plead their cause. But the Court decided that in the circumstances, Russia being neither a member of the League nor consenting to the jurisdiction, it could do nothing.

Of course it may be said that too much importance must not be attached to this single instance of intransigence. It was a good many years ago, and water has flowed under the bridges since then. The Soviet Government has been generally recognised, and its attitude to the League has mellowed considerably. And Señor Madariaga suggests (in his *Disarmament*) that any objections it might still have could be overcome by the appointment of a permanent Russian judge on the panel of the Court—whilst political and economic obstacles should not be insuperable if the U.S.S.R. also had a permanent seat on the Council of the League.

That is surely a delusion. The Communists' distrust of the capitalist Powers is far too deep to be dispelled by such a sop. They are quite incredulous of the possibility—or at any rate of the certainty—of getting an impartial judgment from a body of bourgeois lawyers. Maybe they wrong the lawyers in holding that view ; but their philosophy and their experience alike confirm them in it. Conciliation they are prepared for, as their treaties show. But the conciliation conventions with France and Germany and the rest are in effect simply a method of carrying on the discussion of differences beyond the stage of official exchanges between Governments ; they do not bring a case to judgment. The " Conciliation Commission " consists of representatives of the two parties to the dispute and nobody else. Any decision it takes must be unanimous in order to be valid, and there is no question of the Soviets binding themselves to abide by an award that they do not like. That is not to say that their conciliation system is a trick or a farce. It is, no doubt, serious in intention and sound in principle, though it has not yet been tested in practice. But obviously there is a world of difference between this and accepting the arbitrament of an outside tribunal—and, what is peculiarly obnoxious to the Communists, a capitalist tribunal.

Conclusion. The conclusion of the whole matter, then, is this. Soviet Russia needs peace and desires peace. But it will be hard, if not impossible, to fit Soviet Russia nicely into any complete scheme for the maintenance of peace that may be devised by a League of sovereign capitalist States.

There is, of course, the chance that the Soviet régime may collapse. But there is no present sign of any such catastrophe ; and even if it did come about, it would not make for peace. The result would inevitably be chaos, civil war, wars of intervention, a world once more in the melting pot.

If the Soviet régime lasts, and if the rest of us get as far

as agreeing on a general plan of peace (a much bigger "if"!), then it may be possible to arrange a *modus vivendi* with Russia.

But no Communist, and few Socialists, will believe that the capitalist leopard can change his spots. The best guarantee of a durable peace lies in the advance of international Socialism, with the breaking down of economic nationalism and imperialism, the dissipation of national and racial jealousies and of territorial ambitions. Into a league or federation of Socialist States Russia might fit without difficulty—even if their Socialism were not of the full-blooded Communist type, as it pretty certainly would not be. In such a league, though peace would not be automatically ensured, the triple problem of security, arbitration and disarmament would at least be soluble. In the present dispensation the prospects of solving it are about as good as those of a flight to the moon.

NOTE ON THE RED ARMY

The armed forces of the U.S.S.R. consist of the army, navy and air force, together with the special troops of the State Political Department, and frontier and prison guards.

The peace-time strength of the regular army (including the navy and air force) is 562,000 officers and men. At this figure it has stood for some years. The Tsarist army had a peace-time strength of 1,200,000 in 1913, and 1,800,000 at the beginning of 1914. The highest point reached by the Soviet Army was 4,100,000 in January 1921.

The Red Army is of very moderate size, the Bolsheviks claim, compared with those of other Powers, when account is taken of the area of the U.S.S.R. and the number of the population. It represents in fact less than three soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants.

The Red Navy is of no serious importance as a fighting force. According to the official figures for 1930 (the latest available), it comprised 4 battleships, 5 cruisers, 24

destroyers, 13 submarines, 12 miscellaneous craft—a total tonnage of 166,247.

The air force is relatively stronger, and its quality is reputed to be high ; but it is hardly comparable with those of the principal Great Powers.

Mention must also be made of the "Osoaviachim," a volunteer association of many millions of citizens. Its function is to co-operate in the protection of the Soviet Union, and especially to develop the aeronautical, chemical and other industries which are important from the point of view of defence. All the military activities of the Osoaviachim association are under the direction of the Red Army command.

Military service is compulsory for all Soviet citizens. It begins at the age of nineteen, when all males are liable to a period of preparatory military instruction. Service in the active army begins at the age of 21, and lasts for five years. But only the first two years are spent in full-time service with the colours (three years for coast defence and air force, and 4 years for navy) ; for the remainder of the time the men are on long furlough, subject only to recall for a month or two's service. On the completion of active service, men are placed in the reserve up to the age of 40.

The annual contingent of recruits called up is 1,200,000, and after the deduction of those who are unfit, or are exempted for other reasons, 800,000 are left available for military service. About 33 per cent of these are allotted to the regular army, 25 per cent to the territorial force, and the remainder are given military training outside the army.

The territorial militia consists of cadres, or permanent units, and mobile units. The cadres in peace time are not complete units ; their function is to train men belonging to the mobile units or receiving training outside the army. The period of service for all these is shorter than that for the regulars.

The system of education in the Soviet army is unique. The young soldier (or rather "Red Army man," for soldier is a bourgeois and "imperialist" term which is not used

of the Soviet citizen) is taught during his two years with the colours not merely to shoot and drill and march. He is put through a serious course of culture, with special emphasis on politics and economics. Classes, clubs, lectures, theatres and cinemas, libraries, journals, all play a prominent part in his training, the aim of which is to turn him out an educated citizen, a sound Marxist, and a more devoted fighter. Patriotism is not enough, discipline is not enough ; an " ideology " is wanted. Let the warrior understand and believe in—fanatically believe in—the greatness of his cause, and his strength in the battle will be as the strength of ten men. The Red Army men are in fact the élite of the Soviet youth. They are treated with extraordinary respect, and they are relied on by the Government and the Communist Party, when they have returned to civil life, to spread the gospel they have imbibed, to be leaders and inspirers in the work of building the " Socialist Commonwealth " in the villages and on the collective farms.

The budget of 1933 shows a total expenditure on all the " defence forces " of 2,264,431,000 roubles. That is a formidable sum indeed, though we must not, by taking the rouble at its nominal exchange value of ten to the £1, assume that it is the equivalent of £226,000,000. The internal value of the rouble is nothing like 2s. The Russians boast that their military expenditure is only between six or seven per cent of their total budgetary expenditure. But here again it is necessary to be cautious about comparisons. For in the Soviet budget by far the largest item is one that bulks very small in the budget of capitalist countries—viz., the expenditure on the State-owned industries, railways, etc. This actually accounts for more than two-thirds of the total (23,912,000,000 out of 35,000,000,000 roubles).

CHAPTER IV: INTER-CONTINENTAL PEACE

By CHARLES RODEN BUXTON

1. Introduction
2. Asia
3. Africa
4. America

§ I. INTRODUCTION

The Incompleteness of the World Organisation. There are certain considerations which apply to the whole field of international relationships. These, no doubt, are the most important, and it is necessary to get a firm grasp of them before anything else is attempted. That is the reason why they are so fully discussed in other parts of this book. But there are certain groups of states, and certain regions of the world, where special conditions are found which are not common to the whole community of nations, and where therefore the prevention of war presents particular problems. Such are the states, and portions or dependencies of states, which form the subject of this special chapter. They are those of Asia, Africa, and America.

These regions of the world are not distinguished from the rest merely because each forms a Continent by itself. They have another feature which, to my mind, is more important than this. It is, indeed, a feature of a most fundamental kind, when we are considering the organisation of the world for peace. It is this—that they are not

yet drawn into that system of world organisation which is our supreme goal. Europe occupies a position in that organisation which is, relatively speaking, too important. I do not mean that Asia, Africa, and America have no connection with the League of Nations, or that they have no representation in its councils. This would be going much further than the facts warrant. What I mean is, that they are at best only partially drawn into the world system ; or that they are drawn into it under conditions of undue subordination or of downright injustice. Africa is for the most part divided up among the great imperial Powers, and appears in the world organisation as a conglomeration of separate appendages or dependencies, with no voice at all in the common life of the nations. Asia consists mainly of states which are weak enough to be at the mercy of more powerful states, and whose theoretically equal voice in the councils of the League is, therefore, an unreality ; it contains also two states, Japan and Turkey, which have risen out of this category by assimilating Western military and governmental methods ; another part consists, like Africa, of fragments of great Empires—India, Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Korea ; the remainder consists of republics and autonomous regions forming part of the Soviet Union, which is outside the League. America is represented in the League of Nations, but its greatest state, the United States of America, beside which the rest of the Continent counts as nothing in the scales of power and influence, is altogether outside the international organisation which we have begun to build up. The only other great state which remains outside the League, and to which many of the same considerations apply, is Russia. But the position of Russia in the world has peculiarities so distinctive that it has been necessary already to devote a separate chapter to this unique case.

Differences of character and culture, differences of economic and political interests, differences in influence and in the power of self-assertion—all these are intensified by the vast distances which separate one state from another,

and which, in spite of all modern devices for closer communication, affect the imagination of vast numbers of men and women all over the world. The inhabitants of the Continent of Europe can hardly conceive that they have any concern in the disputes which arise in the Continent of America between Colombia and Peru ; the Chinese in Asia find it no less hard to understand why the Council of the League of Nations has devoted weeks and months to the complaints of a European state, Poland, against another European state, Lithuania.

To remedy this state of affairs, to establish inter-continental peace, i.e., to establish peace on the basis of a world organisation, is indispensable, if war is to be permanently prevented. And in order to understand the problem, we must ask, in the case of each Continent, three questions :

- (1) How has this state of affairs arisen ?
- (2) What is the form it assumes at the present day, and the special difficulties or dangers which it occasions ?
- (3) What steps can be taken to bring this Continent in some adequate manner into the system of world organisation ?

Magnitude of the Differences between the States of the World To-Day. It is as well to remind ourselves at this point that the problem of world organisation would have been far easier of solution if the special difficulties referred to above had not existed. Let us suppose, for example, that the world had consisted of states which were more or less homogeneous—that is to say in each of which the citizens had all reached, broadly speaking, the same stage of development—and let us suppose, further, that they had been roughly similar to one another in character—not more dissimilar than (say) Germany and Portugal. In such a case, the machinery of the present League would have been fairly well adapted to existing conditions. We should have already possessed a fairly adequate world organisation. Quite possibly it would, even now, have been working satisfactorily.

The Covenant of the League of Nations has, in fact, been framed on the assumption that we were living in a world of this kind—a world of more or less homogeneous and similar sovereign states. It is hard to blame the founders of the League for this. They acted upon the accepted conceptions of International Law. These conceptions were a great advance on anything that went before them. They included the notion that all the states concerned, great or small, should be treated as theoretically equal in rights, however different in power and magnitude. The theory diverged from the actual facts, but not so widely as to make it unworkable under the conditions of earlier times, when the relations between states were comparatively few and simple. Confronted, however, with the state of affairs that we find around us to-day, with the results of the Industrial Revolution, with the complicated network of economic and political relations between states resulting from that revolution, and in particular with the existence of gigantic Empires containing peoples and regions in every stage of civilisation—dotted about in every corner of the globe—the theory is too widely remote from the facts to be workable. It strikes us as crude and elementary; institutions founded upon it seem to us out of harmony with the conditions of the modern world.

What we see around us in the world of states to-day is a picture almost infinitely variegated in its colours and shapes. The representatives who sit around the council-table of the League, though theoretically equal, are speaking for states so widely different in character, and in military or economic power, that it is only by a stretch of imagination that we can think of them as belonging to the same category at all. The voice of Guatemala, compared with the voice of Great Britain, counts not merely for less, but for nothing at all. The voice of Saudi Arabia, compared with the voice of Japan, might as well be silent. The voice of the Bantu race, though it may be the voice of forty millions of people, is not even allowed to be heard at all. If five or six great Powers agree as to what should be done

internationally, there is no small state, not even any conceivable combination of small states, which thinks it worth while even to attempt to stand up for any other policy. There are states, again, like China, which though great in numbers, are so fundamentally different in their internal character, and consequently in the influence they exercise in the political and diplomatic sphere, that there seems to be no common denominator between them and others. There are states like Egypt, which is not a member of the League at all, and whose whole international status is governed by a unilateral Declaration on the part of Great Britain, laying down what are the exact limits to which Egyptian sovereignty must be confined.

Subjects excluded from International Treatment. Lastly there is the problem (to use the phrase of international lawyers) of "domestic jurisdiction." There are innumerable questions, such as the relation between India and Great Britain, or the extent to which White settlement should invade Africa, or the major problems of immigration, which are so pregnant with conflict that they should fall to be decided by an impartial international authority, arbitrating between sections of the world's population. But all these questions, and the innumerable minor issues arising out of them, are entirely excluded from any sort of international treatment by the fact that they are held to be matters of "domestic jurisdiction"—that is, mere internal concerns of a single state. There are, of course, certain questions which common sense would always and immediately recognise to be only of domestic concern, and if we were dealing with homogeneous states, such as Germany, no one would object to withdrawing these from international supervision. But the kind of questions above suggested are not of this character, because the states concerned are Empires of enormous extent, stretching over several continents and as heterogeneous as it is possible to conceive.

It is to be noted, moreover, that the founders of the

League itself were compelled by circumstances to recognise even more far-reaching limitations of its power and competence. Article XXI of the Covenant runs as follows :

“ Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration, or *regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine* for securing the maintenance of peace.”

In other words, the League must, in the present state of the world, abandon all right of interference or judgment in many inter-continental matters which certain imperial states or Great Powers claim to be their private concerns, though they arise altogether *outside* their own vast territories. Such are the matters covered by the Monroe Doctrine, and those covered by the reservation made by Great Britain, when she bound herself to methods of peaceful settlement under the “ Kellogg Pact.” With the Monroe Doctrine, which regards the American Continent as the special sphere of the United States, I shall deal below, but a word must be said about the British reservation.

Sir Austen Chamberlain's Note to the United States Government (May 19th, 1928) ran as follows:

“ The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable

interests, any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government."

So wide is the scope of the questions which the British Empire withdraws from all international judgment, that it gives some colour to the view that the assumption is—"The British Empire is good enough for us and we don't want any League of Nations interfering."

The United States, it is true, did not make any similar reservations with regard to the Monroe Doctrine, when they signed the Kellogg Pact—though Sir Austen Chamberlain went out of his way to remind them of their "comparable interests." But, on the other hand, they have introduced a reservation of this kind into a large number of Arbitration Treaties made subsequently with various states. The conclusion seems to be that the United States, as at present advised, does not intend to submit to world judgment any question covered by the Monroe Doctrine; nor does Great Britain intend to submit to world judgment any question arising between herself and any other Power in the undefined "certain regions of the world"—presumably Egypt, the whole area of the Persian Gulf, and the states bordering on India.

The Scheme of Regional Leagues. It has been suggested by some reformers that the difficulties here described might be adequately met by creating Continental or "regional" leagues, subordinate to the main League. The best known advocate of this scheme is Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the author of *Pan-Europa*, who came to England in 1925 to advocate it. He proposed that there should be separate leagues for Europe, America, Asia, and the British Empire. The idea was taken up, as regards Europe, by the Foreign Minister of France, M. Briand, in 1930, and a scheme of

European union is already in existence, though it excludes Russia, and hardly amounts at present to more than the machinery for discussing problems exclusively relating to Europe—machinery which may be used or not according to circumstances.

It is, of course, perfectly true that there are some questions relating to Europe exclusively ; and the same is true of Asia, of Africa, of America. There is need for some machinery whereby questions of this kind can be discussed more fully than is possible or desirable in central bodies such as the Council of the League of Nations. There is need for provisions whereby League of Nations rules and decisions can be applied locally, by local means and under local supervision. For these purposes, regional leagues might provide a convenient method of devolution.

But the failure of the League to provide for these purposes is not its chief defect. The case for a special European organisation is probably the strongest, but this is not because Europe is a Continent; it is because Europe consists of states of an approximately similar type. This reason does not apply to the other Continents dealt with in this chapter ; and it applies least of all to the British Empire.

The dangers of the regional league system, on the other hand, are obvious. In economic matters, such leagues would be likely to lead—and by some of their supporters are avowedly designed to lead—to systems of preferential tariffs, or even customs unions. Economic units would thus be created, with exclusive privileges for their own members. Such systems, whatever might be thought of them on other grounds, are contrary to the League principle, hitherto applied wherever possible, of equality for all its Members. It is true that the League has itself considered the regional scheme—for instance, in connection with the Geneva Protocol in 1924—but it was then definitely laid down that regional groups or pacts must be open to all who might wish to join them.

Another danger is that, in proportion as the regional leagues became strong organisations, the connection

between them would probably become slighter and slighter. We might be faced with combinations similar to the ententes, groups, and alliances so familiar in the world of international politics before the Great War. America might, as a Continent, become more rather than less isolated. The British Empire might become a closed Empire, divorced from Europe. Certain Continents might be dominated and exploited more completely than before—America by the United States; Africa by a small ring of Colonial Powers; Asia by Great Britain, by Japan, or, conceivably, by Russia. The result would almost inevitably be a return to the system of two or three vast, hostile alliances, arrayed and armed against one another—a system which leads not to peace, but to war.

Three Conditions for the Success of the League. It may, perhaps, be said that the League will never be an unqualified success until three conditions are fulfilled.

- (1) All important Powers must be Members.
- (2) The weaker peoples must find their interests adequately protected during the period of their relative weakness.
- (3) The rivalries between the advanced states in the backward regions of the world must be regulated by international authority.

With regard to the second of these conditions, there must be an international organisation within which the backward peoples, such as those of Africa and the Pacific Islands, can receive the help they need, according to the particular stage of development which they have reached at any given moment. Such an organisation must have the power to decide when the final stage has been reached, and a "backward people" may be pronounced capable of taking its own share in the world organisation as a full member. The emergence of Irak in 1932 from the position of a mandated territory to that of a League Member, even though in practice it may mean less than it seems to mean on the surface, is none the less an epoch-making event. In

the Mandate system, indeed, mankind is groping its way towards the realisation of a world need. It is a rudimentary beginning only, but it shows at least a recognition of the essential fact, not only that certain peoples are weaker than others, and require a corresponding measure of assistance—not only that they are “wards”—but that they are “wards” who are destined to grow up—that this growing up must be provided for and prepared for, and that the present condition must be recognised as only a provisional one. In some form or other, and however difficult the process may be, these subordinate peoples can only be protected by means of direct connection with, and assistance from, the world organisation. The disinterested totality of nations must be their ultimate trustee. It, and it alone, can be trusted to give to the backward peoples the protection they need; to secure to them a fair share of control and influence, in proportion as they “grow up”; and meantime to develop their resources, in so far as these need development, in the true interests of the world as a whole.

With regard to the third condition, it must be clearly realised that it is the rivalry between colonial Empires concerning the development of the backward regions that has been, at any rate in modern times, the most fruitful of all causes of war. I would go so far as to say, that every war between great states in the last half century has been traceable to such rivalries. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894 concerned mainly the resources of Korea; the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, the forests and minerals of Manchuria. The Greco-Turkish war of 1897 was caused largely by the desire to develop the wasted resources of Thessaly and Macedonia. The Italo-Turkish war of 1911 was primarily caused by the great Italian banks, which had vast interests in North Africa. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 were perhaps an exception. But the culmination of the series, the Great War of 1914-18, was conditioned largely by the conflict over the resources of the Balkans, and the vast area of the Near East which might be tapped by the Bagdad Railway.

In the backward and undeveloped portions of the earth, the question of expansion and exploitation, as between rival claimants among the advanced states, is still an open one. No test of established rights exists, and in the absence of international agreement there is nothing to fall back upon but the "right" of the stronger to take and use for himself. At the same time, these regions have an overwhelming and an increasing importance for the Western world. At the present time the greatest danger to peace is probably the belief held in great industrial states that, if they do not possess a close preserve in the shape of colonial territories or spheres of influence, they will be shut out from essential markets, and deprived of essential raw materials. Hence the vital importance of Free Trade, and of the "Open Door," from the international point of view.

The general conclusion, in fact, seems to be that great Empires, stretching over several Continents, as we see them to-day, are inconsistent with a true League of Nations. We shall have to consider very seriously, when dealing with Asia and Africa, whether the political and economic powers and tendencies, which these Empires imply and involve, are not fundamentally inimical to the whole conception of a co-operative world organisation. How far the internal constitution of the Western industrial states, and especially the great imperial Powers, must be modified if they are not to remain radically dangerous to world peace—how far, in particular, the present economic structure of those states can be allowed to continue unchanged without rendering a true League impossible—must be left for exhaustive treatment to a later chapter.

Summary. The conclusions reached in this section are:

(1) That the Continents of Asia, of Africa, and of America are only partially drawn into the system of world organisation for peace; and that large parts of them are only drawn into it under conditions of undue subordination, or downright injustice.

(2) That the vast differences between states, and the

number of important subjects with which the present League is not allowed to deal, render the present machinery of world organisation very inadequate.

(3) That "regional" leagues would not remedy these difficulties.

(4) That all important states must be in the world organisation, that weaker peoples must be better protected, and that the rivalries of advanced states, especially in the economic sphere, must be regulated by international authority.

§2. ASIA

The present relation of Asia to the World. The unsatisfactory position occupied by most Asiatic states in their relation to the world organisation arises at bottom from a difference between Asiatic and European civilisations. Apart from two striking exceptions which we have already noted—Japan and Turkey—the nature of the ancient Oriental civilisations has led to a very marked inferiority of power in what the Covenant calls "the strenuous conditions of the modern world"—a world, that is, in which the dominant factor is a "strenuous" industrial civilisation. Oriental civilisations are based on a philosophy of life which inculcates a much greater degree of passiveness in political matters than has ever been accepted by the Western peoples generally. Oriental civilisations have given a much less important place to politics—to questions of government—in their scale of values. They have directed the thoughts of men to other sides of life—to the due discharge of social functions, to family loyalty, to philosophic calm and detachment. The ancient Empires of the East have therefore, for the most part, as was natural, taken the form of tyrannies. The conqueror, even if only a transient conqueror, has had his own way far more completely than European rulers. A profound difference of psychology has thus been produced, and this has had important consequences in the international sphere. International feeling

among Asiatic peoples is less developed on the political side, and rather takes the form of a readiness on the part of the vast mass of the population to live and let live ; there is an absence of the pushing and dominating spirit. This has high value as a contribution to world pacifism, but it involves relative political weakness in the states concerned.

We are confronted with the spectacle of a Continent in which only two states (one of them an island state, whose geographical position resembles that of Great Britain) are capable of competing on more or less equal terms with Western states. The rest of the Continent is in a position of subordination. Large fragments are completely deprived of any voice at all in the sphere of international relations—India, Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Korea, the Philippines. The position of India in the League of Nations, with its representatives appointed by the British Government, can hardly be considered as giving it a “ voice ” in any real sense of the word.

This subordination is not due only to a difference of character and history. It is due to an economic pressure which has had far-reaching effects upon the relations of East and West. The main cause which has given to this economic pressure its specifically modern form is that the Western industrial system has become, in relation to the backward portions of the world, less a matter of the exchange of products, and more a matter of the investment of surplus capital, which must find an outlet somewhere, and finds it on the most profitable terms in what are generally described as the backward regions of the world. The significance of this fact was first clearly set forth by Mr. H. N. Brailsford in his *War of Steel and Gold* (1914), and by the American Socialist, Mr. L. B. Boudin, in *Socialism and War*, published in 1915. It was developed on its economic side by Mr. J. A. Hobson in more than one illuminating study.

Asia provides the best example of the form which imperialism takes when it is practised by capitalist states, not in their own Empires, but in weaker states outside them. The process begins with the sale of finished products and

the obtaining of raw materials, and it soon develops into the making of loans (in return for onerous conditions) and the securing of concessions for railways, mines and the like—leading on to the industrialisation of the native peoples themselves, as in the mills and factories of Bombay and Shanghai. The process assumes great political importance when the thrust of the competitive motive is reinforced by a further weight in the shape of active Government support. The thrust is an irresponsible one, exerted by individuals or groups, but when the Government comes in to support it, it involves the whole body of citizens in the resulting strains and conflicts.

Governments habitually use the powers of the state to help their nationals, not only in relation to the weaker peoples concerned, but also in competition with the nationals of other states. Government representatives in the backward countries are largely occupied with trying to secure contracts and concessions for the citizens of their respective countries. The process is going on in different degrees all over the world. Thus the economic penetration of one Continent by the other—of Asia by Europe—involves two dangers to peace: one in the exploitation of Asiatic peoples by European states, the other in the struggle between the European states for the power and privilege to exploit Asiatics.

Western economic enterprises constitute the dominating factor in the national life of more than one Asiatic state. To take one example, can it be questioned that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company makes more difference to the daily lives of the inhabitants of Persia than all the activities of diplomatic representatives, missionaries, scholars and publicists?

It is so important to understand this process that I shall take an example given by Mr. L. S. Woolf in his *Economic Imperialism* (p. 91). In 1897 a Belgian syndicate obtained a concession for building a railway from Peking to Hankow. The British, not without reason, suspected that behind the Belgian syndicate were French and Russians, and Lord

Salisbury informed the British representative in China that "a concession of this nature is no longer a commercial or industrial enterprise, and becomes a political movement against the British interests in the region of the Yangtze. You should inform the Tsungli-Yamen (i.e., the Chinese Government) that Her Majesty's Government cannot continue to co-operate in a friendly manner in matters of interest to China if, while preferential advantages are conceded to Russia in Manchuria and to Germany in Shantung, these or other foreign powers should also be offered special openings or privileges in the region of the Yangtze. Satisfactory proposals will be forthcoming if the Chinese Government will invite the employment of British capital in the development of those provinces." When the Chinese persisted in granting the Belgian concession, the British Minister presented an ultimatum to the Chinese Government. He informed that Government that "Her Majesty's Government considered that they had been badly treated by China in the matter of railway concessions," and now demanded for British merchants the right to build numerous other railways. The British Minister was directed to inform the Chinese Government that "unless they agree at once, we shall regard their breach of faith concerning the Peking-Hankow Railway as an act of deliberate hostility against this country, and shall act accordingly. After consultation with the Admiral, you may give them the number of days or hours you think proper within which to send their reply."

Given an economic drive of this magnitude, is it possible to contemplate peace in Asia? In particular, can a League of Nations in any way resembling the existing League, calling in aid the nascent forces of internationalism and goodwill, make head against an antagonism so much more deeply rooted in the traditions both of national sovereignty and of economic individualism?

We have seen that the Asiatic States are learning, like Japan, to use the military weapons of Western States in their endeavour to resist the inroads of the West itself. Is

this a fatal obstacle to the whole movement towards disarmament? Japan's attitude in the League of Nations, culminating in her notice of withdrawal from the League in 1933, is largely determined by the fact that she must defend herself, or at least be prepared to defend herself, against European domination. It was against this that she originally armed to protect herself. It is only an incidental consequence that she has utilised her military strength in her dealings with China on the Asiatic continent. She is invited to disarm, but she sees that, without arms, she can neither resist the West nor dominate, as she aspires to do, Eastern Asia.

The Sino-Japanese Dispute of 1931. The Pacific Ocean, or rather the great "quadrilateral" formed by Eastern Russia, the Chinese coast-line, Northern Australia and Western America is undoubtedly the danger zone of the East; and the attitude of Japan is the most important single factor. It is, therefore, worth examining at some length the special conflict that has recently arisen in that area between Japan and China round the problem of Japanese expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia. It has thrown a flood of light on Asiatic conditions.

The failure of the League of Nations, at the time of writing, to exercise a practical restraining influence on Japanese imperialism, has been regarded by some as a final proof of the impotence of the League. But this is an exaggerated view. Its main significance is that it shows how, difficult as it is at all times to induce Governments to work the League machinery, it is doubly difficult in a case of this particular kind. Here is a dispute between two Asiatic states, remote from Europe, one of which is equipped with all the material resources of modern civilisation, and is at a stage of militarism such as was passed through by the great Powers of the West about fifty years ago; while the other is a state to which many of the implications of the Covenant, and the very language used in the Covenant, seem to be only partially applicable. Japan was a member of the League,

and had signed numerous important international engagements—the League Covenant, binding members of the League (1919) ; the Kellogg Pact, or Pact of Paris, binding most members of the League and some important states outside it (1928) ; and the so-called Washington Treaties of 1921–22. Of these last, the most important for the present purpose was the Nine Power Pact, which bound the signatories to respect the sovereignty of China, and to help her to maintain a stable Government ; and furthermore to maintain the “ Open Door ” for trade and concessions in China.

It was on this basis of law that Japan had agreed with Great Britain and the United States to make important naval reductions. The new system of Pacific relations established by the Washington Treaties of 1922 was a substantial improvement on what went before it. Up to that date the international situation had been precarious and unstable owing to the unsolved inter-continental conflicts between Japan, on the one side, and the United States, Canada and Australia, on the other ; while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1892 had been an element of stability as far as it went, but an element more in keeping with the old diplomacy than with modern ideas of internationalism. Though the new system, created by the Washington Treaties, was better, the Powers concerned had done little to utilise it or develop its possibilities. It now broke down completely in face of the stubborn facts of the East Asiatic situation.

Japan was led (by the imperialism of the party then dominant in her counsels) to acts of aggression, first in Manchuria and then in Mongolia, which were inconsistent not only with the spirit, but also with the letter, of her international engagements. But Japan went to these lengths because she had seen similar acts of forcible aggression successfully carried out in Asia by the Western European Powers. These Powers had begun to realise, in the light of the growth of world opinion, that less crude and brutal methods were advisable. Japan herself, however—and it

is easy to understand the position—had not passed beyond the psychological stage which they had passed through a generation before. These Powers appeared to her to have been successful, and she had appropriated their methods in an all too thorough fashion.

On the other hand, she was faced, in China, with a state of a peculiar character. The League machinery was framed on the assumption that all states, or at any rate most states, had attained some degree of national unity ; that the central Government controlled the whole territory and was capable of speaking in the name of the whole people ; and that foreign interference and control were, in the main, excluded.

As an American writer has said in this connection (Mr. Jerome D. Greene, Chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in *International Conciliation*, June 1932) :

“ The machinery of peace does not necessarily contemplate two equal parties ; on the contrary, the defence of the weak against the strong is one of its main objects. On the other hand, it does contemplate two parties who can talk to each other, and to other parties disposed to offer mediation ; and who can say authoritatively what they will and what they will not do.”

China, however, was still struggling to realise her national unity ; was still fettered by the bonds of foreign financial control ; had foreign forces actually on her soil. Residents from Western countries were exempt from Chinese taxation and the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts and police ; they occupied settlements under their own municipal government and employed their own police ; they had effectively asserted the right to establish “ Treaty Ports ” not only on the coast, but a thousand miles into the interior ; and their gunboats passed freely to and fro on Chinese rivers.

The phraseology of the Covenant was, to say the least, less adapted to conditions of this kind than to those of states more advanced in the political sense. The Report

of the Lytton Commission, one of the most remarkable League documents yet issued, illustrates the difficulty of this case. It emphatically condemned the aggression of Japan. But the facts upon which it was based were of so complicated and peculiar a character that, in its elaborate weighing-up of conflicting considerations as to the internal state of China and as to Sino-Japanese relations in the past, the Report was of a totally different character from what it would have been if it had related to a dispute between European Powers.

It is important to form a judgment as to the bearing of this dispute on a League of Nations policy. It is true that the failure of the League was a staggering blow to political confidence, not only in the Far East, but throughout the world. It is true also that one of the factors responsible for this failure was the unwillingness of certain Great Powers not merely to jeopardise their commercial and financial relations with Japan, but also to condemn a Power which was only doing what they had done themselves, and might possibly wish to do again. On the other hand, it is possible, without any very great stretch of imagination, to picture a more successful issue under happier circumstances. As it happens, the powerful military party had gained the upper hand in Japan ; but there had long been an opposite tendency in Japanese politics, and only a few years before it had been dominant. When the Prussian military machine, which Japan had imitated, was broken in the Great War, the Japanese changed their whole attitude, practised a considerable degree of democracy and, in 1926 (perhaps prematurely) introduced manhood suffrage. They pursued, too, a strictly League policy in foreign affairs. If a Government of this type had been in power in Japan in 1931, the outcome would have been different. Again, a Government was in power in Great Britain which did not take advantage of the position which Great Britain holds in the League. Experience has shown that, when Great Britain stands for League principles, her lead is always followed by an overwhelming majority of the members of the League. Every

competent observer is now agreed that if the Ambassadors and Ministers in Tokyo had been withdrawn by all members of the League directly the Japanese refused to evacuate Manchuria, in accordance with the Council Resolution of October 14th, 1931, the Civil Government would have been able to bring the militarists to heel. If the Japanese militarists had known that they would receive no supplies of munitions, raw material for munitions, or petrol from abroad, they would almost certainly not have embarked upon their adventure. If Japanese imports had not been received in foreign countries, the yen would have fallen so fast and so far that financial reasons alone would have brought the Japanese aggression very quickly to an end. There has never at any moment been the slightest doubt that if Great Britain had led the world in any one of these measures, the world would have followed. There is evidence that, at the outset, even the Japanese military leaders in Manchuria were by no means decided as to their objective, and simply proceeded from one advance to another, as one opportunity after another to intervene effectively was wasted by the leading Powers of Europe.

To sum up, the failure of the League to prevent Japanese war on, and aggression in, China, illustrates the difficulty of preserving inter-continental peace under present conditions. There is the difficulty of a League, whose effective action depends mainly on European Great Powers, being moved to take such action in far off Asia, the affairs of which seem too remote to the inhabitants of Paris and London. There is the difficulty caused by the fact that Asiatic States or peoples, like China, are not as effective members of the League and world organisation as (say) even a weak European state, like Belgium or Yugoslavia. Lastly, there is the difficulty caused by the fact that those European States which should take action to preserve the peace in Asia are prevented from doing so by their own imperialistic entanglements there. On the other hand, the incident shows the absolute necessity for a strong League or world organisation, ready to act against aggression no matter

where it occurs, if war is to be prevented. And we have seen reasons for concluding that, even as things are to-day, it only required a different attitude in the Japanese Government and a different policy in the British Government for the League to have intervened effectively in the Sino-Japanese dispute.

The General Situation; Distrust and Misunderstanding.

What we are faced with to-day, with regard to Asia in general, is a very special danger of conflict and of war arising from mutual misunderstanding and mutual suspicion, and from the consequent illusions—illusions which give rise, in their turn, to frequent disappointments. There is in the Far East—it is not confined to China—a profound scepticism about the League. There is a widespread feeling that, wherever the interests of Asiatics and of Westerners come into conflict, the League machinery, while professing to embody complete impartiality, will inevitably show a bias against the Asiatics. The League is felt to be too much a Western or European institution. The Asiatic states, even Japan herself, feel that they had no real part in creating it or devising its machinery. The Japanese delegation, during the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919, endeavoured to have the principle of racial equality embodied explicitly in the Covenant. The attempt, however, failed—an event which was looked upon as highly symptomatic. There is a feeling that the idea of racial superiority and inferiority is a governing factor in the counsels of the League. What the Eastern peoples value is not so much practical or material gains, as the status of equality and the recognition of that status. This to them is fundamental; and forms or expressions often take on a greater importance than what we should call the real substance of the matter. The intense feeling in Japan on the subject of immigration into the United States, arises far less from the limitation itself than from the fact that the limitation is definitely based upon race. To be limited by a quota, however small, like other peoples, would not be offensive. The Californian Exclusion

Act was offensive because it excluded Asiatics on the ground that they were Asiatics.

The General Situation; The Nationalist Revolt. The situation has been complicated still further by the rise of powerful nationalist movements in Asia. Up to the second decade of the twentieth century, the tide, so to speak, had flowed one way. There was a steady, uninterrupted infiltration of West-European ideas, systems and methods into Asia. Then came a period of violent reactions. There were revolutions in Turkey, in Persia, in China, in Afghanistan. There was a reaction in India against the whole conception of European civilisation ; its underlying assumptions were vehemently called in question. These revolutions were partly a protest against internal tyranny and corruption ; but they were at least as much a protest against foreign influence and control. If they were directed against a class of native Pashas or native industrialists, it was because these were regarded as the too subservient tools of the foreigner.

During the Great War and after it, the movement of reaction continued. There were risings against the Mandatory Power in Syria ; there was a second and much more fundamental revolution in Turkey in 1922 ; there was a complete re-modelling of the Arabian Peninsula in 1925-26 under a ruler (Ibn Saud) representing a tendency in the Islamic world which, from the European standpoint, is "reactionary." Perhaps the most striking manifestation was the successful defiance by Turkey of the Treaty of Sévres, imposed by the victorious Powers. Turkey alone of the defeated States resisted by force the imposed "Peace Treaty," and eventually secured another, of a much less drastic nature—the Treaty of Lausanne.

This new striving among the Asiatic peoples, which is destined to have sensational developments in the future, affects the question of peace profoundly. It represents new dangers of war on every hand. To counteract these dangers is a matter which concerns the whole civilised world.

What was the inner significance of these uprisings ?

The unchecked penetration of the ideas and methods on which the industrial civilisation of the West was based had been the main feature up to this time. Now the spirit of resistance to this influence was developing fast. It was resistance to the whole Western system in all its forms and with all its underlying ideas. But, in point of fact, owing to the peculiar nature of the Western system, owing to its astonishing developments in two special arts—that of government and that of war—the Eastern nations could only resist it by acquiring these arts of government and war. They strove, therefore, to acquire them. Two of them, Japan and Turkey, have largely succeeded. They have both learnt for themselves, and taught to others, the disastrous lesson that force—on a short view at any rate—does pay, and pay handsomely. But we now come up against the fact that you cannot isolate the arts of government and war, and avoid absorbing the rest of the Western system as well. Your very success in these arts predisposes you to accept the whole conception of life to which these arts are related—on which, indeed, they are based. Thus the process of resistance to Western civilisation involves you in the painful consequence that you must absorb Western civilisation itself—absorb, that is, the very thing from which you are trying to isolate yourself. For this reason, if for no other, it is impossible to accept the crude doctrine that “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain can meet.” Every year that passes makes it more evidently obsolete.

Is Peace Possible? Some are inclined to think that the situation above described makes peace impossible. Before coming to the question of remedies, this doubt must be faced. The force of the economic drive—the dominance of the economic motive in modern imperialism—seems to be incontestable. But is this drive, and is this dominance, sufficient to make a League of Nations, even a reformed League of Nations, for ever unrealisable? Are the forces making for internationalism, even in difficult cases like that of Asia, absolutely certain to be overborne by these

economic forces, whether individual or national ? This is an assumption often made, but in my judgment it is by no means proved. The forces on the side of internationalism are also strong. They are less obvious ; they are often imponderable. But the lesson of history, as I read it, is that they are not to be ignored, and that they slowly increase in volume. To assume the contrary—to say that the sixty odd independent states of to-day can never subordinate their selfish ends to the needs of a genuine international system—is to assume that they will never do what, in point of fact, individual men and women have long ago succeeded in doing within the limits of national states, and what has been done in a rudimentary way, even in Asia, in the creation, by agreement, of “spheres of influence” and financial “consortia.” It is to assume also that they can never be expected to subordinate their own short-range interests to their own long-range interests ; for I am prepared to argue that, from the point of view of material prosperity, it would in the long run be better for each individual state to come into a world system. And there is still a further assumption which appears to me to be unproved. It is that the internal constitution of these states, particularly on the economic side, is not only favourable to conflict and unfavourable to co-operation, but also can never be modified to a sufficient extent, and in a sufficient number of cases, to allow the tendency to co-operation to prevail. These, in the light of history, are large and daring assumptions.

Remedies: An Asiatic League? When remedies for the special danger of Asia are discussed, the first suggestion generally made is the creation of an Asiatic League within the League. But the peculiar relations of Asia with the rest of the world will not be met by a league of this kind. Though the Asiatic states have certain common features, they have no fundamental unity, and at no period of their history has any effective intercommunication been developed between them. Asia presents every kind of

political unit—powerful states equipped with modern armics ; ancient decrepit states, with the embryonic beginnings of democracy ; countries in loose association with, or in complete subordination to, great Empires with their centres in other parts of the world.

Russia, in particular, has a relationship with Asia which cannot be ignored. Nominally a free union of republics and autonomous regions, she is in some respects in a position similar to that of the other great Empires. But she is distinguished from them by the important fact that there is no sharp dividing line, as in other cases, between the dominant or imperial people and the peoples who hold a subordinate place. European Russia has a kinship with Asia, a sympathy with Asia, an enviable freedom from racial antipathies, which makes it quite impossible to leave her out of account in any estimate of the future relations between Asia and the world outside.

Even if it were possible to create an Asiatic League, it is difficult to see what advantage would accrue either to the peoples of Asia or to the world as a whole. To perpetuate the division of Continents is only one degree less injurious to world unity than to perpetuate the division of nations.

Disinterested Help by the League of Nations. There is no simple remedy, but the first and most obvious remedy is the organisation of disinterested help and advice to Asiatic countries, with their own consent and co-operation, by and through the machinery of the League of Nations. This is a method which is capable of very far-reaching developments. The International Labour Organisation is already playing a beneficent part. The growing industrialism of helpless populations, living at a low standard, and with no knowledge of trade union methods, makes this help indispensable. China is already advancing towards the removal of those defects in government which make her international relations so difficult. The process might be indefinitely hastened. The numerous ways in which the League has already co-operated with China in this respect

—at the request of China herself—afford striking examples of what might be done on a far larger scale.

In 1931 a plan was elaborated for League co-operation in China's work of national reconstruction. Since then, various experts connected with the Health, Transit, Financial and Economic organisations of the League, and the organisation for Intellectual Co-operation, have spent shorter or longer periods in China, assisting her in various spheres. Of special interest to English readers was the work of Sir John Hope-Simpson in grappling with the question of river conservancy, both as regards relief for the victims of the terrible floods in 1932, and in efforts to prevent a recurrence of such a disaster. The appointment of Mr. R. E. Somervell, formerly of the British Ministry of Labour, an expert in Civil Service administration and organisation, to assist the Chinese Government in organising its administrative service, is another example of the valuable co-operation which may be afforded. After having already given advice on health matters in 1930, Dr. Rajchman, the Director of the Health Section of the League Secretariat, was in 1933 asked to return to China as a liaison officer between the Chinese National Economic Council and the technical organisations of the League.

The reconstructive work of the League in China has been one of the best examples of such international effort. It has been consolidated by the creation, at the express desire of China herself, of a Commission for the permanent co-operation of the League with China on technical and humanitarian questions, and especially with the National Economic Council which is actively pursuing plans of administrative reconstruction.

The Fundamental Needs. Outside the official activities of the League, there is much that could be done by unofficial organisations to promote mutual understanding and adjustment. There can be no better service to peace in the long run than the promotion of contacts between East and West in the sphere of culture. On the political side, a good

beginning has been made by the Institute of Pacific Relations, on which the Governments of the various states concerned appear to look with favour. Its conferences, held at different places in the Far Eastern area, provide an opportunity for discussing, in an atmosphere of harmony, many of the questions which the machinery of international Governmental relations at present fails to touch, and yet which are of vital importance for the establishment of peace in the Far East. The first Conference, in 1926, concentrated mainly on the problems of migration and immigration, and those arising out of international commercial and industrial relations.

But what would produce the most immediate effect would be some striking examples of impartiality and disinterestedness on the part of the League of Nations, as between Eastern and Western states. The fundamental difficulty is the want of sympathy and understanding, and the underlying assumption of superiority on the part of the West. These barriers, which destroy mutual confidence, must somehow be broken down. Meanwhile, perhaps the most unanswerable assertion of "equal status," and the best demonstration which it is in the power of our own Empire to give, would be the grant to India of the fullest possible self-government—and, as a consequence, of a real place, instead of a derisory one, in the League of Nations. The significance of India in relation to world peace cannot be ignored by citizens of this country. The whole foreign policy of the British Empire has been more influenced by India, for a century and a half, than by any other single factor. The holding of India involves the maintenance of a large Imperial army, a large navy for the protection of an extensive coast-line, and an Air Force for the policing of the frontiers. And a vast population, whose national aims are still frustrated, and whose political development is restricted, must remain a persistent menace to world peace.

Summary. The conclusions reached in this section are :

(1) That the bulk of Asia is in a state of undue subordination to the Great Powers, and that this is due mainly to an economic drive which the industrial developments of the last half-century have rendered more intense and more dangerous than ever before.

(2) That the conflict between Japan and China over Manchuria, whose most recent phase began in 1931, illustrates the extreme difficulty of the conditions now existing in Asia ; but does not of itself prove that "the League is a failure."

(3) That mutual misunderstanding and suspicion, coupled with Nationalist revolts against Western influence, make it doubtful whether peace can be preserved without fundamental changes in the economic sphere.

(4) That a league of Asiatic states would not provide against these difficulties and dangers.

(5) That disinterested assistance by the League of Nations, with a complete abandonment of the attitude of superiority towards Eastern peoples, represents the only possible line of real advance.

§ 3. AFRICA

The Relation of Africa to the League. The peculiar conditions of the African continent, from the point of view of world organisation, have been already indicated. They arise mainly from the fact that European Powers have penetrated Africa, in one form or another, ever since the sixteenth century, when the Slave Trade began on a large scale. What concerns us to-day is the fact that the peoples of Africa are, in the main, too primitive to "stand by themselves," and that their territory has been parcelled out among a large number of more powerful states. It is true that in Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt, conditions somewhat resembling those of Asia have prevailed, because these Northern territories were largely

influenced both by Asiatic and by European civilisations ; but throughout the rest of Africa, the imperialist Powers were confronted with peoples who were almost completely helpless, and imperialism has had a much freer field, a more unimpeded sphere of action, than in most other parts of the world.

The modern form of penetration, involving annexation of territory on a large scale, may be said to have begun about 1880. Dangerous clashes were occurring between the representatives of the various Powers, and some co-operative action was forced upon them. The result was the parcelling out of the territory by agreement. Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Italy now hold the bulk of the territory. Germany has been eliminated by the Great War, and Britain, France and Belgium hold various portions of her former colonies in the capacity of Mandatories of the League of Nations. Tanganyika Territory (formerly German East Africa) has been allotted mainly to Great Britain, a small corner in the north-west going to Belgium. The main part of the former German Cameroons has gone to France, with a little strip to Great Britain. Togoland has been divided between Great Britain and France. South-West Africa has been assigned to the Union of South Africa, and is administered (under what is known as a " C Mandate ") as part of the Union territory. South Africa has acquired the status of a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire, and is a Member of the League, though its white population, which does all the governing, is a mere fraction of the whole. Egypt is nominally independent, but the British Empire reserves its right of control on certain points which it conceives to be vital to its interests. There remain only Liberia and Abyssinia, two backward states, which have been allowed to retain their independence, and are Members of the League.

The populations of Africa, in other words, are incorporated in Empires whose centres of government are far away in other Continents. To these centres their interests are subordinated, and they have, for the most part, no representation

in the League of Nations. Even among these backward races, however, it cannot be assumed that this position of complete impotence will always continue. Herein lies another danger to peace. Insurgent nationalism has made less headway than in Asia, but its beginnings may be clearly seen. We are reminded of conditions in Asia when we study the movement led by the Wafd and the Nationalist Party in Egypt, and the formidable revolt of Abd-el-Krim in the Riff region of Morocco ; while the periodic disturbances, both in Tunis against the French and in Tripoli against the Italians, have a nationalist and religious side which distinguish them from the uprisings of primitive peoples against obvious grievances. The time will almost certainly come when all the African races, even those now considered "primitive," will claim a place in the counsels of the world, and if that claim is disregarded, they will cause, at the very least, a series of frictions and conflicts which will be so many more occasions or pretexts for war. How is the peace machinery to deal with these problems ? They raise political issues of the widest scope. At present, it is the economic side of the process which constitutes the chief danger to the peace of the world, so far as the Continent of Africa is concerned. The question must often suggest itself, whether the world can ever be made secure against war, unless the present economic conditions in the backward regions can be fundamentally changed. This subject will be further dealt with in the last chapter of this book (see page 516).

The penetration of Africa has taken many forms, and behind it lies a whole complex of motives—glory, prestige, romance, religion, military power, commercial gain, which it is almost impossible to disentangle. There can be hardly any doubt, however, that the dominant motive throughout, whether conscious or not, has been the economic one. The untapped resources of Africa are enormous. It is economic imperialism which has been, at least for a century past, the main feature of the penetration. There are two sides to it. First there is the exploitation of weaker or "backward"

peoples, in order to secure the products of their labour, or their labour itself, on easier and cheaper terms than can be imposed in other parts of the world. Secondly, there is the intense rivalry between the "advanced" states, who jostle one another in carrying out this process of exploitation. The people of Europe have repeatedly been brought to the verge of war by disputes over African territory. The possible addition to the military forces of the world, if the docile African races are systematically conscripted in the future, staggers the imagination.

The word "exploitation" has a foreign sound, but it is difficult to find another which meets the case. Broadly speaking, when I allude to the exploitation of backward races, I mean that the power of government is used for the furtherance of the interests of a small White section of the local population—or of certain sections in the mother-country—without regard to the interests of the native inhabitants. By one means or another, the native is made either to work for wages or to produce raw materials, without receiving in return a fair share of the proceeds of his labour.

The rivalry between the Empires becomes more and more intensified as the industrialist states of the world become steadily more and more dependent on the products of the backward regions, and as these regions approach nearer and nearer to the stage of being "saturated," from the point of view of investment and trade.

There is, however, another tendency in operation in the world to-day. This is to be found in the still weak but growing realisation that the development of the backward regions is a matter which concerns the world as a whole, and not only the five or six Powers which have hitherto carried it on in their own separate interests; and the growth, side by side with this, of a sense of international responsibility for the peoples unable, in the language of the Covenant, "to stand by themselves in the strenuous conditions of the modern world."

Trade and Investment in Africa. We have seen that the existence of great Empires means the withdrawal from world treatment of a vast number of questions likely to lead to conflict, and to have dangerous repercussions far outside the limits of the particular Empire in which they occur. But we have not yet given due weight to the distinctively economic side of imperial policy. Most Empires adopt the policy of making their territories a closed preserve, as far as they can, for the trade and investment of their nationals. This has two consequences. First, it is a gigantic system of exploitation as regards the non-self-governing, and therefore defenceless, inhabitants. They are compelled to pay more for what they need,—to find the burden of life heavier—in order to yield, to the nationals of the ruling state—or rather to some of them—profits greater than they would be if those nationals had to face world competition. Secondly, the conflicts which arise out of this attempt to shelter a particular section of white men from world competition, constitute a standing menace to peace, by the incessant friction they involve between that section and other sections ambitious of sharing its profits. The right policy is that which is enshrined in the Mandate system described below. This gives, on paper at least, equal opportunities to trade and investment, from whatever source it comes; and it offers to the colonial peoples the advantage of drawing their supplies from the most accessible and the cheapest sources.

Up to recently, the British Empire was exempt from some of the dangers of the international rivalry above alluded to, because it granted free and equal treatment to all. As Lord Cromer pointed out long ago, it is doubtful whether the British Empire would have survived so long in its present form if it had excluded trading and investing competitors from all the widely scattered and varied territories which compose it. Holland was the only other country which pursued—and it still pursues in the main—the same policy. But quite recently, the British Empire has taken a substantial step in the direction of forming itself

into a closed preserve. The Ottawa Agreements of 1932 involve the serious consequence that the political advantages of a Free Trade Empire, so strongly emphasised by Lord Cromer on the basis of his great experience, have been given up. As regards the native inhabitants, who are incapable of defending themselves in this matter, they are now much more completely than before at the mercy of the business men of Great Britain and the Dominions. It should be recognised that, at Ottawa, full advantage was not taken of this new possibility of exploitation. The non-self-governing Colonies were represented in the negotiations by the British Colonial Secretary, who paid a reasonable amount of attention to their needs, though there are already cases where their interests were overborne by those of the self-governing portions of the Empire. Where a certain degree of self-government existed, as in Ceylon, there was a stubborn refusal to accept some of the new arrangements. But the fact remains unaltered that this policy could be carried much further, and, given the economic drive which exists and the experience of the past in similar cases, one may predict with certainty that the tendency to take advantage of a situation where one party has unlimited bargaining power and the other has none, will steadily increase. Already powerful and influential voices have been raised—among them that of Lord Lloyd—to claim that the differential advantages of making the non-self-governing Colonies a closed preserve should be utilised to the full. Great Britain has assimilated its imperial policy, in commercial matters, to one which has long been adopted by other empires, but which is contrary to its own best traditions. The policy goes naturally hand in hand with a greater militarisation of the colonial peoples, and with increased possibilities of war on the circumferences of empire.

The Principal of Internationalism in Africa. If we turn now to the question of remedies, we see at a glance that a Continental sub-league for Africa would be of no value. If it meant anything, it would mean predominance by

the self-governing Union of South Africa, with its reactionary native policy. The Union would presumably carry on negotiations with the Colonial Offices of London, Paris, Rome, Brussels and Lisbon ; while Egypt remained outside the circle, and Liberia and Abyssinia were either absorbed by one or other Empire, or contemptuously left in isolation. There is no one who can really speak for Africa in the councils of the League. It must, in its present stage, be an appendage or a collection of appendages. The only question is, appendages of whom ?

The answer to this question is, "Of the League of Nations." More and more, as occasion offers, we must assert the principle of internationalism. There is no other line of advance. The right attitude towards the problem is that which frankly accepts the idea of a "Great Society," to which the sovereign state must subordinate itself.

An effective League of Nations, whether to arbitrate, to develop, or to protect, is more needed than ever before in the world's history. But the League of Nations, as yet, can do little. Through its Mandate system, and through occasional schemes of administrative assistance and advice, such as has been proposed for Liberia by a special committee of the League Council, it can point the way to a new system of dealing with the problem, which may some day take the place of economic imperialism as we now know it. But its powers are extremely limited, and a vast number of great issues are withdrawn altogether from its purview by the doctrine of "domestic jurisdiction." The interests of the world as a whole are still but meagrely safeguarded.

What Internationalism has Done in Africa. The chief means through which the League operates in Africa at present is the Mandate system. What this means is clearly described in the Article whereby the Covenant of the League applies the principle of internationalism. Though merely a tentative beginning, it is an important step in the right direction. I shall quote Article XXII in full, reminding the reader that the actual Mandates given

to the various Mandatory Powers lay down in fuller detail how the general purposes of the Article are to be carried out in practice.

“ To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

“ The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

“ The character of this mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

“ Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

“ Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion,

subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

“There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

“In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

“The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

“A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.”

It should be added that, apart from the Article on Mandates, there is another Article in the Covenant which contains important obligations. After Article XXII follows Article XXIII, and this is in no way limited to any special group of members within the League. It is quite outside the Mandate system, and is absolutely general in its terms. Under Clause (a) it is laid down that Members of the League “will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and

humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children." That is not limited to White races, or to industrial countries. But Clause (b) goes further. Under it Members of the League "undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control." They have undertaken thereby an obligation of a general character which is incumbent not only upon the Mandatory Powers, but upon every state that is a member of the League.

What the League has done already through the Mandate system, through the operations of the International Labour Organisation, and otherwise, is by no means to be underrated. It is a step in the right direction, and it might be carried much further. The Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which binds the signatories to abolish in time the whole system of forced labour, is a good example. But the activities of the League, even now, are not limited to Mandates and labour questions. In the sphere of health policy, for instance, it has promoted, and followed up the work of, an important International Commission for the study of sleeping-sickness. In the sphere of general policy, it has promoted the Slavery Convention of 1926, whereby a large number of Powers have bound themselves to suppress, not only the slave trade and slave raiding, but slavery itself.

Moreover, outside the operations of the League, there are international provisions for Africa whose origins go as far back as the Berlin Act of 1885, and the Brussels Act of 1890.

In 1885 all the chief states of Europe and the United States of America sent representatives to a Conference at Berlin, to discuss the problem of the development of trade and civilisation in Africa. The Berlin Act states the desire of the Powers "in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilisation in certain regions of Africa ; . . . to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation ; . . . to obviate the misunderstandings and disputes which might

in future arise from new acts of occupation on the coast of Africa "; and affirms that they are " concerned, at the same time, as to the means of furthering the moral and material well-being of the Native populations." The provisions of the treaty also distinguish between the three parts of the problem, the development and encouragement of trade, the protection of the native, and finally his education in the ways of European civilisation. Most of the articles deal with trade ; but the first two paragraphs of Article VI are as follows :

" All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade.

" They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific, or charitable institutions and undertakings created and organised for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilisation."

These international engagements have been replaced since the Great War by the Conventions of St. Germain of 1919. The first of these provides for trade equality in what is called the Conventional Basin of the Congo. The second provides for the restriction of the arms traffic, and the third for the restriction of the liquor traffic. In the original treaties there were provisions for the neutralisation of a large part of tropical Africa in time of war—that is to say, the abstention of Powers which might be at war from using their African possessions in any way for the purposes of the war ; these provisions depended, however, on the consent of the Powers concerned, and in fact, when the test came at the outbreak of the World War in 1914, they were thrown to the winds. And now, Germany being eliminated, no

attempt has been made to replace them. Neutralisation is one of those remedies for war, like the prohibition of poison gas, which assume a voluntary renunciation that is most unlikely to be forthcoming when the crisis arrives. Remedies of this kind may be worth putting on paper as a guide to world opinion, but experience shows that they cannot be relied upon with certainty to be effective. Positive international action is of far greater value.

What the League might do. We have seen that the League, following earlier and more rudimentary international efforts, is already doing something to realise the new principle of internationalisation. But it must be admitted that this is a small beginning. The ordinary African sees nothing and knows nothing of the League, or of any international authority ; the conditions of his life on every hand are influenced, often in the most irksome manner, by various national governments, which appear to have nothing to do with the " Great Society." Yet, though it is a mere beginning, it is pregnant with possibilities. Africa may be regarded as the best possible field for developing the positive and constructive side of the League of Nations.

The Mandate System is undoubtedly a safeguard against some of the abuses which have accompanied exploitation in the past. Through the full reports which the Mandatory Powers are practically compelled to publish, and through the Minutes of the Mandates Commission itself, more and more knowledge is becoming available to the public of the whole world. Formerly, the most serious abuses were not only uncorrected, but altogether unknown. A higher standard of colonial administration has been set up in the Mandated territories, and this will almost inevitably be used as a criterion by which the conduct of Governments in other backward areas will be judged. The publicity given to their achievements in the interests of the native population is a positive encouragement to those Powers which are acting up to their obligations. The system constitutes, in a broad

and informal sense, a Court of Appeal for the weaker populations of Africa.

Lastly, it gives formal recognition to the principle that the development of backward regions is the concern of the whole world, and that the responsibility of those who conduct it is an international responsibility.

The ways in which this Mandates System might be further developed are well described by Mr. L. S. Woolf (*Imperialism and Civilisation*, p. 127) :

“ There can be no doubt what the words of Article XXII mean. They mean that the Mandated territories in Africa shall be administered *primarily* in the interests of the native inhabitants, that the trustee of their interests is the League, and that the League shall employ a particular state to carry out the terms of that trust. If this system is to be honestly applied, the Mandatory has no right to treat the Mandated territory as part of its empire ; it is simply a trustee on behalf of the League, which has declared itself to be a trustee on behalf of civilisation. . . .

“ If the terms of Article XXII are to be carried out, the sovereignty in Mandated territory must be in the League. The Mandates Commission of the League must work out the general principles of government to be applied in Africa, and these, when approved by the Council and Assembly, should be obligatory on the Mandatory Power. The main work of the Mandates Commission should be to watch over the carrying out of these principles in practice, helping Mandatories with advice and experience, investigating charges, reporting to the Council on all cases where the Mandatory is not fulfilling the obligations of Article XXII. The general lines on which the relations of the Mandatory to the League Commission and to the League Council should be regulated are quite easy to define. No one who has administered a district in a Crown Colony, without responsible government, can have any doubt that the

British system can be applied to the Mandatory system. The League is to the Mandatory what the Colonial Office is to the local government ; it should lay down the general principles of administration, but should interfere as little as possible in the actual details of administration. . . . It should be a principal task of the League Commission to work out a code of Native rights for Africa."

The various lines of economic internationalism within and outside the League have been much discussed (notably by Mr. H. N. Brailsford in his illuminating book *Olives of Endless Age*), though it is only along a very few of them that progress has yet been made. Free Trade and equal treatment for all nations in economic matters, have, as has been stated, long been provided for in the Conventional Basin of the Congo ; but other lines of advance remain to be explored. There should be international consultation, at least, for regulating the distribution of raw materials. In the matter of access to these, there are gross inequalities between the advanced states themselves. Again, large-scale works of importance would often be far better carried on by international trusts or similar bodies ; and if these are to work smoothly, they should have a separate legal personality recognised by the League, and the League should have authority to act as arbiter in the settlement of their disputes. It should have a general control over their operations, and the financing of the larger projects should take place under its auspices.

The function of the Mandates System in preventing rivalry between the Powers is, from the point of view of world peace, as important as its function in safeguarding native welfare. From this point of view, the most vital feature is its insistence upon the Open Door, upon Free Trade, upon Equality of Opportunity. Unfortunately, as we have seen, there is a strong tendency, especially since the War, to emphasise the exclusive nature of empire in matters of trade. Can a League of Capitalist nations, under

modern conditions, be expected to develop the Mandatory system in this matter of equal opportunities? I do not regard this as out of the question. Take the parallel case of the Berlin Act of 1885. It was precisely because their rivalries were so intense and so dangerous, that the Powers voluntarily agreed among themselves to introduce a system of international co-operation in their place.

The economic field is by no means the only one. Educationally and politically, particularly in the raising of social standards, there are no limits to the help which the League might render. Its scheme of administrative reconstruction for Liberia, to which reference has already been made, is a good example. The other independent African state which is a member of the League, namely Abyssinia, might also be effectively assisted, especially in the matter of the gradual abolition of slavery—the chief curse of its social life, and inseparably connected with its “backwardness.” In both these cases, of course, the consent of the state itself is essential, but as League action becomes more familiar, and the advantages of world co-operation are more widely realised, the difficulty of securing such consent will rapidly disappear. Suspicion will be dispelled and competition for League favours will take its place.

The direct responsibility for government need not be taken out of the hands of individual states. Direct international administration demands an international Civil Service, and this would be of slow growth. It may never prove necessary. The separate states, however, must recognise themselves as “Mandatories” for the world organisation. Their policy must be subject to control and co-ordination. Viewed in this light, the problem of providing a colonial outlet for Germany becomes more easy to grasp. It is an urgent political question of the present time, which cannot afford to wait. But it has a wider aspect. Colonial administration should be regarded as a service to the world, not as a privilege or a monopoly. We need variety in the treatment of the colonial problem. We need contributions and experiments from every state that has experience and

capacity in the government of backward regions. Whatever system is adopted for the development of these regions in future, Germany should have a share in it. (See the discussion of this question in Chapter II, pp. 130-136.)

Summary. The conclusions reached in this section are :

(1) That the populations of Africa are more completely subordinated than those of any other Continent to great Empires whose centres of government are far away.

(2) That on the economic side there is a tendency to "closed" Empires to which the trade and investment of other countries is denied free access.

(3) That the general principle of advance must be that of increasing internationalism, put into practice by an increasingly effective League of Nations.

(4) That this principle has already been applied, to a certain point, with marked success.

(5) That the League, by the development of its Mandate system and in other ways, might carry this principle much further.

§ 4. AMERICA

United States Isolationism. It is difficult for us in Europe to realise the strength of what is called "isolationism" in the United States of America. I am well aware that there are powerful currents in the opposite direction, and of these I shall have a good deal to say shortly, but the isolationist feeling is something deeper and more instinctive. The desire to avoid entanglement in the quarrels of Europe recalls the horror of the tectotaller when he looks at whiskey, or the horror of the vegetarian when he looks at meat. The first great historical document which gives expression to this feeling is the famous Farewell Speech of Washington on September 17, 1796. The important sentences are the following :

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be

engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities."

This was the broad and statesmanlike expression of a deep-rooted feeling that Americans were called by the Almighty to produce something new in the world, to show the first example of Democracy, to create, behind the friendly and providential barrier of the Atlantic, the "land of liberty." There was humility, as well as pride, in the feeling. If they were innocent people who must protect themselves against the wickedness of the Old World, they were also simple people, who must at all costs avoid being involved in tangled problems which they could not understand, and placing themselves at the mercy of practised European diplomatists, versed in the unholy lore of foreign policy.

A more precise application of this feeling to practical politics was the Message of President Monroe in 1823, one of the most famous State Papers in the world, and a turning-point in history. The United States had the courage to declare, through the mouth of their President, that they would not tolerate any further interference by the European Powers on the Continent of America. They wanted to protect themselves against two dangers. The European Powers, they felt, regarded the whole world outside Europe as merely a field for colonisation. And, secondly, these Powers were eternally quarrelling among themselves about the allocation of backward territories, and the United States might be drawn, willy-nilly, into these quarrels.

The relevant parts of the Message run as follows :

"... The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American

continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers. . . .

“ In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. . . . Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe,

nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers ; to consider the Government *de facto* as the legitimate Government for us ; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power ; submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness ; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference."

The Constitution of the United States reflects the same attitude. It aimed at protecting the United States, not only against the dangers involved in any international relationships—to this day there is no "Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs"—but also against the possible extravagances of their own popularly elected President. The Senate—not representing the population, but representing the States, as such, on a basis of equality—was endowed with the power of veto over any possible international engagement which the President might desire to make. The Constitution went even further, a two-thirds majority being required ; so that one-third of the States, through their representatives in the Senate, could prevent any such engagement being made.

The entry of the United States into the Great War was, in the light of these facts, something of a portent in history. It represented a vehement struggle between opposing tendencies. The step was taken after long and painful hesitation. At last the United States threw their weight on one side in a vast international conflict which primarily concerned the Powers of Europe. They won, or at least

helped to win, the War ; they started the whole idea of the League of Nations ; and then, fearful of their responsibilities, and horrified at the nature of the dictated " Peace," they withdrew into their traditional isolation as suddenly as they had emerged from it.

United States Imperialism. What was done, however, cannot be undone. Something new had happened. We rightly regard the United States to-day, not only as the great giant which remains outside the League, but also as the potential leader of a future world organisation.

Meantime, however, their relative isolation, and the concentration of their interests on the American Continent, are still the outstanding features of the situation. The Monroe Doctrine has had developments not anticipated, we may be sure, by its author. It has developed from a negative doctrine of " Hands off the American Continent " into a doctrine of responsibility for the welfare of that Continent ; and also, in the hands of some recent American Administrations, into a process which differs little from the imperialism of the European Powers. In the words of Mr. D. J. Hill (*The Problem of a World Court*, p. 156) :

" With Monroe, it was no extension of territorial holdings in the Americas by any European Power ; with Grant, no transfer of Mexico to a European Power ; with Cleveland, primacy of the United States in America ; with Roosevelt, what we will not permit the Great Powers of Europe to do directly, we will not permit any American State to make it necessary for the Great Powers of Europe to do, to protect their interests ; with President Coolidge, we shall not permit with our consent a political invasion of America by the interpellation of a private Court organised for such purposes, to make America seem wrong where no law has been violated."

The modern American objection to being interfered with on the American Continent is greatly strengthened by the

fact that the United States have come to control and (as some would say) to exploit that Continent along imperialist lines. They have been led, whether by "manifest destiny" or by other causes, into annexing, not only island territory adjoining their shores, such as Porto Rico, but distant territories such as Hawaii and the Philippines. They have closely limited, by imposed treaties, the independence of Cuba, of Haiti, and of San Domingo. Such States as Panama and Nicaragua have seen their elections conducted under the supervision of American troops. The foreign affairs of all these states are under United States control; their economic life is "supervised." Mexico, after having lost a huge territory to the United States in war, has been compelled to subordinate her policy in large measure to the interests of American citizens. The economic penetration of South and Central America by United States capital has advanced apace, and the economic interests of the United States in these regions now greatly exceed those of any other Power. The process shows the familiar features of imperialism; it merits neither more nor less condemnation than the similar action of other empires. The main difference is that, while other empires sprawl over several continents, that of the United States is at their doors, and confined in the main within the limits of a single Continent.

Obstacles to World Co-operation. Isolationism, with the constitutional peculiarities resulting from it, has led to one of the most serious difficulties in the way of American co-operation in world affairs, and is therefore a serious obstacle to peace. The settlement of international conflicts by some kind of impartial decision, is admittedly the most fundamental step in the slow emergence from international anarchy. But whenever this problem arises in any form, the United States Senate is apt to interpret its constitutional powers strictly, and to insist that it must reserve the right to ratify, by a two-thirds majority, every agreement to arbitrate a specific question—that is to say, in effect, that when the conflict arises, whatever previous undertakings

may have been given, the Senate still demands the right to say whether that particular case shall be arbitrated at all.

Another important problem in the relation of the United States to world organisation is the traditional insistence of American policy upon the rights of neutrals when other Powers are at war—the so-called “freedom of the seas,” or the right to trade freely with belligerents. There are, of course, great differences of opinion among American citizens themselves ; and the Democratic Party has so far shown itself more alive to the need of modifying this doctrine than the Republican Party. President Wilson, in one of the famous “14 Points” which he put before the world in 1918, proposed an epoch-making change. No. 2 of the “Points” runs as follows :

“Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.”

If this principle were adopted—the principle that, if the seas were closed to enforce duly authorised “sanctions,” the doctrine of freedom would not apply—a serious stumbling-block would be removed from the path of world organisation. But so long as it is not adopted, it is extremely difficult to secure the enforcement of decisions taken by the League of Nations in cases of armed conflict. There is the risk that, when the League has decided that one party to a quarrel is the aggressor, it may find itself confronted with the opposition or indifference of the United States Government, and of a public opinion which has world-wide influence and effect. It may even find the whole economic power of the United States thrown into the scale against its policy. The element of uncertainty which pervades the whole atmosphere in this matter is, in itself, a serious weakening to any system of so-called “sanctions” against

an aggressor state. For the effectiveness of such a system mainly depends upon whether there is a general belief that it is certain to be put into operation. (For a further discussion of this question see Chapter VI, Section 3.)

These difficulties still exist. The United States remain outside the League of Nations, that is, outside the principal attempt which has so far been made at world organisation. They have refused, moreover, to adhere to the World Court—the Permanent Court of International Justice—although some advance has been made towards it, and the whole machinery of adherence in the form of conventions, which have been drafted though not ratified, has already been brought into existence.

An American League? Would an American League meet the situation? At the first glance, one tends to welcome the idea, perhaps because the century-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine, with all that has flowed from it, influences our minds unduly. But the case for a separate treatment of the American Continent becomes the weaker, the more it is examined. It is hard to imagine a group of more diverse units. Canada, embracing a vast area in the North, with a steadily growing population, is part of another and closer combination, namely, the British Empire. Argentina, Brazil and Chile are important states, capable of speaking with confidence in any international assembly. Panama and Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala, are among the least influential political units that the world can show. On the vast reaches of the Upper Amazon and elsewhere, we find the most helpless of backward populations. In the West Indies, again, we have portions of European Empires. The British islands, or some of them, might well form a self-governing dominion; at present they consist of a collection of "coloured" societies in different stages of development, linked only by their common subordination to the Colonial Office in London. Every type, in other words, that is represented in the world outside, is represented in America, North or South. Canada, it is

true, inclines at times to share the point of view of the United States, e.g., on such a question as that of Asiatic immigration, and, economically, is destined to become more American than British. But, as if to provide a counterpoise to this tendency, the Central and South American States, penetrated though they are with United States capital, and indeed largely on this account, feel the strongest objection to any system which would lay further emphasis on, and give further recognition to, the domination of the great colossus of the North.

An American League, unlike an Asiatic or an African league, is "practical politics," in the sense that one can well imagine its establishment and its continuance in being. The Pan-American Union, inaugurated by the United States forty years ago, has done something to prevent friction between the various American countries, to promote arbitration treaties, and to provide a convenient forum for discussion. But the dangers of domination by one State, and of an extension of the Monroe Doctrine which would render it wholly incompatible with the basic principles of the League of Nations, are so grave that it seems imprudent to create new constitutional machinery of the kind suggested by the advocates of regional leagues.

United States' Contribution to Peace. Meantime, although the United States have not joined the League, they have made no small contribution to the organisation of the world for peace. Theirs was the first Government that powerfully and continuously advocated the general principle of international arbitration. On the Continent of America, they took the first steps in the promotion of international unity through a series of Pan-American and Central American Conferences, and through the establishment of the Pan-American Union in 1889. The main function of this body, which has its headquarters in Washington, is to summon the Conferences, and to publish information of common interest to all the states of America.

Again, the United States Government is responsible for

the consistent formulation of what is called the "Open Door" policy in China. This policy dates back to 1899, when the United States helped to prevent the partition of China by the Note of Secretary Hay to Great Britain, proposing declarations by the Powers concerned that they would not, in their spheres of influence, impose higher duties or transport charges upon nationals of other states than their own. The policy was made still more formal in the Nine Power Pact of 1922, whereby the signatories pledged themselves not to "establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development" in China, and asserted "the principle of equal opportunity."

Since the establishment of the League of Nations, the United States have co-operated in an increasing degree in its work, more especially in its Health and Humanitarian work. They have come into very close association with the League by their participation in the great Disarmament Conference which began in 1932, and the World Economic Conference, which began in 1933. Throughout the dispute between Japan and China, the acute phase of which began in September, 1931, they have taken a firm line in asserting the rights of China, and their action would probably have led to some practical result if they had received timely and effective backing from the Powers possessing influence in the League, notably Great Britain. The one substantial advance made, at the time of writing, was due to their initiative. This was the formulation, and formal acceptance by the League, of the doctrine of "non-recognition"—the doctrine that political changes brought about by violent methods, and in defiance of international engagements (such as the setting up of a puppet state in Manchuria under direct Japanese control), should not be recognised by the other Powers.

The Future of "Neutrality." More recently still, declarations have been made by the United States, first by the Republican Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, and

then by Mr. Norman Davis, the representative at the Disarmament Conference of a Democratic Government, which seem to foreshadow the disappearance of the greatest obstacle to peace which has resulted from the failure of the United States to join the League. This was the doctrine known as the Freedom of the Seas, to which reference has already been made. Mr. Stimson and Mr. Norman Davis have announced a policy which means, in effect, the renunciation of the rights of neutrality in certain events, and which, while reserving to the United States the right to judge for themselves, when the occasion arises, which is the aggressor, binds them to join in bringing pressure to bear on that particular state when the decision has once been made.

Mr. Stimson's statement was made on August 8th, 1932.

“Under the former concepts of international law, when a conflict occurred, it was usually deemed the concern only of the parties to the conflict. The others could only exercise and express a strict neutrality, alike towards the injured and the aggressor. If they took any action or even expressed an opinion, it was likely to be deemed a hostile act towards the nation against which it was directed. The direct individual interest which every nation has in preventing a war had not yet been fully realised, nor had that interest been given legal recognition. But now, under the covenants of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, such a conflict becomes a legal concern to everybody connected with the Treaty. All the steps taken to enforce the treaty must be judged by this new situation. As was said by M. Briand, quoting the words of President Coolidge : ‘An act of war in any part of the world is an act that injures the interests of my country.’ The world has learned that great lesson, and the execution of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty codified it.”

Mr. Norman Davis, speaking on the British Draft Convention for Disarmament, which provided, in the event of a

breach or threatened breach of the Kellogg Pact, for consultation between the signatories, said as follows (May 24th, 1933) :

“ We propose to set forth our policy in the matter of consultation and mutual rights by a unilateral declaration. As an illustration, and without tying myself to the exact words, our declaration would be in some such form as follows :

“ Recognising that any breach, or threat of breach, of the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand anti-war Pact) is a matter of concern to all the signatories thereto, the Government of the U.S.A. declares that, in the event of breach, or threat of breach, of this pact, it will be prepared to confer with a view to the maintenance of peace, in the event of a consultation for such purposes being arranged, pursuant to Article II of Part I of the Disarmament Convention.

“ In the event that there follows a decision by conference of the Powers in consultation in determining the aggressor,—with which, on the basis of its independent judgment, the Government of the United States agrees—the Government of the United States will undertake to refrain from any action, and to withhold protection from its citizens if engaged in activities, which would tend to defeat the collective efforts which the states in consultation might have decided upon against the aggressor.”

A further declaration was made about the same time by Mr. Norman Davis, which has a close connection with the last. It related to the refusal to supply arms to the aggressor. At the time of writing, a resolution to this effect had been passed by the House of Representatives ; but the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, asserting the ancient right of the Senate to be consulted before any international engagement can be made by the President,

had passed an amendment, to the effect that the declaration of an Arms Embargo can only apply to both states concerned in the quarrel—in other words, to the aggressor and his victim alike—unless the Senate itself, when the occasion arises, consents to apply the refusal to one alone. This would be a serious check to the effectiveness of the step, in a matter where rapid action would be essential.

The United States and the Future of the League. On a long view of the prospects of the League, it is probably true to say that there is no question more vital to its success than its relation to the United States. It is a question *stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*. The obstacles to the entry of the United States into the League are, for the present, almost insuperable. And the abstention of the United States constitutes the most serious weakness of the League itself. On the other hand, the value of their adherence, if it could be obtained, would be incalculable. Their rapid rise to power and influence is greatly lessening the preponderance of Europe in world affairs. They stand out in the world of finance as the great creditor nation. Their potential strength, in the military and naval sense, is incomparably greater than that of any other Power. They stand first in the world in respect of iron-ore production, accounting as they do for over one-third of the total. They have an even greater preponderance in the production of oil, corn and cotton, their production being in each case about two-thirds of the total. But, more important than all this, they have a vast population, and the place they occupy in the public opinion of the world gives them an unique influence. In no country is there a more careful and intelligent study of the problems of peace and war. They are even the originators, as I have said, of the League idea itself.

It may be that, even without adhering to the League, the United States will continue to render great services to peace. It may be that they can help to promote the cause all the more powerfully from having stood so long outside the League. Their non-participation keeps us dissatisfied

with ourselves. It serves as a constant reminder that the League is defective ; that it suffers from its fatal association with the dictated " Peace " of Versailles ; that until the European Powers can compose their age-long differences, at least on major issues, and consent to some reciprocal disarmament, they do not deserve the support of the greatest Power outside Europe. The absence of the United States from our councils acts as a constant stimulus to improve the League.

We should take every possible step, while frankly recognising the strong isolationist feeling which still exists, to forge links between the United States and the League—always, it need hardly be said, with their whole-hearted consent ; to devise, in particular, some *modus vivendi* on the neutrality question, which would prevent League action against an aggressor from being crippled by United States abstention or opposition ; to modify the League itself, so far as this can be done without weakening its growing power, or offending those states which are already Members ; to use the reasonable demands of the United States as a means of improving League machinery. It would be best of all—if one who is not an American citizen may express an opinion—if the United States were to lay down what they regard as the essential conditions, and declare their readiness, on those conditions, to become a Member of the League.

Summary. The conclusions reached in this section are :

(1) That one of the greatest factors in the international situation is the " isolationism " of the United States, which has its roots deep in history, and the fact that the United States dominate the American Continent.

(2) That this attitude, reflected in the abstention of the United States from membership in the League of Nations, forms a serious obstacle to world organisation to-day.

(3) That an " American League " would not remove this obstacle.

(4) That the United States have made, nevertheless, great contributions to the cause of peace.

(5) That there is a significant tendency, on the part of the United States, to change their traditional attitude on the question of neutrality—a change which would vitally affect the power of the League of Nations to enforce its decisions in case of war.

CHAPTER V: THE LEAGUE AS A ROAD TO PEACE

By VISCOUNT CECIL

1. The Will for Peace
2. Renunciation of War
3. The League of Nations
4. Lessons from the League's History
5. What Unofficial Organisations and
Individuals can do

[In writing this Chapter I have received very great assistance from
Mr. Arnold-Foster, to whom I am much indebted.]

DO WE REALLY WANT to get rid of war and the war system? If so, how are we going to do it? Manifestly, the first requisite for success is a compelling *will for peace*. In addition, we shall need a continuing *organisation* for building peace and preventing war, and some generally-accepted *code* of international peace and justice, such as :—
an unqualified *renunciation of war* ;
provision for *peaceful settlement* of international disputes ;
provision for *peaceful change* ;
provision for *collective security* against war, including action to prevent and stop peace-breaking ; and
general *disarmament*.

§1. THE WILL FOR PEACE

IF THE will for peace is to be effective, the great majority of the peoples and their governments, including the most powerful, must genuinely desire peace. They must desire

peace so much that they are willing to accept all the consequences of doing without the war system ; they must have an informed conviction, or at least a vigorous hope, that prevention of war is feasible : and they must have a fairly clear perception of the means of preventing it.

A. Before the War. Before considering how far such a will for peace exists now, after the Great War, and how it can be strengthened, let us glance back at the position before the War ; for that has much to teach us.

If we delve at random into the history of that international anarchy before the war, if we read, for instance, books such as *The International Anarchy* by Lowes Dickinson, or the *Memoirs of Prince Bülow*, or the collections of diplomatic documents published by various Governments, we can hardly fail to be impressed by the absence of any real will that war should be eradicated.

The reasons for this were complex. Partly there was no adequate realisation of the moral, economic, and political case against war, although that case was being strengthened yearly by fresh developments of commerce and invention ; partly, there was no readiness, especially on the part of the Governments of the Great Powers, to dispense with war and the threat of war as a means of imposing on others their sovereign, independent will.

Most of all there was no serious belief that war could be prevented or the war-system eradicated ; so that the will for peace was paralysed by a sense of helplessness both within the governments and outside them. War was admittedly a bad remedy. But there was none other.

The Failure of the Governments. Consider, first, the behaviour of those pre-war Governments and the assumptions upon which it was based. The Foreign Ministers of the European Powers chiefly concerned in the diplomatic negotiations before the War were, for the most part, humane and honourable men, anxious to serve what they conceived to be the highest interests of their respective countries. Any one

of them was ready to declare at any State banquet his "devotion to peace"; and some of them, notably Sir Edward Grey, laboured with the utmost sincerity to prevent the Great War.

Yet all of them were in fact participants, willingly or unwillingly, in what must seem nowadays to the reader of that history as a reckless game of menaces. Their secret negotiations were based on the principle that each Government was absolutely sovereign, absolutely independent, and retained absolute freedom (save for limiting treaties in a few cases), to exploit war and the threat of war as a means of gaining its ends: and each Government, including our own, did in fact exploit this threat as a commonplace of diplomacy. They exploited it, sometimes with bluff and counter-bluff, sometimes in all sincerity, to gain objectives which now seem on a long view to have been often of relatively trifling importance, the reason being that war was the only ultimate resource against international injury or injustice. To us looking back, the incidents connected with Fashoda, or Agadir, or the annexation of Bosnia—to name only a few examples—seem almost ludicrously insufficient to justify a threat of European war. We are tempted to ask: can those who used such a threat have been blind to the real case against war in the modern world? Were they half-insensible to the evil and suffering that would inevitably result? Did they even realise the political and economic consequences?

In the then existing circumstances those Governments were still unwilling to dispense with war as a means of gaining their ends. If challenged to justify their unfettered right of war, each of those pre-war Governments would have professed to be retaining that "sovereign" right purely for purposes of "defence"; and in a sense the profession was true enough. Since there was no general means of settling international disputes pacifically, the most peace-loving statesman might well feel that any invasion of international right might lead to consequences so serious that resistance *in limine* was essential. It was not only that,

as Clausewitz said, "War is the supreme instrument of national policy, whereby one nation imposes its will upon another," but that it was also the supreme instrument of international justice. No doubt there were those who went further and like Wilhelm II used boastful and intemperate language apparently glorying in war. Talk about "mailed fists" and shining armour and bright swords made things worse. But they were rare survivals of an even more barbarous age. Even without such emotional extravagances the system was bad enough. Each nation's war was still regarded as entirely its own business, and care for the world's peace as nobody's business ; so that a Minister could not even show concern about another country's war without risking complaints of unjustified interference or suspicions of national self-seeking. Thus, as Sir Edward Grey found when he tried to avert the World War at the last moment, the principles, technique and machinery of peace-keeping had all to be improvised under the worst possible conditions. This is the fundamental fact. *No organisation of peace had been prepared beforehand.* That fact rather than the incompetence or wickedness of pre-war statesmen explains why the will for peace was so ineffective and so paralysed by scepticism.

It was not surprising that in those circumstances all the statesmen became fatalists. Before them all loomed what appeared to be "inevitable" war. The task of allaying causes of war, and of erecting trustworthy barriers against it, seemed superhuman, and even those who could discern a way out of the anarchy could have little hope that that way would be tried. Many of them, as if to justify their fatalism, evidently came to regard war as an inescapable natural phenomenon, almost as an "act of God," rather than as a laboriously-planned act of national policy : and there were even some who countenanced the revolting and silly notion that war is really a "biological necessity," on all fours with that "struggle" and effort which characterises all life, and that it would somehow lead to "the survival of the fittest."

This lack of organisation for peace was the chief cause of the lack of an effective will for peace. That was true of the Governments, and, as we shall see, it was true also of those outside the Governments who might have built up a potent public opinion against war.

The Failure of the Peace Movements. The weakness of unofficial public opinion against war was common to all countries and all sections of the community.

The average Englishman, for instance, deficient in imagination, and confident (except during an occasional scare), in such security as his predominant Navy could give, neither loathed nor feared war very much. There had been energetic pioneers in the cause of arbitration, in England as well as in America, such as Henry Richard and Randal Cremer; but their success had been very limited. And of course there were some, at the time of the Crimean War, and many at the time of the Boer War, who were profoundly stirred by the suffering and moral evil of those wars: but the fighting then was far from England, and the means of destruction were still relatively restricted. Moreover, fear is not often a potent motive of moderation. Thus even the danger of war coming, always very real in that anarchic world, was underestimated in England, despite all the preaching of many observers that it was bound to come. Nor did the Churches adequately bring out the moral case against war: they were still far from proclaiming the position arrived at by the Lambeth Conference in 1930, when war was declared to be contrary to the will of God. As for the political and economic case against war, not all Sir Norman Angell's demonstrations secured general recognition of the fact that nations could not each be stronger than the others, could not afford to beggar their neighbours, and could not even appropriate their neighbours' wealth by war. Even in England, in this rich country where the industrial revolution began, there was still a general failure to realise that mankind was moving into an age when the old question, "how

shall we get our daily bread?" need not and could not be solved, as some feckless barbarian might have tried to solve it, by a murderous scramble for the few existing crusts, but must be solved by co-operative planning for the use of plenty.

So, too, in other countries: the unofficial forces on the side of peace proved far too weak to stay the slide of the Governments into war. In Russia, for instance, autocracy and illiteracy had starved the growth of any informed public opinion. In Germany autocracy and militarism directed attention away from those peaceful victories that German science and industry were steadily winning, and opposed every challenge to the dogma of absolute sovereignty and unqualified independence of the German State. In order to make acceptable the system of universal compulsory military service, the young men of Continental Europe were brought up to regard preparation for war as a normal and inevitable circumstance of civilisation. A great part of the Press was glad to exploit news of crisis and antagonism, since that is easier to sell than the unsensational record of the victories of reason: much of the Continental Press, too, was under Governmental control or censorship, and some of it was undoubtedly influenced corruptly by foreign Powers or by armament firms. Other forces that might have made for peace were equally ineffectual. The Churches, the intellectuals, organised labour were indeed in favour of peace, but in such an anæmic way as to produce no real counterblast to the war mongers. There were gatherings of international pacifists and ministers of religion which passed pious resolutions against war worth rather less than the cheers by which they were accompanied and when the storm burst there was practically nothing to resist it.

Thus, even where opposition to war was most free to develop, the peace forces were far too weak. And this was due, not only to lack of imagination or of foresight and energy, but also chiefly to that lack of international organisation which, as we saw, helped to paralyse the will of

Governments. How seriously this deficiency hampered the growth of a strong peace movement may be judged from a single illustration.

How was a distinction to be drawn between "aggression" and "defence"? Unless the peace-movement could point to a clear answer to that crucial question, its appeal to the great bulk of the civilian population must inevitably be very much confused and weakened, and its task of enlisting support for a new code of peace-keeping must be rendered far more difficult. It could not hope to become sufficiently large and politically powerful if its appeal had to be confined solely to those few, the believers in absolute non-resistance, who opposed all kinds of coercion indiscriminately: it needed to be able to appeal also to the vast number of civilians who believed that there is something that may legitimately be defended against the triumph of violence, and that coercive action by the nation may sometimes deserve support as being the lesser of two evils. Millions of people who would reject as indefensible the anarchic attitude, "my country, right or wrong," would nevertheless feel bound to support their Government in certain cases where it was using coercion for purposes which could justifiably be claimed as "defensive" and compatible with world-order.

But who was to judge whether a nation's claim to be acting in "justifiable self-defence" was a fair one, and what principles should be applied? The question could not safely be left to the self-judgment of the Governments engaging in war: for every Government engaging in war in recent times always has claimed to be acting in self-defence even when what it was really fighting for was, not so much defence of its territories, as the enforcement of what it conceived to be its just interests by the exercise of its own sovereign power. Somebody other than the disputants, somebody impartial and able to judge with authority on the basis, if possible, of some generally-accepted code, was therefore required, if "the right of self-defence" was not to be a mere synonym for anarchy. But no such body

existed. The nearest approach to such an arbiter was the public opinion of the world ; and that was totally unorganised and unprovided with even the simplest means of expression and of judgment, or even of the necessary information.

So to those who asked, "How shall we know whether self-defence is being fairly claimed or not?"—the peace movement before the war could offer no answer that was even moderately satisfactory : it could only say—"We must wait and see what turns up in each crisis." In such conditions, those working for a peaceful world-order could not hope to evoke, on any adequate scale, a new tradition of loyal observance of the rules of peace-keeping : they could not lay hold of clear principles and practice upon which the average civilian's attitude towards war and national defence could be solidly based. The perception of how to prevent war was lacking, and therefore the faith that it could be prevented, and the will to do so. To the unofficial peace forces, as to the Governments, lack of impulse was bound up with lack of machinery ; the will and the organisation were necessary each to the other.

B. After the War. And now, after the Great War, how far can we say that an effective will for peace exists to-day ?

Present-day Governments, and the Will for Peace. Let us deal with the Governments first. We can assume that all of them want peace *if* they can get their own way without war. But the real question is, whether they want peace so much that they are willing to do without the war method as a means of getting their way, and to join in taking the necessary steps to eliminate it.

At the outset we should recognise that there has been a great advance in this direction since pre-war days. Sometimes, looking at the political scene, we may be led into supposing that the anarchy now is just as unmitigated as ever it was, and that the will to peace is still too weak to be of the slightest avail. I am convinced, however, after

many opportunities of study, that there has really been a great change in the general attitude of Governments towards the "right of war," and that the lesson of the Great War, and the post-war engagements as to keeping the peace, have done much to eliminate the threat of war from amongst the weapons of diplomacy. Anyone who doubts this should study the diplomatic history referred to in the preceding pages.

Yet it would be naïve to suppose that the will for peace is now so strong with the Governments that they have all accepted the consequences of doing without war. On the contrary, it is obvious that the threat of war has been exploited again and again since 1919, and that war has been resorted to or threatened many times. That the eradication of the war system has not been achieved in a few years ought not to surprise or dishearten us : but we should certainly be inexcusably blind and complacent if we supposed that, because the Governments now play the game of menaces very much less than they did and because the League of Nations has stopped or prevented several wars, an effective will for peace on the part of the Governments of the world is already assured. The reader will be able to think at once of quite a number of Governments whose will for peace has either been shown to be unreal or is under suspicion, or is at any rate subjected to exceptionally severe strains and temptations. I think of one Great Power which has flouted its gravest engagements to the League of Nations and the world in an undeclared war of conquest, and which might at any time seek to extend its conquests further, under its present militaristic leadership. I think, too, of that Power's victim, a Power of vast population but divided Government united in one thing at least—determination to win back some day the provinces wrongfully severed from her by the invaders.

I think of the present Government of a Great European Power which has lately been fanning long-smouldering resentment and grievances into a fire of fanatical nationalism and racial intolerance, and is now ruthlessly suppressing

all liberty of thought and especially all pacifist and internationalist opinion : a Government whose Head has been an inciter of the nation to war, and whose policy, despite some reassuring recent declarations, is regarded with deep and natural anxiety by other Governments.

I think, too, of the Paris Treaties and the grave hardships—some of them inevitable, and some gratuitous—inflicted on countries with proud and virile populations, hardships made all the more difficult to bear by reason of the novel and oppressive methods by which those Treaties were negotiated.

We have to remember, too, that, though some wars have been prevented since 1919, thanks to the League of Nations, yet there have been a number of wars and warlike incidents since that time, such as the seizure of Vilna, the bombardment of Corfu, the invasion of the Ruhr, fighting in Morocco, war in Asia Minor and the burning of Smyrna, various attacks on Soviet Russia, and so on. Even during the four years since the Kellogg Pact for Renunciation of war came into force, there have been three wars between its signatories—two in South America, and one in Asia. One League Member has severed from another League Member a territory larger than all France, Germany, and Great Britain put together, and has tabled its resignation from the League as a protest against the League's protest.

Not only is the renunciation of war incomplete in fact ; it is not yet complete even as a formal admission on paper, as we shall see presently.

As for the alternative to war, a number of States have as yet made little progress towards acceptance in advance of the principle of arbitration, for peaceful settlement of their international disputes.

Some States, including some of the most powerful, still shirk full acceptance of the principles of collective security—the principle that war is the common enemy of all, and that all should loyally shoulder a fair share of the responsibility for preventing and stopping it.

And if anyone should question whether the Governments

have confidence in each other's will for peace, an answer is sufficiently given by this appalling figure : In 1932 the World's Governments spent admittedly and directly upon armaments a sum equal to about a thousand million gold pounds ! That sum was the largest sum ever so spent in peace-time ; it was spent in a time of great financial depression, despite the League of Nations and its Covenant, despite the Kellogg Pact, despite the long efforts to achieve general disarmament, and during what was supposed to be a truce in the race of armament building.

Thus it cannot fairly be claimed that the will for peace of the Governments has yet become fully effective. The desire to prevent war and the readiness to forego it has grown enormously ; but fear of war remains far too powerful, and the determination to do without the supposed advantages of the war-method remains far too weak.

We will consider, in the following pages, what Governments can do individually and collectively to make this will for peace effective. But first let us consider the position of the individual citizen and groups of citizens.

The Will for Peace Outside the Governments. Can it be claimed in a sweeping generalisation that the peoples deeply desire the prevention of war and are willing with open eyes to pay the price of peace ? If so, what can they do to make their desire operative ? What can you and I do about it ? I am convinced that the deepest political desire of the overwhelming majority of civilised peoples is that there shall be No More War. The objective is attainable. But it is not attainable in the modern world without certain profound changes in the ethics and organisation of national and international society. And the trouble is that a great proportion of those civilised peoples who want prevention of war, do not yet appreciate or accept the changes it must involve. How can the individual citizen help ?

The Case Against War. The first step is to master the moral, political, technical, and economic case against war, or, to

put it positively instead of negatively, the case for World co-operation for peace.

For instance, it is worth trying to realise in some degree how stupendous was *the waste and suffering involved in the last Great War*. A few cold facts about the losses and costs are given in an appendix. But no imagination suffices to enable us to apprehend even a fraction of the pain and injury that those figures represent. As the French writer Duhamel said in a terrible sentence of his war-book—"If suffering were a communicable experience, another war would be impossible." But suffering remains incommunicable; imagination is rare; and the generation that remembers the War is quickly passing. Even those survivors who endured, say, the first bombardment of the Battle of the Somme, or the long starvation of their children in the hunger-blockade, can convey little of their experience to those who come after. And even if the experience could be conveyed, many of the younger generation would be, perhaps, as likely to say: "If they could stand such things, we can," as to say: "Such things must never happen again."

We ought to know something, too, of the probable *character of the next Great War*, if we were to let one happen. (Some of the facts are set out in an important book, *What Would be the Character of the Next War?* which is a collection of papers by experts, brought together by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.)¹

In 1918, man had powers of destruction that were incomparably greater than those available in 1914, when the war began; and the War Services had not yet actually tried some of their most appalling marvels when the Armistice was concluded. Since that time, the science of massacre has made extraordinary strides. The destructive power of the air weapon has increased—so the experts have told us—by several hundredfold. And in an air attack on a city on a cloudy night, the advantage is so overwhelmingly with the attacker that no effectual defence is possible. Millions of

¹ A cheap edition, at 5s., has been published by Messrs. Gollancz. This book has been banned in Germany.

pounds have been spent by the Governments in perfecting the means of wholesale poisoning, suffocating, and burning. The mechanisation of war on land has resulted in the creation of tanks which can move at great speeds, and can cross trenches and jump and almost swim : a single submarine may now have a tonnage of over 3,000 tons, with an immense radius of action, and the type of submarine which inflicted such enormous damage on the world's shipping, especially in 1917, has been completely outclassed. There is, I believe, a strong probability that resolute air attack could inflict casualties in the London area alone amounting to millions of lives in a single night, and according to some authorities this nation's imports of foods could be so blocked by air attack as to bring a quickly fatal breakdown of supplies.

We ought to master the *economic* case against war. When the war ended, the world's economic and financial structure appeared to be so damaged that no early recovery could be looked for. As a matter of fact the immediate economic injury is commonly supposed to have been much greater than in fact it was ; actually (as Sir Arthur Salter has pointed out in *Recovery*) " already, by 1925, only seven years after the conclusion of fighting, world production had increased, as compared with 1913, by 18 per cent. . . . Within a decade of the Armistice not only the world as a whole but even belligerent Europe had a substantially higher level of prosperity and average standard of living than in 1913."¹ But the post-war boom has been followed by the greatest economic and financial depression ever known : and it is now plain for all to see that the world can only hope to work out the means of combating depression and of making full use of the world's resources if it does so co-operatively. Without confidence we can neither shake off the burden of vast armament expenditure, nor break down the barriers to international trade, nor make a serviceable monetary system for international exchange. Without confidence we cannot conquer unemployment or lay hold of the

¹ *Recovery*, Sir Arthur Salter, pp. 23-24.

plenty which is at our hand. And without prevention of war, that confidence cannot grow.

Furthermore, we need to grasp the *political* case against war. On the one hand, we have to realise the strength of that case from the standpoint of a sated Power with vast possessions, like the British Commonwealth, or a Power like France, anxious to maintain what was won by the War. Our scattered Commonwealth is exceptionally vulnerable, and our huge overseas trade is exceptionally sensitive to economic disturbances. It is, and ought to be, a truism to say that world peace, world order, is the first of British interests, and the very condition of our prosperity. And it goes without saying that for countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, violent change is the worst of all prospects. So far as the contented Powers are concerned, the political case against war as a means of change is overwhelming. It is so strong that they ought to be ready—though as we shall see, some of them are not—to join in renouncing, without any reservation whatever, the use of war as an instrument of national policy.

On the other hand, we ought also to realise the strength of the political case against war from the standpoint even of those States which are dissatisfied with the *status quo*, those whose peoples feel that they did not get a fair deal in the Peace Treaties of 1919, or that the territories under their national sovereignty do not correspond with the needs of their population, or that territories which should share their system of government have been severed from them by a conqueror. Many of these demands for political change may be utterly unreasonable and unsound, as Sir Norman Angell and others have shown: but that does not mean that they are not passionately felt or that they are free from peril to the world's peace if left unattended-to indefinitely. "There is one thing worse than war, and that is injustice." Those words of Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, express a feeling shared by millions in Europe to-day. What should be our reply? We have to make two points:

(1) Merely to say, "No, no, never," to the demand for

change, merely to deny all hope of redress for what is felt to be intolerable wrong, would be to make explosion certain. Some provision for peaceful change there must be ; it must be a real, workable provision, not merely a pious phrase in a document. This book deals later with this most difficult of all the problems of war-prevention (see Chapter VI).

(2) The war method is not merely hazardous as a means of change, not merely a toss-up like the spin of a coin : it is almost certain to aggravate the general situation. In this world of modern weapons, modern commercial and financial ties, the war game ought never to be, and can hardly ever be, worth the candle for a national gambler, even on the most short-sighted reckoning of material advantage. For the moment it may seem that, in face of a League of Nations weak and less than loyal to its principles, Japan has won a cheap triumph in Manchuria. But even there, I hope and still believe that in the long run those responsible for the breach of Japan's pledges will have cause to regret their experiment in change by violence.

Herr Hitler, in his speech in the Reichstag in May 1933, put the case against war as a means of change in these words : " No fresh European war is capable of putting something better in the place of the unsatisfactory conditions which to-day exist. On the contrary, neither politically nor economically could the use of any kind of force in Europe create a more favourable situation than exists to-day. Even by the decisive success of a new European settlement by force, the final result could only be an increase in the destruction of the European balance of power, and thus would contain the seeds of later differences and fresh complications. New wars and sacrifices, new uncertainties, and new economic distress would be the result. The outbreak of such a madness without end would lead to the collapse of the existing social order in Europe."

We may well differ from Herr Hitler as regards the value of maintaining " the European balance of power " ; but we must agree that his case against war as a means of change is, and will continue to be, perfectly true, and we

must hope that its truth will not presently be obscured by passion from Herr Hitler or anyone else. For in truth, war is a collapse of civilisation, not a means of defending it. It may create a state of flux out of which new conditions may be shaped : but in doing so it creates a temper in which the right use of new opportunities is most difficult and improbable. If we fancy that we can truly serve freedom, democracy or justice by breaking the peace, we shall deceive ourselves as blindly as those who fought the " wars of religion " in the name of Christ.

This inadequate summary of the case against war must serve as an indication of the argument we have to think out, if we want as citizens to help in preventing war.

There is much more to be said, of course. In particular, let us remember that, bound up with the negative case against war, there is the positive case for using peace to good purpose. I will not attempt here to suggest that case, for if the reader doesn't know already that there is something better to do with life and effort than killing or preparing to kill his fellow-inheritors of the earth, then this book will be waste paper to him.

What Else Can the Individual Do ? Suppose, then, that as individual citizens we have mastered the case against war. What else have we to do ?

First, we ought to understand what are the main conditions necessary for prevention of war ; in other words, we ought to realise what is the real price of peace.

Secondly, we ought to be familiar with the elements of the world's code of peace-keeping and with our country's commitments. This is as much part of our duty as rational citizens as a knowledge of the elements of our own country's laws.

Thirdly, we ought to do our utmost as citizens to ensure that our country loyally and effectively observes those rules of peace-keeping, and contributes energetically and courageously to the further development of a just and peaceful world-order.

These subjects are dealt with later in this chapter.

§ 2. RENUNCIATION OF WAR

NOW LET us turn to the other side of the world's effort to master international anarchy. Prevention of war is impossible unless the nations will renounce certain sovereign rights which are mutually destructive, and will accept certain collective obligations. We will trace the successive steps in logical, not in chronological, order.

The Right of Immediate War. As I have said, at the beginning of this century, each nation retained absolute liberty to go to war at any time for any purpose. There was no obligation to wait, or to try what enquiry or conciliation could do to resolve a disputed issue : each nation was free to strike a sudden blow, the character of which was limited only by certain rules of war.

Renunciation of this liberty to strike at once was obviously the first, least, easiest of the possible steps. If States would pledge themselves at least to try what conciliation could do before resorting to war, they would be putting up a first barrier against war ; for they would be providing for a cooling-off period in times of crisis, during which those in favour of peaceful settlement could mobilise their resources. A period of delay and discussion would generally result in public recognition that war must somehow be avoided ; it would give the peace-makers what they would most need—time ; and it would reduce the mutual fears and suspicions of sudden attack.

The Bryan Treaties. This was the principle of the Bryan Conciliation Treaties, made by the United States with a number of countries shortly before the war. These American Treaties and others like them are still in force. There is strong ground for claiming that, if such a treaty had existed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia in 1914, that particular spark, at any rate, would not have lighted the European powder-magazine.

The Covenant. The same principle was carried further in the League of Nations Covenant.¹ League members agree—every citizen should know this fact—that in all disputes “likely to lead to a rupture” they will “in no case” resort to war until peaceful procedure has been tried. In other words, they renounce the right of immediate war. But that is not all; they agree further that they will submit such disputes either to conciliation or to arbitration or judicial settlement; they accept in general, though not as a definite commitment, the principle of legal settlement in legal disputes; and they agree that, if a dispute is referred to the Council for enquiry and conciliation, and if the Council reaches a *unanimous* report, then they will not resort to war against any party which accepts that unanimous report.

In other words, they renounce in *all* circumstances the right to break the peace immediately; they renounce in *some* circumstances the right to break the peace ultimately. If, however, the Council fails to reach a unanimous report, then, after three months’ further delay, they recover freedom to fight.

The Gap in the Covenant. Thus, the Covenant goes some way, but not the whole way, towards renunciation of war. There remains a “gap in the Covenant.” President Wilson, in one of his drafts of the Covenant, provided that League members should from the outset make their renunciation of war complete: indeed, they were to go further, they were to bind themselves in advance to submit to and accept peaceful settlement for all their international disputes of whatever kind. But in the Paris of 1919, the authors of the Covenant considered that this would be too long a stride to be taken all at once; and they compromised upon that partial renunciation of war, and that partial acceptance of the principle of arbitration, which the Covenant contains.

Perhaps the statesmen would have been better advised

¹ The text of the Covenant is given in the Appendix at the end of this book.

to agree then on the complete renunciation of war. Certainly the position would have been simpler, and easier therefore to explain to the general public ; and, as will be seen in a moment, the disadvantages of keeping open this "gap in the Covenant" have proved very serious. But personally I still consider that in the circumstances of that time, it was better to take only the Covenant's moderate step.

In a matter involving so fundamental a change in the rule of international behaviour, it is important that advance should be slow enough to allow time for public opinion to realise what is happening. A new social ethic as regards war cannot be manufactured overnight by a mere change in war's legal status : and it is unfortunately only too certain even now, thirteen years after the Covenant came into force, that a large proportion of the citizens even in those countries where understanding of the League is most widespread, have not realised how the Covenant restricts the liberty of their Government to threaten war.

But, whether it was tactically wise or not to leave open a conditional right of war in the original Covenant, clearly a time was bound to come when further steps would have to be taken. Experience has shown that the "gap in the Covenant" has been even more damaging to the League's enterprise than anyone anticipated in Paris. So long as the Covenant admitted that it might be legitimate for a nation in certain circumstances to resort to war, to get its own way, for so long a judgment that aggressive war is a crime could not be passed without implying that the Covenant permitted criminal behaviour. The League's moral case against war was thus maimed at the outset. Keeping open the gap has meant that the War Departments, in opposing disarmament, could argue justifiably that they had to provide not only for self-defence and for collective coercion against a peace-breaker, but also for a legitimate "private war"—war to gain purely national ends. Moreover, so long as that right of war remained, it was impossible to get rid of all sorts of political and legal dangers, such as the

system of exclusive alliances against private enemies—which is the fatal opposite of everything the League stands for—and such as the conflict between the irreconcilable claims of neutrals and belligerents in private war at sea.

Thus every method of prevention of war—arbitration, disarmament, and collective security against war—has been rendered more difficult. Sooner or later, the gap in the Covenant had to be closed: the *ultimate* right of war, as well as the immediate right, had to be renounced. The growing recognition of this need has been an outstanding feature of the League's history.

The Ultimate Right of War. Indeed, even before the League existed, the right of resort to war had been wholly renounced between a few pairs of States by means of comprehensive Treaties of arbitration. Chile and Argentina, for instance, in 1902, made a Treaty providing in summary terms for peaceful settlement of all kinds of dispute between them; and several pairs of States did likewise before the War.

As for the League itself, even before the League held its First Assembly, in September 1920, the Committee of Jurists which had been appointed to draft the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice, was trying to close the gap in the Covenant so far as legal disputes were concerned. It proposed that States adhering to the Court should in doing so bind themselves unreservedly to submit to and accept the Court's jurisdiction in their legal disputes. That proposal was rejected. But it was provided that by signing what was called the Optional Clause the same result might be achieved. Many countries including our own have since done so and to that extent the Covenant's conditional right to go to war in the last resort has been renounced so far as legal disputes are concerned.

A further attempt to close the "gap" was made in the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which was to provide for acceptance of peaceful settlement in all kinds of international dispute between its parties. The Protocol was rejected,

chiefly on account of the British Government's objections. In 1925, many States declared their continued faith in this principle of the Protocol ; and a very important application of it was made in the Locarno Treaties. By the main Treaty of Locarno, Germany and France, Germany and Belgium (but not the other parties to the Treaty, Britain and Italy) bound themselves not to begin war against each other *in any case*. Even if a dispute between them were referred to the Council for conciliation and the Council failed to reach a unanimous report, even so, they would not recover that right to resort to war which the Covenant formally allows. In principle, too, they undertook to settle all their disputes by peaceful means, and they accepted a definite obligation to submit to and accept legal judgment in all their disputes of a legal character. This was followed in 1926 by Resolutions of the Assembly recommending the principles of Locarno.

In 1927 Dr. Nansen submitted the draft of a Treaty of arbitration which was to provide for peaceful settlement of all kinds of disputes, legal and political : and the Assembly passed a Resolution submitted by Poland condemning in general terms all war of " aggression " as an international crime.

In 1928 the Assembly approved the " General Act," referred to below, a Treaty providing for peaceful settlement of all, or some kinds of, disputes between its signatories. And in 1928 also, came the Kellogg Pact, providing for the renunciation of war " as an instrument of national policy." Since then, plans have been worked out for amending the Covenant, by eliminating what remains in it of the ultimate right of war, so as to bring it strictly into harmony with the Kellogg Pact. At the time of writing, these proposed amendments have not yet been adopted.

The Kellogg Pact. Here, since everyone ought to be familiar with them, are the two principal articles of the Pact :

" I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn

recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

"II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatsoever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

Obviously this brief and simple text takes no account of a very great deal that must be provided for if war is to be prevented. It says that settlement of disputes "shall never be sought *except* by pacific means," but includes no positive obligation that such a settlement should be sought. It rules out "war as an instrument of national policy," but omits to define "war" or to provide for any collective judgment as to whether the proscribed offence has been committed.

And the text of the Pact makes no provision for what is to be done in the event of any such war being committed or threatened.

Nevertheless, those sceptics—and they were many—who thought that the Pact would prove just another pious resolve, a scrap of paper, are being proved wrong. It is, I think, beyond question now that the Pact is proving of great value in a number of ways. It has resulted in a powerful reinforcement of the world's moral judgment that resort to war is a crime which no national grievance can excuse: it has involved the abandonment by all its signatories of the *amoral* attitude towards war, and has thus promoted conference and co-operation between members and non-members of the League for the prevention of war. It has done much, as we shall see later, to ease the problems connected with the "sanctions" of the League.

Reservations to the Pact. Can we say, without qualifications, that all the nations bound by the Pact—i.e. all but Argentina and Brazil—have definitely renounced

liberty to break the peace? Are all the League's members bound never to begin a war against each other, even if conciliation should break down?

Unfortunately, we cannot quite say that. Before the Pact was signed, some of its principal signatories made declarations, amounting in effect to reservations, as to their understanding of its obligations. Mr. Kellogg himself, for the United States, declared that "every nation is free at all times, regardless of treaty provisions, to defend its territories from attack or invasion. It alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence."

The French Government likewise reserved "self-defence." The British Government expressed its agreement with Mr. Kellogg's formula, and added a further reserve of its own: it claimed "freedom of action" in "certain regions of the world" whose "welfare and integrity" might be regarded by British Governments as of "special and vital interest for our peace and safety." The claim was so broadly phrased as to cover the globe; neither the "vital interests" nor the "regions" were specified, but it was generally supposed that reference to the Suez Canal Zone and the Persian Gulf and possibly Afghanistan was intended.

Evidently, if belligerents were really to retain such wide freedom of action, as these claims implied, there would be an enormous gap in the Pact's renunciation of war: so far as Members of the League were concerned, there would even be a widening, not a narrowing, of the "gap in the Covenant." For, as we have already noted, belligerents almost always do claim that they are really fighting in "self-defence," if not in defence of home territory, then in defence of their "vital interests" in "certain regions of the world." An essential principle of the Covenant is that this claim to be acting in legitimate self-defence cannot be left wholly to self-judgment by the claimant: its justification must be determined by as impartial an authority as possible, and the discrimination between "aggression"

and "justifiable self-defence" will only be sure and reliable if that authority has at its disposal some established code and technique of peace-keeping.

For States Members of the League, such an authority exists in the League's Council: the Council has its code of peace, in the shape of the Covenant and certain other treaties, and it has now a fairly well-developed technique which it can employ, if it has the will, for preventing war and preventing aggravation of a critical situation. For instance, when two weak States, Greece and Bulgaria, came to blows in October 1925, both claimed to be acting in self-defence (see p. 299). The League Council's first act was, not to listen to and assess their rival claims, but to insist on their both accepting an imposed armistice and withdrawing from a neutral zone. If Greece had refused to comply with this demand, then she would have been presumed to be the aggressor: fortunately, both parties complied, and then the League could turn to consideration of the merits of the dispute. The essential point was that the right of self-defence was not left to self-judgment by the disputants themselves.

But what of the position of States not Members of the League, such as the United States? For them there exists no accepted tribunal, no code, no recognised technique of peace-keeping. Thus the American Government was in a difficulty. Mr. Kellogg recognised that some external tribunal was needed: "justifiable self-defence," like "justifiable homicide," was a claim that could not safely be left to the claimant's own judgment. "A nation claiming to act in self-defence," he said, "must justify itself before the bar of world opinion as well as before the signatories of the Treaty." "The tribunal of public opinion" would, he hoped, somehow serve the purpose. But he could go no further than that. The United States, he declared (Armistice Day, 1928), would not yet accept any actual world Tribunal "to decide when a nation has violated its agreement not to go to war. I do not believe that all the independent nations of the world have yet arrived at the advanced stage of thought which will permit such a tribunal

to be established." And, that being the position he had to start from, he maintained that it was impossible to lay down in advance any principles by which legitimate self-defence could be distinguished from aggression. Granted his premises, he was obviously right. Without a real tribunal in the shape of an actual conference or some similar machinery, and without some minimum code of peace accepted by the parties to the conference, no test of aggression laid down in advance could be expected to work.

Happily, however, at the moment of writing, there appears to be a good prospect that this very unsatisfactory position as regards States not Members of the League will soon be amended to some extent.

It is probable that the United States will undertake, by a formal declaration, to join in consultation with other States in the event of a threat to peace, and will thus help to avert conflict, and to judge whether a breach of the peace in violation of international obligations has been committed. It appears likely, too, that something will be done to help in defining and determining an aggressor. This has received strong support both from the United States and from Soviet Russia. Indeed the latter power has entered into treaties with eight other powers embodying this proposal.

Already, in this brief consideration of the renunciation of war and of the implications of the Kellogg Pact, we have seen that the issues involved are more complicated than they appear to be at first sight. In truth, the simple affirmation of the Pact is only the first stage in what should be a far-reaching change.

Definition of "War." The signatories declared in the Pact that they renounce "war" as an instrument of national policy. War! What is this "war"? Evidently we must think out more clearly what it is that we meant to renounce: and when we begin doing that we are soon forced to consider the further question—What is it that we *ought* to renounce?

Japan invaded the four northern Provinces of China, and set up a separate Government there, subservient to herself: she invaded parts of China proper, bombarded and destroyed a part of the populous city of Shanghai, bombed many towns and villages from the air and killed scores of thousands of Chinese. (This case is more fully dealt with at p. 301.) She did not actually "declare war," but she certainly did resort to "war in everything but name." She claimed to be acting, in the first instance, in genuine self-defence; and she cited the self-defence reservation, and the "British Monroe Doctrine," as justification for her policy. But the nations of the League in conference, with the tacit assent of Russia and the declared support of the United States, judged at long last that her claims to legitimate self-defence were indefensible and that she had in effect resorted to "war as an instrument of national policy," and that she had violated her Covenant.

Something must be done to extend the proscription of "war," so as to cover such action as that.

Renunciation of Force. The British Government proposed, in November 1932, to supplement the Kellogg Pact by an engagement by the European States not to resort to *force*: and the other countries, not including Britain, have supported the extension of this engagement to the whole world, not merely to Europe. Such a world-wide engagement, supplementary to the Kellogg Pact, would be a contribution worth making to the foundation of a new social ethic about international violence. It may however be wrecked, restricted, or delayed by the insistence of the British Government on reviving the "British Monroe Doctrine" referred to above. The present Government of Japan will probably refuse to have anything to do with it.

Conclusion. Let us now sum up the conclusions suggested in this section. We need a world-wide renunciation of war and the equivalent of war. The renunciation should apply to all parts of the world, with no reservations

of "freedom of action" in any region ; for the peace of all such regions should be treated not as a matter of concern solely to this or that nation as owner, suzerain or guardian, but as part of what the Covenant calls "the peace of nations," which is a matter of concern to all.

One other conclusion has emerged. If we assume that there is something for the defence of which nations may justifiably use their powers of coercion, then that "right of self-defence" must be subject to some international judgment : it cannot be left without check to the discretion of the disputants themselves, for in that case the renunciation of war would be stultified. There must therefore be some international body, some conference which can be quickly and conveniently convened, with a sufficiently representative and authoritative character, to judge whether a claim of "justifiable self-defence" is well-founded or not. So far as Members of the League are concerned, that body is, of course, the League Council, which has the additional advantage of having at its disposal an accumulated experience, a developing technique and a code of peace-keeping, and a permanent secretariat.

§ 3. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

IN THE preceding sections, we saw how the sturdy growth of a will for peace was hampered before the war, by the absence of any permanent organisation charged with guarding the world's peace. Many thinkers had advocated such an organisation. Some scraps of machinery for co-operation existed ; but until the League of Nations was instituted in January 1920, there was not the rudiment of a world authority or even a provision for Conference in times of crisis.

The League is not the only official instrument of international co-operation : in particular, there is the Pan-American Union, which promotes collaboration between

the American Republics. In addition, there exist very many unofficial organisations which contribute, some of them very substantially, to co-operation and the growth of confidence. But amongst all these agencies, the League of Nations is incomparably the most important. Beyond question it is by far the most valuable means for prevention of war and the building of peace that exists or has hitherto existed. It is a magnificent instrument, naturally imperfect as yet, and commanding only a very imperfect loyalty. In this shrunken interlocked world of modern commerce and communications, where not even America and Russia, outside the League, can be sufficient unto themselves economically, and where none can escape the consequences of international anarchy, the League has proved itself indispensable.

To deny that is only possible to those who, whether through prejudice or inertia, have neglected to inform themselves of what the League is, and may become. To be blind to what has been, and might be, achieved through using and developing the League, would be as stupid as to be complacently blind to the failures in the use of it. To dismiss the subject as dull or merely experts' business would be to shut out knowledge of, and weaken support for, the most hopeful and creative enterprise in the whole world of political endeavour. If "the Intelligent Man" (and Woman) to whom this book is addressed wants to help in preventing war, an understanding of the League, and an informed support of it, should be the first item in his equipment.

The facts about the League are so multitudinous and varied that it is always difficult to convey an impression of the whole. Here, only a few points specially relevant to the theme of this book can be touched on. For a more adequate information, reference must be made to books specially written on the subject.

The League's Purpose. The League's dual purpose is thus summarised in the first words of the Covenant :

“ In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security.”

Thus there are two sides to the League's work—*building of peace* and *prevention of war*. Each supports the other. Confidence in the prevention of war is the first condition of prosperity : and to strengthen the ties of peace through the League so that the interdependence, nay, the unity of mankind becomes more and more a reality is to provide a powerful guarantee against violation of its code of peace-keeping. At the outset, prevention of war must be the most pressing task ; but in course of time, when general disarmament has made substantial progress and international confidence has been strengthened, the negative side—prevention of war—should tend to fall more and more into the background, until it comes to be regarded as no more than a necessary but inconspicuous protection for the untroubled continuance of the League's real business.

The League's Principles. After the opening words quoted above, the Covenant indicates the ways in which this dual purpose is to be achieved :

“ By the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all Treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another.”

Peaceful, candid, law-abiding, just, faithful to engagements ; these are the qualities that the League explicitly demands from its Members. It will be observed that there is here no affirmation of the principle of racial equality. Japan proposed, when the Covenant was drafted, the insertion of these words :

"by the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals."

Nor is there any declaration of the principle of religious tolerance. Nothing could excuse these omissions except the doubt whether the nations had yet reached the degree of enlightenment in which their insertion would have been generally accepted.

The League and Sovereignty of States. The Members of the League are the Governments of independent, "sovereign," States. The Covenant does not explicitly challenge their sovereignty : and, except in certain special circumstances or in matters of procedure, the League's decisions require the *unanimous* vote of all the Members present. Thus the League is, in theory, far removed from being a "super-Government" : actually, it is in practice steadily nibbling at the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of States, steadily enlarging the field which is regarded as proper for international action. Mr. Tawney has said that "the conception of a League which repudiates the intention of impugning national sovereignty is, it may be suggested, a half-way house which, if a necessary stage on the journey, is not permanently habitable." I think that is true ; but it is also true that the League has already, by its Covenant and by its practice, curtailed sovereignty far more than is commonly realised and that it has found means to avoid being paralysed by its rule of unanimous voting.

The League, when newly started, was regarded simply as an instrument to give effect to the greatest amount of co-operation that the Governments had a will for : but as time passes, it begins to acquire certain powers of "recommendation" through a majority vote, which though not technically "decisions" may have almost as much influence as if they were. In this way a first step towards a real "legislature" with Governments for Members has been taken.

A League of Governments. It is sometimes criticised for being a League of Governments only, not a "League of peoples." Perhaps, as it develops, means may be invented for giving more adequate representation to the popular will of the entire nations, without unduly weakening the responsibility of the ruling authority which has to carry League policy into effect. In the meantime the national League of Nations societies ought to and to some extent do supply a link between the "peoples" and the "Governments."

The League's Membership. To achieve its dual purpose the ideal League of Nations should include as Members all the self-governing States, all sincerely collaborating for a common end.

Here we should note one of the assumptions on which the existing League's Membership is based. It is a daring, but in my view a justifiable assumption; namely, that very diverse kinds of government can well be harnessed together in one society for certain purposes common to them all. The League's Membership is open to "any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony," whose admission is agreed to by a two-thirds majority of the League Assembly, "provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments."

Observe that there is here no attempt to stipulate any particular type of political system as a condition of Membership. Any State which can fulfil these conditions can become a Member, whether its Government be Capitalist or Socialist, Monarchist or Republican, Democratic, Fascist, Nazi, or Communist.

Now it is evident that no such association can hope to collaborate successfully for the promotion of world peace and social justice unless its members do start with, or do at any rate develop within a reasonable time, a real

community of purpose. Can such community of purpose be found, or be developed, in a League of Nations based, as the existing League is based, on a Membership open to all sorts and conditions of States?

Kant, in his dream of a future society of nations, thought that it would have to be confined to republican States: but the existing League includes Monarchies and Republics alike, of the most varied types. Lenin thought that a League of Nations would have to confine itself to socialist States, if it was to have any true community of purpose founded on a common basis of social justice; but this League, rightly or wrongly, includes States with every kind of system, primitive and highly organised, competitive and more or less collectivist, short of Lenin's own Union of Socialist Republics. President Wilson at one time thought that the League would have to exclude autocracies, and he flung his challenge at the last Emperor of Germany: yet the League which Wilson did more than any other man to found now omits the United States and includes a "totalitarian" German State under an autocracy more absolute than any that Bismarck ever dreamed of, Mussolini's Fascist Italy, King Alexander's Yugoslavia, and other countries under dictatorial régimes share membership with countries such as Britain and France where freedom of speech and democratic powers of government are essential features of their polity.

Can this daring experiment succeed? Some people nowadays contend that it must inevitably fail, on the ground that we cannot rely on the "sincere intention" of this or that type of Member-State to observe its "international obligations" as to peace-keeping. Many contend, too, that nothing substantial can be done to prevent war or to promote good use of the world's resources unless and until we have utterly got rid of x ,— x meaning "Bolshevism" or "Imperialism," "Socialism" or "Capitalism" or "Fascism," or whatever compendious label sums up the tendencies which the particular critic happens to abhor. It was on that rock that the Holy Alliance foundered.

Nevertheless, the challenge must be candidly faced by those who would serve the League's cause. It must of course be frankly admitted that in the economic sphere we are very far from having achieved conditions in which the world's resources are most likely to be used to the best advantage of the world commonwealth. We are equally far from having mastered the vested interests that make for war. We have it may be, prosperity at our command, if only we will learn to control our powers of mutual destruction : but citizens within the nations, and nations in relation to each other, may be so blind to the interests they really have in common that they will abandon in a rage the laborious rational planning of the commonwealth. The occupants of this aeroplane, our civilisation, may start shooting each other, so that the fragile, marvellously-contrived machine will crash.

But I do not think the founding of the League could be deferred until all its crew were uniformly labelled or until all had learned a similar answer to the varied problems of how to use nature's resources and man's abilities. We cannot afford to wait for any such absolute triumph of one principle of Government over another, any more than we can afford to wait for a day when some miraculous change has transformed "human nature." The need is too urgent ; the experiment of co-operation must be attempted even though its difficulty is much increased, of course, by the divergencies of outlook among the Governments concerned. The economic depression compels us to work together quickly, and so too does the danger of war with modern weapons of destruction. And experience is showing that such practice in co-operation as only the League can afford does make even the most dissimilar Governments realise their community of interest in the loyal observance of certain broad rules of peace and justice.

We need not postulate a sudden transformation of "human nature" ; we need not wait till a Utopian day when human selfishness shall have been eradicated : what we must have, and need not despair of achieving, is such

a degree of enlightenment that we shall become content to subordinate so-called interests of our "sovereign" States to the major interest of the world commonwealth.

But of course the great experiment cannot succeed if there is no growth of that "sincere intention to observe . . . international obligations," of which the Covenant speaks. And it must be frankly admitted that very many of us cannot feel confidence in the "effective guarantees" of sincere intentions when given by States that suppress free expression of the will for peace. A Government which persecutes the peace movement within its borders, stifles freedom of meeting and of the Press, and punishes diversity of opinion, must inevitably be regarded with anxiety by its partners in the League's enterprise; for such policies destroy the very foundations of understanding on which a peaceful world commonwealth could be evolved. Wherever a Government relies on force rather than on consent, the "effective guarantees" of peace-keeping are likely to be weak in fact, and will certainly be weak in the world's estimation, whatever the Government's label may be. That does not mean that we must despair of building up a just and peaceful world order by means of an all-inclusive commonwealth of nations; but it does mean that the growth of mutual confidence is bound to be slow and that the League should be strong and its members should be able to rely on loyal fulfilment of its obligations of mutual assistance against a peace-breaker.

The League's Incompleteness. The League's Membership is, as we have seen, extraordinarily comprehensive. Out of sixty-six nations, no fewer than fifty-six (not including Japan) are Members of the League: they cover about three-quarters of the globe and comprise about four-fifths of the human race. Yet the incompleteness of the League is extremely serious, so damaging, indeed, to the League's work in organising a peaceful order that we have cause to be astonished that so much success has been achieved against such heavy handicaps. Two of the greatest Powers

of the world, the United States and Russia, are not Members. Japan has given notice of withdrawal. Brazil has withdrawn. Egypt and a few other States are not yet members. And the League was born in the fevered air of the Paris of 1919, into a world crippled by the waste of war and embittered and divided by war's passions.

(a) *The League and Germany.* It was a major error and misfortune that Germany was not admitted to Membership of the League¹ at the outset, but only in 1926. Much of the antagonism and reaction in Europe since 1919 has been due to the assumed division of the nations into two categories, "aggressors," and their innocent victims. If only the post-war Germany had been quickly accepted as an equal partner in the League's enterprise, a vengeful and intolerant spirit would have been far more difficult to evoke from the German people, and the policy of fulfilment of Germany's treaty obligations would not have been so fatally associated in German minds with years of humiliation and isolation, including the Ruhr invasion and the disastrous inflation of the German currency.

(b) *The League and the United States.* Whilst that initial error, the exclusion of Germany, has handicapped the League's work in Europe, the voluntary withdrawal of the United States has been a grave added handicap throughout the world and especially in the Far East. The League's handling of its task of war-prevention, notably in the first stage of the Chinese-Japanese conflict in the autumn of 1931, would certainly have been far more confident, and almost certainly far more efficacious, if the United States had been in an established and unequivocal position as partners in the guardianship of the world's peace. Confidence in the League's powers to prevent war and restrain a peace-breaker would undoubtedly have been far less weak to-day than in fact it is. Perhaps the League's peace-keeping technique would by now be more fully developed.

¹ Germany was, however, admitted to Membership of the International Labour Organisation.

Moreover, if America had been the League's partner, certain causes of embitterment in Europe would probably have been avoided. The whole Reparations question might have taken on a new aspect. Europe would have understood better the American point of view and America might have viewed more sympathetically European difficulties. American advice might have prevented the invasion of the Ruhr, and if that tragedy had not occurred, the League would to-day be unhampered in its task by some of the bitterest memories that poison Franco-German relations.

So, too, as regards the administration of that Saar territory which the Versailles Treaty separated for a term of years from Germany and placed under the League's authority: errors which marred the administration of the territory during the League's first years might have been avoided if the scheme could have been worked as planned, with American participation.

Thus, America's absence from the League's counsels has added much to the difficulties of adjusting the peace settlement, of organising peace, and of preventing war. But whilst we recognise the added difficulties under which the League has had to labour, we must not exaggerate the extent of America's non-participation. Ever since 1927, the United States has been sharing in a great part of the League's peace-building work, sending observers or representatives to the League's conferences. Year after year, American delegates have been working at Geneva for the Disarmament Conference. As I write, the United States has just been officially represented for the first time at the Annual Conference of the International Labour Organisation. American leadership as regards the Kellogg Pact has been of immense assistance to the League in dealing with some of the main problems left open by its Covenant. At some of the critical times during the Sino-Japanese conflict American policy was a powerful though not quite adequate support to the League's effort, and a challenge to the League's laggards. And now, recent declarations of American policy happily make it almost certain that the United

States will at least confer with the League in case of war or threat of war, and that if the American Government is satisfied that the peace-engagements to which it is party are being broken, it will at any rate not seek to stultify the League's action to restrain the peace-breaker. Already, by the Kellogg Pact, the United States had by implication renounced the amoral attitude of indifference towards war : now, if her recent declarations are duly endorsed, she will be formally recognising that she too shares in some degree in the collective concern for " the peace of nations." That will be a great gain. It will enormously facilitate the task of the League Council, enabling it to act in a crisis with confidence, instead of incertitude, as to American policy. It will greatly reduce the danger that a would-be peace-breaker may be tempted to gamble on the chances of the League being paralysed by fear of an American challenge. It will virtually eliminate both the danger and the fear lest British naval action in support of the League's measures to restrain a peace-breaker might involve a clash with the United States. In a word, America's abandonment of the anarchic doctrine of absolute " neutrality " will much reduce the chances of peace being broken.

This does not mean that the United States is on the way to becoming a Member of the League : that would be a complete misunderstanding of her new contribution. But it does mean that the disadvantages to the world that have resulted from her absence from the League's counsels are likely to be much reduced.

(c) *The League and Russia.* We need not deal here at length with Russia's absence from the League, though that is of the first importance : for the subject is being treated more amply elsewhere in this book (see Chapter III). It must suffice to say here that, for the present at any rate, the policy of the Soviet Government must be accounted as on the side of peace. The League's work has been hampered in a thousand ways, of course, by Russia's absence : many of the most important political problems in Eastern

Europe and in the Far East, and many of the economic problems of the whole world, admit of no satisfactory solution without Russia's collaboration. That collaboration has been increasing. The Soviet Government was the first to ratify the Kellogg Pact : its contribution to the Disarmament Conference has been both radical and on the whole helpful : its conclusion of a series of treaties of non-aggression with neighbouring States, and its pacific attitude towards the recent challenge of the Japanese policy as regards the railway situation in Manchuria may fairly be regarded as proof of the sincerity of its present peace policy. The wholesale militarisation of the Russian people, which extends to the women, and to the children in the schools, is certainly an evidence of fear ; and the enormous armaments of Russia may become an instrument of menace : but whatever we may think of Russia's ruthless collectivist experiment at home, or of her propagandist experiments abroad, we ought not to allow our detestation or our enthusiasm to prejudice our reading of the facts about her present attitude towards peace and general disarmament. Much of Russia's history since the war ; the position reached in her economic programme ; the extreme danger to the present form of Russian Government which a Russian war whatever its result would involve ; all this should persuade us that for the present Soviet Russia, though no friend of the League of Nations, is no enemy of the League's cause of peace, and is compelled by self-interest if by nothing else to be a fellow-servant of that cause.

The League's Organisation. A word, next, about the organisation of the League.¹ The League's essential features are, that it is :—

“ *Representative* of the Governments of its Member States, by means of its annual *Assembly*.

“ *Executive*, by means of its Assembly and, more particularly, of its *Council*, which meets for several periods in

¹ The facts are so many and varied that the reader must be referred, for an adequate outline, to books or pamphlets on the subject.

each year and on which the Great Powers have a special position.

“*Continuous*, by means of its permanent *Secretariat*, and
“*Expert*, by means of its *technical committees*, and the expert Sections of its *Secretariat*.”

The League's adjunct, the *International Labour Organisation*, is based on recognition that international peace and social peace are bound up together, and that “conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are impaired.”

This organisation has its own Annual Conference, corresponding to the League Assembly ; a Governing Body, corresponding to the Council ; and an International Labour Office like the League Secretariat. But unlike the Assembly, the Conference is not a Conference of Government representatives only, nor is it a Parliament, or a Committee of experts. Each State is represented by a Government delegate, a delegate nominated by the Government in consultation with the most representative labour organisations, and a delegate so nominated from the most representative employers' organisations. Instead of each State having one vote, as in the League Assembly, each delegate has a separate vote ; so that divisions of opinion in the Conference tend to be not purely national, as in the Assembly, but social.

Lastly, there is the *Permanent Court of International Justice*, founded by the League's agency, which affords for the first time a really permanent judicial tribunal. It can hear and determine any kind of international dispute which the parties to the Court bring before it, and can give an advisory opinion upon any question or dispute which the League refers to it. In general, its judgments are based on existing law, for which it can draw upon very wide sources ; but if the disputants so agree, the Court can decide *ex æquo et bono*, i.e. on broad grounds of equity.

The League's Code. What are the broad rules of conduct which the Covenant lays down for League members? (They are only summarised here, since they are set out more fully later.)

(1) "*The Peace of Nations.*" Any war or threat of war, anywhere, is recognised to be a matter of concern to the whole League.

(2) *Renunciation of War.* Members may "in no case" resort to war until they have at least tried peaceful procedure, and have then waited a further three months. In certain conditions, the obligation not to resort to war is unqualified.¹

(3) *Peaceful Procedure and Settlement.* Every dispute "likely to lead to a rupture" must be submitted to peaceful procedure,—either to a decision by the Permanent Court or special arbitrators, or to enquiry and report by the Council. Certain kinds of dispute are recognised as "generally suitable for legal decision."

(4) *Peaceful Change and the Status Quo.* The territorial integrity and political independence of Members are to be respected and preserved against aggression, and the Assembly may advise "the reconsideration of Treaties which have become inapplicable" and "the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

(5) *Collective Security.* Provision is made for collective action to coerce any State resorting to war in breach of its obligations. The contribution by all other Members of the League to economic and financial pressure is obligatory; the contribution of naval and military force is a matter for recommendation by the Council: but it is assumed that

¹ If one party to a dispute accepts a verdict or award, or agrees to carry out the recommendations of a report agreed to by all the Members of the Council except the disputants, then no other party may resort to war against that State, even after the three months has elapsed. If a disputant claims that a dispute arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within his own "domestic jurisdiction," then the Council "shall make no recommendation as to its settlement."

Members will co-operate "loyally and effectively" within the limits allowed by their armaments and geographical position.

These "sanctions" are not for the purpose of imposing the League's decision, but for *preventing* and in the last resort stopping breaches of the Covenanted Peace as quickly and with as little injury as possible.

(6) *Disarmament*. It is recognised that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations": and there is provision for formulating plans of disarmament, "for the consideration and action of the several Governments." After these plans have been adopted, "the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council." Lastly, it is recognised that manufacture of arms by private enterprise is "open to grave objections."

(7) *Publicity*. Every Treaty or international engagement by Members must be registered with the League and published; otherwise it is not binding.

(8) *Organising Peace*. In addition, there are numerous provisions for organising peace, and for the removal of causes of war; e.g. for the administration of Mandated territories on the principle of Trusteeship, for protection of native races, and for the improvement of conditions of labour.

The League and the Organisation of Peace. No attempt will be made here to indicate what the League has done in the financial, economic, humanitarian and other fields to strengthen the ties of peace. I will only repeat that the League's greatest power should come, and will come if we serve it loyally, from making itself indispensable to its Members. It should find means to render such irreplaceable and disinterested service to such States and peoples as those of China and Japan, for instance, of Bolivia and Paraguay, that they will not dare to compromise that Membership by disloyalty. No one will study the League's

Health work, its work on dangerous drugs, its work on Slavery now developing, the beginnings of its Economic and Financial contribution, what it has done through the Mandates system, and what the International Labour Organisation has done already in regard to Labour legislation, without realising that this is indeed the greatest creative enterprise in the history of political effort. Much more might be done. The independent sovereign States still restrict international action within too narrow a field. The action taken is in some respects (e.g. under the treaties with regard to the protection of Minorities) weak still in face of a powerful political opposition. But the League's brief history already proves that the instrument—this is only an instrument, not a super-government—does offer an indispensable and effective means of giving effect to the maximum amount of co-operative peace-building, to which its Member Governments can be brought to agree. The field of subjects recognised as being of international concern is widening year by year. Almost unnoticed, the League, by developments of its procedure, begins to acquire for itself the rudiments of power to legislate—to act as a federating Government for certain common purposes of its commonwealth. We are a long way from the Super-State, the legislative "Parliament of Man": perhaps we shall never get there: but at all events we have found ourselves, and shall continue to find ourselves, constrained to limit the mutually stultifying powers of sovereign States. In organising peace, as in preventing war, we are now driven to curtail absolute sovereignty.

So much for the League's peace-building. Now let us turn to the other side of its work, not more important but more urgent and more directly relevant to the theme of this book. What has the League been able to achieve in preventing and stopping war, and in settling disputes?

The League and Prevention of War. Take first some instances of what may be accounted successes for the League, and then its failures.

In 1921, the League effected an agreed settlement in a dangerous dispute between Sweden and Finland about the *Aaland Islands*.

In 1921, Serbia invaded *Albania*, and the League Council was invoked, with a warning allusion to the League's powers to coerce Serbia ; and the Serbian forces were promptly withdrawn.

In 1921, the League had to try to solve the problem of the *Upper Silesian frontier* between Germany and Poland, left unsettled by the Peace Treaty. The area was divided, after a plebiscite, and economic conditions were regulated for fifteen years by a Convention.

In 1923, an Italian officer was murdered in Greece, whereupon Italy bombarded and seized the Greek island of *Corfu*. The dispute was referred both to the League and to the Council of Ambassadors of the victorious Powers. After the judgment of world opinion against Italy's action had been manifested in the League Assembly, the Ambassadors, acting on League advice, decreed the restoration of Corfu to Greece, and afterwards imposed an indemnity on Greece for the murder. Whilst it cannot be said that the outcome was wholly satisfactory, it was certainly infinitely better than it would have been if the League had not been available.

In 1924, the League had to settle the status of *Memel* (formerly part of East Prussia), which the Peace Treaty left unsettled. Under the régime established by the League, friction arose in 1932 between the German population of Memel and its Lithuanian Government. These disputes were settled by the Permanent Court.

In 1924, the League effected a peaceful settlement of the serious dispute about *Mosul*, between Turkey, and Great Britain on behalf of Iraq. The League was able to stop the fighting that began, and drew a provisional frontier, sent out an impartial Commission of Enquiry, took legal advice from the Permanent Court, and helped the disputants to an agreement. In 1932, Turkey and Iraq entered the League together.

In 1925, Greece invaded *Bulgaria*, after a frontier incident. The League promptly called a truce and stipulated that both parties should withdraw their forces from a neutral zone, under supervision. This was done within sixty hours; whereupon the League immediately sent a Commission to assess the damages and to report. Both parties afterwards thanked the League for its intervention, and accepted a frontier Commission to prevent similar incidents recurring.

The disputants in this case were weak Powers, one of them disarmed, and League action was relatively easy to take. But unless the League had been in existence and able to act very swiftly, serious losses would soon have been inflicted, and a major war might have resulted. The League's peace-keeping technique was powerfully strengthened by this experience of *imposing an armistice* on the disputants before discussing the merits of their dispute. The League's first job was to stop bloodshed, and prevent aggravation of the crisis. That it promptly did: and it was thus encouraged to work out a technique for such preventive action, in its Convention for Improving the Means of Preventing War.

In 1928, *Bolivia and Paraguay* began fighting about the Chaco territory. The League and the American States brought moral pressure to bear on the disputants; a truce was enjoined, the fighting was stopped, and the case was taken up by an impartial body of neutrals from the American Republics. But no settlement was reached; and private firms in Britain and the United States continued to supply arms and credits to the disputants. In 1932, therefore, fighting broke out again. Now, in 1933, the League is again active in trying to settle the dispute.

In 1933, the League, supported by the United States, stopped war between *Peru and Colombia*, after declaring Peru to be the aggressor. A League Commission was then promptly sent to settle the boundary and keep the peace.

In 1933, the League negotiated a peaceful settlement of a dispute between *Britain and Persia* in regard to the Persian oil concessions.

Other settlements successfully effected with the League's help or that of the Permanent Court, included a frontier dispute in 1923 between *Poland and Czechoslovakia*, over Jaworzina ; a long-standing dispute between *Britain and France* over nationality in Tunis and Morocco ; and a frontier difference between *Austria and Hungary* over the Burgenland.

Besides all this, the Permanent Court has settled by its judgments twenty legal disputes, has given a number of advisory opinions, and has built up a valuable body of international case law.

League Failures. Now turn to the failures. The League's machinery failed, or was not used, to stop the war between *Poland and Russia*.

In the terrible *Greco-Turkish* war, ending in the sack of Smyrna, the League did not intervene—indeed the disputants were encouraged by different Powers Members of the League.

In both these cases one of the disputants was not a member of the League, which added to its difficulties of action.

In 1920, a Polish general seized the city of *Vilna*, claimed by Lithuania. The League failed to get the Poles out of Vilna, neither country being willing to accept the terms of settlement suggested by the League, so that to this day their frontier remains closed and diplomatic relations are severed.

The League was not used to stop the French invasion of the *Ruhr* ; which was claimed to be justified under the Treaty of Versailles.

The League was not used, though it was notified, when Great Britain sent reinforcements into, and just outside of, the *International Settlement at Shanghai* in 1927 ; this action was not resisted by China and was confined strictly to what was necessary to protect British lives and property.

It was not used when American forces landed in *Nicaragua*.

There were other cases of fighting in Russia, in Morocco,

in Palestine and in Syria which could not reasonably be regarded as international in character.

Lastly, most important of all, the League's efforts did not avail to prevent or to stop Japan's invasion of Chinese territory in Manchuria and Jehol.

On September 10, 1931, the League did obtain pledges from Japan and China, whereby Japan was to withdraw her invading forces to their privileged station in the Manchurian Railway Zone: but finding the League apparently irresolute, the military party which had come into power in Japan continued its policy of conquest, bombing undefended towns from the air, expelling the Manchurian authorities, and finally setting up the puppet State of "Manchukuo," virtually as a protectorate of Japan, completely separated from China.

The Chinese trade boycott against Japan, in reply to Japan's aggression in Manchuria, led to a Japanese attack on the Chinese city of Shanghai. Large areas of the city were bombed and burned, and thousands of civilians were killed, before Japan finally accepted the mediation offered by the League and the Powers, and withdrew.

Again and again, Japan gave assurances to the League, and every time she flouted them. At the outset her plunge into violence might probably have been stayed if the League Council, backed by the United States, had stood firmly in defence of the engagements to which Japan was party, and shown its resolution by insisting on sending a Commission of Enquiry to Manchuria. But the European Great Powers on the Council wanted to proceed by conciliation only, the United States perhaps over-estimated the danger of opposing the Japanese militarists, the American association with the League was ambiguous and experimental, the Government in London was twice changed, and the financial blizzard broke upon the Western world; Japan was encouraged to gamble on the League's inertia.

In January 1932, the United States gave a lead, declaring her determination not to recognise any situation created in violation of the Kellogg Pact: Great Britain, instead of

promptly supporting this advance towards the League, gave a discouraging reply. And then, as the Disarmament Conference opened, Japan struck at Shanghai.

In March, a special Assembly of the League was held at China's request ; and now the smaller States, including South Africa, Canada, and the great majority of the League's Members, made plain their conviction that the world's code of peace-keeping must be upheld, in the interests of the security of all. Japan argued that the Covenant could not be held to apply to disordered China : the Assembly replied that it did, and endorsed the American doctrine of non-recognition.

Meanwhile, the Lytton Commission had been sent out by the League. It reported in the autumn of 1932 that Japan's policy was incompatible with the Covenant ; that " Manchukuo " was simply a Japanese creation, unsupported by the people of the country ; and that China should retain sovereignty over Manchuria, but that an autonomous Government should be established there, with foreign assistance, and with special guarantees for the interests of Japan.

Finally, in March 1933, having still failed to effect the change of Japanese policy which alone could make an acceptable settlement possible, the League delivered its Report, the verdict of the world, against Japan. The United States supported this. Japan, protesting against the protest, gave notice of withdrawal from the League, and left the Assembly.

Since then, the League's Committee, charged with working out what is to be done, has not brought about any action. After a brief indiscriminating embargo by Great Britain on certain very limited categories of exports of arms, both to the peace-breaker and to its victim, Britain withdrew this measure, declaring that it had received no support : certainly it had done nothing to restrain Japan or assist China. Nothing has yet been done to hamper Japan's consolidation of her new position on Chinese soil, or to clear the way for unprejudiced consideration of the real difficulties and grievances of both China and Japan.

And so we face a Japan, financially straitened it is true, but apparently successful in her challenge to the world's collective system of security against violence and injustice. We see Japan's War Departments increasing their claims at the Disarmament Conference. We see China, who had put her trust in the League, distracted and divided by the problems of making a working arrangement with the invader; we see her vast population, with its ancient traditions, uncertain which way to look, whether towards Communism, or submission to Japan or towards some form of militarism that shall enable her to recover her lost provinces. We see Russia, with her long and frail railway connection with the Pacific, trying by concessions to prevent, or at least to stave off for a time, the clash which Japan has been manifestly risking. We see a set-back to the belief and interest in the League which was growing in the United States. And we see, most serious of all, the whole system of collective responsibility for peace and justice amongst nations—what Lord Lytton has called the League's "life-line"—menaced by the gravest blow to confidence that it has yet received.

In the eyes of the Eastern world, the Western plan of a new world-order has been put to the test by Japanese generals, and has been bluffed, and discredited. And in the eyes of any would-be militarist adventurer of the Western world, the way of violence has been allowed to appear as a way of victory.

§4. LESSONS FROM THE LEAGUE'S HISTORY

WHAT conclusions should we draw from this brief history of success and failure, as regards the League and prevention of war?

1. *The League's Value.* *The League is indispensable. If this League foundered, something like it would have to be created.*

The League is effective for organising peace and preventing war, *when* it is used with loyalty and courage. Its Covenant has proved to be very well-designed for its limited purposes, *when* used with a will to breathe life into it ; but it represents only an early stage in the mastery of international anarchy and will need amendment as the needs of world-order become better appreciated.

2. **Membership.** The ideal League should include all the nations, loyally supporting a common code of world-order. It would be worse than useless for the League to press non-members to join : its own success must be the means of making them want to join. If some of its Members prove disloyal to its principles of peace, it may be better that they should be expelled from Membership.

3. **Powers.** The League will have to carry further its curtailment of national *sovereignty* ; and extend gradually its powers, now rudimentary, to legislate for the world community for certain purposes. It is too early yet to say in which direction the next advance must be made. That must depend on the opportunities which may occur. The principles of international co-operation remain those laid down in the Covenant.

4. **The Will for Peace.** The League, with help from the Kellogg Pact, has done much to strengthen the will for peace and to afford means of making this will operative. But the requisite change in social ethic and in education is only beginning. The conception of loyalty to the State needs supplementing by new conceptions of loyalty to the World-Commonwealth.

5. **Organising Peace.** The League has already done an extraordinary amount, in the circumstances, to organise peace and promote fruitful co-operation : but its members will have to use it more fully if it is to do what it should to secure good use of the world's resources and to remove economic and other causes of war. The aim should be to

make its service so indispensable to its Members that they could not afford to violate their covenants of peace.

6. Renouncing War. Its Covenant, supplemented by the Kellogg Pact, carries far, but not yet far enough, the renunciation of the right to resort to war or force. The case for completing this renunciation and for amending the Covenant accordingly is dealt with below.

7. Peaceful Settlement. The League and the Permanent Court have effected peaceful settlement in a great number of international disputes, during a time, after the war, when such disputes were abnormally numerous and difficult. By establishing the Court, the League has provided for the first time a really permanent and judicial tribunal for international differences and for the development of international law. The League's existence is responsible for an enormous increase of arbitration treaties, and an enormous extension of the field within which nations base their mutual relations not on force but on Contract and Trust.

8. Peaceful Change. The League's existence has done something to ease the way for the *peaceful changes* in the *status quo* established by Treaty that have been effected more largely than is commonly realised, since the war. The Covenant offers a hope of change by peaceful means, and has therefore contributed indirectly to the survival of some faith in peaceful methods, in the States that demand "revision." But it is clear that the League's powers in regard to peaceful change will have to be cautiously developed.

9. Preventing War. The League has *prevented war* in a number of cases. It has found in its Covenant fairly adequate powers for prevention of war, if, but only if, its powerful Members have a sincere will to make it operate. It has already been able to improve its technique for preventing the aggravation of situations when peace is endangered, and for discriminating between peace-breaking

and the permissible resistance to violent wrong. This development will no doubt be carried further. In particular, improvement would be effected by the general ratification of two valuable Conventions which the League has already prepared—the *Convention for Improving Means of Preventing War*, and the *Convention for Financial Assistance to States Victims of Aggression*.

10. Stopping War. The League has been used effectively in several cases not of the first importance, to stop wars that had actually begun or were beginning. In a number of cases it has not been used, either because its Members rightly recognised that the League was not yet strong enough to act effectively in the particular circumstances of the case, or because the disputants could not be called independent States so as to make their quarrel an international matter. In one major case the League has been half used and has failed so far to secure respect for peace and justice. One great thing was done : the world's moral judgment, based on full enquiry, was delivered against the peace-breaker. But the judgment was given too late, and it has so far led to no effective concerted measures of constraint. It is idle to pretend that this has done no grave harm to the League's repute : but it would be mistaken to claim that it has irreparably injured it. The experience shows that the League's powers for prevention of war, and for checking the aggravation of a crisis, need clarifying and strengthening. For instance, when the League Council is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, or is prescribing peace-keeping measures to prevent aggravation of a crisis, there ought to be no question or ambiguity (such as was allowed to arise in the Sino-Japanese case) as to the League's freedom to make decisions without having to obtain the concurring vote of the disputants themselves. The Council took the line, in this case, that even when acting quasi-judicially, under Article X of the Covenant, it had to obtain the agreement of Japan herself. In effect, the Government whose conduct was being arraigned was

allowed to veto the arraignment of itself. This is probably in accordance with the terms of the Covenant but not with ordinary principles of justice.

II. Collective Security against War. The outstanding lesson is that, for the development of a world order securely founded on peace and justice, the League must have at its disposal reliable means of preventing violence from achieving its ends. If those means are assured, then the League will be able to rely more and more on *preventive* action, rather than coercion: if those means are not assured, then the nations now armed to the teeth will not disarm, and each will be impelled to fend for itself, in a doomed scramble for supremacy.

No one but a lunatic desires coercion, whether national or international. But if violence is attempted, then collective constraint must be used to stop it with as little injury as possible.

Loyalty to this principle of "pooled security" is as necessary to the great society of nations as it is to the society of citizens within the nations. We have to "respect" the broad rules of peace ourselves; but we must also "preserve" them against violence, as the Covenant affirms. Every isolationist who challenges this principle and who says in effect "am I my brother's keeper?" is a contributor to anarchy: he is keeping alive the anarchic conception of "security" as meaning a precarious "supremacy" in a world of competing armament, and is preventing the emergence of a new, rational conception of "security" as meaning the public assurance of solidarity against violence and wrong.

A strenuous effort was made to clarify and improve the "pooled security" of the covenant in the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This was in principle agreed to by the members of the Assembly subject to the approval of their Governments. Unfortunately, as I think, this attempt was rejected by some Governments, including the Government of this country, in 1924.

Loyalty to the principle of collective "sanctions" against a peace-breaker is essential, but it is not enough. The sanctions must be effective for their purpose. We cannot here discuss how the claims of loyalty and of effectiveness may best be combined ;—in other words, how the sanctions can be made a tolerable burden to those who guarantee them and a reliable assurance to those who are guaranteed by them. That subject is discussed elsewhere. Here it must suffice to say that the sanctions must be made part of a system in which they are *least likely to be required*—i.e. a system in which adequate provision is made for peaceful settlement, peaceful change, and drastic controlled disarmament all round.

It may be found desirable to amend the Covenant's provisions as to sanctions in due course : but this is a difficult operation, and no large change should be attempted at a time when loyalty to the League is weak.

On one point only does there seem to me an overwhelming case for alteration. If and when a Disarmament Treaty has been agreed on as urged below, it should be provided that if any of the parties to that Treaty break it by increasing their armaments beyond the agreed limit they should be immediately subjected to severe economic pressure.

It should be emphasised that the League's sanctions are, and should remain, an instrument for stopping violence, not for imposing a judgment of the League's. The League ought never to break the peace itself, or cause it to be broken, even for the purpose of coercing a passive but recalcitrant State.

12. Disarmament. Lastly, the League's record proves beyond question that war will not in the long run be preventible if a large measure of general disarmament is not quickly effected.

For thirteen years the disarmament pledges given to the defeated Powers after the War have remained unfulfilled. The nations cannot longer be divided thus into two

categories,—those which are trusted with unlimited armaments, and those which are still bound by measures of imposed disarmament. All must join—whether Members of the League or not—as willing and equal partners in the enterprise of general disarmament.

The burdens of competitive armament are growing still : they will grow far more rapidly in the near future if the growth is not checked now, by limitation and reduction both of armaments and of the expenditure thereon. It is not enough to limit quantities ; quality and type must be limited too.

The danger of re-armament by the disarmed Powers ; the dangers of growing fear and suspicion, which the race of armaments inevitably breeds ; the danger to the vital centres of civilisation and to the whole fabric of economic life, which increases every year with the perfection of new weapons of mass-destruction : all these dangers must be quickly countered. If we are not willing to join in paying this price—drastic, progressive, controlled disarmament—then it would be hypocrisy or stupidity to claim that we genuinely desire “ peace in our time ” and in our children’s time.

This is the price of peace. The League’s existence helps us to pay the price. If we fail to pay it, we shall imperil the League and all it stands for.

§5. WHAT UNOFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS CAN DO

AN OFFICIAL, governmental organisation, such as the League of Nations, is very far from being enough for the building of peace. There is also an enormous part to be played by semi-official organisations and unofficial organisations, and individuals.

At least one semi-official organisation, the Bank of International Settlements, is—or may in time come to be—powerful enough to do a great deal to prevent war.

The Individual's Part. As for the individual ; what can he or she do ? In the first place, as has already been said, he should equip himself with knowledge of what is the price of peace and justice, what the League of Nations is and can be made to be, and what part his country is playing and should play in the peace-building. In this he can help himself and give help by joining an organisation such as the League of Nations Union or other peace society. By speech and pen and vote, and by example, whether as a free-lance or as a member of a Society or of a Political Party, he can help to spread knowledge of the League's work, and to formulate and secure acceptance of a progressive peace policy by his Government. That, at least, is what the individual *ought* to be free to do. It must be added, however, that in some countries such free activities are now discountenanced or suppressed by the Government. In present conditions, Immanuel Kant would be silenced as a dangerous pacifist, or driven from the country that he honoured. Wherever dictatorships exist, to "seek peace and ensue it" with sincerity and freedom is now a perilous service.

The Organisations' Part. The unofficial organisations, also, have an indispensable contribution to bring ;—the Churches ; the political parties ; the Labour organisations, national and international, the International Federation of Trade Unions ; the Chambers of Commerce ; the Inter-parliamentary Union ; the peace societies such as the League of Nations Societies and their International Federation ; the scientific and intellectual societies ; organisations of ex-service men, and of students ; the women's societies ; all these and many other organisations can help to strengthen peace against folly and misrepresentation. The peace societies did much to bring about the acceptance by the British Government of the principle of compulsory arbitration ; and they have made great efforts, which may bear fruit presently even if they fail to do so now, to secure acceptance of an adequate disarmament policy. As for

opposition to warlike policies, no Government can hope to prosecute a modern war on a large scale without winning the assent of the greater part of public opinion at home, especially the opinion that has been made potent by association in great organisations. There have been very many instances where the policy of British Governments has been modified by strong expressions of organised opinion. That is an essential feature of democratic government more highly developed perhaps here than elsewhere. But even in non-democratic countries public opinion is not without influence. Wherever therefore it is permitted to create and maintain voluntary organisations in support of peace or the League of Nations it is of the utmost importance that this should be done. Powerful societies of the sort exist here and in the United States as well as in several European countries and I believe even in Japan. Many of them are united in International organisations like the Federation of League of Nations Societies already mentioned, and these International bodies may and should be strengthened so as to make an effective link between the Assembly of the League which rightly consists of representatives of Governments and the peoples for whom those Governments are supposed to speak.

A good deal has been recently said and written about an even more direct intervention of the peoples on behalf of peace. It has been suggested that individuals or perhaps societies should here and now undertake to boycott either all wars or all aggressive wars undertaken by their countries. The case for this policy is that it would deter the Governments from entering on such wars and would thus do much to secure peace. Those who advocate action on these lines are unquestionably sincere. But I doubt very much whether the result would be such as they desire. The effectiveness of the plan depends entirely on whether in the first place a large section of opinion could be got to support it, as I think is possible though perhaps not very likely, and in the second, on whether it was believed that when it came to the point the threatened boycott would be carried out.

If the undertaking proposed was in general terms, as for instance not to support aggressive war, it would be almost certainly valueless. Under the stress of war passion very few would abide by their pledges. That has happened before and that fact makes any threat of this kind impotent. It might have a better chance of success if aggressive war was defined beforehand, for a specific, detailed pledge is less easy to ignore than one in general terms. But here the difficulty of definition becomes acute. Some have suggested that war unanimously condemned by the Council of the League must be aggressive. Granted, but what chance is there that any British Government would engage in such a war? Practically none, as things stand. With British opinion as it is, it is not credible that any British Government would flout the League so openly. No doubt the League may change its character or British opinion may cease to support it. But in either of those cases the pledge would scarcely be regarded as binding. The truth is that movements of this kind are really in the nature of rebellion. Most people believe that in cases of extreme misgovernment rebellion is justifiable. It is a very violent action, a denial of law, a challenge to civilised government, but people have been and may be again driven to it. One thing is certain. Rebellion should never take place and certainly will never succeed unless the rebels are desperate men, convinced that no other remedy is open to them for intolerable wrong. It is only in similar conditions that any refusal to fight is likely to be sufficiently widespread to hamper a war-making Government. To attempt now in cold blood to bind people in a future case necessarily defined with vagueness to defy all the powers material and moral of a Government will certainly be futile as a means of maintaining peace. It may even make war more probable by encouraging lawless foreign Governments to assume that we are negligible even in support of peace and justice.

There is another grave objection to this proposal. It aims at threatening action to stop war that has broken out and only indirectly at preventing the outbreak. That is the

wrong way to proceed, at any rate in a democratic country. Our whole energies ought to be spent not in considering what we shall do if our Government goes to war, but rather in taking every possible means to keep them from doing so. The pressing danger is not that we shall find ourselves suddenly involved in aggressive war but that the warmongers will step by step undermine and destroy the peace-making machinery. There is now a regular campaign going on to belittle the League of Nations and decry Disarmament. Certain organs of the Press openly preach this doctrine. That in itself would not much matter. But they have a number of half-hearted sympathisers, some of them in very influential positions. These men do not conceal their dislike of Geneva or their wish to replace the League with some other international understanding. Others there are who, while nominally supporting the League, actually oppose all its activities, try to cut down its exceedingly modest budget and resist all effective proposals for disarmament. How many of such persons there are in the Cabinet I do not know. But it is certain that during the tenure of office of this Government, and largely owing to its attitude, the League has declined in influence more than under any Government since the war. In spite of this I do not believe there is any considerable support here for an anti-League movement. But we must not let the issue go by default.

The Ties of Peace. Finally it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the Prevention of War is not simply a negative business, a repressive action to be taken in a crisis. The best and surest of all "sanctions" against war lies in making the ties of peace too strong to break. We can all help to do that. When the advantages of peaceful co-operation are seen to be so great that no State will dare to throw them away, and when the individual citizens, the unofficial organisations, and the Governments are firmly resolved to withhold those advantages from a violator of the minimum code of peace, then the prevention of war will be assured.

CHAPTER VI: ARBITRATION, SECURITY, DISARMAMENT

By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

1. Pacific Settlement of Disputes
2. Peaceful Change
3. Security
4. Disarmament

THE LAST CHAPTER began with a catalogue of the chief contributions necessary for prevention of war : and it ended, half-way through the catalogue, with a study of the renunciation of the right of war. There remain to be considered four indispensable " roads to peace " :—peaceful settlement, peaceful change, collective security, and disarmament. Let us begin with the peaceful settlement of disputes—the subject which is loosely but conveniently indicated by the word " arbitration."

§ 1. PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

RENUNCIATION OF WAR is not enough : nations must also renounce the right to be judge in their own cause. They must accept pacific *settlement* in the last resort by a third party's judgment. That is the conclusion towards which the nations have been moving, slowly at first but rapidly in recent years, ever since 1794. They have been learning by experience to trust to the judgment of reason, in place of the hazard of war, for the solution of *all* kinds of international disputes : and they have been learning to commit themselves *in advance* to the acceptance of a third party's

judgment, not waiting till a crisis has arisen and passions have been kindled. Experience has shown that it is possible to set up competent and trustworthy tribunals; that nations can be brought to entrust to the judgment of such tribunals the settlement of great issues, such as those involving the transfer of vast territories; and that the settlements thus peacefully effected do in fact serve both the disputants far better in the long run than any decision by brute force could have done. Experience has shown, too, that, in the absence of adequate provision for pacific settlement, great wars have been fought or risked for causes which appear in retrospect to have been utterly trivial. Politically, no less than ethically, the venture of international arbitration has been splendidly justified.

Growth of Arbitration. The venture may be said to begin in 1794, with the Jay Treaty, in which Britain and the United States agreed to arbitrate certain disputes which they could not otherwise dispose of. This example was increasingly followed during the 19th century, especially by the two countries that had tried the experiment. Arbitration treaties for the settlement of particular disputes increased progressively in number: and by 1899, when the First Hague Conference was held, one treaty (between Italy and Argentina) provided for arbitration in advance.

The Hague Conference of 1899 did something to codify the procedure of arbitration, and it set up a panel of arbitrators (called somewhat misleadingly the Permanent Court of Arbitration), from which arbitrators could be chosen. This system has served a useful though limited purpose: but it could not fill the place of a real judicial tribunal permanently established, and its lack of continuity precluded the steady development of a body of international case law.

After the Hague Conference, treaties providing *in advance* for arbitration rapidly multiplied, and by 1914 a very large number of them had been concluded. A few of these

treaties, such as one made in 1902 between Argentina and Chile, covered *all* kinds of disputes : but the great majority covered only a very limited and ill-defined class of disputes. In particular, there was a treaty between Britain and France in 1903, on which many others were modelled : it provided only for arbitration in *legal* disputes and excluded those legal disputes which the disputants might choose to regard as affecting their "*honour*" or "*vital interests*." So vague and vast a reservation virtually stultified the treaty, for it left the parties free to exclude from arbitration any disputes, even amongst those admittedly of a "legal" character,¹ to which they might attach serious importance. In 1905 an attempt was made to conclude a similar treaty between Britain and the United States. But even so limited an engagement proved too much for the diehards of the American Senate. For constitutional reasons they insisted on putting in yet another reservation, to the effect that the special agreement as to the terms of the case to be arbitrated must only be made "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." President Roosevelt at first refused to endorse the treaty with this addition ; for as he pointed out, it would amount to no more than saying that the United States would arbitrate *if* it found itself willing to arbitrate. Three years later, however, the President did sign the treaty ; and it remained in force, with renewals, till 1928, when it was allowed to lapse. In 1911 an attempt was made to conclude a comprehensive arbitration treaty between Britain and the United States. This was approved by President Taft but was defeated by the Senate. In 1913 the United States began making the series of conciliation treaties, known as the Bryan Treaties, to which reference was made in the last chapter. They provide not for pacific settlement, but for enquiry and report, pending which war may not be resorted to. This was one of the principles after-

¹ It was generally assumed by jurists that international disputes could somehow be divided into two categories, "legal" and "political." As will be seen below, it is very questionable whether this distinction can be sustained as valid.

wards embodied in the League Covenant. Then came the War ; and then the League of Nations' Covenant.

The Covenant and Alternatives to War. How far does the Covenant go towards providing *in advance* for acceptance of *peaceful settlement* in all kinds of disputes ?

The following summary will show that it does provide for *peaceful procedure* being tried ; that it includes certain statements of principle about so-called " legal " disputes ; but that it does not provide for *peaceful settlement* being accepted. President Wilson, in one of his early drafts of the Covenant, proposed that League Members should undertake to accept peaceful settlement in all kinds of international disputes between themselves : but when the Covenant was negotiated in Paris, this idea was dropped.

What the existing Covenant provides is as follows :—

" *The peace of nations.*" " Any war or threat of war " is declared to be " *a matter of concern to the whole League* and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." Any Member may bring up " any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." (Article XI.)

Peaceful procedure. In all disputes between them " likely to lead to a rupture " (Note 1), League Members must try peaceful procedure—by submitting either to legal decision or to enquiry and conciliation : and they must " in no case " resort to war until three months after the decision or report has been made known. (Article XII.)

(a) *Legal Decision.* If, on the one hand, Members choose the way of legal decision, then they are bound to carry out in full good faith the decision given (by the Permanent Court of International Justice, or any specially chosen arbitrators). (In the improbable event of failure to

carry out this decision, the League Council has to propose "what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.")

Members agree to submit to legal decision such disputes as they "*recognise to be suitable*"; and they recognise in advance, as "*generally suitable*" for submission, certain kinds of disputes, viz. :

"disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach. . . ." (Article XIII.)

Provision is made for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. (Article XIV.)

(b) *Conciliation.* If on the other hand, Members choose the way of conciliation, then the Council has to investigate the matter and try to effect a settlement. Up to this point (Article XV, paragraph 3), the Council acts as an impartial mediator, the votes of the disputants themselves being counted, except in matters of procedure. But if the Council fails to effect an agreed settlement, then (under Article XV, paragraph 4) it must go on to make and publish a *report and recommendations* : and for this purpose it need not secure the concurrence of the disputants. If this Report is *unanimous* (the votes of the disputants not being counted), then Members may not go to war with any party which complies with the recommendations of the Report. If, on the contrary, the Report is *not unanimous*, then the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider "necessary for the maintenance of right and justice" : in other words, they recover *freedom to fight*, after three months' further delay. The Council can make no recommendations as to settlement in cases where the dispute is found "to arise out of a matter which, by international law, is solely within the *domestic jurisdiction*" of the disputant. (Article XV.)

It will have been apparent from this summary that the authors of the Covenant, rightly or wrongly, were content with a modest advance. They did provide unreservedly for renunciation of the right of immediate war, and they did avoid the reservation about "honour and vital interests" which had stultified so many arbitration treaties before the War: but they did not definitely stipulate acceptance of impartial judgment in any kind of dispute. League Members retained, on paper at any rate, freedom to reject the verdict of any authority outside themselves. On paper, the States Members of the League were still absolutely sovereign, absolutely independent, and need not bow to justice. The practical effect of this concession to anarchy should not be exaggerated. If a dispute were referred to the Council and the Council reached a unanimous or almost unanimous conclusion on it, or obtained from the Permanent Court an advisory opinion, the Council's view, backed by public opinion, would be extremely potent: if the Council were resolute and if the disputant were not reckless, this pressure would commonly suffice to secure both peace and peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, the case for making obligatory the acceptance in the last resort of a third party's judgment has become clearer with every year of the League's existence, and efforts to extend this obligation have been varied and extraordinarily persistent.

Four methods have been tried.

Legal Decision: the Optional Clause. At the very beginning of the League's career, an opportunity arose for making obligatory the acceptance of *legal decision* in "legal" disputes. A Committee of the greatest jurists in the world was set to drafting the statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice. They came to the conclusion that the four classes of disputes specified in the Covenant as being "generally suitable" for legal decision were indeed "suitable"; and they unanimously recommended that within this admitted sphere of law States should accept the rule of law as an obligation. They proposed that States accepting

the Court's statutes should, in doing so, accept its jurisdiction as obligatory in legal cases.

But the League Council, at the instance of Britain and France, rejected this proposal as being at any rate premature. In the Assembly, it received widespread support. Finally, as a compromise between the two views, the draft statutes of the Court were amended so as to leave acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to the discretion of each State in each dispute, unless they chose to sign an optional clause, accepting that jurisdiction in advance.

By May 1929, some eighteen nations, including Germany, were bound by this Optional Clause. The British Government had repeatedly urged others to sign this Clause ; it had joined in declaring that the principles of Locarno, which bound Germany and France to accept legal decision in all their " legal " disputes, were " amongst the fundamental rules which should govern the foreign policy of every civilised nation " ; but it had advanced a variety of arguments for refusing itself to sign.¹ Nevertheless public opinion in favour of signature continued to grow, in England, in Wales, in Canada, and elsewhere : and when the Conservative Government in London fell in May 1929, the Labour Government which succeeded it was pledged to signature.

In September 1929, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald announced at Geneva that Great Britain would sign the Clause ; and it was afterwards signed and ratified by Britain, India and all the Dominions. The British announcement was the signal for a number of other signatures, including those of France and Italy—a sequel which advocates of British signature had predicted : so that at the present time the number of States bound by the Optional Clause is not eighteen but forty-two. All the major States Members of the League are now bound, except Poland and Czechoslovakia which

¹ These arguments are dispassionately examined in a pamphlet, *The Optional Clause*, published by the League of Nations Union in 1928. Some of them are so weak, or even so manifestly fallacious, that the reader is likely to be surprised that they were ever officially put forward.

have not yet ratified their signatures, Japan, who has violated her Covenant and given notice of withdrawal from the League, and China, who allowed her early signature of the Clause to lapse.

Each of these forty-two States has accepted the Court's jurisdiction (subject to certain reservations, some of them important) in its legal disputes with all the other signatories ; so that this one multilateral engagement, the Optional Clause, has done the work of many hundreds of separate arbitration treaties between pairs of States. That is one of the great advantages of an "open" Convention of this kind : it enables the principle of arbitration to be applied brick by brick, as fast and as far as the nations are willing to go.

Thus the British signature of this undertaking was one of the most important events in the history of obligatory arbitration. It represents an enormous advance beyond the position reached in the Covenant, and towards full and general recognition of the principle that the contested legal rights of nations should be judged by an independent tribunal impartially administering the law of nations.

Being open for further signatures without discrimination between this State and that, the Clause tends to promote equality before the law. If Egypt, for instance, joins the Court and signs the Clause, she will have, and of course should have, just as strong a claim to the law's protection as France : and it should be recognised as a prime interest of the British Commonwealth that the rule of law should thus be extended and strengthened. Every British citizen who cares at all about world affairs and about his country's peace and honour ought to know that the Members of his Commonwealth have given this pledge. He ought to recognise (and, if necessary, be ready to insist) that, in any dispute of a legal character with another State bound by the Optional Clause, his Government must honour its obligation to submit to and accept legal judgment in the last resort.

British Reservations to the Optional Clause. It should be noted, however, that the British acceptance of the Clause was qualified by important reservations. In the hope of maintaining a uniform policy for the whole British Commonwealth, efforts were made in 1929 to secure that all the seven Members of the Commonwealth who are separate Members of the League should accept the Clause in the same terms. But on the one hand, the Irish Free State had been an advocate of obligatory arbitration ; and it now broke away and signed the Clause without any reservation. On the other hand, at least two of the Dominions (Australia and New Zealand) had been shy of this principle, and hung back ; and in an endeavour to meet them, the British reservations became extended. In the opinion of many experts these reservations seriously reduce the value of the British acceptance of the Clause, chiefly because they introduce an element of uncertainty and controversy as to the meaning of the engagement.¹

(a) *Reservation as to prior situations or facts.* One of these reservations restricts the British acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to "disputes arising after the ratification" of the Clause, "with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the ratification." This reservation is not new, having been made by Germany and other States. Its intention was presumably to leave obstacles in the way of re-opening old disputes, such as that between Britain and Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, or about claims to compensation arising out of Britain's belligerent action in the Great War. The reservation does not necessarily preclude reference of such disputes to pacific settlement : but it does leave Britain free to refuse legal judgment, or to insist on a special preliminary agreement as to the terms of the case to be judged ; and it does this as

¹ The text of the British acceptance, embodying these reservations, is given in Appendix A. For an expert examination of the reservations, see *The British Reservations to the Optional Clause*, by H. Lauterpacht, reprint from *Economica*, June 1930.

regards a vaguely defined class of disputes. The jurist, scrutinising the reservation, naturally asks,—“What are situations prior to the British ratification of the Optional Clause? When do disputes “arise”? He complains that the reservation introduces an element of uncertainty as to what signature of the Optional Clause really amounts to.

(b) *Reservation as to inter-imperial disputes.* Another reservation excluded disputes between the League Members of the British Commonwealth, “all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree.” The intention here was to maintain the practice of referring legal disputes between the Members of the British Commonwealth to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or to some such body drawn solely from within the Commonwealth. And behind this issue lay the question—are the Dominions independent States in the full sense of those words; are they international entities; or are they simply the parts of a federated unity? The British, clinging to the idea of an imperial unit, wanted to slur over the prickly question. The Irish, on the contrary, insisting on their full statehood and distrusting a British imperial tribunal, stood out for reference of their inter-imperial disputes to the Permanent Court. The Free State accordingly refused to subscribe to the reservation accepted by Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, South Africa and India. As the Free State was alone in its attitude, its abstention did not make any practical difference in the way of securing reference of inter-imperial disputes to the Court: but the issue thus posed is not likely to remain where it stands. It is possible that a very radical reconstitution of the Judicial Committee, so as to make it more truly representative of the whole Commonwealth’s jurisprudence, may presently suffice to secure the full confidence of the Irish Free State and of Canada and of South Africa. But it seems much more probable that this attempt to withhold recognition of the independent statehood of the Dominions which are separate Members of the League, will presently break

down. The Dominions like any other League Members, have the right to have their representatives elected on to the League Council ; Canada and the Irish Free State have each been so elected : and when their claim to separate national identity has been conceded by the world so unequivocally as that, it is difficult to see how Governments in London will long succeed in maintaining that disputes between one League Member of the Commonwealth and another are not "international" but "domestic."

There is in this no real cause for regret. If the bonds that tie the Commonwealth together are sufficiently genuine and strong to make the union valuable to its Members and to the world, then those bonds are not likely to be broken by the substitution of an international Court of Justice for an imperial tribunal. What does greatly matter is that inter-imperial disputes should not be left to fester, unsettled, like the dispute which, as I write, is still being allowed needlessly to poison relations between Great Britain and the Irish Free State. To assume that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or a reconstituted tribunal drawn solely from within the British Commonwealth, would be, by reason of its origin, biased against the Free State's claims, will probably seem to the reader absurd. But it would be equally absurd to assume that the Permanent Court of International Justice, not being purely imperial, or purely "Anglo-Saxon" in its legal conceptions, would be, by reason of its origin, unfit to judge a dispute between Britain and the Free State. What really matters to peoples' lives is that a ruinous economic "war" is now going on between two States, both of them Members of a British Commonwealth which boasts of offering to the world one unmatched contribution,—the example of its own internal peace. Both States are Members also of the League, and both are parties to the Permanent Court and bound by the Optional Clause. Their "war" could be stopped to-morrow if only both disputants would agree to refer their dispute to decision by an impartial tribunal : and each of them has recognised the Permanent Court to be a tribunal so impartial and

authoritative that it can be trusted with the settlement of their gravest "legal" international disputes. The most authoritative tribunal in the world is there, ready: the costly "war" will have to be stopped and a settlement by impartial judgment will have to be accepted sooner or later: reference of the dispute to the Permanent Court soon rather than late would best serve both the immediate and ultimate interests of all concerned.

But we must return from this digression to the Optional Clause.

(c) *Reservation as to reference to the Council.* One other reservation in the British acceptance of the Optional Clause must here be noted. This enables Britain to *suspend* any action brought against her before the Permanent Court, by insisting that in the first instance it shall come before the League Council. Notice of such suspension has to be given within ten days of the initiation of the case; and the proceedings before the Court can thus be postponed for one year, whilst the Council deals with the case (or longer than one year, if the Council unanimously approves the extension of time).

In making this reservation, the British Government explained that the intention was that only issues "really more of a political than a legal nature" should be referred to the Council. This reservation is defended on the ground that in some cases the question—"what *are* a nation's existing rights?"—is mixed up with the question "what *should be* a nation's rights?" It is suggested that some international disputes can be handled with better prospect of mutually satisfactory adjustment, if they are dealt with not on the basis of law, but in an atmosphere of conciliation and compromise, such as the Council may contribute (e.g. in the Anglo-Persian oil dispute). And it is claimed that there are some kinds of disputes—those concerning so-called "rules of war"—which should if possible be kept in the Council's hands, since it would be a misfortune if the Court were to be compromised in the vain attempt to apply rules of law

to the lawlessness of war.¹ The reservation is criticised on the ground that it tends to enlarge the Council's responsibilities for settling disputes, and that the character of the Council and of its other business make such an extension undesirable. The Council meets for only a few weeks in the year ; its principal members are extremely busy statesmen : and it is already so burdened with work for settling disputes, many of them of trivial importance, that it has too little time to spare for the creative tasks of international government. I think there is considerable force in this criticism : the Council can now spend too little of its energy, proportionately, on such constructive service as might be rendered under Articles 23 and 24 of the Covenant ; and it is to be hoped that the Council, instead of acquiring more and more the functions of a universal Conciliation Commission, will be set free more and more for the positive organisation of peace.

A further criticism of the reservation is that the Council is really much less fitted than the Court to ascertain contested rights. This, I think, is certainly well-founded. What is needed for this purpose is a tribunal which can be relied on to give a judgment on the basis of law, unbiased by any calculations of consequent political support or opposition : and such a tribunal is much more likely to be found in the permanent judicial Court than in the Council whose members are the official spokesmen of national political interests. The reservation is so vague and sweeping that it could be used to suspend reference to the Court of any kind of dispute whatever. The explanation of the British Government that it meant the reservation to apply only to disputes which "are really more of a political than a legal nature" does

¹ It should be observed that the British reservations to the Optional Clause include no special reserve concerning belligerent rights at sea. In 1924 at the time of the Geneva Protocol, the first Labour Government provided that, in signing the Optional Clause, they should be free to reserve this question : and in January 1930, when the second Labour Government submitted to the House of Commons a motion for ratification of the Clause without any such reservation, the bulk of the Conservative opposition voted for its insertion. But the proposal was defeated, and there is no separate reservation on the subject.

not clarify but confuses the issue—(in the opinion of many legal authorities)—since it is impossible to conceive of any kind of dispute which might not be described as “political.” Every dispute which has come before the Permanent Court might have been fairly described as “political.” The word is as wide and question-begging as the old, discredited formula, “honour and vital interests.”

In the case of the British reservation itself, the inclusion of a time-limit of twelve months does safeguard the principle of pacific settlement in the last resort : we do renounce not only the right of war, but also the right of deadlock : we are committed in principle to the acceptance of a third party's judgment. Unfortunately, however, the other States, including France and Italy, went far beyond the British example : they omitted the safeguarding time-limit, so that their reservations were (ostensibly, at any rate) much more sweeping and damaging.

Existing rights and peaceful change. The reader will, I expect, agree that it would be a wholly good thing if all nations would accept in advance, unreservedly, the principle that their rights should, if contested, be ascertained by an impartial tribunal, and that for such a purpose the Court, being a permanent judicial body, is better suited than a changing and briefly-assembled Council of political representatives. But—the reader will be asking—what about those rights which are admitted to exist in law but which one of the disputants wants to see changed ? And is not international law too inadequate or too incapable of development to allow of any clear judgment being given on the basis of law ?

That question of change is obviously of fundamental importance. Adequate provision for peaceful change will have to be made if the forces that are making for change in this changing world are not to smash the world's peace and the League of Nations with it. Plainly, too, adequate provision for such change does not yet exist. In the next section an attempt will be made to suggest some ways in

which we might improve the prospects of change being effected peacefully, by reason, not by force. Here we will only note this one point, directly relevant to the Optional Clause and to the reservations made in accepting it.

The shortcomings of the existing machinery for peaceful change ought not to be advanced as an excuse for refusing to extend the rule of law. There is still an enormous advance to be made before we can claim that all nations have even got so far as to accept legal judgment as to what are their legal rights—let alone any question of amending those rights. And as for the alleged insufficiency of international law, there is no reason to fear that the Permanent Court will ever find itself debarred, by such insufficiency, from giving a clear judgment or opinion on the basis of law, and there is, I believe, no recorded case of an international tribunal having refused on such a ground to adjudicate on a matter referred to it.

The fact is that the Permanent Court can draw upon extremely wide sources of law ; as its Statute says, it can draw not only upon international treaties, but also upon “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” ; and “the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations” ; and also, “as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law,” “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.”

An enormous number of treaties and of conventions widely accepted have been concluded since the War : indeed, there has never before been anything approaching such a growth in so short a period. And besides these additional contracts between States, there have been extensive developments, almost unnoticed by the general public or the Press, through the continuous work of the Permanent Court in building up a new “international case law.” This was never possible before, since there existed before the war no really permanent judicial Court.

This enormous extension of ascertainable rights does not apply, of course, to the so-called “rights of belligerents” or

"laws of war." The Permanent Court has hitherto wisely avoided having anything to do with the futile enterprise of trying to patch up compromises between the irreconcilable claims of neutrals and belligerents : it has not attempted to devise rules for the orderly conduct of disorder or "the polite conduct of wholesale massacre." Nor has the extension been effected by means of *codifications* of international law in Conventions universally accepted. Hitherto, such efforts as have been made thus to codify law have proved singularly sterile. What has been fruitful has been the development, the gradual building up, of international law through the Court's agency.

So much for the most important arbitration engagement in existence, the Optional Clause. As we have seen, the acceptance of it is incomplete and the reservations made by Britain and other nations since 1929 have introduced new and regrettable uncertainties. But when all this has been allowed for, the acceptances of the Clause do represent a great advance towards international order and the victory of reason over violence.

Bilateral Arbitration Treaties. Now let us turn to another of the methods which have been tried for extending the acceptance in advance of pacific settlement. An engagement like the Optional Clause, or a convention like the "General Act" referred to below, is a multilateral treaty applicable between all the States which are bound by it ; so that it does the work of a great number of bilateral treaties between pairs of States. The multilateral form has some great advantages ; it avoids the multiplication of needlessly diverse texts, saves an immense amount of separate negotiation, and promotes general acceptance of common principles of peaceful settlement. But so long as the few Powers with the most widespread interests, notably Great Britain, held aloof, the multilateral method could make no substantial progress.

The arbitration treaties made before the War were all bilateral. Most of them were extremely limited in scope,

such as the British-American treaty of 1908, previously referred to ; this only covered " legal " disputes not regarded by either disputant as affecting its " honour or vital interests " ; and in each case a special agreement as to the terms of the case to be arbitrated had to be concluded " by and with the advice and consent " of the American Senate. Amongst other pre-war arbitration treaties there were a few, such as those between Argentina and Chile, between Denmark and Holland, and between Italy and Denmark, which were " all-in " treaties ;—i.e. including all classes of disputes. But for the most part these were between States little likely to find themselves seriously at variance and little able to inflict serious injury on each other. Other pre-war treaties—the Bryan Treaties made by the United States—provided not for arbitral decision but for enquiry and report before war might be resorted to. Thus, between 1900 and 1914, a beginning, but only a beginning, had been made. Anything like a comprehensive system of pacific settlement, accepted in advance by Great Powers, was still a dream unrealised. After the War and the Covenant, this network of treaties was much extended. The bilateral method received a stimulus in 1924, when Italy and Switzerland made an important treaty of pacific settlement for all kinds of disputes ; and still more in 1925, when Great Britain rejected the Geneva Protocol which was to have had the effect of a multilateral treaty of all-inclusive pacific settlement. Pair after pair of States, seeing that it was hopeless to wait for a general treaty so long as Great Britain stood back, made all-inclusive treaties of arbitration and conciliation between themselves.

As for British policy at this time, five European States offered such treaties to Great Britain, but all these offers were refused : no reason for this refusal was made public, but it is evident that the British Government of that day was opposed to the whole idea of committing itself in advance to acceptance of a third party's judgment in the last resort. Back in 1919, one all-inclusive treaty of pacific settlement, as if by a freak of policy, had been made between

Britain and Uruguay : but this one surrender of the right to be the ultimate judge in our own cause was not repeated, even when such countries as Switzerland or Spain, Sweden or Holland, offered us treaties to that effect. British spokesmen between 1925 and May 1929 took the line that other countries, such as Germany and France, would do well to accept such obligations, but that Britain's own position was unique and that other countries must simply trust her to do the right thing when a dispute arose. Then, in 1929, after a change of Government, came the British acceptance of the Optional Clause already referred to, and in 1931 the acceptance of the General Act referred to below. Thus Britain has now given her support to the method of the multilateral open treaty in preference to that of the bilateral treaty.

There remains a field within which the bilateral treaty of pacific settlement may still serve a useful purpose, pending general acceptance of the multilateral method. Consider, for instance, what should be done about disputes between Britain and the United States, Russia or Japan.

The Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty of 1908 was, as we have seen, so narrowly limited in scope as to be almost worthless. But not even that wholly inadequate provision for peaceful settlement now exists ; for this treaty was allowed to lapse in 1928 and has not been renewed ; so that the only engagements now existing between the two countries are the Bryan Conciliation Treaty (which provides for a cooling-off period, during which enquiry is to be made, before war may be resorted to), and the multilateral Kellogg Pact.

Would it be worth reviving such an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, if it were improved by omitting the old reservation about " honour and vital interests " ? There is a strong case against this, unless the new treaty were also to omit the reservation making each case subject to a special agreement approved by the Senate : and it may be powerfully argued that it will be better to wait till the United States adheres to the Permanent Court of International

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Justice, as she is likely to do before long, and that in course of time we may perhaps hope for American acceptance of the Optional Clause. That would be far better than any bilateral treaty perpetuating the Senate's reservation.

On the other side, it may be contended that there is hardly a chance of the Senate budging from what many of its members still regard as a constitutional prerogative, to be jealously guarded against the President's authority. Only lately, in the Pan-American Arbitration Treaty submitted to it, the Senate restored the reservation which the Executive had purposely omitted. It may be contended therefore that it would be wise to make the best of a bad job and conclude so defective an Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty.

As regards Russia and Japan, it would be very desirable to have engagements as to pacific settlement of disputes, but it is unlikely that these Governments will accept any arbitration treaty at present.

Multilateral Treaties. We have now dealt with a multilateral treaty covering legal disputes—the Optional Clause. We have dealt also with bilateral treaties covering some, or all, kinds of disputes. Now we come to multilateral treaties covering all classes of disputes.

(a) *The Geneva Protocol.* First, there was the Geneva Protocol. It is worth briefly recalling what that famous project provided, for though it was killed in March 1925, through being rejected by the British Commonwealth, yet its principles have had a profound effect on subsequent developments.

The main object of the Protocol was to promote arbitration, security, and disarmament simultaneously, and eventually to secure the amendment of the Covenant so as to eliminate what remained of the right of war. Its main points were these six :

(1) It outlawed aggressive war between its signatories, declaring such war to be an international crime which they undertook not to commit.

(2) It defined aggression by a test as nearly automatic as possible. (Broadly speaking, that State which refused pacific settlement and resorted to war was to be presumed to be an aggressor.)

(3) If the Council could not at once determine the aggressor by this test, it was bound to impose an armistice, acceptance of which was obligatory.

(4) On the assumption that there has to be a method other than war for settling all international disputes, it provided for settlement—in the last resort by compulsory arbitration—of all classes of international dispute. For legal disputes it required signature of the Optional Clause.

(5) It defined the existing obligation of League members in regard to sanctions ; provided for the further working-out of means of making economic sanctions effective ; and authorised the conclusion of special pacts to operate only as sanctions under the League's authority. (This was intended to sterilise the exclusive treaties of alliance which were endangering the whole principle of the League.)

(6) Finally, it made provision for a Disarmament Conference, the successful issue of which was a condition for the Protocol coming into operation.

We cannot here discuss the reasons which led to the British Government's rejection of the Protocol. In the writer's opinion, these were largely ill-founded, though there were serious defects in the plan.¹

(b) *Locarno*. In rejecting the Protocol, Sir Austen Chamberlain recommended that "special arrangements in order to meet special needs" should be made for the "extreme cases" where "differences might lead to a renewal of strife." This was in accord with a proposal already made by Germany ; and the sequel was the conclusion of the Locarno treaties between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The first five of these States guaranteed Germany's western

¹ For a brief discussion of the Protocol and its rejection, see *The Victory of Reason*, by W. Arnold-Forster, Hogarth Press.

frontier from attack or invasion by Germany, Belgium or France ; and Germany, France and Belgium agreed to settle by peaceful means " all questions of every kind which may arise between them." For all legal disputes, Germany on the one hand and France or Belgium, or Poland or Czechoslovakia on the other, have accepted compulsory arbitration. All other questions have to be submitted to a conciliation commission ; if this commission fails, then the dispute goes to the Council ; and even if the Council fails to reach a unanimous report, even so, the disputants may not begin war against each other.

Thus Locarno goes much further than the Covenant as regards peaceful settlement, and it renounces entirely the ultimate right of war which the Covenant allows in certain conditions. But Locarno does not go nearly so far as the Protocol. It omits, for instance, the valuable provision empowering the Council to impose an armistice ; it omits the specific provisions for peaceful settlement in the last resort ; it makes no provision for further study of the obligation to co-operate in sanctions ; and above all it omits any provision, beyond a general declaration of intention, in regard to disarmament. In effect, therefore, Great Britain played the greatest stake at her command—her pledge of military aid to France against Germany, or vice versa—without buying any disarmament in return. And she gave her guarantee alike to disarmed Germany and to heavily-armed France. It would have been a disastrous error and fatally damaging to the League's cause of international solidarity if the British guarantee had been given to France alone as against Germany, instead of being given to both parties alike as a guarantee against the common enemy, War. But it is evident that, having played this great card without getting any disarmament in return, Great Britain was in some respects in a much weaker position thereafter for pressing France to disarm.

One other point about Great Britain's position at Locarno should be noted. Germany and France, Germany and Belgium, were thus bound to settle all their disputes by peaceful

means, and all their legal disputes by legal judgment. But Great Britain as guarantor of the treaty stood aside herself from any such obligation. At the League Assembly in 1926 Great Britain joined in recommending the principles of Locarno as being "amongst the fundamental rules which should govern the foreign policy of every civilised nation." But those rules we did not accept for ourselves. The position was an invidious one, not to be defended even by reference to the special complexity and the enormous responsibilities of the British Commonwealth.

(c) *The General Act.* Meanwhile the British rejection of the Protocol had diverted, but could not stop, the movement toward "all-in" arbitration. As we have already seen, those nations which wished to extend arbitration were driven to doing so, not by the quick, simple method of a single general treaty, but in treaties two by two. This became more and more inconvenient; and after Dr. Nansen had raised the matter in the League Assembly of 1927, efforts were made to get over the difficulty by means of a series of model treaties of arbitration, conciliation and security. Finally, at the Ninth Assembly in 1928, the arbitration and conciliation drafts were fused together in one document, the General Act.¹

This great multilateral treaty of pacific settlement is a landmark in the history of arbitration and is one of the chief international engagements of Great Britain; so its contents must be briefly indicated here.

The Act is in four chapters. It can be accepted as a whole or piecemeal, in bilateral or multilateral form, by non-Members as well as by Members of the League. Within certain limits, reservations may be made.

The first chapter, dealing with *conciliation*, provides that disputes not settled by diplomacy shall be submitted to bilateral conciliation commissions, which are to be constituted

¹ In addition, model treaties were prepared on non-aggression, mutual assistance, etc.

on the same lines as those provided for at Locarno.¹

The second chapter, on *judicial settlement*, provides that disputes "concerning rights" (the so-called "legal" disputes), shall be submitted to the Permanent Court for decision, unless the disputants agree to have recourse to an arbitral tribunal or to try conciliation first.

The third chapter, on *arbitration*, is much the most controversial, and several Powers which have accepted the rest of the Act have not accepted this part. Suppose that a political dispute is referred to a conciliation commission and that it is not peacefully settled thereby, then within one month from the end of the conciliation commission's work, the dispute must go before a specially constituted arbitral tribunal for final decision. The tribunal is to consist of five members, one being nominated by each of the disputants, and the other three by agreement from amongst the nationals of other Powers. The tribunal's jurisdiction is to be defined in a special agreement; and the tribunal will apply rules of law in the same way as the Permanent Court. In so far as there exists no such rule applicable to the dispute, the tribunal shall decide *ex æquo et bono*. This does not mean of course, that the tribunal is empowered to revise existing treaties; it can only do that if the disputants agree that it should do so.

The fourth chapter contains *general provisions*, including an undertaking to abstain from all measures likely to prejudice the execution of judicial decisions or the peacekeeping arrangements proposed by a conciliation commission. Reservations may be made but only under three heads, viz.:

- (1) "Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession."
- (2) "Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States."

¹ Nominally this applies to *all* kinds of disputes, i.e. both to "legal" disputes—those "concerning rights," and to "political" disputes—those "not concerning rights." Actually, however, it will apply only to political disputes; for if Chapter II is accepted as well as Chapter I, the "legal" disputes will be subject to judicial settlement.

(3) "Disputes concerning particular cases or clearly specified subject matters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly specified categories."

The signatories may extend the scope of their accession or abandon their reservations.

Disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the Act, "including those concerning the classification of disputes and the scope of reservations," are to be submitted to the Permanent Court.

Obviously this is a very far-reaching engagement. There were many who thought, when first it was concluded, that it would never be accepted by any Great Power ; but the lead given by the British and French Governments in 1930 has resulted in the acceptance of the whole Act by some eighteen States, including France, Italy, Great Britain and the whole of the British Commonwealth. Several other States have accepted all except the crucial Chapter III. But the British acceptances have been conditioned by reservations similar to those made in accepting the Optional Clause, and are confined to disputes with States Members of the League.

There can be no doubt that the Act represents already a great advance toward full provision for peaceful settlement of the world's disputes by the judgment of reason. Moreover, by providing a standard text, the Act has facilitated the spread of pacific settlement as fast and as far as the nations may be willing to go ; it has removed an obstacle to the growth of a technique of pacific settlement on the basis of a uniform text, and many of its articles have been used as a standard form in treaties between pairs of States.

It must be recognised, however, that the Act is a defective document. Efforts will almost certainly be made to amend it when it falls due for revision in 1934. (It may be noted that when the Act was drafted in September 1928, the delegation representing the Conservative British Government, like that of Japan, opposed the project and took little hand in the work.)

Some of the chief points likely to be reconsidered may here be indicated.

(1) First, there is the omission of any reference to the League's machinery,¹ or to the rôle of the Council as a conciliator. This was deliberately done, in the hope that it would facilitate adhesion to the Act by States not members of the League. But that hope was almost certainly vain : there appears to be no chance that America, for instance, or Russia or Brazil, would go so far as to accept the Act if they were not prepared to join the League itself. Probably therefore an attempt will presently be made to improve the Act by working in references to the use of the League's machinery. The Ninth Assembly, which approved the Act, recognised the important part which the League might have to play in making the Act work : it emphasised in a covering resolution that the Act in no way restricts the League's duty under Article XI of the Covenant or the Council's rights of intervention under Articles XV, etc.²

As it stands, the Act is certainly very rigid in its operation : if, for instance, a political dispute were referred to a conciliation commission and the commission failed to effect a settlement, then the dispute would have to go within the short time of one month to an arbitral tribunal. This would be too rigid if there were not the option of having recourse to the League Council, which could, if it thought this desirable in the interests of peace, postpone for a while the procedure which would result in a compulsory judgment. Two things are needed. On the one hand, it ought to be possible to allow for delay in certain cases without forcing a judgment prematurely. On the other hand it ought to be made perfectly plain that in any case, even

¹ Excepting one point of detail.

² In 1927 a multilateral treaty of pacific settlement, a forerunner of the General Act, was prepared by the British Labour Party and approved by the Labour and Socialist International. This was designed only for League members, so it provided explicitly for reference to the Council if the conciliation commission failed to effect a settlement ; *the Council's report had to be accepted, if unanimous* ; reference to the arbitral tribunal was treated as a last expedient, to be adopted only if the Council should fail to settle the dispute or reach a unanimous report.

in the last resort, the disputants will not recover freedom to fight.

There are those who hold, with a weight of arguments on their side, that disputes may arise in which any final settlement, however equitable, had better not be attempted, at least until a long time has been allowed for passions to cool down. The Treaty of Locarno binds Germany and France, in principle, to settle *all* their disputes by peaceful means : it binds them never to begin a war against each other even if conciliation breaks down : but it does not prescribe definite means of pacific settlement, e.g. by an arbitral tribunal in case of a breakdown of conciliation. In other words it does bolt the door against war but it does not absolutely rule out deadlock. Critics of the General Act contend that in this respect, the Treaty of Locarno indicates the limit to which we ought to go. But on the other hand, the knowledge that a final judgment would be given in the event of a breakdown of conciliation would be a powerful inducement to disputants to adopt an accommodating attitude in the conciliation commission. If the disputants knew that a breakdown of conciliation would be followed by a deadlock of indefinite duration they might be encouraged to dig their toes in and refuse to budge.

The British reservation in accepting the General Act meets this difficulty by providing for reference to the Council, with a time limit of one year unless the Council or the disputants agree to extend this time limit.

(2) Another ground for criticism of the General Act is that it makes no provision to avoid the inconvenient multiplication of bilateral conciliation commissions. If twenty States are bound by the Act and a separate commission has to be established between each pair of them, the number of these commissions, nominally distinct, will be enormous. Something will have to be done to avoid this waste of effort, e.g. by the formation of a panel of conciliation commissioners.

(3) One other point of great importance remains to be noted. The General Act, in its provisions for arbitral

judgments in the last resort, does not attempt to deal with peaceful change. It does not empower an arbitral tribunal to revise existing treaties, though it does contemplate that, if the disputants so desire, it can give its judgment on questions of revision. Some critics have suggested that this is an argument against the General Act, since it would tend to crystallise and render more immutable than ever the *status quo* established by treaties. But, as was suggested in regard to the Optional Clause, the proper way of meeting this difficulty is not to refuse to extend the rule of law but to work out and improve the means of peaceful change. Just as the acceptance of the Kellogg Pact renouncing war makes it all the more necessary to go on to perfect means of peaceful settlement, so the acceptance of the General Act for pacific settlement makes it all the more necessary to go on to perfect peaceful means of change.

Disputes concerning Rights. The reader will have noticed that in all this long analysis of existing methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes, there has been an assumed distinction between disputes classified as "legal" or "concerning rights" and disputes classified as "political" or "not concerning rights"; the former being assumed to be "justiciable" and the latter "non-justiciable." This is a distinction which has long been assumed by most international lawyers, but there is now strong support in some quarters for the view that it is unsound, being based on no real difference in the intrinsic nature of international disputes. The technical issues involved cannot here be discussed; but it may be pointed out that the distinction is a survival from a day when Governments were accustomed to suppose that international law, in its actual state of development, afforded no adequate basis for decisions on matters of real importance, and when there existed no permanent international tribunal in which confidence could be placed. It need not be assumed that a judicial tribunal such as the Permanent Court will compromise its judicial virtue by deciding disputes on broad

grounds of equity, if the disputants agree thereto with their eyes open, clearly seeing what they are doing. Already, in the Swiss-Italian Treaty of pacific settlement which came into force in 1926, provision is made that if conciliation breaks down, either party may bring the dispute to the Permanent Court for decision, and that if the Court considers that the case is not of a juridical nature, it shall be settled by the Court *ex aequo et bono*. Several other pairs of States have followed this example. It seems likely that we shall see a breaking down of the assumed distinction between disputes that can, and those that cannot, be settled by the agency of a dispassionate clearing-house of international justice such as the Permanent Court is becoming. We shall see the abandonment of the idea that there are some issues "not concerning rights" and not amenable to rational settlement unless that settlement is negotiated under political pressure. We shall see the further emergence of the conviction that, if nations are to get rid of war as a means of "settling" their disputes (or rather silencing their rival's argument), they must have recourse to some judgment of reason; and that such judgment can best be given in a judicial atmosphere, on the basis of respect for law.

Conclusions. The conclusions of this section may be summarised as follows: Nations should undertake in advance to submit to and accept pacific settlement, by a third party's judgment, of all their international disputes of whatever kind.

For those disputes which are now classified as "concerning rights," the best means of doing this is by accepting as obligatory, through the Optional Clause, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

As regards disputes of the kind still assumed to be classifiable as "not concerning rights," nations should accept in advance provisions for pacific settlement in the last resort, if conciliation breaks down.

The assumed distinction between disputes "concerning

rights" and those "not concerning rights" is likely to fade.

Provisions for peaceful change, i.e. for reasoned amendment of existing rights, should be further developed ; but the incompleteness of such provisions should not serve as an excuse for withholding extension of the rule of law.

§ 2. PEACEFUL CHANGE

THE FIRST TASK of the World Commonwealth is to make peace assured and to secure observance of law. The second task is to provide for living justice. Without success in that second task, success in the first cannot endure for very long. If law remains immutable in a changing world, it will cease to satisfy new needs and new conceptions of justice ; and if that happens, then respect for law—a fragile and precious achievement of civilisation—will eventually break under the strain. The society of states, like society within the State, cannot afford to shirk this most difficult of the problems of its government—the reconciling of the claims of stability with the claims of change. It will have to secure respect for existing rights : but it will also have to secure effective recognition of the principle that the existing rights of states cannot be suffered to remain immutable for ever if they prevent equitable changes needed in the general interest.

The Dangers of Change. Two points must be emphasised at the outset : viz., the danger of trying to solve problems of revision in the present state of international relations, and the difficulty of solving the more complex problems of change except under peaceful conditions which admit of thorough and dispassionate understanding.

The danger of prematurely raising hopes of revision of treaties, amongst those who want revision, and the danger of stimulating panic fears amongst those who oppose revision, is very grave. No statesman ought to raise those hopes

and fears of revision unless he has assurances that the will for peace of the parties directly concerned, and the collective guarantees against peace-breaking, are strong enough to withstand the strains that will be created by his doing so. It is safe to say that, during the decade after the war, whilst many questions of revision could be dealt with and were dealt with peacefully, questions of territorial revision could not have been raised in Central Europe without the gravest risk. The patient was not in a fit condition for another operation of such a kind. The task of statesmanship had to be to make the best of existing frontiers : and that task was incumbent on the states desirous of change at least as much as upon the Council of the League of Nations. It seems probable that at the beginning of the Disarmament Conference there was a time when an active policy of revision might have secured acceptance as part of a coherent policy. France and Poland for instance might reasonably have been asked to assent to reconsideration, within certain limits, of the status of Danzig and the Corridor ; Germany might have been asked for explicit renewal of her assurances that she would not seek to change the *status quo* by force ; the United States might have helped by such assurances as were afterwards given that, if satisfied after due consultation that the Kellogg Pact was being broken, she would do nothing to stultify the League's measures to restrain the peace-breaker ; and Great Britain might well have given renewed and explicit assurances of her intention "loyally and effectively" to honour her engagements as to collective security. Such a quadrilateral policy, resolutely pursued at that time or somewhat earlier, might have been a valuable contribution to peace and justice. But that policy was not adopted as a whole. Germany was asked to give, and did give, fresh assurances against "resort to force" : but by the time they were formally given, the Hitler Government was in power. America did give the assurances about consultation and about support of a peace-breaker. But Britain and France, so far from strengthening faith in collective guarantees

against forcible change, did much to shatter that faith by their policy in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Not a word was spoken about revision until 1933 when it had become much more perilous to do so : and the tendency towards isolation has been strengthened, not weakened, by the Government in Great Britain.

At present, thanks largely to the policy of Britain, the League's assurance against forcible change is weaker than it has ever been : for it is manifest that change has been effected forcibly on a scale compared to which all the territorial transfers in Europe after the Great War are a mere trifle, and that the League's Members are ignoring their duty under the Covenant to restrain the peace-breakers whom they have explicitly condemned.

In these circumstances, and with the present situation in Germany and in Japan, a policy of territorial revision seems out of the question at this time. Change is needed, certainly, in the Far East, but a change which would undo what force has been suffered to achieve. Change is needed in Europe, some day, but only a change in which the menace of force would not be suffered.

Change in Peace. That brings us to the second point referred to at the outset as conditioning all this problem of change and justice. The very worst of all the possible approaches to justice, and especially towards the unravelling of complicated questions involving change, is by the way of war or menace. On occasion, if ruthless enough, war may silence an adversary's argument, at least for a while : it has sometimes been followed by a peace so negotiated or so imposed that more justice than injustice has been embodied in the settlement : but if anyone should suppose that war nowadays, between whole nations whipped into the fight by fear and war propaganda and armed with the indiscriminating instruments of scientific massacre, is conducive to justice or reason, he has only to read such evidence to the contrary as the Allied Note to Germany in June 1919, the text of the Versailles Treaty, of

Herr Hitler's book, *Mein Kampf*. As Mr. Harold Nicolson says in his book, *Peacemaking, 1919*: "Given the atmosphere of the time, given the passions aroused in all democracies by four years of war, it would have been impossible even for supermen to devise a peace of moderation and righteousness."

Change in the complex modern world must commonly be a complex business. For solving such intricate problems of change as that raised by Japan's increase of population, or Germany's demands in the Corridor, or Hungary's earlier need for financial reconstruction, the only basis of an equitable readjustment, not likely to breed fresh wars, is a dispassionate understanding of complex circumstances. When we say that equitable change is a necessary condition of an assured peace, we should add that assurance of peace is a necessary condition for the working out of equitable change.

With this preface, let us consider, first, what is the real and the alleged extent of this problem of peaceful change; then note what provisions exist for dealing with it, and attempt a brief suggestion of the means which should be developed.

The Real Importance of the Problem. Adequate provision for peaceful change is indispensable in itself, as a condition of justice, and important indirectly, since the absence of it can be exploited as an obstacle in the way of further organisation of a world commonwealth free from the war system.

"There is one thing worse than War," said Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, "and that is Injustice." Those words imply a perilous misreading of the truth about war as a means of securing justice; but that does not alter the fact that they express a view which is shared by millions, hundreds of millions, of people to-day.

It is comparatively easy for an Englishman, an American or a Frenchman, as citizens of the "sated" Powers, to affirm with conviction that peace must never be broken by any nation as a means of securing a change of existing

rights. Probably we should all agree with the words of M. Tardieu in a broadcast message to America in February 1932 : " The French people, who have taken the first step in so many historical developments, know that the world must continue to develop. But the French people have passed through much suffering and wish the development to take place without violence."

But it should not be surprising to us if the issue presents itself differently to many, probably to nearly all, people in Hungary, for example ; and the Englishman who feels tempted to be self-righteous on the subject may do well to recall the policies of his own Government at the time, say, of the beginning of the Boer War, or at the time, less than twenty years ago, when under the stress of war Sir Edward Grey was urging Italy and Roumania to go to war as a means of securing territorial changes which they desired.

Certainly, as Chapter II of this book has indicated, there are situations to-day which gravely need to be changed.

It is impossible, for instance, to defend on grounds of justice or nationality the separation from Hungary of certain territories, not very large, which are peopled by Hungarians and contiguous to existing Hungary. It is just that some changes should be made in regard to Danzig, if desired, and some changes, much less than those which Germany would now demand, in regard to the Polish Corridor. It is manifestly just, too, and most urgently necessary, that the one-sided disarmament chapter of the Peace Treaties should be superseded—not weakened, but superseded—by a general disarmament treaty "self-imposed and freely entered into" by all, on a footing of equal rights and treatment. And it is impossible to defend the lie of "Germany's *sole* war-guilt," in so far as this has ever been responsibly alleged. (Impossible too, of course, to defend the converse lie of "Germany's sole innocence" of the war.¹)

¹ In dealing with all these matters, it is necessary to allow fully for the psychological effect of Germany's experiences. Some issues which appear to the great majority of Germans as important may not seem

There will be reasonable claims for "open door" treatment and fair economic opportunity in colonial territories. And certainly there is and will be great need for change as regards the treatment of minorities.

In such respects as these the case for change will prove to be based on sound principles of justice and nationality. "All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord and antagonism. . . ." That declaration of President Wilson's does express a living idea consonant with most peoples' notions of justice ; and we shall have to allow fully for the recognition of nationality (which may of course be a cohesive force of immense value for the world), whatever we may think about the need for subordinating national egotisms and sovereignties.

Even where the case for change is not well-founded on justice and nationality, the international statesman cannot ignore the demand for change that exists ; he has to concern himself not only with such claims as people would make if they were conciliatory and well-advised, but with the claims that they actually do make or suffer to be made for them. Many such claims are indefensible. Some of the claims that have been officially encouraged in Hungary have been wholly incompatible either with peace or justice or nationality ; and in Germany to-day school-children are being taught to suppose that sweeping changes far beyond the Eastern frontiers of present-day Germany may have to be demanded and achieved presently by force of arms, if menace fails.

so to us ; but we have to take into account the special character of some of the wounds which Germany suffered and cannot forget. We should remember, in particular, the hunger-blockade, and the circumstances which, taken together, resulted in the dreadful continuance of hunger in German cities long after the Armistice ; the dictated character of the Versailles terms ; the huge losses of wealth and raw materials, imposed partly with penal intent ; the terrible inflation after the Ruhr invasion ; and the fact that, for whatever reason, hardly anyone in Germany realises the extent to which the Treaty's worst provisions have since been wiped out.

Such facts as these have to be taken into account, whether we agree or not with the judgments they imply. We must not allow the hope of change, in so far as change is just and needed in the general interest, to be so long unrealised that blind forces of hatred and despair are engendered. If we wait till some violent challenge confronts us, we shall be in the familiar difficulty of having to decide whether to concede to menace the claims that were denied to reasoned appeal. But plainly, too, change is a perilous business, not to be attempted too soon, especially territorial change ; and to encourage hopes of it before there is real prospect of being able to get it put through peacefully would be merely inviting a disastrous clash between a force made unres trainable and an object still immovable.

Loyalty to the world community is still most dangerously weak and new ; and, as we shall see, the existing provisions for peaceful change are still extremely sketchy. Therefore, the society of nations, if it is to reconcile peace with change, will have to move with the utmost forbearance and restraint as well as courage.

Exaggerations of the Problem. The fact that the problem is difficult makes it all the more important not to allow ourselves to be unduly scared by the current exaggerations as to its extent. If we were to believe those exaggerations, and were to conclude that territorial change is now the central problem of international relations, or that nothing could be done to strengthen world organisation on a peaceful basis until full provision for legislative change has been made, the problem would indeed seem hopeless.

Nowadays it is not uncommon to hear people who were silent about the Versailles Treaty in the years immediately after the war denouncing it as if it were principally responsible in its present form for most of the present troubles of the world ; they suggest that Europe to-day is tormented with injustices from end to end because of this Treaty ; and I

recently heard a highly-educated American, a democrat in politics, declare that President Wilson ought to be burning in hell on account of these injustices.

Such estimates as these grossly enlarge the present defects of the Treaty. It is only right to recognise that the original Treaty was in many respects monstrously unjust and unworkable, that it was imposed in the most woundingly insulting way, that it inflicted many penal injuries now irremediable, and that some of its surviving elements ought to be amended, under favourable conditions, in the interests of justice and reconciliation. But to overstate the present case against it, to ignore the extent to which its worst clauses have been dissolved away by the acid of reality, or to fail to recognise how preponderant a proportion of its territorial changes are indisputably in accord with justice and nationality would be to do injury to the cause of peace and reconciliation.

In withstanding the tendency to exaggeration, we may help ourselves by recognising some of the motives which have prompted it.

In particular, there is the natural tendency of the propagandist in favour of particular changes to back his claim with menacing indications of what will happen if it is not conceded. It is not surprising, for instance, that the German propagandist should seek to scare us with the allegation that his countrymen will never be induced to settle down as loyal collaborators in a peaceful Europe until the entire Polish Corridor has been restored to German sovereignty. It is quite possible that he is right ; certainly it is difficult to find a single German who does not now believe that the Corridor " must " be recovered somehow and that Poland will fight rather than renounce it ; but the fact is that incessant reiteration of the demand, and of the warning that it will inevitably be pressed insistently and without qualification by the entire German people, even to the point of war, has helped to create the situation which the propagandist wants to alarm us with. By kindling the anger that he warns us of he is making his own prophecy

come true ; and in doing so he is destroying that cool judgment without which a peaceful readjustment can hardly be negotiated.

Others who are naturally inclined to exaggerate the importance and difficulties of peaceful change are those who are really opposed to the whole idea of a world commonwealth endowed with any legislative functions. Those who resist the further curtailment of national sovereignty and are sceptical of the possibility of winning the race "between education and catastrophe" are apt to emphasise unduly the claims of "justice," as a means of blocking extension of the rule of law ; they are inclined to exhibit the present weakness of the League's machinery for peaceful change as a ground for refusing obligatory arbitration or collective security against war.

Even amongst the sincerest workers for peace in England there are still some who argue that, because certain features of the *status quo* are indefensible, or may become unjust, therefore we ought not to join in guarantees against its being changed *by force*. That argument rests on a confusion of thinking. There is excellent reason for refusing to give guarantees against change of inequitable existing rights ; but there is excellent reason also for loyally giving guarantees against change of that inequitable situation by the use of "force as an instrument of national policy."

Means of Peaceful Change. Now let us review some of the means available, through the League of Nations and otherwise, for effecting peaceful change, and for reducing the demand for it within manageable limits.

They may be roughly classed under five heads :

- Measures to reduce the need for change ;
- Measures to facilitate and encourage agreed change ;
- Measures to extend judicial discretion ;
- Measures to authorise impartial decision on grounds of equity ; and

Certain rudimentary powers of legislative decision.

I. *Reducing the Need for Change.* If emphasis is laid here on the League's powers, and on League Members' duties, to reduce the need for change, that is not a dodging of the main issue. On the contrary, such reduction of the problem of change within manageable limits is an indispensable condition for success ; it is the least difficult but not the least important part of the whole.

Consider first the duties of League Members, individually. Their purpose, as declared in the opening words of the Covenant, is "to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security"; and the Covenant goes on to indicate a variety of ways in which Members must contribute to "positive security" by reducing the causes of demand for change.¹ Under Article XXIII, for instance, they are pledged in principle to "secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League." Under most of the Mandates (Art. XXII), the States to which the mandates are entrusted are bound to accord "equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League," and there are provisions against establishment of naval or military bases in the mandated territory or the military training of its natives for other than police purposes and territorial defence.²

In proportion as Members learn to carry out and to extend such pledges about equitable tariffs, trading conditions, waterway rights, military service in colonial territories, etc., they will be reducing the demand for change in connection with access to the sea, trade routes, markets, raw materials, colonial opportunities, and other major causes of difference or injustice.

It goes without saying that in many very important respects League Members are not fully applying these principles. The world's economic condition to-day shows

¹ See next section, under the heading "Positive Security."

² In the French mandated territories in Africa, but in no other, the troops locally raised may be sent abroad. France insisted on this at the Peace Conference. But the forces in question are very small.

little trace of the influence of that vague admonition in Article 23 about "equitable treatment" of commerce ; and it cannot be said that the Minorities Treaties have been fully applied within the limited areas which they cover. But it is fair to say that a great deal has been done, by such means, to prevent developments which would certainly have been causing by now pressing demands for change. It is certain, too, that a great deal has been done to reduce the need for change, both by States Members acting on their own initiative and by the League's help ; and it is certain that very much more could be done by extending the application of principles already embodied in the Covenant, and in other ways. Look, for instance, at what has been done by Estonia, Czechoslovakia, and Spain, in according cultural liberties, or a measure of autonomy, to minorities within their borders. They are showing, as was shown in Canada or in Wales, the political value of according fair treatment to cultural, racial or religious minorities. If certain other countries would accord similar recognition to the demand for equality of human rights, for cultural liberties, or for a measure of self-government, some of the most exacerbated demands for change would not have reached the point of troubling internal or international tranquillity. The Indian problem is too large and complex to be dealt with here. But as an illustration, we may mention that territory south of the Brenner Pass, now part of the Italian Trentino, which was formerly of German speech and northern traditions, under the Austrian flag. Its transfer to Italy need not have remained a source of bitterness if Italy had not tried forcibly to Italianise it quickly, even denying opportunities of education in their mother-tongue to German-speaking children.

Poland and Germany, too, by economic obstacles or by such means as the restriction of educational opportunities, have needlessly aggravated their mutual problems ; nationalistic pride and strategic apprehensions have helped to make territorial change both more desired and much more difficult to negotiate.

On the other hand, it would I believe be found, if a vote were taken, that many of the Hungarians now in Czechoslovakia would choose to remain under Czechoslovak sovereignty rather than be re-transferred to the sovereignty of Hungary, owing to the relative advantages they obtain from the Czechoslovak land laws and superior economic conditions. The racial frontier is here being sterilised ; and it is most desirable that this should happen elsewhere, with the help of a lowering of tariff barriers.

But the task of reducing the causes of demand for change cannot safely be left solely to voluntary action by League Members individually. The League has an indispensable part to play. Take for example what it had to do in a case (not intrinsically of much importance),—the dispute in 1921 between Sweden and Finland about the Aaland Islands. Here the League was able to do what the disputants could not have done by themselves and what no court of justice could in its ordinary course have done. The League eased the problem of change by insisting on pledges from Finland to give additional rights of self-government to the Aaland islanders, and ten Governments joined in undertaking to respect and guarantee a neutralisation of the islands. Thus a problem of territorial change was effectively sterilised by quasi-legislative action which effectively reduced the demand for change. Only a collective organisation such as the League could hope to provide for the necessary dispassionate analysis in such a case, or for the necessary collaboration in working out such a scheme, or for the necessary authority to secure the scheme's acceptance.

In the cases of Austria and Hungary, their financial breakdown after the War was leading to a chaos which might soon have involved perilous demands for territorial change ; the League was able in both cases to prevent complications which might at that time have proved fatal to peace, by clearing up a huge tangle of disputes and grievances that had blocked the way to financial reconstruction. If the threat of war had been more challenging and immediate, it would probably have been impossible to mobilise

the cool judgment necessary for so complicated a disentanglement.

There are many ways in which the potential demand for change could be further reduced, by extending the League's opportunities of service. Two examples are referred to in the next section of the book, under the heading of "Positive Security." Why should not the principles of the best of the Minorities Treaties be widely extended, as a charter of elementary human rights and liberties, to the countries where no Minority Treaties are now applicable? To generalise the principle, and to offer at the outset to accept it ourselves, would be to rob the proposal of offence; a country such as Germany or Italy could not fairly say, if the issue were raised in this way, that the proposal was aimed specially at their heads. With the help of a permanent Minorities Commission, the League would thus be in a far stronger position than it now is under the general terms of the Covenant to help in forestalling the growth of minority grievances that might lead to difficult demands for change. "Irredentism" would be usefully subjected to birth-control.

So too as regards Mandates. Great Britain could render very great service by voluntarily proposing extension of the principles of the best of the Mandate Treaties to those of her colonial possessions which are not self-governing. That would help to sterilise imperialist jealousies, and would be in accord with the "open door" tradition of British colonial development in the past.

2. *Encouraging Voluntary Change.* Another way of reducing the temptation to seek change by violence would be to show readiness in some notable instances to make it voluntarily, with the League's help.

In the past, when no impartial authority existed, it might have been argued with some force that to propose voluntary transfers of territory might have an unsettling effect, for which there would be no check. But with the League in being, to help in applying the necessary tests of justice and

nationality and in working out the necessary safeguards, the position has become quite different.

Moreover, the political development of this or that country may now, or presently, render the transfer of certain territories to those countries much more safe and desirable in the general interest than it was in the past. It may be argued, for instance, that there was a good enough case in the past for the retention of Malta by Great Britain, when Italy was not yet a united country ; but that now, when Italy is a Great Power, the cession of Malta to her might well be considered, along with the cession by Italy to Greece of the Italian-owned islands of the Dodecanese.

Now that the League is in being, and now that we are bound by the Covenant, Kellogg Pact, and other engagements, the transfer of Gibraltar to the League (by agreement with Spain) might well be considered. In any case, whether transferred to the League or not, Gibraltar ought never to be used as a blockade control unless in the League's service ; " by international action for the enforcement of international covenants " ; it ought never to be used again by any Power as an " instrument of national policy," for the coercion of its own private enemies.

Or again, it may be hoped that the time is not far distant when China will have become so far strengthened and unified that the rendition to her of the International Settlement at Shanghai may be carried through (probably with provisions for an internationally-aided policing force) ; and the time should come when even the transfer of Hong Kong would be safe enough to be to the general advantage.

It would, I believe, be a wholly good thing if Britain would propose the transfer of Cyprus to Greece, subject to the concurrence of Greece, and subject of course to the concurrence of the people of Cyprus who are overwhelmingly Greek in sympathies. The League's help would have to be invoked, especially in regard to the Minority Treaty which would be necessary for the safeguarding of the Moslem element in the population.

3. *Extending Judicial Discretion.* Every State has to solve the problem due to the conflict between the rigidity of law on the one hand, and the changing needs and conceptions of justice on the other hand. Within the State a great deal is done in this respect by the exercise of judicial discretion as well as legislative action. There is no sufficient reason why the Permanent Court of International Justice should not develop its technique on these lines. The Court might be given the right, while giving legal decisions, to express at the same time an opinion as to the appropriateness and the justice of the legal position. It might perhaps be provided that such a pronouncement of the Court should have the effect of suspending execution of the judgment pending consideration of the matter by the Council and the Assembly of the League under Article 19 of Article 11 of the Covenant.

Other positive developments of judicial discretion might be worked out now that there exists a permanent and impartial judicial tribunal. There is, for instance, the doctrine known to international lawyers as *rebus sic stantibus*. That doctrine means that an international court may declare a treaty to be abrogated, wholly or in part, if, since its conclusion, conditions have so changed as to frustrate its purpose as understood by the parties at the time of its conclusion. So long as there existed no permanent tribunal, this doctrine was liable to serve simply as a dodge for treaty-breaking: the question of whether a change of conditions had really taken place had to be left to the discretion of the interested party. This doctrine is still regarded in many quarters with the utmost dislike and distrust; but now, with the Permanent Court in being, it might be applied with much less danger of abuse, within a limited field.

4. *Impartial Decision on Grounds of Equity.* Another way of solving the problem of peaceful change—by far the most radical and decisive of all—is for States to entrust to an international authority the function of giving decisions *ex equo et bono*, i.e., not on a basis of existing law, but on broad

grounds of equity. Provision has already been made for this in a number of treaties of peaceful settlement, notably in the Swiss-Italian Treaty referred to in the last section and other Swiss treaties. Under these treaties, if a dispute is submitted to conciliation and conciliation fails, then the dispute may be brought before the Permanent Court; and if in the opinion of the Court, the case is not of a juridical character, the parties agree in advance to its being settled by the Court *ex æquo et bono*.

Many jurists are apprehensive about such plans, on the ground that they may tend to compromise the judicial character of the Permanent Court. The Court takes its decisions by a majority vote; and it certainly would be extremely serious if there were to be a strengthening of the tendency for the Court to be divided on political lines, or if the Court's judgment were to be flouted when given. But it may be questioned whether there is any sufficient reason why the Court, as an authoritative and impartial body with accumulated experience, should not be entrusted by agreement between the parties with a kind of equity jurisdiction, at least, in particular cases in which the disputants clearly perceive what they are committing themselves to. Some impartial body will have to work out solutions of the problems involving changes of rights that will arise in a changing world. If the Court is found to be not the most suitable body for doing this, it might entrust the function to special conciliation courts related to itself.

Another solution of the problem would be to give authority to a special arbitral tribunal to determine the lines of a settlement *ex æquo et bono*. This can perfectly well be done if, but only if, the disputants agree in advance to empower the arbitrators (or the Permanent Court) to act in this capacity.

A third method has several times been mooted at Geneva and was proposed in the Draft Treaty of Pacific Settlement which was prepared by the British Labour Party in 1927 and approved by the Labour and Socialist International in that year. The proposal was that if a dispute likely to lead

to a rupture were referred to the League Council for conciliation, and if conciliation failed, then a unanimous report by the Council would have the effect of a binding decision. It should be noted that under this proposal the disputants themselves would have agreed in advance to the Council acting in this manner, and would have agreed to accept its unanimous judgment as obligatory. Of course, the "unanimous" vote of the Council in this case would not have to include the votes of the disputants themselves; the Council would be acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, when the votes of the disputants would not be counted.

All these proposals are perfectly practicable. Many people will regard them as an over-simplification of the issue—short cuts to the millennium. It is obvious that passionate conflicts of will, profound national animosities, love of a native land, will make tangles in the future, as in the past, which cannot be solved by the judgment of any appointed international authority, however eminent and wise. But the fact remains that there is no alternative, in the long run, to the judgment of reason. As we said, the sword can silence an argument for a while, or for ever, but it is the worst of instruments for disentangling a problem of justice.

5. *Article 19 and the League's Legislative Powers.* Lastly, we come to Article 19 of the Covenant and to a consideration of the League's rudimentary powers of legislative action.

Article 19 is as follows :

"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

In three cases this Article has been invoked by the Members, but it has never been actually applied. All the States taking the initiative in these three cases, namely, Bolivia, Peru, and China, were States not directly affected by the

Peace Treaties. But of course it is in connection with the Treaties of 1919 that most people think of the problem of peaceful change and revision.

When Bolivia, in 1931, asked for modification of her Treaty of 1924 with Chili, on the ground that that Treaty was imposed by force, the Assembly replied that it could not modify a treaty, but could only advise its reconsideration; and that such advice could only be given in cases where treaties have become inapplicable—that is to say, where the state of affairs existing at the moment of their conclusion has subsequently undergone, either materially or morally, such radical changes that their application has ceased to be reasonably possible—or in cases where international conditions exist whose continuation might endanger the peace of the world. Again, in 1929, when China and Abyssinia proposed the appointment of a committee to examine means of giving effect to Article 19, the Assembly made a very cautious reply: it confined itself to declaring that a League Member may on his own responsibility place on the agenda of the Assembly the question whether advice should be given under Article 19, but that “for an application of this kind to be entertained by the Assembly, it must be drawn up in appropriate terms,” that is to say, in terms which are in conformity with Article 19.

That is now the position so far as the League is concerned. How much could be done, granted good will and courage and favourable conditions, to make Article 19 as it stands into an effective instrument of peaceful change?

In the first place, whenever there is an allegation that treaties have become inapplicable, or that international conditions exist “whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world,” Article 19 can be used for the appointment of a commission of enquiry to report on the facts and to recommend what action, if any, should be taken. Such an ascertainment would be purely persuasive in effect, and persuasiveness does not depend for its effect upon the formal unanimity of the persuading body. On receiving the report of such a commission of enquiry, the Assembly

would have to "advise"; and if the League Members concerned did not act on the advice within a reasonable time, the matter would presumably be brought up under Article II.

Meanwhile the enquiry would have helped to elucidate the facts, and would be influencing public opinion and the policy of Governments. Deadlock might result for a while; the world community in the present stage of its development might be unable to secure a definitive settlement. But whatever happens, resort to force must be ruled out absolutely: that could not make the situation better.

It is often supposed, erroneously, that the League is altogether hamstrung by the rule of unanimity. Actually, however, the unanimity rule governing the League's decisions is to a considerable degree not applied in practice. Decisions taken in the Commissions of the Assembly do not require a unanimous vote; and it happens only very rarely that a report sent up to the Assembly from a Commission with the backing of a substantial majority fails to receive the unanimous vote in the Assembly which is technically necessary. For instance, in the case of the General Act, the British delegation disapproved of the project; but when it came before the Assembly the Act was approved by unanimous vote. Great Britain did not at that time accede to the Act; but it stood there ready for accession, and three years later Great Britain was herself among the first of the Great Powers to accede to it. Lack of unanimity had not paralysed the League's action. One way in which the States Members of the League can extend the powers of collective legislative actions is by empowering an international body, such as the Opium Commission, or a Tariff Commission, to take certain kinds of action on their behalf. For a particular, clearly-defined purpose, they would pool their authority.

As for the International Labour Organisation, it can adopt conventions by a two-thirds majority. Such conventions have to be submitted to the national legislatures of the Member States. Of course those legislatures need not

pass the proposed legislation ; but they have to be given an opportunity of considering it, and in this way public opinion can be mobilised in support of acceptance of laws which have commanded the support of the majority of the International Labour Conference.

In these and other ways, the world organisation begins to acquire the rudiments of legislative authority. It can lay before world opinion conventions dealing with a variety of problems of world government ; and though it cannot compel adhesion to those conventions, it can afford to public opinion unprecedented facilities for making the world's best judgment effective in legislative action.

Clearly there is no short cut, by mere exploitation of the existing terms of the Covenant, to the creation of an international legislature. The authors of the Covenant did not set out to create an international legislature. We shall have to provide, as soon as conditions permit, for an international authority which really has legislative powers for certain purposes ; and that, presumably, will necessitate consideration of the very difficult question of representation and its relation to the great and small populations of States. As a step in that direction it might be possible to strengthen Article XIX by providing that a " recommendation " made by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, including all the States Members of the Council, but not including the disputants, should have the effect of a binding decision.

But, meanwhile, our task is to enlist much more loyalty than now exists behind the League of Nations. The League, together with the International Labour Organisation, has already more power of a legislative character than is commonly realised.

Conclusions. The conclusions of this section may be summarised as follows :

1. " Peaceful change " is a necessary but perilous enterprise, only to be undertaken in conditions in which the menace of force is neither offered nor tolerated. It is only

in the temper of peace that complex problems of change can be properly worked out.

2. The extent of the problem is much exaggerated.

3. It is essential that the world community and its members should do everything in their power to reduce the need for change, e.g., by such means as the extension of the principle of the Minorities and Mandates Treaties and especially by sterilising political frontiers.

4. Certain voluntary changes might well be offered, e.g., by Great Britain, to encourage voluntary changes by others and to reduce exaggerated conceptions of national sovereignty.

5. Something could be done to extend the judicial discretion of the Permanent Court.

6. Much can be done by potential disputants to authorise impartial decision on grounds of equity.

7. Lastly, the League already possesses certain rudimentary powers of legislative action ; those powers should be extended as the League grows stronger.

§ 3. SECURITY

IN LAUNCHING a battleship before the War, the German Emperor declared that every additional German battleship launched upon the waters was an additional guarantee of peace. Marshal Foch made a precisely similar claim for the sword of France. I heard an American admiral not long ago declare that "to strengthen the hands of the righteous is not to be dreaded," and that as his country always had been "moral in its foreign policy," any reduction of its armed forces would be a positive sin. And as I write, our own First Lord of the Admiralty, repeating the claim of many of his predecessors, has just declared that wars are not made by a strong British Navy ; they are prevented by it ; and that the British Navy is in truth the guarantor of peace, not only for ourselves but for all mankind.

What is it that makes the claims of all these self-appointed guardian angels look so futile when set beside each other? And why is it that discussions about security and disarmament with members of Navy Leagues and other partisans of unlimited national armaments are so often stultified by a fundamental misunderstanding?

What has really happened is that the word "security" is coming to be used in a new sense totally different from the old one: the conception of world peace and of the means of achieving it are being transformed.

"Security": old style. In its old sense, "security" meant simply the assurance of each State that it would be able to maintain its own self-judged interests everywhere and its safety from invasion, either by its own unaided force or by means of exclusive alliances with other States. That meaning still persists. It is in that sense that the word "security" is incessantly used by the advocates of unfettered armament competition. "My country," they say, "as guardian of the peace, should be free to arm according to its own conception of the requirements of its own "security."

"Security": new style. But to-day, that word "security" is coming to mean something quite different, viz., the collective assurance of all nations that the common peace will be respected and preserved against a common enemy, violence and injustice. This is the only kind of security that can be shared by all nations, and the only security for nation A which is not incompatible with the security of nation B. True security must mean, not a national guarantee of national victory in private war but a guarantee that no such victory and no such war shall ever again be tolerated. In large part this true security rests already upon mutual confidence; in part it must be strengthened by the collective organisation of peace; and in part it involves collective measures for preventing and stopping war.

Security Based on Confidence. In thinking about the urgent need for strengthening the ties of peace where they are weak, we are apt to overlook the fact that already, over an enormous field of international relations, peace and a measure of justice are substantially secured, not by any active guarantees of coercion against a peace-breaker, but simply by faith in contract, by good-will, and by realisation of community of interests in this vulnerable inter-dependent society. Already there exist great areas where international peace depends in effect not primarily upon armed defence but upon the moral sanction, on economic interests, and on mutual trust. In a properly federated society of nations, disarmed, and deprived of their sovereign rights to be judge in their own cause, the element of coercion could be reduced within very narrow limits indeed. The society which consents to the service of the policeman who regulates traffic in Oxford Street does not need to arm the policeman with a revolver for its own restraint. His outstretched hand suffices (though behind him, in reserve, as we are too apt to forget, are the armed forces of the State).

But when all this has been allowed for, it remains necessary to make provision against war and injustice, both by positive measures to develop the commonwealth in peace, and by negative measures to prevent war and to stop it if it happens. We need *preventive* action, to reduce the risks that war may come ; otherwise Governments and peoples will naturally be shy of accepting their fair share of the guarantees against war. And we need *coercive* provisions, to ensure that violence shall not succeed ; otherwise some Governments, probably all, will not have the confidence which will enable them to join in radical disarmament and the organisation of peace.

I. Positive Security. Consider first the positive measures that can be taken to strengthen confidence and " security " by reducing the risks of war. As has been emphasised elsewhere in this book, these will be far more important in the long run than any purely negative measures. As the world

community learns to pool its resources for the struggle against poverty, malaria, hookworm, etc., it brings to each individual mortal a "pooled security" more fundamental than any security of nations against war; as the ties of peace, economic and other, are strengthened by the growing services of world government—services whose possible range we are only beginning to conceive—it will become evident that no one of the groups of individuals that we think of as nations will be able to afford to cut itself off from the benefits of membership of the great Club. That will be, and already begins to be, the most potent of all "sanctions" against breach of the world's code of peace-keeping.

In earlier pages we have dealt with some of the methods, direct and indirect, for building up a positive security against violence and injustice. We saw the need for developing a will for peace and a new loyalty in support of the broad rules of a peaceful society. We saw too that it is not enough to have a will for peace or to talk beautiful stuff about "world loyalty," "the great society," or "the commonwealth of nations"; a continuous organism for the world's service is needed, and a code of world order, loyally accepted.

(a) *Moral Disarmament.* We have not yet made sure of that will for peace. There is still an extremely important and definite work for security to be done in the field vaguely described by the words "Moral Disarmament." Those words have sometimes been allowed to appear as meaning an insubstantial substitute for concrete disarmament rather than a real contribution to international confidence. But, as has been shown at the Disarmament Conference and in the Institute for Intellectual Co-operation, there are definite things that we can all do to help in building world citizenship and in preventing damage to international understanding. No attempt will here be made to outline the many ways in which this cause of moral disarmament may be advanced. But it must be recognised that at this moment the need grows more urgent, not less. Over a vast area of Asia, faith

in the League's principle of collective security has been utterly discredited, and the antagonism of several of the greatest nations of the world has been dangerously intensified. At this moment, too, in Central Europe, a dictatorship which has suppressed all open opposition at home is deliberately teaching hatred to its children in the schools, poisoning the wells of history with militant nationalist propaganda, and breeding an ardent temper of revenge in the manhood of its people. A statesman with the psychological understanding of a great doctor of the mind, and with political knowledge of the true state of Central Europe, might perhaps make now some great contributions to positive security.¹

(b) *Renunciation of War.* Then, again, we have not yet made complete and unequivocal our renunciation of war and its equivalent. It is idle to pretend that we are really paying the price of true security against war, if at the same time we nurse a belief, half avowed, that a State suffering under what it regards as injustice may justifiably take the law into its own hands and may resort to armed force as a means of changing the *status quo*. As the American writer, Mr. Buell, has said : " No international community can be developed which permits each State to retain the right of war until the injustices in the *status quo* are removed. No one who believes in the anti-War Pact can oppose sanctions because they will prevent a State from going to war to correct an injustice."

(c) *Freedom of the Seas.* In this connection one very important application of the renunciation of war might well be explicitly recognised. The right of any Power to close the high seas, or to use the weapon of blockade, as an instrument of national policy, should be definitely renounced. In other words, the modern doctrine of

¹ The Archbishop of York made, I think, one such healing contribution in his speech in the Cathedral of Geneva at the beginning of the Disarmament Conference, when he denounced the lie of Germany's *sole* responsibility for the War. He spoke in 1932, not in 1933.

Freedom of the Seas, as defined by President Wilson, should be accepted : the high seas should *only* be closed, if closed at all, by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

This modern doctrine is, of course, perfectly in accord with the Kellogg Pact and is indeed a logical application of it : it is totally different from the pre-war doctrine called "Freedom of the Seas," which was simply an attempt, doomed to failure, to patch up a compromise between the opposing claims of sea-traders and sea-fighters in a legitimate private war.

It is one of the ironies of history that when, in 1919 at Paris, the United States pressed Great Britain to accept the Wilsonian doctrine, Great Britain, which had most to gain by its acceptance, was the Power which flung it away.

(d) *Peaceful Settlement and Change.* Furthermore, we must, as has been emphasised, develop and accept means of peaceful settlement and means of peaceful change, at the cost of drastic curtailments of national sovereignty. And we must drastically disarm.

(e) *Disarmament.* The French and other Governments have often emphasised the paramount importance of collective security against war as a condition for general disarmament. It is even more important to emphasise, as the government of Holland, amongst others, has done, that disarmament is an indispensable condition for security. The point will be dealt with in the next section : here it is sufficient to point out that unless we can quickly master armament competition, bringing all nations as loyal partners into a comprehensive and controlled scheme of limitation and reduction, there is no chance for the growth of confidence, and war will sooner or later become inevitable. And as for the League's ultimate powers of coercion, to prevent and stop breaches of the peace, it is manifest that they will not function reliably for the common advantage so long as vast national armaments survive on a scale

sufficient to challenge the League's collective resources. We need look no further than the Sino-Japanese tragedy for an illustration of the way in which the heavy armaments of a Great Power helped to deflect other Members of the League from their plain duty under the Covenant to restrain the peace-breaker.

(f) *Economic Disarmament.* Most important of all, perhaps, is that work of economic disarmament, and the effort to master the evils of economic anarchy, which is dealt with elsewhere in this book. M. Albert Thomas, at the end of the last report which he wrote before his death, as Director of the International Labour Organisation, wrote : " Everyone says that the evils from which the world is suffering cannot be remedied, except by international solutions. And yet there is such a state of general panic that a policy of economic armaments is being adopted on all sides, on top of the policy of military armaments. One country after another is trying to manufacture and produce all it can so that it need not be dependent on any one else in case of a conflict. Each is endeavouring to maintain its artificial industries or forms of cultivation by a hedge of protectionist tariffs and import prohibitions which still further increase mutual distrust." That was written for the International Labour Conference in 1932 : to-day, when the World Economic Conference has largely failed, the evils to which Albert Thomas referred are aggravated, and the nations look like committing economic suicide by isolationism rather than accept the necessary surrenders of their national sovereignty.

If the world is to be secure against war, we must take the poverty out of peace—as well as take the profit out of war.

But if we do want to master poverty—if we want social justice and a proper use of the world's resources for the world—we must seek this by the ways of reason, not by way of class war. No labour-saving slogan will enable us to dispense with the effort of planning for the commonwealth or the effort of persuading people to try our plans

under conditions in which success is possible. Even if all the nations were to agree to-morrow to swallow a large dose of the medicine labelled "Socialism" or a dose to purge themselves of what is labelled "Marxism," that would not suffice to do the trick. For many of the problems of ordering and adjusting the world's economy are going to become not less complex but more so, as the growth in transport and communications makes everyman into everyman's neighbour and customer. And any political planning that we may attempt collectively, for the sake of a good life based on social justice, will only be well done if it is steadily and rationally thought out ; it can hardly be so thought out in a society distracted by immediate peril ; and it can only be durably founded if founded in large measure on *persuasion*.

At this moment, our world appears so complex, so difficult to understand and to master, that the principle of dictatorship has been allowed to win sweeping victories and there is widespread loss of faith in the democratic experiment. But sooner or later, if the world is to achieve economic disarmament and social justice, it will surely have to do so by means of patient democratic education in the elementary principles of world citizenship.

(g) *Vested Interests in War.* No contribution to positive security is more needed than the mastery of the vested interests in war and the elimination of private profit from the armament industry.

All over the world, some members of the fighting services, some political representatives of munition-making towns, munition-makers and their shareholders—all those who have either a vested interest in war and armaments or an old-style conception of security—are stimulating secretly and openly the demand for competitive armaments and are sabotaging "positive security." In many parts of South America, for instance, where the military hierarchy is so strong that it can stifle the growth of pacific opinion, British and American agents are to-day soliciting armament

orders. The rival War Departments are bribed to buy the means of mutual slaughter of their peoples. All that has then to be supplied is a pretext for a fight. Elsewhere, British Ministers abroad have been employed to press sales of British aeroplanes, etc., upon the Governments to which they are accredited. Great Britain has the largest arms export in the world ; and though she has (as many other Powers have not) a system of licensing for exports of some kinds of arms, such restriction as exists is really purely formal. The War Departments wish the trade to go on. By keeping the private firms thus happily employed in fulfilling foreign orders, we can, at no expense to ourselves, —no *immediate* expense—maintain the capacity for rapid expansion in time of crisis, and so defeat one of the chief purposes of a disarmament treaty. As Messrs. Remington's agent frankly testified before a recent enquiry at Washington (in connection with the proposed arms embargo project), the private armament firms require "trouble" to be going on in some part of the world in order that they may be kept busy by demand for their products.

In France some of the greatest newspapers, including *Le Temps* itself, are directly under control of the armament ring.

In Roumania there have lately been scandalous revelations of bribery by the great Skoda munition works in Czechoslovakia.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that public opinion in many quarters begins to waken to a loathing of this "traffic in death." Everywhere if one speaks on the subject in England or Scotland or the United States, one finds people angered at the thought that their countrymen should still be making blood money out of supplying arms to Japan. Mere control is not enough, though, in view of the attitude of certain Governments, including our own, it is probably all that we shall get at present. What is needed is the total suppression of manufacture of arms for private profit. That, as we shall see in the next section, is what the French Government now proposes at the Disarmament Conference.

(h) *Mandates.* Next we must note, without here discussing, one contribution to positive security which might do much to rob economic imperialism of its dangers. Under the Mandate system of the League of Nations, the principle of the Open Door in Colonial Territories has been affirmed. We see here a small beginning of the application of a Charter of World Rights, which should restrain the abuses of imperialistic exploitation. That principle, as embodied in the best of the League's mandates, might well be applied to all colonial "possessions." In the past, before the Ottawa Conference, the British Empire had in large measure, though not wholly, applied this principle of the Open Door in its Crown Colonies. To-day that Open Door is being largely closed. Why should not this Commonwealth, which has in this respect set an honourable example in the past, propose extension of the Mandatory principle to all colonial possessions, including its own? That would be a real contribution to positive security.

(i) *Minority Rights.* Another way, even more important, in which we could help to reduce the risk of war is to extend the principle of guarantee of elementary human rights already embodied in the Minority Treaties. At the present time there are countries in Europe which deny to their citizens, needlessly and dangerously, elementary civil rights, on grounds of race, religion or opinion. There are countries where racial minorities are denied elementary liberty to use their own language or to obtain education for their children in their mother tongue. In some countries guarantees of respect for such rights are provided by Minority Treaties: but in other countries, where similar provisions are not less needed, there is no such safeguard. Why should not the existing machinery be strengthened by the creation of a Minorities Commission of the League of Nations? And why should not the Minority Treaty principle be extended to other countries where a minority problem now exists?

Why not? The answer is, of course, that the Governments in power are still under the impression that they have

something to gain by denying such freedom and opportunities as are accorded, for instance, to the Welsh speaking people of Wales, or the French speaking people of Canada. Let us seek to show that by recognising cultural rights and applying principles of social justice to minorities within a nation's borders, a positive security against war can be built up and the frontiers themselves can be made unimportant.

(j) *Conference in time of Crisis.* A new factor likely to strengthen the world's peace organisation is the notable development of American policy dealt with in Chapter IV. In connection with the Disarmament Convention, the United States will undertake to confer with its fellow signatories of the Kellogg Pact in the event of breach, or threat of breach, of the Pact : and if the United States is satisfied after such consultation that the Pact to which it is a party is being violated, it will refrain from any action which would "tend to defeat the collective efforts which the States in consultation might have decided upon against the aggressor." The great importance of this declaration (not yet formally endorsed) is emphasised below. Undoubtedly it can do much to reduce the danger of war and the danger that sanctions may be required ; it helps also to spike the guns of those isolationists and militarists in Great Britain who have supported their isolationism with the argument that support of the League's restraining action against a peace-breaker would fatally embroil Britain with the United States.

More important still, the recognition of this principle of conference and of common concern for peace everywhere is a powerful assurance against any military gambler's bid for victory. The solidarity in support of "the peace of nations" which is the substance of Article XI of the Covenant thus receives a much needed reinforcement.

(k) *Non-recognition.* Another contribution from the United States is the "doctrine of non-recognition." In January 1932, the United States, following American precedents,

declared that it would not recognise any situation or agreement "which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris." The League has since endorsed this doctrine, extending it to breaches of the Covenant as well as of the Pact, and applying it specifically to Japan's conquest of Manchuria. Whether this passive sanction will have any useful effect remains to be seen : the principle that violence should not be suffered to achieve its ends is admirable, but a mere refusal to notice officially that the violence has in fact created a new situation would be no more helpful than the traditional gesture of the ostrich.

(1) *Test of Aggression.* One of the problems of the peace movement has long been (as the last chapter showed) to define reliably what is that something which may legitimately be defended without violating the world's code of peaceful order. Or, to put it the other way round, what is that something which may not be done. Important efforts were made, at the time of the Geneva Protocol, to lay down in advance a definition of aggression (and consequently a definition of "legitimate self-defence") which would as nearly as possible identify itself. The idea then was, broadly speaking, that that State which refused peaceful settlement and resorted to war should be presumed to be an aggressor.

Helpful moves in this direction have been made during the Disarmament Conference by President Roosevelt and by Soviet Russia. The President proposed, as a rough and ready test, that that State which commits the act of invasion shall be regarded as the aggressor. Russia has submitted a much more detailed proposal ; and on this basis the great majority of the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference has agreed upon a definition of aggression. The proposed definition,¹ in its present form,

¹ The definition of aggression proposed by the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference at present reads as follows :—

"Art. 1. The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to

is considered too rigid by the British Government and some others. But there is wide support for the view that some definition of this kind, in the hands of an authority capable of applying it with discretion, such as the League Council, would be of real assistance in the League's peace-keeping technique. In the world's code of international ethics, why should there not be some commandments which are absolute? Why should it not be said without any qualification that that State which is found to be the first to invade another State's territory shall be presumed to be an aggressor and violator of the world's code? (Probably the Disarmament Convention will include some simple provision of this kind, for general acceptance, whilst the more precise and detailed proposals of the Security Committee will be left optional.)

A further provision which has been worked out at the Disarmament Conference is for the establishment of commissions of verification to be set up in different European countries, in order to determine, on the demand of the Government of that country, whether any act of aggression has been committed against the country.

In considering all these questions about determination of an aggressor, it is important to realise how transforming

the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is *the first to commit any of the following actions* :—

- (1) Declaration of war upon another State ;
- (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State ;
- (3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State ;
- (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State ;
- (5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

“ Art. 2. No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 1.”

Russia and a number of European States have already made an agreement in this sense.

a change has been brought about by the creation of an international authority such as the League Council. One sometimes hears the argument that it was impossible in pre-League days to determine reliably which of two states resorting to war was really the wilful peace-breaker, and that we must therefore assume the existence of an insuperable difficulty now. It is natural that this analogy should be drawn, but the conclusion is erroneous. Given the existence of an authority such as the Council and of a peace-keeping technique such as the League has developed, the determination of the aggressor can be assured even now with certitude. The Council's action in a crisis can be such that the wilful peace-breaker cannot help identifying himself.

(m) *The Imposed Armistice.* A valuable development in the technique of peace-keeping is the imposition, by international authority, of an imposed armistice. This method, which the League has long regarded as one of the best instruments in its armoury of peace, received its first notable application during the Greco-Bulgar incident of 1925. When the League Council met, after hostilities had begun, one part of its task—decision as to the merits of the case—could be deferred for the moment. The other part—stoppage of hostilities and withdrawal of troops—was of the utmost urgency. The Council called on Greece and Bulgaria to inform it within twenty-four hours that they had given unconditional orders for withdrawal behind their respective frontiers: within sixty hours evacuation was to be completed. Bulgaria agreed promptly. Greece, whose troops had by this time advanced a considerable distance into Bulgaria, hesitated for a critical day. Plans for constraint of a Covenant-breaker were there in a dispatch-box in the Council chamber. And then, realising no doubt that the League could, and almost certainly would, exercise compelling pressure against a peace-breaker, the Greek Government of the military adventurer, General Pangalos, also complied. Within a very brief time, officers

representing the League were on the scene of the fighting ; and by midnight of that day, only a week after the incident had begun, the last troops had been withdrawn. And then—not till then—the Council turned to the other part of its task—to deal with the merits of the dispute.

One consequence of this success in dealing with minor Powers was an increase of faith and interest in the imposed armistice and the neutral zone as instruments in the League's hands, both as a means of preventing aggravation of situations dangerous to peace and as a help towards determining reliably which of two disputants in a conflict should be accounted an aggressor. This lesson afterwards bore fruit in the League's *Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War*. This Convention, which is all ready to be brought into force when the Disarmament Convention is concluded, is designed to strengthen the League's hands in conserving peace. Its signatories agree in advance to empower the Council to call upon States that have begun fighting to stop fighting and to withdraw their forces behind lines which the Council may lay down. It also gives the Council the right to prescribe other "conservatory" measures to prevent war and the aggravation of a crisis, and it binds the signatories to accept and carry out such peace-keeping measures.

There are similar provisions in the Franco-German arbitration treaty of Locarno and in the General Act ; but this new convention will give more precision and a wider range to such engagements.

(n) *Financial Assistance*. Another important convention which may be classed among the positive rather than the negative contributions to security is the *Convention of Financial Assistance*. This provides that if one of its signatories is the victim of aggression, the others will co-operate in guaranteeing payment of interest on loans which it may need to issue for its defence. The Convention also allows financial assistance to be used as a preventive instrument, before war actually breaks out, provided that the

Council "considers that peace cannot be safeguarded otherwise." In other words, this guarantee may be assured to a State *threatened* with attack, but only after the Council has taken every other step open to it to secure agreement between the disputants, and when the party to whom financial assistance is granted undertakes for his part to submit the dispute to pacific settlement and to conform to any peace-keeping measures that the Council may recommend.

This Convention, like the one on the Means of Preventing War, is ready to come into force when the World Disarmament Treaty is concluded.

(o) *Control.* In the next section we will deal with the crucially important subject of supervision of the Disarmament Treaty as well as with control of the arms traffic.

(p) *Civil Aviation.* In the next section we will deal also with internationalisation or control of civil aviation. Undoubtedly the development of man's conquest of the air, for world-service, under international regulation or ownership, could be a factor of immense importance in promoting the sense of security against air attack, and in developing, with the help of concrete symbols, a new loyalty to mankind. Any boy who takes to the air has it in his power to do irreparable injury to his fellows and to the treasured inheritances of civilisation. When a European Air Union directs the air transport of Europe and has its officers and its machines in the aerodromes of Croydon, Le Bourget, and Tempelhof, we shall have before us a visible reminder that the sky is unfrontiered and that all Europe, all mankind, has a common interest in developing civil flying as a great uniter and in preventing its abuse as the great destroyer.

It will have been seen from this long catalogue, still incomplete, that a great variety of ways of contributing to "positive security" lie waiting to be developed, and that a good deal has been done already. We can, if we will, build

such a peace that no one but the blindest fool will want to smash it. But we have not adequately built it yet ; and there are plenty of fools now playing about, blind to the fact that their playground has become a powder-magazine. Whilst we are getting on with the positive job of peace-building, what are we to do about the more negative kind of security—measures to prevent and to stop the firing of the magazine ?

II. Negative Security: *The Principle of Coercion.* Whilst we are learning to apply all these methods of positive security—methods for reducing the risk of violence and injustice by organising peace and removing occasions for conflict—is there nothing else that we need do ? Or is it necessary, in the world society, to provide some element of coercion which may serve to deter a would-be peace-breaker and in the last resort to stop breaches of the public peace ?

Plainly, every kind of coercion, whether national or international, whether economic or military, is an evil. Can we say that some provision for collective restraint of a violator of the world's minimum code of peace-keeping is a lesser evil than the alternative ? Can we say that such a provision, now firmly embedded in the constitution of the existing League of Nations, is *morally legitimate, politically desirable, and technically practicable* ? If we are to get rid of the immense competing national armaments which now exist, and if we are to give confidence to the peoples that violence will not be permitted to achieve its ends, can we dispense with some kind of international "sanction," loyally and effectively sustained ?

Before we go on to consider what the Covenant actually provides in this respect, let us briefly review the moral, political and technical questions of principle involved in providing for sanctions at all.

The Moral Problem. No statesman in the world, responsible to his people, can ignore the plain fact that many nations

are at present armed to the teeth ; that in some countries, such views about war as those which have been tacitly assumed in this book are unfamiliar or are suppressed by those in authority ; that in some quarters there exists, rightly or wrongly, a burning sense of grievance in regard to the *status quo* ; and that there is therefore a possibility that some Government may refuse peaceful settlement and run amuck with modern weapons of destruction. No one, therefore, who accepts any share in the responsibilities of political choice can entirely ignore the question—what is the least injurious course that could be taken in the event of violence being threatened or committed on a national scale.

If violence is threatened or committed, the moral problem involved presents itself differently to the three classes of people concerned, viz. the attackers, the attacked, and the spectators.

(a) *The Moral Problem in the Attacking Country.* As regards the attacker, the moral issue is clear. The Government ought not to prepare for, or authorise, or support the attack. The citizen ought not to support his Government if it should do so. This should be made so clear to every Government and every citizen that none can be left in any doubt about their duty. If a nation is judged by the League (or by a larger body including States not Members of the League), to be resorting to force in breach of the world's code of peace-keeping, then it is the duty of every *civilian* of that country to oppose his Government's anarchic behaviour and to prevent the continuance of war.

What would be the duty of the *armed forces* ? They would already have pledged themselves to unquestioning service of the state. But they have consciences just as much as any civilian : they too have in reality an over-riding interest in the upholding of that loyalty which is due to the world community : and it ought to be possible to establish the principle that, in taking their oath of service, the armed forces do not hand over their consciences, in sealed packets as it were, into their Government's custody. The soldier

ought not to be required by his oath to take such action as the League has declared to be anarchic ; he ought not to be called upon to be the instrument of violation of his country's pledges to the world. This difficulty, which is of special importance if a system of universal compulsory military service is in force, might be overcome, as in the Spanish Constitution, by a "Peace Act" of Parliament or other enactment, making illegal any warlike action in breach of a nation's covenants of peace, as judged by the League.

It must be realised however that there are very many in Europe and elsewhere who will consider it fantastic that Governments should be expected to make engagements against the lawlessness of themselves or their successors. Millions of people in England and elsewhere are still unfamiliar with, and shocked by, the conception of another loyalty—loyalty to the world's minimum code of peace—which should override the local loyalty to "King and Country."

It will not help much, if at all, if individuals merely say : "We don't want to fight and, by Jingo, if we don't !" That is not likely to stay the hand of a peace-breaking Government, and it will not even suffice, probably, as a principle on which to sustain the loyal war-resistance of all the individuals who give such engagements in peace time.

But there is another engagement which individuals and organisations may, I think, usefully take, if only as a means of embedding more firmly the principle of world order in the structure of social ethics. One might affirm that one would give no support to any Government in any war for any purpose unless it had made plain beyond question its willingness to submit to and accept peaceful settlement in its dispute.

So much for the moral problem on the side of the attacker.

(b) *The Moral Problem in the Country Attacked.* Next what should be the position of the *attacked* party ? There are those who will recommend a policy of complete non-resistance in

all cases. I will not attempt here to discuss the profound ethical issues here involved. I could not myself give an undertaking of absolute non-resistance ; but I believe that there are cases in which absolute non-resistance in a military sense and the passive resistance of non-co-operation would be by far the least evil and injurious of the courses which a country could take in face of an attack. When the Bulgarian Government, in October 1925, sent orders to its commanders in the field—"Make no resistance : we have appealed to the League of Nations"—it was acting with real prudence and understanding, as a disarmed Power appealing for the world's support.

(c) *The Moral Problem for Other Countries.* It is often assumed that, when one has answered the problem, "What should I do if my country went to war ?" one has disposed of the whole moral problem. But that is far from being the case. There remains the moral problem for the *spectators*, the people in the other countries which are neither attacking nor attacked. What is to be their position ? It might be morally and politically sound for the Chinese, say, or the Bulgarians, when attacked, to make no resistance whatever ; but what ought those other countries to do which have recognised a common interest and responsibility for the respect and preservation of "the peace of nations" ? Even if no Covenant or Kellogg Pact existed, could these spectators say "Am I my brother's keeper ?" Could they simply wash their hands of all responsibility for choice as to their collective conduct ? I do not think so. For they could not avoid the choice between either changing or maintaining their relations with the peace-breaker. In the world of modern commerce, they could not long shirk the question : "Which would be the less anti-social course—to change our relations with the peace-breaker and so put pressure on him, or to maintain those relations?" In short, if we do recognise peace as a matter of common concern, then we cannot be indifferent, that is "neutral," if the peace is broken. As the United States has now recognised along with the rest of

us, we have abandoned in our Kellogg Pact the amoral attitude towards war ; and if the peace-code to which we are party is violated, then non-co-operation with the violator is the very least that the society of nations has a right to expect from us. As a Turkish delegate declared at the Disarmament Conference—"The only alliance which ought to be allowed is the alliance of all civilised nations against war."

I repeat, every kind of coercion is an evil. We have to choose, if the peace is broken or threatened, which is the lesser of two evils. If we make plain in advance the world's resolve not to suffer its peace to be smashed and not to allow any victor to dictate his terms, then, and only then, can we hope that true security against war will grow in those areas where mutual fear and suspicion are now strongest. If we take any part at all in the responsibilities of political choice, we have to assess what is the least objectionable course that can be taken by the spectators when peace is threatened : and for my part I cannot doubt that on moral grounds the least objectionable course is to collaborate loyally and effectively in preventing or stopping the outrage as quickly, and with as little enduring injury as possible.

The Political Problem. When we turn to the political problem, we are compelled to recognise the fact that the nations, probably without a single exception, would insist on the provision of some collective means of restraint of a peace-breaker as a condition for drastic reduction of their national armament. This was clearly seen at the time of the drafting of the Covenant, when every State, whether neutral or belligerent, which contributed to the plan of a League of Nations included proposals for sanctions against breach of the peace. No man affirmed this principle more emphatically than President Wilson ; and he was supported in this view by his predecessors in office, Taft and Roosevelt. The principle was firmly embedded in the Covenant, and the article in which the sanctions are formulated corresponds

almost verbally with a draft prepared for the British Government before the end of the war by an official committee under Lord Phillimore.

Thus the political question has been answered decisively already so far as League Members are concerned : their Covenant implies that sanctions are an indispensable element in the evolution of a just and peaceful order. They are something more than a façade behind which good-will and faith in contract may grow strong ; they are a necessary adjunct of world-government.

Suppose, however, that some of us come to the conclusion that this principle of solidarity for the prevention and stopping of war is politically inexpedient. Suppose we consider, for instance, that the League of Nations itself has become so hostile to those political principles for which we care most that its judgment cannot be trusted at all. In that event four possible courses would be open to us. We might advocate an amendment to the Covenant which would cut out all reference to sanctions. If we failed (as we certainly should fail) to secure such elimination, we might then propose withdrawal from the League ; or we might propose that the League should be scrapped altogether, leaving the world to muddle along somehow ; or we might decide to make the best of the situation, staying in the League and loyally accepting its obligations. The fourth possible course would be to remain in the League, but to take the line that its obligations as regards sanctions might be honoured or dishonoured just as we might feel inclined when the time came. The last course would be inexcusable. It would also be politically inept. Remember how in 1876 the concert of Europe used a threat of collective sanctions against Turkey without meaning to do anything more than bluff. That was the direct road to the atrocious Russian-Turkish war.

The Technical Problem. There is something to be said for having no sanctions at all : there is much to be said for having sanctions that will do their job : but there is nothing to be said for having sanctions that will not work.

To build a ninety-foot bridge for a hundred-foot gap is simply to endanger the life of bridge-builders and travellers alike.

What, then, are the conditions which must be fulfilled, if the League's sanctions are to be effective and technically practicable?

They must :

- (1) act as an *adequate deterrent* to those who might contemplate attack ;
- (2) serve as a *reliable assurance* to those who may be attacked ;
- (3) be a *tolerable burden* to those who may have to take part in the coercive measures.

And these three requirements are most likely to be fulfilled if the sanctions are made part of a system in which they are *least likely to be required* and in which their application would present the least difficulty. That means that they must be part of an order in which the renunciation of war is unequivocal, in which provision is made for peaceful settlement and peaceful change, in which radical disarmament has been generally accepted, and in which the ties of peace are strong.

The Sanctions of the Covenant. Now let us see what answer the Covenant gives to these moral, political and technical questions.

As we have already noted, the authors of the Covenant assumed that some kind of international sanction was morally legitimate and politically desirable. The sanctions they provided for are intended, not to impose anybody's political decisions,¹ but simply to prevent, or in the last resort to stop, a breach of the covenanted peace. The League's Members say in effect : " We will bind ourselves to try peaceful procedure in all our disputes and to obey certain rules of peace-keeping ; if nevertheless a violent breach of those rules is threatened or committed, we promise

¹ But see below, under the heading Article XIII.

loyally and effectively to co-operate in preventing or stopping the outrage as quickly and with as little enduring injury as possible."

As the League has gained experience, emphasis has increasingly been laid upon the peaceful pressure that the League can exercise during a time of strained relations rather than upon the coercive measures which it could impose if war were actually committed. The Covenant allows for a whole series of graduated steps which the Council can take, first in its capacity of mediator with the agreement of the disputants, and then in a quasi-judicial capacity, making recommendations which amount to commands. Finally there is the obligation in the last resort to do something effective, and to do it loyally, to restrain the peace-breaker.

Let us glance at the Articles of the Covenant one by one.

Article X. First in order comes Article X, which embodies the League's territorial guarantee :

"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

This Article was regarded by President Wilson as the backbone of the Covenant, and many speakers at the Assembly dealing with the Sino-Japanese conflict emphasised its special importance.¹ Nevertheless, the article has led to much trouble. It was largely responsible for the American Senate's refusal to vote by the necessary majority for the acceptance of the Covenant : and it has hitherto proved,

¹ Until a fairly late stage in the drafting of the Covenant, this article and Article XIX, which provides for peaceful change, were juxtaposed as the two complementary parts of one article. It is regrettable that they were separated.

whether through its own ambiguity or through the Council's fault, to be of little value except as an affirmation of principle. This was shown in the early stages of the Sino-Japanese dispute, when the Council appears to have assumed (wrongly as I venture to think) that it could do nothing under this Article except on the basis of a unanimous vote *including* the votes of the disputants themselves. The Council acted as if it could not (under Article X) advise upon the means of preserving China against aggression unless Japan would join in the vote. It is difficult to believe that the authors of the Covenant, when they drafted this Article and gave the Council a quasi-judicial function under it, intended to make the defendant a member of the jury and able to deprive the verdict of legal authority. In other words, it is hard to believe that the unanimity rule was meant to apply to this Article.

If the Council Members had really had the will to make the Article work, they would probably have done so : and if all of them except Japan had been willing at the outset to make a strong declaration without seeking the concurrence of Japan or China (as they afterwards did, too late, in the Spring of 1932), they would have been technically correct and, not improbably, less ineffectual in restraining Japan.

Article XI. Next comes the famous Article XI, which really is the backbone of the Covenant. This is the Article above all which is concerned with mediation. Here is the text again, as a reminder :

“ 1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

"2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever effecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

It will be noted that the League here takes to itself extremely wide powers. The text refers to "*any* war or threat of war," "*any* action . . . deemed wise and effectual," "*any* circumstance whatever . . ." etc. Note also the reference to the "friendly right" of League Members to raise troubling issues under this Article. The essential point about action under Article XI is that it should be based on the assumption of continued amity. In so far as the League uses pressure under the Article, it should be the amicable pressure of one colleague upon another, for preventing injury to the common cause.

Strictly speaking, the League's powers under Article XI are purely persuasive; every decision by the Council as such requires a unanimous vote, including the votes of the disputants themselves. Now, as we have already seen, the League has been learning to attach more and more importance to the preventive action it can take, before any actual "act of war" has been committed and before the terrible occasion for actual application of coercive sanctions has arisen. It is under Article XI and Article XV that such preventive action has to be taken. It might be supposed that the "unanimity rule" would operate to prevent the League from applying any effective measures of prevention or restraint under Article XI; but this has not proved to be the case. There are a number of ways in which the difficulty has been met with fair success.

In the first place, the unanimity rule does not apply to "matters of procedure"; and that phrase may cover a lot, if the Council has the will to interpret it broadly. It might cover, for instance, a decision to send a commission of enquiry to investigate a situation dangerous to peace.

Secondly, League Members may agree in advance to waive their right to veto peace-keeping measures enjoined by the League. As we saw on pages 334 and 339, provision has been made for this at Locarno and in the General Act, and in the Convention, not yet in force, for Improving Means of Preventing War.

Thirdly, the Members of the Council other than the disputants may act as a group, not officially as a complete Council. This was done by "twelve Members of the Council" in a protest to Japan in February 1932.

And fourthly, the Council can, when acting under this Article, declare itself competent to act under another Article, e.g. Article XV. This was done in a dispute in 1921 : and in March 1932, after China had invoked Article XV, it was done despite the protest of Japan.

Thus, the League can, if it has the will, do a great deal under this Article, notwithstanding the limits imposed by the unanimity rule and by the proper observance of the courtesy necessary for true mediation. It can employ a graduated pressure very different from the full coercive sanctions of Article XVI. Much depends on whether the League (and especially the Great Powers on its Council) has the will to apply the wide power available to it under the Covenant with courage and determination to strengthen the system of collective security against war.

That brings us to a point of fundamental importance which underlies all this technical discussion of texts and treaty obligations. If the Covenant is narrowly interpreted in the way in which lawyers construe a laboriously-studied legal text, the League's development will be dangerously restricted. The Covenant is something more than a lawyer's text for legalistic interpretation ; it is rather an affirmation of living principles broadly stated but not yet wholly worked out. If it is used pedantically, with a desire to find excuses for shirking action, plenty of such excuses will be found and the Covenant might become little better than an outgrown cage instead of the developing charter of a society learning the way to live in peace.

Article XIII. Next comes Article XIII, which provides for the submission of legal disputes to legal decision.

The fourth paragraph of this article reads as follows : " The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith.¹ In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto."

It is extremely unlikely that a State which had agreed to submit its dispute to legal judgment would afterwards refuse to carry out the decision. But if such a refusal did occur, plainly the League of Nations would have a special responsibility for seeing that the aggrieved party got a fair deal : the League ought to do all it can by pressure short of " acts of war," without itself breaking the peace, to induce the recalcitrant State to carry out its obligation and give effect to the award.

A proposal has been made, in the draft amendments to the Covenant, that the last words of this article should be altered. Instead of saying that " the Council shall propose what *steps* should be taken to give effect " to the legal decision, the new text would read : " The Council shall propose what *measures of all kinds* should be taken. . . ." The proposed change has certain dangers. It would be a bad thing if it could be charged against the League of Nations that its Covenant authorised it to break the peace, for the coercion of a passive but recalcitrant State. The League's sanctions should be used to prevent, or in the last resort put a stop to, a breach of the peace : they ought not to be used to impose, by recourse to armed force, the decisions of the League itself or of any tribunal. It has often been maintained by those unfamiliar with the Covenant, especially in the United States, that the League's sanctions may be used for imposing by force of arms the decisions of a political body, the League Council.

¹ If and when the Covenant is amended so as to bring it into line with the Kellogg Pact, this reference to resort to war will of course have to be struck out, since all resort to war will be prohibited.

This is not the case. The sanctions as they stand—the ultimate coercive sanctions—are meant only to stop a peace-breaking which has actually been committed. The guns are going off. Something has got to be done to stop the bloodshed. What the League does is not to impose a victor's decision upon a defeated enemy, but to stop the public nuisance so that reason may then give its dispassionate judgment.

Article XV. If a League Member does not submit his dispute to legal decision under Article XIII, then he must submit it (if it is a dispute "likely to lead to a rupture") to the Council for inquiry, conciliation, and report. If the Council fails to effect a settlement, one of two things may happen. Either the Council will be able to make a report which is unanimously agreed to by all its members except the disputants, or else it will fail to reach such unanimity. If it does make a unanimous report, then no League Member may go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendation of that report. If, on the other hand, the Council fails to reach unanimity, then, after three months' further delay, Members become free, so far as the existing Covenant is concerned, to go to war. Against such war the League's sanctions would not be applicable.

That looks as if there were an enormous gap clean through the Covenant. And in fact the gap has been (as we saw in the last Chapter) of great importance in the League's history. But four relevant facts must now be taken into account.

Firstly, if the conciliation did break down, the League would still be charged with the duty of action of some kind, under Article XI, to safeguard peace.

Secondly, there is the Kellogg Pact, which should have the effect of closing the gap: it should mean a complete renunciation of that conditional right of war which the Covenant allows.

Thirdly, there are the treaties of pacific settlement, notably Locarno, the Optional Clause and the General Act.

And lastly there are the proposed amendments of the

Covenant, not yet in force, which are designed to bring it into line with the Kellogg Pact. The ultimate right of war would be wholly surrendered ; disputants would not be free to break the peace, *even if the Council should fail to reach a unanimous report.*

It is to be hoped that these amendments will soon come into force. When they do so, they will of course affect the League's sanctions. For at present (apart from the Kellogg Pact) the Covenant allows resort to war to go unchecked by sanctions in certain conditions : when that right of war is renounced the sanctions will be applicable to more kinds of war. But that does not mean that the closing of the gap in the Covenant will increase the danger that sanctions may have to be used. The contrary is the case. When the amendments of the Covenant, designed to close the gap, were discussed in 1930, the British delegation pointed out that the danger would in fact be much reduced if the right to threaten war, and all that that carries with it, were wholly eliminated within the League's system ; and that view was endorsed by the committee which framed the amendments.

Article XVI. Now look at Article XVI itself.

Its first paragraph falls into two parts, the first of which is as follows : " Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state . . . "

Up to this point, it will be noted, the action contemplated is purely domestic and involves no contribution of naval or military force. Great Britain, for instance, could do what was required under this part of the article by such measures as the prohibition of imports from the peace-breaking country and the refusal of export licences to it. The pressure would be exercised upon the quay rather than

on the sea ; and if all the principal countries trading with the peace-breaker were collaborating in the measure and if the peace-breaker were sensitive to pressure of this kind, then the economic sanction might be sufficiently potent by itself without any backing of naval or military force. Indeed, it seems safe to say that, in most cases, the mere beginning of a graduated pressure of this kind, if applied extensively and with an evident intention to sustain the pressure, would suffice to restrain the State resorting to war : its military adventure would become manifestly hopeless if the League really mobilised its moral forces and its powers of collective economic and financial boycott.

The word "immediately" in this context has led to considerable misunderstanding and criticism. The real intention, as has frequently been explained, is to permit of graduated pressure if that should seem desirable in the circumstances of the case, the object being of course to stop the trouble with a minimum of suffering and enduring injury.

Now for the rest of the first paragraph of Article XVI. It reads : " And the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not."

In this part of the article the obligation becomes more extended : it might or might not be capable of complete fulfilment without a contribution of armed force. Suppose, for instance, that Holland were required to stop exports to Germany of goods from Holland and the transit of goods from overseas. Both operations could be performed in Holland without any substantial contribution of armed force (though it is possible that she might be invited to contribute to blockade measures at sea in addition to her domestic measures at home). But for Great Britain the position would be different. If she had to prevent commercial intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and those of States overseas she could deal with goods in transit by domestic measures, but she could

not complete the preventive measures without making some contribution of naval force.

Thus it is plain that Great Britain's island position, as well as her great naval power, makes her responsibility a special and a heavy one.

Now turn to paragraph 2 of the article. "It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

Here it is plain that the League Council can only *recommend* what naval or military forces should be contributed. But on the other hand it is clear that some contribution of armed force would in some cases be indispensable, especially in a world still armed as ours is. The economic measures might in some cases be stultified completely if there were no naval force to check commerce with non-Members, or with disloyal or weak Members of the League. Or it might be necessary to support a loyal Member "in resisting any special measures aimed" at it "by the Covenant-breaking state," e.g. to protect it against invasion or severance of its communications (Article XVI, para. 3).

To what extent are Members bound to contribute to such forcible action? No one would expect Peru, say, to participate in military sanctions against Persia or Poland. No one should expect a disarmed country to arm for such a purpose. The extent of the obligation was defined by Britain and the other signatories of Locarno in a joint Note to Germany, in which these Powers gave it as their view that the sanctions of Article XVI must be carried out "loyally and effectively" within the limits allowed by the Member's armaments and his geographical position.

Thus it cannot be said that Members are perfectly free to choose whether to ignore the Council's recommendation or not. There is a plain obligation of honour to make the Covenant work; and that obligation cannot well be shirked by Great Britain, who, as a permanent Member of

the Council, would have a special responsibility (unless she were a disputant) in formulating the recommendations as to what effective forces should be contributed.

It need hardly be said that no part of the Covenant is more vehemently assailed from one side or the other than this. On the one hand there are those who take the line that for the League to authorise the use of armed force for any purpose whatever, even to prevent massacre, is to sully its hands with the accursed thing and to condone the reign of violence in international relations. The critic can point to the simple commandment—"thou shalt not kill"; and he affirms his own refusal to support anything of the kind, whether used in the service of the society of nations to stop the fighting ordered by a lawless Government, or used in the service of the lawless Government itself.

Personally, I cannot share that view, though of course I regard it as supremely desirable to avoid if possible all use of armed force of whatever kind. There is a real distinction, though not a sharply drawn one, between the use of armed force and the use of economic pressure. Both weapons are detestable: both make for destruction of the most precious things in life: economic pressure, even in the form of passive non-co-operation, can bring about widespread hunger, starvation and long-drawn suffering, and it is a mistake to suppose that the pens used in making a blockade or boycott effective are cleaner and humaner weapons than bayonets. But there is this to be said in favour of the economic weapon—that it does its job more slowly. A graduated economic pressure, or even a complete economic boycott, does leave the victim time to think and time to change his ways or to influence his Government; whereas high explosive or a breath of Lewisite gas simply finishes the argument.

Other critics of the sanctions of Article XVI maintain that the obligations are too onerous and far too perilous for those States which may have to guarantee them, especially for Great Britain. Until lately, they could point with much force to the fact that Great Britain might, in helping

to apply the League's sanctions, be brought into disastrous conflict with the United States. The American challenge to Britain's blockade measures in the early part of the war and the building of a great American fleet with which to sustain that challenge was naturally remembered with keen anxiety. But it is impossible now for the isolationist who would have us repudiate the sanctions obligation to sustain this argument with anything like the same force as formerly. For now the United States is a party with Great Britain to the Kellogg Pact ; the United States, through the mouth of the former Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, has repudiated the old doctrine of neutrality, and this position has been sustained by the Roosevelt administration ; and now, at the time of writing, the United States has lately engaged itself to participate in conference with the other signatories of the Kellogg Pact in the event of breach or threatened breach of its peace-keeping engagement. That means, of course, that the danger of an Anglo-American clash is enormously reduced. If the United States is satisfied after due enquiry and consultation that a breach of the peace-covenant to which it is party is being committed, then it will not do anything to stultify the League's action to restrain the peace-breaker : passively, if not actively, it will be on the League's side. That means that a would-be peace-breaker will be far less likely to gamble on the prospect of the League being paralysed by fear of an American challenge ; and so the danger of war will be reduced, and with it the danger that sanctions may be required. Moreover, the United States will be associated with League Members, including presumably Great Britain, in considering what action should be taken to safeguard or restore peace.

There was a time when the doctrine of "neutrality" was regarded with honour. But to-day, when the nations bind themselves to renounce the "right of private war," they are compelled by the logic of their own action to go on to renounce the "right of private peace" as well. They have now to recognise "neutrality" to be only a pernicious relic of the international anarchy, a survival from lawless days

before civilised nations "took sides" against war. To refuse to "take sides against war"—that would be *il gran rifiuto*, a repudiation of the prime condition for a peaceful commonwealth. And to claim that peace in this or that foreign land is our country's private concern should likewise be recognised as anarchic: for the peace of Suez or of Nicaragua is no longer "our" peace, part of the Pax Britannica or the Pax Americana; it becomes part of what the Covenant calls "the peace of nations."

It is curious how those who regard Article XVI as imposing too heavy a burden upon Great Britain commonly imagine this country only in the rôle of guarantor and never as the party guaranteed; they like to think of England in the attitude of the kind policeman restraining the wayward young and never as the man with great possessions who may have cause to be grateful some day for the policeman's ubiquitous service. A Power so widely spread as the British Commonwealth is of necessity more vulnerable than any other, and it should rejoice at, rather than regret, the development of a new sense of solidarity for the defence of "peace, the first of British interests."

One other provision of Article XVI remains to be noted. Its fourth and last paragraph says that any Member of the League "which has *violated any covenant of the League* may be declared to be no longer a Member" by a unanimous vote of the Council (the offender's vote not being counted). This should prove a valuable sanction. It might have been applied in the Japanese case.

Article XVII. Lastly there is Article XVII, which provides for the treatment of disputes involving States not Members of the League. The non-Members are to be invited to accept the obligations of League membership for the purposes of that dispute: if the State so invited refuses the obligations of membership and resorts to war against a League Member, the provisions of Article XVI are applicable against the peace-breaker.

A Review. What are we to think of these provisions of the Covenant? Let us assume that some kind of sanction is morally legitimate. Let us recognise also that some kind of effective sanction is desired by the great majority of nations, if not by all.

(1) Can we regard these sanctions of the Covenant as likely to be *effective* if used with reasonable loyalty, discretion and courage? Can we expect that they will act as an adequate deterrent to an attacker, as a reliable assurance to those who may be attacked, and as a tolerable burden to those who may have to take part in the coercion?

As matters stand, confidence in their adequacy has been gravely shaken by the League's failure, and especially by the failure of France, Great Britain and the United States, to apply any pressure of an economic kind, let alone any military pressure, against Japan. A little was done to mobilise the resources of diplomatic protest: something was done, too late, to demonstrate the moral condemnation of the world: a little may perhaps be done, though this remains to be seen, by means of the American doctrine of non-recognition of the situation that Japan has wrongfully created. But the League's great economic weapon, which could have been and should have been, used, has not been touched (except in so far as an unofficial boycott has been operative in the United States). Great Britain's isolated and indiscriminating embargo on certain classes of exports of arms not yet ordered for Japan was worse than a failure. And the League's members did not even demonstrate the world's judgment to the people of Japan by the withdrawal of ambassadors from Tokio. But that does not prove that the Covenant is at fault: it only shows that certain Governments, faced by the great armaments of Japan and by Japan's favourable strategic position and gravely underestimating the injury that would be done to the collective system by their failure to constrain Japan, were not prepared to use the resources of the Covenant. The fault lies not in the Covenant but in ourselves.

I hope that the League will still act in defence of its

Covenant and of its engagements towards China. The question at issue is not whether Japan had genuine grievances to complain of but whether she used tolerable means of securing "satisfaction" for them. Assuming that Japan does not radically change her policy and comply with the League's requirement, I hope that League Members will yet, in agreement with Washington, withdraw ambassadors, stop all exports of arms to Japan and impose a concerted embargo on imports to, and exports from, that country. But I hope too that it will be made absolutely clear, whatever action is taken, that the League's sanctions are not to be used for penal purposes or to impose a victor's irresponsible will, but simply to secure the engagements against violence to which Japan subscribed, and that Japan is as much entitled thereafter to a fair and radical consideration of her pressing problems as China is. That would be a vindication, however belated, of the principle on which sanctions should be based.

The outstanding lesson of the Sino-Japanese case is that loyalty to what Lord Lytton has called "the life-line of the League," the principle of collective responsibility for peace and justice among the nations, is still far too weak and that the League's success or failure at any given time depends to a very large extent on whether the British Government at that time happens to be disposed towards isolationism or towards solidarity. The experience shows, too, that the League cannot rely on its sanctions being found a tolerable burden and risk by those States which will have to bear the brunt of applying them, unless they are part of a system in which they are least likely to be needed. The two greatest Powers within the League, apart from Poland, which were not bound by the Optional Clause were precisely these two—Japan and China. The greatest armed Power in the Western Pacific was Japan. One of the chief causes of the trouble was the failure to provide in time for a radical reconsideration of Japan's and China's problems, economic and other. And one of the most tragic features of the whole business is the fact that the League had not yet had quite

enough time to make its disinterested services so indispensable to both States that neither could have afforded to risk a breach. Except as part of an order that provides first for peace and then for justice, the sanctions are at once morally insufferable and politically and technically impracticable.

(2) Ought the sanctions obligations to be *strengthened or clarified*, by amendment of the Covenant?

There is, I think, a case for clearing up the position about preventive pressure and the authority under which it may be applied. Experience has shown the great importance of strengthening the League's hands in applying preventive pressure of a non-military kind *before* a dangerous situation has actually developed into war. There is also a strong case for clarifying Article XVI. The word "immediately," for instance, in the first paragraph, has given rise to much misapprehension. It might well be made even plainer that a country's obligations as regards military sanctions are limited, of course, by its armaments and its geographical position; it should be made clear that the Council should notify to League Members the date recommended for application of economic pressure, so that this may be properly synchronised. It would be easy to suggest other ways in which the Article might be clarified or strengthened. But the question arises—what would be the effect of tampering with the Article under present conditions: in particular what would be the effect of trying to strengthen it, if that were thought desirable?

Since a weakening of the principle of sanctions would be a mistake, it would be very dangerous to the whole Covenant if any such attempt were made at this time. If any substantial recasting of Article XVI is presently suggested, this should be done only when the forces of isolationism and reaction are much weaker than they are just now, and when the sense of solidarity and the readiness to subordinate national sovereignty have been restored and reinforced.

By far the greatest need at this time is, not any further elaboration, or any perfecting of the symmetry, of the League's legal structures, but the loyal support of existing

engagements. Unless the League's Members, and particularly Great Britain, hold firmly to their obligation to act collectively, effectively, and loyally in defence of the world's code of peace-keeping, confidence cannot grow and disaster will be sure.

(3) Ought the sanctions obligation to be supported by the creation of *an international force*?

It is easy to see the extreme danger and difficulty of entrusting armed power to any such world-authority as now exists. The League is by no means all-inclusive; it is regarded by some of the most powerful States outside it with suspicion or hostility; and even its most powerful Members have at present only a weak sense of solidarity within it. Thus, there is danger that a League force might be abused: and there is the manifest fact that unless the national forces which might stand against it were abolished, it might be defeated. There are immense technical difficulties, also—difficulties which, I believe, are insuperable at present—in the way of creating any large land force, stationed somewhere, and composed of miscellaneous nationals. I do not think that we have yet reached a stage in which there is enough solidarity to make possible the surmounting of these difficulties.

But it is suggested in the next section that, as regards the air, there is a good deal to be said for creating a small League air-force of fighting planes, to give assurance against abuse of civil aviation, *provided* that by this means we could secure total abolition of national air forces. In that case there would be no formidable competition with the international force: and the difficulties of stationing the force would be much less.

As for the navies, there are no sound arguments—nothing but the prejudices and mistaken calculations of national advantage in a few States with great naval power—in the way of abolition of all existing forces above a low tonnage, the abolition of submarines, and the pooled use of the remaining forces as a “gendarmerie” for the policing of the world's high seas.

Five years ago the Russians proposed at Geneva that all warships above a certain small size should be abolished and that the seas should be divided into sixteen areas for "police" purposes. Spain made a somewhat similar proposal at the Disarmament Conference. There is nothing unreasonable or utopian about that proposal: granted the will to make it work—a will which has yet to be created—it could be quickly applied, with great advantage to the security of all nations and especially to an island Power. Incidentally, it would greatly facilitate application of the League's sanctions at sea in accordance with President Wilson's doctrine of "Freedom of the Seas."

(4) Ought the sanctions obligations to be *weakened*, e.g., by deletion of the provisions concerning military sanctions?

Many people, especially in the United States, would welcome this change with profound relief. For my part, though I hope that the military sanctions will never have to be employed, I think it would be a profound mistake to attempt to cut them out of the Covenant.

The question is often discussed as if all that mattered was whether we liked military sanctions or not. That is not the real question. No one but a brute would excuse the use of the sanctions if the economic sanctions could be made sufficiently effective to do their war-stopping job without waste of precious time. But there may be cases, when some contribution of armed force, however regrettable in itself, may be the means of preventing appalling bloodshed and misery: there may obviously be cases where economic pressure cannot be made quickly effective without some contribution of naval force. If we are going to have a sanction at all, let it be an effective sanction, capable of doing its work of restraint before much enduring injury has been inflicted by the peace-breakers.

If any reader thinks that the world can now dispense with all kinds of collective sanctions, let him faithfully answer for himself the question—how otherwise can we hope to build confidence, where confidence is lacking, that *resort to armed force as an instrument of national policy* will not

be committed. If the reader thinks that some sanction is necessary for this purpose, let him ask himself faithfully what powers may be necessary to make the sanction *effective* for its purpose with the minimum of enduring injury.

Conclusions. The conclusions of this section may be summarised thus :

1. The old-style conception of "security," involving a scramble of sovereign nations each trying to become more powerfully armed than the other, must be superseded by the new conception of collective security against violence and injustice.

This collective security should be built up in two ways.

2. Positively, it should be made strong in a great variety of ways, by reducing the risks of war and reinforcing the ties of peace. The world community can so develop its services to its members that none will be able to afford to forfeit by violence the advantages of membership.

3. Negatively, security should be sustained by loyal and effective support of the League's provisions for preventive pressure and ultimate coercion, the purpose of such pressure being, not to dictate a victor's will, but to prevent or stop, with the minimum of injury, breaches of the indispensable code of peace-keeping.

4. These provisions might well be clarified in certain respects, to make them more sure as a deterrent, more reliable as a guarantee, and more tolerable to the guarantors : but any substantial recasting of the provisions should not be attempted at a time when isolationist tendencies are strong, e.g., in Great Britain.

§ 4. DISARMAMENT

The General Case: Why bother about Disarmament at all? The main reason for general disarmament is, of course, that this is an indispensable, and most urgently needed, part of the whole enterprise of organising peace

and preventing war. Without disarmament, it will be impossible to create security against war or that confidence without which economic recovery is impossible. Without disarmament, our renunciations of war, our treaties of peaceful settlement, and our still-shadowy provisions for peaceful change, will be subjected to an intolerable strain. If we want world order we must renounce the instruments of disorder.

There are other arguments for disarmament besides this general one. There is the fact that the nations victorious in the war, and all the members of the League are deeply *pledged* to a general reduction and limitation of armament ; and that those pledges, many times re-affirmed, have not yet been honoured. If they are not honoured very soon there will unquestionably be a disastrous break-away by Germany, who will claim and exercise freedom to rearm.

The nations are heavily *burdened* too with enormous armament expenditure, which is modern, growing, and bound quickly to become far more enormous unless checked now. The burden is modern : in 1886, for instance, Britain's expenditure on all armaments was only £28,000,000 ; in the year before the war it was £77,000,000 ; and now, for all our Kellogg Pact and our Washington and London Treaties and Germany's disarmament, it stands at £114,000,000. The world to-day is spending about a thousand million gold pounds every year on armaments, mostly for war which it has sworn not to fight ; a sum equal to a pound a minute ever since Christ was born. If we allow this growth to continue unrestricted for another year or so, and if we begin replacing battleships, for instance, when the existing holiday from battleship building expires, the present burden will be immensely magnified within a decade. In a world still starved of the services of life, and menaced by powers of destruction of new and uncontrollable kinds, this wasteful expenditure on the services of death is an intolerable wrong.

The competitive expenditure cannot even achieve its supposed purpose of giving "security." It cannot give

security for all against war, but on the contrary breeds the fear and suspicion out of which war is made. It cannot even afford the old-style "security" which meant supremacy, since there is not one Imperial Rome in this modern world but a number of Great Powers, each of which cannot be stronger than the others. We are *endangered* by the unlimited competition; endangered by the increasing deadliness of modern arms; and endangered by the activities of the vested interests in war.

We have to honour these pledges, lighten these burdens, and reduce these dangers now. There is no time to lose. And if we lose what opportunity now remains of achieving an instalment of general disarmament before it is quite too late, we are likely to smash that edifice of world order which, as we have seen, the world has been patiently constructing; we shall be opening the door, not to a little blood-letting, or another Waterloo, or even to another Verdun or battle of the Somme, but to a disaster such as man has never yet inflicted on mankind.

The Objective. What should be our near, and our remoter, objective?

Some people enjoy a comfortable feeling of dashing radicalism in saying that they stand for "total disarmament." That may serve as a slogan: but it is really too loose a phrase. One may speculate on what the world would be like when all those tiresome foreigners abroad, and all gangsters and other troublesome people at home, have been tamed, fed, and disarmed—a world where the lions will no longer want lambs for supper and there will be no lethal weapons any more except humane killers for keeping down rabbits or for warding off the more unmannerly of the Larger Cats. But that is not the world we are here concerned with.

I suggest that a rough but not useless definition of our remoter objective might well be this: The total abolition of all armaments in the world except such as may be genuinely required in special cases to prevent breaches of public order.

And I suggest, as a definition of our immediate objective, this : the very longest step towards that remoter objective that we can hope to induce our Governments to take, granted a reasonable amount of luck in the political circumstances and granted courageous leadership.

Scores of millions of people throughout the world would, now, I believe, rejoice if their own countries would, within the next ten years, get rid of all their armaments except such light weapons as may be required for helping to prevent slave-trading and piracy, for stopping frontier raids in troubled lands, and as an aid to the police in case of riot or disturbance. But with not many exceptions as yet, all those people desire this only on one condition : they must feel assured that other countries will loyally do likewise.

And that confident assurance they do not feel : they do not feel it as yet, for several reasons.

1. The most fundamental reason for this lack of confidence amongst peoples and Governments is that we have not yet created a comprehensive world community. The nations have not fully renounced the claim to be judge in their own cause ; they have not fully accepted provisions for stopping a breach of the peace if it happens ; they have not accepted either a pooling of national armaments or a controlled and supervised limitation of them under international authority. And that being so, we cannot arrive as yet at a common answer, genuinely accepted by all, to the primary question—"What are these armaments for ?" Until that question has been given a civilised answer, it is idle to hope for a fully civilised answer to the consequent question—"What armaments do we need ?"

It would be mere complacency to pretend that all the existing Governments and War Departments have ceased to regard their armaments as instruments of national policy, or that when they talk of "security," they are thinking only of contributions to the pooled security against war. The calculations are mixed. A long step has been taken away from the old anarchy ; but there are still plenty of Admiralties and War Offices and Air Ministries which are

encouraged to compete in the hope that they may become winners in the lunatic's race for armed supremacy. Once grant the assumption that each group of individuals called a nation may impose its own will, if it can, by force of arms, and there is no logical limit to any nation's armament except the taxpayer's endurance.

But it is no good laying down rigid, absolutely logical, conditions for action in such a matter as disarmament. It is no good saying that all disarmament conferences must be useless until all nations have wholly renounced, privately as well as openly, the claim to fight in the last resort if they cannot secure by peaceful means what they regard as bare justice. We cannot afford to wait for that day before making a beginning of general disarmament. We shall not be able to achieve, by a glorious chain of bonfires next Monday, the drastic disarmament that the world urgently needs and should attain. But something can and must be done at once to honour the disarmament pledges and to check the armament competition before present dangers become much worse. In short, whilst adequate disarmament will only be achieved as part of the organisation of a world community, it would be a gross error to maintain that no disarmament can be attempted until the world community has been fully organised. The "longest step in the right direction": we shall have to be content with that as our immediate objective: we shall have to reckon with the fact that in present conditions some Governments, perhaps all Governments, will participate in a disarmament conference with half an eye on the chance of wangling for their countries some relative superiority out of an economical readjustment of the handicaps in the armaments race.

2. A further reason for lack of confidence in the loyal application of general disarmament is, of course, the League's failure in the Far East to sustain the collective system, and the frank challenge of Japan. At the moment of writing, the Japanese armaments programme, which already imposes fantastic burdens on the Japanese taxpayers, is being greatly expanded; and in part as a reply to this, the naval

armaments programme of the United States is being greatly expanded also, within the limits fixed by the London Naval Treaty. It may prove to be the case, unfortunately, that even such inadequate limitation of naval armament as was secured by the London Treaty until 1936 will be destroyed within six months from now by Japan.

Even if Japan finds that she cannot afford to run amuck in this way, there remain plenty of causes for lack of confidence elsewhere, especially in Central Europe. As Chancellor of Germany, Herr Hitler has spoken words of admirable moderation. But only a few months before coming into office he was writing to Chancellor von Papen emphasising the importance of conserving unimpaired Germany's grievance as regards disarmament simply in order to be able to use it presently with full advantage as an argument for rearmament. His book *Mein Kampf*, written in 1924 but now being pressed on the attention of the German people in vast numbers, assumes the necessity of conquest beyond the Eastern borders of present-day Germany and says that "oppressed territories are not restored to the bosom of the mother country by flaming protest but by a sword that is able to strike. To forge this sword is the task of the leaders of domestic policy ; to secure that it be forged undisturbed and to seek comrades in arms is the task of foreign policy." Dr. Rosenberg, who has long been the main expositor of the foreign policy of the Nazi Third Empire, emphasised in his book, the *Future Way of German Foreign Policy* (1927), that Germany must expand in the East so far as may be necessary to feed a hundred million Germans, that an alliance should be made between Berlin and a separate Ukrainian State, and that abolition of the Polish State must be Germany's first demand. Responsibility may teach prudence to these men, now so powerful in Europe ; economic necessity may compel them to pursue a policy of great patience and moderation in the last stage of the disarmament conference ; but meanwhile the young men of Germany, nursed in the years of the hunger-blockade, are being trained wholesale in ways of war, and the children in the schools are being

taught hatred and revenge. Other countries, not least Great Britain, bear a heavy share of the responsibility for the despairing temper which has made these things possible ; but that does not alter the fact that we now see what many of us foresaw and laboured to avert,—a Germany so turned towards hatred, so careless of liberty, and so blinded to justice and mercy, as to have alienated those sympathies which had been laboriously re-won since the war and to be regarded now, not in France only but in England, in America, and even in Austria as a peril to the world's peace. Hitherto, a growing Anglo-American sympathy for Germany acted as a brake upon dangerous policies by Germany's neighbours. To-day, that brake is weaker than ever before in the last decade.

Plainly, then, the conclusion of the first World Disarmament Treaty must needs be an enterprise of extraordinary difficulty at the present juncture.

What Has Been Done. This is not the place for a detailed history of disarmament. But it is necessary to recall briefly three great treaties before coming to what has happened in the Disarmament Conference :

(a) *Versailles*. In the Fourteen Points on which the Armistice was based, President Wilson declared that there should be "adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." The disarmament imposed upon Germany and the other defeated Powers conforms to this principle. The Versailles Treaty expressly lays down that Germany's army may only be used for policing her frontiers and for maintaining internal order : and the provisions of the disarmament chapter of Versailles were intended to restrict her accordingly. All warships over ten thousand tons, all submarines, tanks, big guns, poison gas, naval and military aviation, were prohibited and abolished under Allied supervision ; conscription was prohibited, and the army was reduced from an enormous conscript army, with

huge reserves and a Great General Staff, to a long-service professional army of only one hundred thousand men, with no reserves and no General Staff. There was no limitation on expenditure ; in that one respect Germany was left free : but there was rigorous limitation of the numbers of the weapons she was allowed to retain. Even the smaller arms, such as rifles and machine guns, were limited to specified numbers, and the total allowance of artillery of all kinds was fixed at only 288 guns not exceeding four inches in calibre.

Thus it will be seen that Germany's disarmament was far-reaching, and that it included some provisions, at any rate, which could only be expected to work reliably if they were willingly and loyally assented to by the German people. The great error of French policy in the years since 1919 was that for too long French statesmen sought to build peace on the rotten foundation of an assumed inequality of status between Germany and France. As M. Maginot, French Minister of War, put it in 1931 : " All nations cannot be placed on the same footing. It is just and necessary that the aggressor should undergo a more severe limitation than the nations who have not committed, and who refuse to commit, aggression. There can be no question of going back on the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. With these reservations, France will do all she can to make the Disarmament Conference a success." Manifestly, the Disarmament Conference could not succeed if Europe was still to be divided into two groups—the " peaceable " nations, trusted with a voluntarily accepted disarmament treaty, and the " aggressive " nations, bound indefinitely by special penal fetters. Such an assumed division is deadly to any general disarmament and any League of Nations.

As for British policy, its fault, in the years after Versailles and especially after Locarno, was to have waited too long before acting courageously as mediators between Germany and France in regard to this great question of equality of rights. Year after year, when the Germans were collaborating in the preparatory work for the world disarmament treaty, the German spokesmen emphasised the crucial

importance of this issue : month after month during the Disarmament Conference itself, the Germans daily repeated the point : but it was not until December 11th, 1932, that, as will be seen below, the principle was conceded, subject to conditions about security. By that time Hitler was knocking at the door.

(b) *Washington.* Meanwhile, two notable instalments of voluntary limitation and reduction of armaments were made. First, there was the Washington Naval Treaty, which was coupled with important political agreements about the Pacific Area and which resulted in large reductions of the existing battleship forces of Britain, the United States and Japan. Amongst other results the treaty prevented the carrying out of colossal armament programmes in the three countries, and did much to prevent the further growth of the bitter feeling which had been aroused over the American discrimination against Japanese immigration ; it meant too that the United States virtually won recognition for the claim to be "second to none" at sea, and that Britain virtually renounced the dream of trying to keep its supremacy as against the United States (though the question of competition in cruiser and destroyer strength was left unresolved). It had some bad results also ; for it left a rankling sense of grievance in France, where the ratio of battleship strength allowed to France was regarded as inadequate ; and its provisions about limiting cruisers to a maximum of 10,000 tons led to a competition in the new type of large, heavily-gunned cruiser. But on the whole, the Washington Treaty was a very valuable beginning. It showed that limitation and reduction by voluntary agreement is practicable and can have a salutary effect in allaying political apprehensions and antagonisms.

(c) *London.* The London Naval Treaty of 1930 was another useful instalment, carrying further the limitation agreed on at Washington and preventing the bad feeling which had begun to grow between Britain and America

over the unsolved cruiser problem. There can be little doubt that, if the London agreement had not been made, the ill-will that arose out of the breakdown of the Coolidge naval conference in 1927 and the abortive Anglo-French negotiations in 1928 would have continued to fester and that a competition in cruiser building even more wasteful than that which has occurred might have ensued. The limits fixed for British and American cruiser numbers and tonnage meant a completion of that recognition of American "parity" with Britain which Washington began, and it had the wholesome effect that, when the United States set about increasing her cruiser forces to bring them nearer to the total of under-age tonnage and numbers permitted by the treaty, no one in England had any excuse for regarding the increase as a disturbing challenge. Big-Navy partisans in the United States and in Great Britain are exactly in accord in loathing the London and Washington treaties because they set limits on naval competition, and so deprive the navies of freedom to build *ad lib.*, each according to its own untrammelled estimate of its own "absolute requirements." But the historian will see in this limitation, so far as it went, a wise step taken before it was too late.

Unfortunately, the agreement was in large part unacceptable to France and Italy in so far as it was to apply to them ; and they stood out of the principal provisions, and continued a dangerous naval competition between themselves, which was not ended by some further negotiations in 1931. So the fruits of the London effort remain incomplete, and Britain, America, and Japan have in consequence kept a freedom to reopen the question of the limits fixed for them.

The Draft Disarmament Treaty. Now turn to Geneva. As we have already seen, the Geneva Protocol in 1924 was to have had as its consequence and as a condition for its operation the holding of a Disarmament Conference in 1925. When that failed, the League was still under obligation, by Article VIII of its Covenant, to go on with the disarmament enterprise ; it had to fulfil the pledge given

there to "formulate plans" for armament reduction "for the consideration *and action* of the several Governments," and in doing so it had to take into account the principle, recognised by its Members in the opening words of Article VIII, "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national¹ safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

So the League, after various attempts and explorations, convened the Preparatory Commission for the World Disarmament Conference. This began in the Spring of 1927 and did not end its preparation of a Draft Treaty till the end of 1930. In February 1932, the Conference at last met, and had before it this laboriously prepared draft.

It cannot be said that the Draft was a good document. It did embody answers to some important questions never before so studied, which had to be cleared out of the way ; and it was in many respects a better text than had seemed likely at many times during its drafting ; but it left unsolved, indeed untouched, some of the most important of all the problems of disarmament, and some of its main provisions were not merely imperfect but ludicrously inadequate. For instance, as regards the material of land war—the guns and tanks, etc., which had been abolished or drastically limited in Germany's case—it said not a single word, except that expenditure thereon should be separately limited ; and expenditure was just the one field in which Germany had been left free. It is not surprising that such a provision was regarded by the Germans as no better than a mockery of the general disarmament that they had a right to look for from the rest of the world.

The Conference. The first stage of the Conference disclosed a general agreement in words to take the draft as a basis for the final treaty—a basis which would require

¹ Note that, whereas the Covenant speaks of "national safety" as the criterion, the terms of Armistice spoke of "domestic safety," and that was the principle on which Germany was disarmed.

radical additions and amendments. Actually, however, the bulk of the early draft has not played an important part in the discussions of the Conference, and much of the ground covered before has been covered again and yet again. The first discussions also showed widespread agreement on this principle—that disarmament was to be sought by stages, not by sudden and total abolition of all the national armaments at once ; and that such piecemeal disarmament, besides helping towards the full honouring of the pledges and the lightening of the burdens, could be so directed as to reduce very greatly the danger of a sudden, fully-equipped, smashing attack. It could thus act as a brake on war-making and give a better chance for success of the world's methods of peace-keeping.

It was evident that there were two ways in which this objective could be achieved ; by limiting and reducing the quantity of all the armaments which might be retained and so far as possible limiting their quality and type ; and by selecting for total abolition or specially drastic treatment certain weapons which would be likely to give to an attacker a crushing advantage over a defending State.

Both methods were employed in the Peace Treaties. The armaments allowed were limited in number and type, and, as we have recalled, all the major weapons of modern attack were prohibited. This was done for the avowed object of rendering impossible a renewal of what the Allies called Germany's "policy of military aggression" ; and though it may be true that the Allied experts, in selecting the weapons to be prohibited, were chiefly concerned to reduce the armed power of Germany by the least easily evaded means, it is also certain that they did enormously restrict what is loosely called the power of attack. As Sir John Simon said, these weapons were selected "beyond all question . . . because they were regarded as arms singularly calculated to assist attack against national defence."

The Conference, then, was in general agreement on this principle, which became known as "qualitative disarmament." The idea is reasonable enough, though it is easy

to make it look silly, and the Conference certainly handled it in such a way as to land itself into a ludicrous mess. It asked the technical experts to report which weapons should be regarded as "most specifically offensive," most dangerous to civilians, etc. ; and the experts, faced with the task of answering questions which were still essentially political and which had not yet been answered by the statesmen, sent in reports which were for the most part simply a catalogue of contradictory views. Each expert claimed that his pet weapon was "defensive" and must be acquitted, but that the weapons of the others were the very devil. The English Admiral declared that capital ships were "more precious than rubies to those States which possess them" and were almost always used purely defensively, but that submarines might perhaps be a danger to civilians ; whereupon the French Minister of Marine rushed to the defence of the submarine, claiming that it was really the most innocuous of all weapons to civilians, that it must be retained to "introduce an element of mystery, of the unknown, at sea," that it might be the support of the righteous," and was the "poor man's weapon" against the overweening power of those with great naval strength.

Meanwhile, the sands of German patience were running out ; the Tardieu Government in France had fallen and the French delegation at Geneva had not yet been effectively replaced ; conversations between a few of the chief delegates proceeded in private ; but public opinion outside was becoming more and more troubled and impatient. The moderate Government of Dr. Brüning in Germany fell, before Brüning had been given a single concession to take home. He had offered to accept voluntarily all the limitations of Versailles and more, and to scrap Germany's famous pocket battleships, provided only that the others would disarm on the same principles themselves ; there could be no more of the Versailles discrimination between sheep and goats : but the burning question of equality of rights—not, be it noted, equality of numbers but equality of treatment—had never been frankly faced and discussed.

On June 22nd, whilst the secret conversations between Britain, France and the United States were proceeding, President Hoover suddenly startled the world with his proposals, "cutting through the brush" of the long discussions, and calling for the abolition of about one third of the armaments of the world. In particular, he offered, as part of a general agreement, abolition of all tanks (of which the United States alone had 924), all heavy mobile guns, all bombing aircraft, and all chemical war, and of one third of the existing capital ships allowed under the London Treaty. The President's move was ardently welcomed by public opinion in England and America and elsewhere; but the British Government's reply, whilst ostensibly cordial, amounted to a flat rejection of the bulk of the plan. For example, instead of accepting abolition of five out of the fifteen existing capital ships, Britain was said to want *more* disarmament; and it was proposed therefore that all the existing ships should be retained, and that an agreement should be made forthwith permitting their replacement at a lower tonnage than the present maximum of 35,000 tons. The peace-movement here and in America naturally pointed out that this did not really represent more disarmament but much less; it was indeed the worst of all possible courses from the standpoint of disarmament, since it would commit the world forthwith to a new and ruinously costly programme of replacement of these monstrous ships, instead of giving at least a chance of future agreement on their non-replacement.

The private discussions were resumed, Italy and Germany being left outside "on the mat." The Germans were getting increasingly restive about their equality claim, the more militaristic von Papen Government being now in power; but nothing was done to meet them.

Then came the publication of the Resolution of July 23, 1932, which ended the first phase of the Conference's work. It had been drafted by the British, French, and American delegates, with the collaboration of M. Benes of Czechoslovakia, and these three Great Powers insisted that it

must stand or fall as a whole, being the result of a "complicated series of interrelated concessions" between themselves. It was a deplorable document. It began with certain admirable affirmations of principle, which if thoroughly applied would involve a large reduction of armaments such as had been contemplated in the earlier proposals of Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain and the United States; but it went on to include no figures and no definite decisions as to specific reductions or as to the principal issues. In some respects, as for instance in its reference to "substantial reduction" as distinct from mere limitation of armaments, it marked an advance beyond the position reached in the Draft Convention with which the Conference began; it admitted the principle of direct limitation of the material of land war, and indicated a move forward as regards reduction of the numbers in the armies. But taken as a whole, it was rightly regarded as a profoundly disappointing outcome of the six months' work.

Forty-one States voted for it (as being the best that could be got through at that time in view of the attitude of Britain and France); eight States, including Italy, abstained from voting, and Italy protested against its entire inadequacy; two States, Germany and Russia, voted against it. The Russian delegate, who had persistently tried to improve it by amendments so as to bring it up at least to the standards of the Hoover proposals, but who had been defeated by the opposition of the American and other delegates in every amendment, got in the last withering comment as he voted; "I vote *for* disarmament, *against* the Resolution."

As for Germany's vote, her delegate said that she wanted not less disarmament but much more. He had previously explained that unless the principle of equality were recognised, Germany could not undertake to continue her collaboration in the work. So Germany broke away.

Then followed an exchange of notes between Britain, France, and Germany. They were faced now by a situation which ought never have been allowed to arise—a situation

obviously perilous, and one for which France, and in lesser degree Britain and in some degree America too, bore a heavy responsibility. They had presented to Hitler in Germany the best of all possible weapons for *Mein Kampf*, a perfectly good grievance. When Sir John Simon at Geneva deprecated the "introducing" of the equality issue "at a quarter past six on the last day" of the session, he was regarded as adding insult to injury, for the subject had been the theme of every German spokesman daily since the Conference began, and for years before that. And when the British Government followed this up by a Note, on September 18th, which began in a tone of superior reproof, German opinion was infuriated and blinded to the real concessions contained in the latter part of the Note. Hitler was thus powerfully reinforced; the position of the moderates in Germany was gravely weakened; the danger grew that the Conference would result in an approach towards equality being made not by levelling down on the part of the heavily-armed States but rather by levelling up in Germany.

In November came two new and important disarmament plans, French and British. The British plan at last recognised explicitly the principle of equality of treatment and the French virtually did so.

On December 11th the effort to pull the Great Powers together for a further stage of the Conference mercifully succeeded; a Five Power declaration was made, by Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and America, that one of the guiding principles of the Conference should be the granting to the disarmed Powers of "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations." It was also proposed that there should be a "renunciation of force"—in effect an extension of the Kellogg Pact—for the European States. Thus equality of rights was formally recognised at last by the States most directly concerned. So Germany returned to the Conference: but Hitler had got his reinforcements.

On January 27th, 1933, General von Schleicher, who had succeeded Herr von Papen as Chancellor, declared

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that Germany was returning to the Conference "in order to achieve within the shortest time the conclusion of a disarmament convention which would create equal security for everybody through the disarmament of the highly armed States. Germany's disarmament plan of February 18th, 1932, has shown how this aim should be achieved. (Thus Schleicher was still supporting the Brüning plan.) "It is our fundamental right to demand that any decisions of the Conference should apply to us without limitation ; there can be no question of distinguishing between the rights of those who have won and those who have lost the World War."

On the very next day, an intrigue against von Schleicher succeeded : he fell, and Hitler stood at the door. March came : and the British Government submitted a new Draft Convention, on which the subsequent work of the Conference has been based. (See below.)

Herr Hitler was now Chancellor of Germany, and the first effect on the German delegation at Geneva was to stiffen its critical attitude. Mr. Roosevelt's Presidency had been inaugurated, and the effect on the American delegation was to deprive it for a while of all initiative. The French Government, under the liberal direction of M. Daladier, showed no violent and obvious reaction, but its opposition to the German thesis was naturally stiffened. The Japanese Government, having just been arraigned by the League and having given notice of withdrawal from the League, stiffened its opposition to disarmament and increased its naval programme. The British armament estimates showed an increase, and it became evident that American naval building would be expanded in answer to Japan. Deadlock was soon reached, owing chiefly to Germany's opposition to proposals for standardisation of the European armies. A complete breakdown was imminent.

The Roosevelt-Hitler Compromise. At this point, in mid-May, President Roosevelt intervened with a notable

message. Amongst other proposals, he suggested what amounted to a world-wide pact of non-aggression : and he declared that the ultimate objective must be the abolition of all the so-called " aggressive " weapons, of which he specified four, in particular, viz., war-planes, tanks, heavy mobile guns, and poison gas. He said there were " three steps to be agreed upon at the present discussions." (1) To take now the first step, as broadly outlined in the British Draft Convention ; (2) " to agree upon the time and procedure for taking the following steps " ; (3) to agree that, while the " following steps " are being taken, " there shall be no rearmament."

This was widely understood to mean that the President urged agreement now on the " time and procedure " for the abolition of the aggressive weapons, such as military aircraft. Two days later, Chancellor Hitler, replying in the Reichstag, took the President's offer in that sense. He offered to forego any claim to rearm now in these weapons " if, during the five years " (five years was the time-limit he proposed) " other nations likewise destroy theirs."

Could not the Conference be saved from breakdown on the question of equality, and from defeat owing to rearmament, by means of this Roosevelt-Hitler compromise ? Why should not Britain and France join in agreeing now to abolition within a fixed time-limit—five years, or even ten—of all those weapons which they had prohibited for Germany ? For a long while past, that policy had been urged by the peace-movement. Now Mr. Norman Davis, for America, declared at Geneva that " while the United States is not bound by the provisions or the implications of the (Peace) Treaties, I have no hesitancy in saying that it is the will of the American people, interpreted by President Roosevelt, to join with the other Powers in disarming down to that (the German) level, and that the United States Government is prepared to exercise its influence to bring this about, not by theoretical statements of good intentions, but by decisive and progressive reduction of armaments

through international agreement." The objective, he emphasised, is to get, "as soon as possible, through successive stages, down to the basis of a domestic police force." Unfortunately, he made no specific proposal for an agreement now on ultimate abolition of such weapons as military aircraft within a fixed period : he did not crystallise the Roosevelt-Hitler compromise.

Perhaps history will find that that statement indicated the last moment when this Conference might have been rallied into surmounting the obstacles in its way, by a Franco-British acceptance of the Roosevelt-Hitler compromise. The British delegate gave a very cordial welcome to the Roosevelt message : but there was no one now to respond, as Lord Balfour had responded twelve years before to the surprise-offer made by Mr. Hughes at the Washington Conference, with a courageous and far-seeing acceptance of the proposals in principle.

Before the second stage of the Conference ended, Germany and America followed up the Roosevelt and the Hitler pronouncements by two important advances. The Germans withdrew their previous opposition to proposals about standardisation of armies : and the United States made the notable declaration about conference in time of crisis, to which reference has been made in the previous section and in Chapter IV.

Then came adjournment, during the Monetary and Economic Conference in London. The second phase of the Disarmament Conference had ended, in a world heavily oppressed by apprehension and disillusion and suffering still from the unparalleled economic depression with hardly any hope that this would be relieved by the ill-prepared Governmental Conference in London. Mr. Henderson, as President of the Disarmament Conference, still holding unshaken to his determination to win a substantial instalment of general disarmament out of this long effort, now set out on a tour of the European countries in an attempt to clear the way for the next stage of the Conferences by private negotiations. To many, this

attempt, most gallant as it was, seemed unlikely to succeed.

That is the position, when these pages are written. The London Conference has adjourned, having, so far as the "Intelligent Man" can see, failed almost totally so far. Mr. Henderson has finished his tour. In Germany the challenge of rearmament (and, it seems, actual rearmament in secret) grows stronger. France and Italy have been competing in a naval armaments race, the immediate naval building programmes of Japan and the United States will cost nearly £100 millions, and the average annual expenditure on America's naval building for the next three years promises to be treble what it was during the past decade. The danger of a breakdown even of the existing limitations on naval building is serious. Defeatism is widespread, and there are some, even amongst the keen workers for world peace, who now suggest that disarmament must be put into cold storage for the present.

What will happen when the Disarmament Conference meets again on October 16th, and what should the "Intelligent Man" do about it?

The Main Objectives. Let us first estimate, in the light of the foregoing summary of recent events, what are the main requirements which ought to be fulfilled by the first World Disarmament Convention. And then let us see how far these requirements are likely to be met if a Convention is concluded on the lines of the British Draft. Five requirements are, I suggest, indispensable :

- (1) *comprehensive limitation* : we must prevent armament competition ;
- (2) *substantial reduction* : so as to honour our pledges, lighten our burdens and reduce our dangers ;
- (3) *no Rearmament* : a disarmament treaty which resulted in rearmament would be a mockery of the world's hopes and a peril to the world's peace ;
- (4) *Collective Security* against war and war's equivalent,

and against evasion of disarmament. Reliable guarantees for the restraint of a peace breaker, and for thorough control and supervision of the fulfilment of the disarmament treaty, are indispensable if such a treaty is to be generally accepted ; and the provisions for disarmament and for security must be so timed and co-ordinated that at all times the community will have ample resources to restrain a violator of its code of peace-keeping ;

- (5) *Equality of Rights*, in a treaty freely accepted and loyally applied. If the principle of discrimination were to be maintained, as at Versailles, free acceptance and loyal application of the World Treaty would be unattainable : reliable general disarmament must rest on willing collaboration for a common purpose.

The British Draft Convention. How far does the British Draft Convention as it stands (in September 1933), seem likely to fulfil these five requirements ?

To begin with, here is a summary estimate of the whole Draft. It does, I think, attempt as no previous Draft has done, to meet all five requirements in some degree in one Convention. In some respects it is gravely defective : it is inadequate in its provisions about security and control, it fails to provide now, as it should, for ultimate abolition within a fixed period of certain major weapons such as military air-craft, and it perilously implies a measure of rearmament. But it does include, with some hope of acceptance, proposals which go substantially beyond the position previously taken by the most reluctant Powers ; and it would, if accepted and loyally applied, be a really valuable step, though a short one, away from arms competition and along the road of progressive demilitarisation. It ought to be strengthened by amendment ; but if it were rejected outright, the consequences would almost certainly be disastrous for the world.

Now, to substantiate this summary estimate, let us

examine one by one the sections of the British Draft Convention. It is worth doing this, although the text of the Draft as it now stands may be radically amended : for the Draft can serve as a row of pegs on which to hang discussions of all the main contemporary questions of disarmament, and it affords the best indicator of the positions actually reached up to date. As laymen, most of us are naturally inclined to say : " Why should we bother to think about these technical controversies about tons and guns ? " But the fact is that the layman has an important part to play in the decisions about the broad issues, which are political as much as they are technical ; unless and until the layman, the " Intelligent Man," gets a grasp of the substance of these issues the technical expert is likely to have excessive influence on the decisions reached. It would be a mistake to assume that, if we get down to consideration of precise questions about whether great battleships should be replaced or whether bombing aeroplanes should be retained, we must inevitably get lost in a forest of details or must inevitably be blind to the main factors necessary for reasonable judgment.

I. Security. The first Part of the Draft Convention, headed " Security," declares that any breach, or threat of breach, of the Kellogg Pact may be made the occasion for *consultation* to preserve peace or determine the peace-breaker. We can all welcome that so far as it goes ; but it may be regretted that it refers only to the Kellogg Pact and not to the proposed world-wide engagement against resort to force. Great Britain, who proposed the No-force Pact for Europe, has opposed its wider extension.

The proposal for a *definition of aggression*, referred to in the preceding section, has been accepted by the majority of the Security Committee of the Conference, and has already been adopted in treaty form by a number of European States. It is to be hoped that British opposition will not prevent general acceptance of something of the kind, perhaps in simpler form.

Provision may also be made by certain countries for

special *machinery to establish the fact of aggression* : and further provisions are contemplated in the British draft for the inclusion of *regional pacts of mutual assistance* on the lines of Locarno, with some additions.

If these new engagements are accepted, and if the Convention on *Financial Assistance* and on *Means of Preventing War* are brought into effect, together with the amendments for harmonising the Covenant and the Pact, then the world's provisions for collective security against war, both positive and negative, will be substantially increased. And as will be seen below, there are other important ways in which this security can now be promoted.

It may be thought that, with all these contributions from various sources towards security, and in view of Britain's guarantees given at Locarno, there is nothing more for Britain to do as regards security. But the contrary view is widely held in Europe, partly because of British policy in the Sino-Japanese case and because of the attacks in England, by isolationists and others, on the whole principle of sanctions and collective repression of war, and it should always be remembered, too, by Englishmen and by Americans, when thinking of European anxieties about security, that they have not the personal memory of such a wound as was suffered by the Frenchman of Nancy or Lille, the Pole of Warsaw, or the people of Belgium, through the invasion of their country and the destruction of their homes. It would undoubtedly help enormously now, if the British Government would make plain in an unequivocal way that it does mean "loyally and effectively" to honour the engagement of Article XVI of the Covenant, within the limits allowed by her armaments and her geographical position. That is an engagement by which we are already bound : it may seem strange that anything could be gained by reaffirming it : but if our engagement is now regarded with diminished confidence, we have ourselves to thank for this in large measure. If we do not offer such a contribution to negative security, then it becomes all the more imperative that we should contribute

more energetically to positive security, e.g. by accepting radical measures of control and periodic supervision of the Disarmament Treaty and of arms manufacture and traffic.

2. Men. The second Part of the British Draft Convention begins with a section on "effectives," i.e. the personnel of the armed forces.

To appreciate the purpose of this part of the British Draft, it is necessary first to understand what were the peculiar difficulties to be surmounted.

Hitherto, the only limitation on armies has been that imposed compulsorily on four Powers under the Peace Treaties ; and it has proved extremely difficult to reach agreement on voluntary limitation or reduction, especially as regards the armies of Continental Europe. For, besides the obvious political difficulties, there has been a special technical difficulty ; these European armies are so differently constituted as to defy exact comparison, so that there has been no basis on which limitation could easily be founded. Germany, for instance, has a professional army of 100,000 men, highly trained and with a very long period of service ; she has no reservists which would enable her rapidly to expand her forces in war-time, but she has very large irregular forces, unofficially or officially organised. France, on the other hand, has both a professional long-service army and a conscripted, short-service army ; she has no irregular forces but she has very large reserves of men who have undergone regular military training. Thus the French and German armies were so little comparable that it was wellnigh impossible to find a basis for limitation or for progressive reduction, or to apply the principle of equality of treatment. This difficulty is radically dealt with in the British Draft, in this way. The armies stationed in continental Europe are to be *standardised* as regards organisation, all of them being enlisted for *short-service*. In general, the period of service will be *eight months* only.

Thus there would be no more long-service army in Germany or in France (except such limited numbers as would

have to be allowed in both cases to maintain a permanent framework for the army, and except, in France's case, the troops which are to be sent overseas for Colonial service). There would be only one type of army on the European mainland, with a standard period of service ; the armies would be comparable, and so the way would be clear for limitation and progressive reduction of numbers.

Unofficial forces are to be prohibited altogether. The permitted numbers may be recruited either by voluntary enlistment or by conscription.

The British Draft boldly suggests the actual numbers to which these standardised armies should be limited. France, Germany, Italy, and Poland would be limited to 200,000 men each for troops stationed in Continental Europe : but France would be allowed an additional 200,000 for her overseas Empire, and Italy 50,000 ; Russia would have 500,000 ; Roumania 150,000 ; Czechoslovakia and Jugo-Slavia 100,000 ; Spain 170,000 ; and so on. What chance is there of these proposals being accepted and how do they answer, so far as they go, to the four tests we suggested at the outset ?

(1) Firstly, *limitation* would be applied, where no limits have ever yet existed. That would be a very great gain. Incidentally, the principle of *universal* compulsory military service would be modified : for the conscript army of France would have to be limited and reduced to the figure specified in the Treaty. (Such reduction to a predetermined figure can easily be made, and is now made in a number of countries, either by means of stiffened medical tests for recruits or by a system of ballot.)

(2) Secondly, the plan should effect, on balance, a substantial *reduction* of the numbers of armed men in Europe, a very substantial *reduction* of the period of service, and consequently an important *reduction* of the means of striking a sudden blow with highly-trained men.

On the one hand, the armies of the heavily-armed Powers would be substantially reduced in numbers. That of France, for instance, would come down from 651,000 to 400,000 : that of Italy from 415,000 to 250,000 : that of Russia from

562,000 to 500,000 : that of Poland from 266,000 to 200,000, and so on.

On the other hand, the official armies of the partially-disarmed Powers would be increased in numbers. That of Germany would go up from 100,000 to 200,000 ; that of Hungary from 35,000 to 60,000 ; and so on. But this increase would be more apparent than real if the Treaty were faithfully applied ; for the enormous irregular military forces which now exist in Germany and in Hungary would have to be suppressed, in so far as they are not included in the regular army. At present the limits fixed in the Peace Treaties are unreal.

Thus it appears on the basis of such rough calculation as is possible to a layman, that the numbers of men actually under arms, and also the numbers of those who undergo some kind of military training, would on balance be reduced. It must be recognised, however, that, even if such provisions about the unofficial forces and about the military training of youth, are now accepted by Germany, Italy and the rest, their thorough application can hardly be expected until some years have passed and until confidence has begun to revive. In Germany the situation is now such that it will be extremely difficult for any Government, whatever its good-will, quickly to put through effectively a plan which involves real subordination and suppression of the huge auxiliary forces which exist. Under present conditions there is no sign of Germany being encouraged by its Government to tread this path : on the contrary, every possible step is being taken to extend military education to the youth of Germany and to stimulate exasperation. We may see the Disarmament Conference break upon this rock. If it does so break, we shall have some share of responsibility for the temper which has made these things possible. And Hitler's share will be tremendous.

(3) Let us assume then that this part of the plan would satisfy our suggested tests as to limitation, reduction, and *no rearmament*, if it were loyally applied. Of course, it needs completion ; figures have yet to be inserted for Britain,

America, and Japan, amongst other countries, and Japan's case may present serious difficulties.

(4) As for *security*, the plan should make a valuable contribution, by reducing the power to strike a sudden blow with highly trained men. But this gain would have to be discounted if the reduction of man-power were to be offset by an increase of machine-power. This is a point of great importance ; for the War Departments tend nowadays to rely more and more on mechanisation, rather than on numbers of men, for their killing-power.

(5) Undoubtedly, the plan would make a contribution of outstanding importance to the full application of the principle of *equality* of treatment. By making the European armies much more nearly comparable, it would effect an indispensable clearing of the way for further scaling down in future. The armies of Germany and France would still be very dissimilar in many respects ; that cannot and need not be avoided. France would have, unlike Germany, a vast reservoir of coloured troops just across the Mediterranean, in addition to her European army and available as a supplement to it ; and Germany may continue to criticise the plan on this ground. France, too, would still have enormous reserves of men who have been through regular military training, and the plan makes no attempt (rightly as I think) to compute and allow for the military value of these reserves. Here again Germany may continue to criticise, though the plan concedes so much of what she has previously contended for that she would be on weak ground in doing so. As for Germany herself, she will have huge numbers of men who have undergone some kind of military training outside the regular army ; the Draft makes no attempt (wisely as I think) to allow for the military value of these forces, except in so far as they will be included in the permitted army of the future. France may be critical of the provisions about this. Probably the best thing that could happen in the circumstances would be a Franco-German understanding that the one incalculable factor, France's "trained reserves," and the other

incalculable factor, Germany's irregular forces, should be written off one against the other.

To sum up, I conclude that this part of the Draft does satisfy our five suggested tests as well as can be expected in the circumstances ; and that we should do well to work for its general *acceptance*, its due *completion*, its loyal and forbearing *application* during the difficult years of transition that must follow, and the avoidance of such mechanisation as would stultify some of its chief advantages.

3. **Material.** Next in the Draft comes a long section on material of war ; and this is very much less satisfactory.

(A) *Land Armaments—Guns.* The Draft provides for *abolition* of all mobile land guns over 155 millimetres (about 6 inches). These are to be destroyed by stages. Guns over 4½ inches (which is approximately the limit fixed at Versailles) may *not be replaced* but may be retained without limit of numbers. (It is not stated in the Draft whether the four Powers now legally debarred from having 6-inch guns might henceforth have them : presumably they might.) Within these limits of calibre, there would be *no limit on numbers*. "Coast defence guns" are to be limited to 16 inches calibre, that being the size of the biggest naval guns.

This scheme represents a considerable advance beyond the position reached when the Conference began, but it is still deplorably inadequate for the real purpose of disarmament.

First, the good points. It does provide for actual destruction of the heaviest guns. If that be accepted, the principle will have been admitted, the process will be begun. It is a sound principle, far preferable to proposals for keeping the existing guns under League of Nations labels, in the countries where they now are, or in some "castle in Spain."

Secondly, it does offer a prospect of getting rid of all artillery over 4½ inches in course of time : and that would mean an immense strengthening of defensive power in relation to an attacker.

At this point, though, the reader may be saying to himself, "How can you hope to prevent the building of guns of the types prohibited if a war begins?" The answer is, "Of course, it is very likely indeed that all such prohibitions would break down in war-time: the war itself would be due to the breaking of a prohibition. But that is no reason for abandoning what we are trying to do, which is to reduce the chances of war beginning. We want to reduce the danger that War Departments may gamble on the chance of a sudden blow, being fully-equipped to strike. If we can prevent the amassing of the heavy guns in peace-time, we can hope to gain time—in this case a very substantial time—between the crisis and the crash. Big guns cannot be improvised in a week, or even in many months, on a scale adequate for war, and they cannot be hidden easily like rifles or machine-guns. Thus, it is a real gain for the true purposes of progressive disarmament if we can get rid of the guns in peace-time."

But now turn to the defects of the plan. It does not abolish all guns over $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches; it does not even provide for an agreement now as to their abolition within a fixed period; it leaves in existence, without limit of duration or of numbers, all the existing 6-inch guns which may be possessed by countries other than Germany, Hungary, etc. That means that unless Germany is to be allowed to re-arm with 6-inch guns, she will be left for an indefinite period in the position of being unable to reply, if attacked, to artillery bombardment by her neighbours; for their guns will out-range hers. It is difficult to believe that Germany in her present temper will be content to accept such a striking inequality of treatment. On the other hand it will no doubt be extremely difficult to win French consent to any such agreement. The failure to limit numbers is very important, especially as regards the 6-inch guns. The development of the technique of modern artillery bombardment in preparation for an attack has tended, I understand, to favour the use of large numbers of 6-inch guns rather than the use of relatively small numbers of

heavier guns. The number of guns up to 4 inches which were allowed to Germany by the Versailles Treaty was limited to 288 ; if it was technically practicable to do that, it must be technically easier to limit the numbers of 6-inch guns which are rather less easy to hide. A third point of importance is that, as we shall see later, no provision is being made for separate limitation of expenditure on the material of land war. When the Draft Convention of 1930 was concluded, it was supposed that such separate limitations would be practicable ; and that was in fact the only method of limitation proposed for land material. If that idea has to be abandoned for technical reasons, it becomes all the more necessary to limit the numbers of the 4-inch guns that may be built.

One other objection must be noted. No provision is made to prevent mobility of the guns labelled "Coast defence guns"; any gun, it seems, can have a calibre up to the enormous maximum of 16 inches, provided that it is glossed as coastal, and there is nothing to prevent its being moved about the moment war begins, if not sooner. This is a provision which was denounced by the Dutch and Swedish delegates, when it appeared in the Resolution of July 1932, as "Not only weak but positively dangerous." The best way to get over the difficulty would of course be to get rid of the very big guns on the warships which the coastal defence guns are meant to reply to. But it seems that we cannot hope for that yet, largely owing to Britain's insistence on the replenishment of great capital ships. Failing this, the best expedient, though manifestly unsatisfactory, would presumably be a limitation of the numbers of the coastal gun thus permitted and any technical measure that may be possible to render their mobility more difficult.

Tanks. The Draft limits the maximum weight of tanks to sixteen tons ; and the British Government has subsequently made the important statement that it would no longer oppose limitation of the number of tanks. The definition

of tanks shows that, in addition to the sixteen tons "unladen weight" there will be a large addition in respect of guns, etc., so that the total weight is likely to be not far short of twenty tons. The tanks over sixteen tons are to be destroyed by stages.

It is important that English readers should realise the isolation in which their Government stands in regard to retention of tanks. Only France and presumably Japan support this policy. The United States and at least twenty-two other countries have publicly proposed abolition. What is the case for retaining these weapons, which were prohibited for Germany? Lord Hailsham, as Minister of War, has defended the policy in the House of Lords. "Since the war," he said, "the kind of tank which is constructed and the purpose for which the tank is being constructed have both been very much changed, and at present the expert view of the usefulness of the tank is not so much as a heavy machine which can crush its way through an elaborate system of fortifications, but as a much lighter machine which will *enable the infantry to be conveyed to the suppression of machine-gun posts without undue loss of life.*" As for sudden smashing attack, Lord Hailsham added that "from that point of view the tank, of course, is of no use at all, because if it advanced against any prepared fortified position, such as now exist along the whole Eastern frontier of France, it would be annihilated and would be absolutely of no value."

It would be difficult to imagine a dictum more apt to the purpose of those in Germany who demand re-armament. For there are some frontiers which, unlike the French, have not got "prepared fortified positions" along their whole length: the frontier of Germany is one of these, for her fortifications were deliberately destroyed by Allied orders.

The Government's policy was further elucidated in the statement of November 17th, 1932, which said that "in a small voluntarily enlisted army like our own" the tank "contributes an essential compensation for lack of numbers and a *protection to human life* which it would be impossible to surrender." Did our Government overlook the fact that

the American army, which possesses 924 tanks, is small and voluntary too? Yet America has offered repeatedly to scrap the lot in the interests of qualitative disarmament.

The same declaration frankly declared that, as regards tanks for Germany, "in principle it is impossible to deny them the right to have a limited number." In effect, therefore, the British Government chooses the retention of tanks on both sides of the frontiers rather than the abolition of tanks on both sides of the frontiers; and it does this with the argument, officially and not ironically advanced, that these crashing instruments of destruction, so marvellously developed since the War, have now become "a protection to human life."

Machine-guns and Rifles. The most important of all weapons as a casualty producer in the Great War was the machine-gun; and machine-guns and rifles were rigidly limited for Germany in the Peace Treaty. It is however most unlikely in the circumstances that these limitations, difficult to enforce, have, in fact been observed. The Draft Convention of 1930 did make some provision for limitation of these smaller weapons, by means of limitation of expenditure on land material: but the British Draft omits even this form of limitation, and unless expenditure is limited in some way, the competition in this type of weapon will be left completely uncontrolled. The technical difficulty of making a reliable limitation of the numbers of such weapons is obviously considerable. If so, there is all the more reason for indirect limitation by means of expenditure.

Judged by our five suggested tests, this part of the British Draft is extremely unsatisfactory. It is most inadequate as regards limitations for the heavily-armed Powers, and would apparently wipe out the principle of limitation of numbers for the guns, etc., of the disarmed Powers. It involves some reduction, for the heavily-armed Powers, but far less, especially as regards tanks, than a great volume of opinion now demands. It implies a most dangerous measure of rearmament. It fails to contribute adequately

to security against smashing attack. And it violates the principle of equality of treatment.

(B) *Naval Material.* As regards naval armaments, the Draft seeks to do two things : to bring France and Italy within those limitations of the London Naval Treaty which they have not yet accepted, and to hold the naval armaments of the rest of the world for the time being, so that the whole position may be reviewed in 1935 without having been prejudiced in the meanwhile.

(a) *Capital Ships.* Take capital ships first. At present, Britain, the United States, and Japan are bound to build no more till 1936 at the earliest, and the matter comes up for discussion in 1935. These Powers have already built up to the total permitted to them by the treaties : but France and Italy are still free to build, within their quota, under the Washington Treaty of 1922, and France has lately started to build the *Dunkerque* as a reply to Germany's *Deutschland*. Under the new treaty as drafted, all the Powers, including Germany, would have to stay their hand till 1936, except that Italy might if she choose build one as a reply to France's *Dunkerque*.

Now there are four possible policies, broadly speaking, in regard to the capital ship :—viz. (1) abolition of the lot ; (2) abolition of some of them, coupled with agreement as to non-replacement ; (3) deferment of decision till 1935 ; (4) agreement now permitting replacement.

Of these four policies, by far the best from the standpoint of equality and true security and "no re-armament" would be the first. That is the policy proposed by Italy, Germany, Russia, Spain and various other countries.

The second policy, partial abolition, was substantially that proposed by President Hoover, who suggested the scrapping of five out of the fifteen now possessed by Britain and the United States.

The third policy, which is now proposed in the British Draft, has at least the merit of avoiding aggravation of

the situation for the present and gives a little more time during which we may hope to mobilise opinion against the folly of spending our resources in this perilous and unproductive way.

The fourth policy, which was that advocated by Great Britain up till a recent date, was by far the worst of the four from the standpoint of disarmament; for it assumed, beyond hope of subsequent escape, that such ships as battleships of 25,000 tons would be imposed on the world by a few wealthy Powers for generations ahead.

The British Draft now represents a slight improvement on this earlier position; for though it indicates no actual change of the policy of replacement, it does at least defer the fatal decision for a short while. A new naval treaty, would, under the plan, have to be worked out by the Permanent Disarmament Commission (see below), and if public opinion could be brought to bear sufficiently on the British Government in this interval, the greatest obstacle to abolition or non-replacement of warships over 10,000 tons might be removed.

Here again, even more than in the case of tanks, it is important that Englishmen should realise the certain consequences of this policy, before it is too late.

(1) *Technically*, there are very strong grounds indeed for the view that these weapons are obsolete: that they are unsuited for those purposes for which the existing fleets of the world, and of Britain in particular, may be used, and that a battleship offers a much-too-vulnerable target for air-attack: technically, it would be far better to allot what money is available for naval construction to the building of much smaller ships, better suited for whatever part this Commonwealth might have to play in case of war.

Moreover, to get rid of the huge warships is not merely to eliminate a weapon technically obsolete. What is far more important is that it reduces a powerful vested interest in war preparations.

(2) On *financial* grounds, this policy would be most damaging. After 1937 the British taxpayer would be called on to

foot new bills for replacement of capital ships of some 22,000 tons apiece, at a cost of some £6 millions or £7 millions each (spread over three years). If we replaced at the rate of two a year, this would mean £12 millions annually, on top of naval estimates which already amount to £50 millions. And other countries would be similarly burdened with unproductive expenditure.

Do not be deceived by the fallacious claim that to spend money in this way is fruitful since it gives employment. The battleship will be scrap-iron in twenty years ; it will yield no rent, but only a rivalry in battleships abroad ; whereas a slum cleared and rebuilt will give not only work but rents during all the twenty years and afterwards, and a precious return in decent conditions of living.

(3) Lastly, the policy of maintaining battleships is *politically* inane. Consider its effect on the policy of other countries. Germany, for instance, has offered to scrap all her pocket-battleships and to forego the right to build any more, provided, of course, that the others would level down likewise. Brüning offered that at the beginning of the Disarmament Conference, Hitler repeated it on May 17th, 1933, and the German delegate at Geneva repeated it on May 26th, 1933. If we insist on replacing ships at 22,000 tons, Germany will be free, as the Draft recognises, to do likewise after 1936. We should be deliberately throwing away Germany's sensible offer to disarm below the Versailles limits, and should be in effect inciting her to rearmament of a kind likely to exacerbate every political problem in the Baltic and elsewhere. What would be Poland's reaction ?

Or take the case of Italy. Italy offered to scrap all submarines, on one condition—that capital ships were simultaneously abolished. The British Government still professes anxiety to get rid of the submarine menace, which was not far from bringing this country to its knees in 1917, when submarines were far less developed than they are to-day. How can we expect that Italy, or France either, will forego the submarine if we do not forego these huge

ships. Take France's position. If we fail to make an adequate contribution to disarmament in this field where ours could be most substantial, how can we expect France to contribute generously in those respects in which France is strong. It may be said that Britain has already done a good deal of disarmament at sea and is limited now by the London Treaty in categories where France is still unlimited. That is true : we have most sensibly and profitably limited, and to some extent reduced, our navy in return for valuable limitations and reductions of other great navies. But France can claim that she has done a good deal of disarmament on land, without reciprocity, and has lately cut her war-service budget whilst we have increased ours. The cause of which disarmament forms part cannot be served by exploiting comparisons of this kind as an excuse for refusing to do any more.

As for America, President Hoover offered the scrapping of five out of the fifteen capital ships now possessed by Britain and the United States : and he said nothing about replacement when the age limit of the remaining ships is reached, presumably in the hope that, if only Britain would support him, an agreement on non-replacement might be reached. President Roosevelt has gone further ; the words of Mr. Norman Davis at Geneva, already quoted, affirm that " it is the will of the American people, interpreted by President Roosevelt, to join with the other Powers in disarming down to that " (the Peace Treaty) " level." America thus indicates that she would offer us the ultimate abolition of all warships over 10,000 tons. Why should we not cheerfully accept that offer, adding that we hope also to avoid replacement of warships of the 10,000 ton type ?

As for Japan, she has a militaristic régime at present : we know that she wants to increase her ratio of naval strength ; but we know too that she wants to reduce her armament expenditure. We need not assume that Japan would block the way alone, if Britain and America were to stand in 1935 for a policy of non-replacement and abolition by stages.

Politically, as well as technically, the great warships are obsolete. If we insist on their retention, we shall not merely be preventing the elimination of a costly and obsolete weapon, adding huge burdens to armament expenditure, maintaining a powerful vested interest in war, and inviting rearmament : we shall be indirectly blocking many other contributions to disarmament, on land and sea and in the air ; and we shall be showing ourselves blind to the implications of the new order of which the Covenant and Kellogg Pact are signs.

(b) *Cruisers and Destroyers.* Cruisers are dealt with in two categories. As for the larger ones, those with 8-inch guns, the plan would stop new construction for the present. The existing right of the United States to build three such ships would thus be suspended.

As for the smaller, 6-inch-gun, cruisers, and the destroyers, Britain, America and Japan would remain free to build each year their full programmes for replacement or new construction up to the limits already fixed by the London Treaty till 1936. France would for the first time be limited in this respect ; in the four years till the end of 1936 she might only lay down, for new construction, the amount that was authorised in her programme for one year, 1932, viz. : 34,300 tons. Italy would be limited to 27,173 tons for the same period. There are further provisions about building for replacement.

The plan is likely to be objected to by France on the ground that she will be limited, for the four years, to a programme designed for a single year. But, if France does press for an increase of her proposed quota, that is likely to reopen the question of the limitations fixed, provisionally, for Britain, the United States and Japan in the London Treaty.

(c) *Submarines.* As to submarines, France and Italy would be required, under the plan, to build none till the end of 1936 ; and France would have to limit her tonnage of

completed submarines (at present unlimited) so that it would not exceed x tons by that date.

As for Germany, she would not be free to build submarines at present, being precluded under the plan from building anything till the end of 1936 except for replacement purposes. But the qualitative limitations of Versailles, which prohibited submarines, would be removed ; so that in effect Germany would now be given the right to build submarines presently, subject to her leaving that right unexercised till 1936. Thus, in the coming negotiations on naval disarmament, Germany would take part as an equal, being free like the rest to threaten armament competition.

Yes, that admits the principle of rearmament. How else can the principle of equality of rights be applied ? Germany will negotiate as an equal, not bound still by penal fetters. She has offered again and again, through Hitler's mouth as well as Brüning's, to do without submarines altogether if others will do likewise. Hitler has offered a time-limit of five years. Britain, too, has repeatedly urged abolition of submarines ; so has America and other countries. Italy offered it, on condition that capital ships were simultaneously abolished. How can England expect to buy this advantage from France and Italy if she is not prepared to pay for it, e.g. by amending her policy on capital ships ?

The fact is, perhaps, that the British Admiralty are not now seriously apprehensive about the submarine menace : they assume that they have mastered it by new technical devices, such as the ray-detector for detecting the presence of a submarine ; and so they are reluctant to have what they would regard as a substantial price paid, to secure abolition of the submarine.

(C) *Air Material.* The Draft prohibits " bombing from the air (except for police purposes in certain outlying regions). "

It also requires the Permanent Disarmament Commission to devote itself immediately to working out " the best possible schemes providing for (a) the complete abolition of military

and naval aircraft, which must be dependent on the effective supervision of civil aviation to prevent its misuse for military purposes ; (b) alternatively, should it prove impossible to ensure such effective supervision, the determination of the minimum number of machines required by each High Contracting Party consistent with his national safety and obligations, and having regard to the particular circumstances of each country."

Meanwhile, aeroplanes capable of use in war are to be limited and reduced in numbers and in weight ; the numbers for the Great Powers being put at 500 each, plus a further 125 in "immediate reserve" ; and the weight being limited to the high figure of 3 tons (unladen), except as regards troop-carriers and flying-boats. Apparently, the war planes in excess of the permitted numbers need not be destroyed, but have only to be "put out of commission or otherwise disposed of by the end of the period of the present Convention." This represents a big advance beyond the obstructive attitude taken by France and Britain up till November 1932 : but it is still dangerously inadequate. Nothing short of an agreement now on abolition of all naval and military aviation within a fixed period, as indicated in the "Roosevelt-Hitler Compromise," can really meet the urgent need. It is an illusion to suppose that national safety can really be determined by the number of war-aeroplanes each country may possess. In thick weather, if not in clear, no amount of military aeroplanes can defend our great cities from devastating air attack : "It cannot be done," as Mr. Baldwin said, "and there is no expert in Europe who will say that it can. The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."

Nothing, nothing short of total abolition of the air-arm can really do what is needed. This is a new situation which mankind has now to face, a danger altogether different in scale and kind from any that was envisaged in 1918. In the whole war, when vast effort and resource was expended

on defence of the London area, less than one in 20 of the attacking aeroplanes which reached England were brought down. Even if, in the next war, 10 out of every 20 were brought down, what consolation would that be in face of the destruction that the remaining scores or hundreds of planes could wreak in an hour in the small area which includes one-third of all the resources of Great Britain and which houses in London alone seven million people? Almost all the Governments of the world now recognise that. Almost all desire abolition of the entire weapon. America and Russia are at one on this, Germany and France and Spain, and all the smaller European Powers. If Britain had proposed abolition (coupled with internationalisation of civil aviation at least in Europe), she could almost certainly have carried the entire Conference with her.

Even as matters stand, we are not very far from this position. Here are the words of Mr. Eden, at the Conference, on May 27th, 1933: "If, as we trust, the Permanent Disarmament Commission can work out some such scheme as is here outlined for the effective supervision of civil aviation, then before the period when the next Disarmament Conference meets, the total abolition of naval and military aircraft will be realised under the terms of the Draft Convention as it now stands." (That seems to be an optimistic reading of the actual text: but it expresses the British delegate's view.)

What stands in the way? Two obstacles in particular.

(a) *The Bombing Reservation.* First, there is the British reservation about bombing in "certain outlying regions" unspecified, for what are euphemistically described as "police purposes." This is supported now by the British Government alone against almost the entire world: it has the backing only of Siam and Iraq. The American delegate was amongst those who denounced the British reservation in impressive terms: France with her African Empire is against it too. And a great mass of opinion in Great Britain has expressed itself against the policy.

Certainly air bombing affords a cheap, relatively bloodless, and very efficient instrument for doing whatever terrorism can do in inaccessible lands. That is not disputed. Certainly, too, it breeds an enduring loathing and sense of wrong amongst its victims. And certainly, if England insists on retaining the weapon for use against helpless coloured peoples in peace-time or times of frontier affrays, others will claim freedom to retain it, in Africa and elsewhere, for the "policing" of their troubled territories. And certainly, if that happens, other peoples, not so helpless, will be affected : even those who are now helpless may become armed to strike from the air : the dark-skinned mortals may learn to hit back at the whites : and the whites, in Germany and elsewhere, will not easily be content to see their neighbours who have Imperial responsibilities going on making bombers and bombs, and training bombing pilots. To many people, the idea of prohibiting the bombing of the armed peoples in war-time whilst permitting the bombing of the helpless peoples in peace-time is morally repugnant. And those who do not share this view should recognise that the British Government stands for a policy repudiated by the almost unanimous judgment of the nations—a policy, too, which must prove perilous in the extreme to the life of our overcrowded centres of population.

In these circumstances, the British Government has given some indications which justify a hope of change of policy. Let us trust this will be done, and done not by provisions for retaining a national bombing force under special guarantees to the League but by accepting the unqualified prohibition of all bombing and bombers. That will presumably necessitate some modifications of policy, e.g. on the N.W. Frontier of India : it will mean some increased expenditure. That is a small price to pay.

(b) *Abolition of Air Forces.* But the bombing reservation is only a small part, not nearly the most important part, of the air question. What matters fundamentally is,

not prohibition of the act of bombing but removal of the means of air-warfare of all kinds.

Here is what we said to Germany at Versailles :

"The maintenance of air forces of any kind is forbidden. The total air force material which has so far been either in service or in reserve or in stock shall be destroyed, except those armaments which are to be incorporated in the quantities allowed for land and naval forces."

All dropping of bombs, etc., and all preparations therefore, was "forbidden without any exception."

Here is what Mr. Baldwin said to the House of Commons on November 10th, 1932 :

"I am firmly convinced myself and have been for some time that if it were possible the air forces ought all to be abolished ; but if they were, there would still be civil aviation, and in civil aviation there are potential bombers."

If we don't declare now for abolition of all air forces within five years or ten, Germany will certainly claim freedom to re-arm in this respect.

(c) *Civil Aviation.* But what about civil aviation? Clearly it must be controlled, either by internationalisation or by international control of a far-reaching kind. By far the simplest and best course would be internationalisation, at least in Europe to begin with. The plans for this have been worked out in considerable detail, and present, I believe, no serious difficulty apart from that of winning the consent of a few Governments—the British and the German—to the requisite measures.

This is needed for three reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to prevent abuse of civil aircraft (so far as prevention is possible by such means) for military purposes. Any such

measures will have to be supplemented, of course, by the education of a new social ethic in regard to the use of the conquest of the air.

Secondly, it is very important as a means of promoting the fuller use of aviation for civil purposes. At present, as the work at Geneva has proved, the development of air transport and mail services is fantastically hampered by national restrictions : this is a means of communication which far outranges all our old conceptions of travel based on the railway-train or the car, and which requires free access to at least a continent if it is to operate with anything like its full efficiency and economy.

At present all European air lines operate with the help of large subsidies, varying from 35 per cent to 90 per cent. Naturally, the Governments who pay the piper, want to call the tune, with military interests in mind.

Thirdly, internationalisation is becoming very important as a means of preventing the rise of a new imperialistic scramble for exclusive national air-routes and concessions.

(d) *Limitation of Air Forces.* If the internationalisation or control were not now agreed upon, in detail or in principle, there would, under the British plan, be a reduction and limitation of the existing air forces—a limitation which would give Britain numerical parity in air forces with France. The reductions of numbers shown in the air force returns would be substantial ; but apparently only a relatively small proportion of those excluded would be destroyed : the bulk of them would simply be “ put out of commission, or otherwise disposed of by the end of the period of the present Convention.” (Does that mean that they might be kept as a third reserve ?) Hydroplanes and transport planes would escape limitation by weight ; and only the heavy bombers, those over three tons, would be destroyed. (It is believed that this includes about 130 for Britain and 100 for France.)

Thus, the effect would be to keep all the military aeroplanes in being except the heaviest bombers, and to allow

of the unfettered development of air warfare within these limits so widely drawn.

(e) *An International Air Force.* A proposal has been pressed by the French Government that a League Air Force should be established. To entrust such a force to a League not yet all-inclusive would be a perilous enterprise, and the dangers of abuse are obviously great. There would be serious technical difficulties too, e.g. as regards station, and command, and personnel. But in this case the technical difficulties are very much less than in the case of an international land force; possibly they could be surmounted. Such a force ought to consist of fighters, not bombers; its purpose should be, not to employ reprisals (which the League ought not to touch) but to add an extra assurance against military use of civil aviation. (The modern fighting plane has a very great advantage over the relatively slow and cumbrous civil transport plane.) The League's force, stationed in a number of areas, would be in the nature of an armed international "flying squad" for preventive, not for penal, use.

If, for this price, it were possible to buy abolition of the national air forces, the creation of such a force might be a price worth paying. But with such a country as Russia still outside the League, the dangers would be very serious unless the control were in the hands of a body more widely representative than the League itself.

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To sum up, the one really adequate outcome of the Conference, so far as air disarmament is concerned, would be an agreement to abolish all air forces within a fixed period, allowing no rearmament. Coupled with this there should be internationalisation—or failing that, international control of a far-reaching character—of civil air transport. The creation of a small international air force of fighting planes, to prevent abuse of civil aviation, might perhaps be accepted.

4. **Chemical War.** The remaining provisions of the Draft, though very important, can only be briefly indicated here. The chapter on chemical war, embodying the results of the work of the Chemical Committee of the Conference with a few weakening changes, provides for prohibition of *the use and the preparation* of chemical, incendiary and bacterial war : and for supervision of the observance of these prohibitions, and for establishing the fact of their violation. The plan certainly represents a great advance on anything hitherto formulated with such authority. In particular, the prohibition of preparation as well as use is to be welcomed : that should be a real contribution to disarmament, not simply a regulation for the conduct of war.

The prohibition of preparation is unqualified, and applies to all preparations "in times of peace as in time of war." In order to enforce this, it is in particular prohibited to manufacture, import, export or possess "appliances or substances exclusively suited to chemical or incendiary warfare." Training for such war is prohibited also, but gas masks, protective experiments, and training are permitted exclusively for protection against the effects of such attack.

It is easy to see that such a scheme offers many loopholes for abuse, and it will probably be found to need amendments, when tested by experience ; it may be that international supervision or control of the chemical industry will have to be much extended. But the provisions for a Permanent Disarmament Commission and other measures of control offer a better hope than ever before that such a plan may be made to work reliably, as a means of preventing sudden chemical attack.

5. **Permanent Disarmament Commission.** A very important chapter deals with the control and supervision of disarmament by a Permanent Disarmament Commission at the seat of the League. It is to be composed of representatives of all the Governments adhering to the Convention (so that it will not be confined to League Members).

The duty of the Commission is defined as being "to

watch the execution of the present Convention." And it will also have to prepare the next stage of Disarmament, working out, for instance, the plan of control for civil aviation and the new naval treaty. Any party which makes allegations of infraction against another, or which has allegations made against it, can ask for an investigation on the spot, and the Commission will decide on this by a two-thirds majority. In addition, the Commission is entitled to make *periodic* investigations in regard to States which have made a special agreement to that effect. The Commission is entitled to have any person heard or consulted who is in a position to throw any light on questions at issue, and may take into account information from any "responsible source": but there is no provision about the immunity of witnesses from being penalised for giving information to the Commission.

Much might be said about this crucial question of internal control over the fulfilment of such a treaty, with the help of workers and organisations. A loyalty to the world community will not grow overnight, especially in such countries as Italy, or in Germany where the memory of the Allied Control Commission, which supervised the fulfilment of a very different and one-sided Treaty in the years 1919-1927, is a bitter one. Everything possible ought to be done to strengthen the idea of that larger loyalty, and to win freedom to uphold such a loyalty: the conception that it would be "high treason" to supply information of alleged breaches of the Convention to the world authority will have to be patiently broken down.

By working together for a period of years on the common task of supervision of the common treaty for the common good, it should be possible for the Commission to build up in time a new confidence—the most needed of all conditions for the next, 1938 inadequate stage of disarmament.

Among the proposals for improving the control, one suggestion is that a small committee of independent persons should be set up, in addition to this huge Permanent Commission of Government delegates—a body representing

unofficial public opinion, fully supplied with information, and entitled to submit suggestions to the Commission. Such a body, including representatives of Labour organisations, the peace movement, etc., might become useful.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of making the most stringent provisions for supervision and control, which can be applied all round, without offence, from the outset. In view of the rise of Hitlerism, there is all the more reason for believing that without this no treaty worth anything will be accepted by France. As M. Daladier, the French Premier, has said in this connection, "Security is Control." Even with such provisions, it is almost certain that France will not accept any large reductions of material unless they are timed for the later stages of the Treaty's life; the curve of material disarmament will have to be a flat one at the outset, steepening later on. In these circumstances, one of the most useful contributions that Britain and America could make to the success of the Treaty would be to press for, and to accept unconditionally themselves, *periodic* investigation on the spot by the Permanent Commission. Inspection ought not to be an abnormal and invidious occurrence but a matter of course; it should be regarded as a means of establishing each nation's good faith and so contributing to that growth of confidence which is a necessary condition of the general security. If inspection has to wait until some Power makes a charge of infraction against another, it will inevitably be conducted under the worst conditions, in an atmosphere of exasperation and distrust.

6. "Derogations." If a Party becomes engaged in war, or finds its security menaced by a "change of circumstances, it may temporarily suspend any provision of the Convention¹—in other words, may throw over the restrictions—provided that it notifies the Permanent Commission and the other Parties, explaining the reasons. The other

¹ This does not apply to certain absolute provisions, such as the prohibition of chemical war.

Parties have then to advise promptly on the situation thus presented. When the reasons for the temporary suspension are over, the Party in question has to reduce his armaments again to the Treaty level.

Some provisions of this kind had to be put in, to meet the demand of countries which might have to mobilise their forces suddenly in an emergency. They are obviously—probably inevitably—of a kind that might be abused. Much depends in these matters on the steady growth of confidence, with the Commission's help. But it is evident, too, that for the present some countries are likely to be haunted by fears that their neighbour may cut loose from the disarmament restrictions, claiming that a "change of circumstances" constitutes in his opinion "a menace to his national security."

7. Final Provisions. The final provisions include articles about the duration of the treaty for five years and its replacement thereafter by a new Convention so as to carry on the work. The Convention will replace, for the four partially-disarmed States, the disarmament provisions of the Peace Treaties; so that it will indeed be "the common obligation binding upon all." The discriminatory régime of 1919 will thus be disavowed.

It appears likely that difficulties will become manifest over the duration of the Convention: France may show her anxiety as to what would happen if, five years hence, Germany were to reject the fresh Disarmament Treaty, and thus be free to rearm *ad lib*. In truth, that is a danger which exists everywhere where suspicion and resentment thrive. Here, as in other parts of the Convention, everything will depend on whether it will be possible to get France to trust Germany enough for the time being, and to get Germany to collaborate loyally enough. If this process can be begun, with courage and mutual forbearance and with a reversal of certain educational policies that are breeding war, then confidence will have a chance to grow and the Convention will live.

But manifestly the risks of failure are now much graver than they were.

Two subjects of extreme importance were omitted from the British Draft, because the relevant Committees had not yet reported when it was published.

8. Expenditure. One of these was limitation and publicity for expenditure on armaments. A most thorough review of armament expenditure was made by a Technical Committee, and certain conclusions have been submitted. The Committee found that it was possible to make a uniform framework, for the tabulation of armament accounts ; and that by this means, and with the help of a supervisory Committee it would be possible to verify armament expenditure with a high degree of accuracy as regards the totals for each country. But, owing to the present organisation of the accounts in many States, the accuracy would be considerably less if the expenditure on the land, sea and air forces had to be given *separately*. As for the separate expenditures on the *material* of land, sea and air forces (on which the Draft of 1930 had relied), these " might not be capable of verification to anything like the same degree as is attainable " in the grand totals for each State.

This finding had a consequence which may prove very important. The United States used, till this Conference began, to oppose budgetary limitation altogether : but in February 1932 it modified this position, indicating that it would accept limitation of expenditure on *material* but not on the total armament expenditure.¹ The American delegate, coming to the latest meetings of this Technical

¹ I have never been able to make out the reason for this curious distinction. It is perhaps due partly to the survival in the United States of the quite erroneous belief that the purpose of limiting expenditure is to bring American expenditure, e.g. on a volunteer soldier, on to the same basis as the French expenditure on a conscript soldier. The armament expenditure of the various countries is of course quite unreliable as a criterion for comparing their armaments.

Committee, found that separate limitation of expenditure on material was regarded as not so reliable as had been hoped : so he put in a reservation to the Report, saying that it showed the "impracticability of measures of budgetary limitation at this time." He therefore limited his concurrence to measures of publicity only. If this position were maintained, it would be extremely damaging to the prospects of the whole Convention.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of budgetary limitation, not only as a means of preventing competition in types and qualities, and in quantities of the weapons left unlimited, but also as a supplementary method of supervision and control. It would be a disaster if Great Britain were to go back now to the position of supporting publicity only, without limitation of total expenditure.

9. Arms Traffic and Manufacture. The other subject left untouched in the British Draft was the Manufacture and Trade in Arms.

France, Poland, Spain and Denmark are pressing for complete suppression of the manufacture of arms for private profit, and they have put forward a powerful case for this. Great Britain, with Germany, Italy, Japan, America and Belgium, opposes this absolutely. She contends that the

"evil effects alleged to result from private manufactures fall roughly into two classes :

"(a) misconduct by individual concerns (interference with the Press, improper influence on Parliaments, etc.

"(b) the supply of arms to undesirable quarters.

"The evils of the former class, if any and where they exist, can be adequately dealt with by national legislation : evil effects of the latter class (which may also arise from State manufacture) would be obviated by proper regulations for the international traffic in arms."

This argument fails to meet the real case for suppression of private manufacture. The evidence is overwhelming that

purely national action does not suffice to prevent "misconduct by individual concerns": Governments do not prevent their nationals from stirring up "trouble" abroad, to stimulate orders: they do not even much want to look into the evils, it may be, because it suits the War Departments that the private firms should be kept occupied upon foreign orders. But the main argument against the British policy is the one given in support of it by Lord Hailsham. We must, he said, keep this private industry going in our country because it gives us the national advantage of an elastic source of supply: it gives us a cheap and rapid capacity for expansion of armament production in a crisis; so that we can quickly surmount those obstacles to the striking of a sudden fully-equipped blow which the Disarmament Convention seeks to build up. The British thesis is, in effect, the exact negation of the doctrine of "qualitative disarmament": it is intended to neutralise the "time-lag" between a crisis and a crash which the Disarmament Convention should promote.

It is greatly to be hoped that all manufacture of the casualty-producing weapons for private profit will be suppressed: but it seems only too certain that this will not be achieved in the present Convention. In the absence of such suppression, manufacture and traffic should be controlled as thoroughly as possible, e.g. by licensing manufacture and registering the licences with the Disarmament Commission; by confining the licences to specific orders by Governments; by inspection and control by the Commission of arms factories and of arms in use; by report to the Commission of number or weight, and value, of manufactures and of stocks. As for the traffic, this should be subject to licences of short duration, registered with the Commission, and applying to imports as well as exports.

It has been suggested that the Commission might take up the study of suppressing private manufacture, and might also study the practicability of a truce on armaments inventions and the standardisation of war material.

It is to be hoped that the world will not long be content

with interim measures. The traffic can be regulated, and the private manufacture suppressed, without injustice to the States which have no arms manufacture of their own. This should be done soon, before the vested interests in war have time to wreck the Disarmament Convention, as Mr. Bill Shearer was doing at the Naval Conference in 1927.

Conclusion.

1. The *ultimate objectives* of the disarmament effort should be to get rid of all the armaments in the world except such as may still be required in special cases for preventing and stopping breaches of the public peace.

2. The *immediate objectives* should include *comprehensive limitation, no re-armament, and drastic and progressive reduction* by international agreement, under thorough international control and supervision, including control of arms traffic and suppression of arms manufacture for private profit. The limitation and reduction of men, material and money, should be so directed at this stage as to provide especially for increased *security* against sudden smashing attack, and for *equality* of treatment in a treaty universally and loyally accepted.

3. Present conditions in Germany and Japan make it problematical whether any such treaty, however imperfect, can be concluded at present. Conclusion of such a treaty will in any case be perilous, and full loyalty cannot be quickly achieved; but failure to conclude a comprehensive treaty of limitation now would almost certainly be disastrous.

No effort should be spared to conclude a first world disarmament treaty before Christmas 1933. This is now nearly within grasp.

4. The treaty's provisions should include :

Men. Standardisation of home service armies in Europe so as to facilitate limitation and reduction of numbers and period of service.

Material. There should be agreement now on abolition within a fixed period of all the weapons prohibited for Germany at Versailles, e.g. warships over 10,000 tons, submarines, mobile land artillery over 4 inches (105 mm.), tanks, chemical war, naval and military aviation. Such agreement is now particularly important as regards guns over 4 inches (or $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches), tanks, and naval and military aircraft. Civil aviation should be dealt with by internationalisation of civil air transport, at least in Europe to begin with: and this (or, failing this, a scheme of international control), could be quickly agreed on, granted the will. Unless agreement is reached now on abolition of war planes within five years or ten, German re-armament in this respect is certain.

Money. Limitation, as well as publicity, of expenditure is of very great importance.

Supervision and Control. The most rigorous supervision and control is essential. Private manufacture of arms ought to be suppressed, as France and other States urge: failing this, it is indispensable that the treaty should provide for international regulation of State and private manufacture and of the arms traffic. Manufacture of arms should only be permitted on Government orders, published through the Permanent Disarmament Commission and restricted within the limits of the Disarmament Treaty.

5. *Security.* The provisions about security and disarmament should be so timed and co-ordinated as to ensure that the supervision and control will begin forthwith, with the surest guarantees of steepening reductions a few years hence.

If Japan refuses to come into a fair Treaty, certain reductions which should otherwise be effected all round might have to be suspended—not cancelled—so as to leave an overwhelming superiority against the recalcitrant State.

It is to be feared that no Treaty that we are likely to be able to secure under present conditions will be sufficiently drastic to rob Hitler wholly of the opportunity of exploiting its inadequacy as a grievance before the German people. But we must at the very least offer a Treaty that commends itself to enlightened world opinion as an honest and very substantial instalment of progressive disarmament, with a view to full and early levelling down all round to the standard of a "domestic policing force." We must rob Hitler of any justifiable pretext for rearmament. We can only do that if we go further than we have done in the British Draft Convention in some respects. If we do that, and if Hitler still challenges the world and rearms, then, but only then, coercive pressure on Germany might become justifiable as the lesser of two evils.

The worst of all disservices to disarmament would be to become defeatist, utterly hopeless about it now, in the coming third stage of the long Conference. The situation is grave indeed—partly through our fault. If a Convention is not pulled through now, the situation will very soon be infinitely worse. But if we want peace, we shall have to pay the price of it, and take risks for it. To give guarantees of collective security against war is dangerous : to withhold them is more dangerous still. To press on, undeterred, with disarmament, in face of the German situation, is dangerous and difficult : but to call off disarmament, and to try falling back on the one-sided régime of Versailles—that would be not only dangerous but assuredly disastrous.

CHAPTER VII: EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL

TWO PRELIMINARY inter-related questions present themselves to those who desire to see the elimination of war from our world :

- (1) What should be the contribution of education to that task ? Where has education fallen short in preparing those in its charge to live at peace with their fellows ? What is the nature of the educational changes, if any, which ought to be made ?
- (2) How may we deal with the innate pugnacities of man ? Does "human nature" make war inevitable as so many allege ? What is the truth in that respect ? And what the wise policy in reference to it ?

Now there are certain simple and unchallengeable facts that bear upon this phase of the problem which, if fully appreciated, will help us in grappling with more complex aspects.

Let us take the latter part of the problem first, "the human nature" case. Perhaps the commonest phrase you meet in the discussion of war and peace, is that "you cannot change human nature," with the implication that as war is a manifestation of human nature, it will always defeat our efforts to rid the world of that scourge. It is not a question, however, of changing human nature, but of changing human behaviour ; and that human behaviour can change as the result of outside circumstance—institutions, religious, social or political ; tradition, law, fashion, habit, tribal or other taboos, new ideas, suggestion, education, disciplines—the commonest daily observation, the facts

of history, as well as the conclusions of psychologists, clearly show.

In obedience to the forces enumerated above, behaviour undergoes amazing changes : the way one generation behaves even in conduct which has very deep roots, like that touching the relations of the sexes, alters profoundly from one generation to another. More striking still is the fact that not only conduct but taste—what we like and dislike—alter : one generation thinks a particular kind of dress or type of domestic architecture beautiful ; the next thinks it horrible ; what one generation desires another does not want at all ; the amusements which entertain one generation bore the next insufferably ; plays and novels which move one period to tears provokes another to laughter ; food over which one generation smacks its lips makes the next sick ; what one regards as obvious justice the next regards as obvious injustice ; conduct which one regards as bad and wrong the next may regard as good and right. And both act accordingly. Certainly there is no change of fundamental human nature in a single generation : but behaviour, conduct, likes, dislikes, “ innate sense of justice,” views of right and wrong, can all change very rapidly, as we well know. There is no question here of racial differences accounting for different conduct. How profound may be the difference even of tastes, likes and dislikes, produced by early suggestion and education may be seen in the East, notably in India, in the case of men of the same race belonging to different religions or different castes of the same religion. The favourite food of all members of one group, eaten with the greatest relish, is regarded by all members of another group with a loathing as great as that with which we should regard the eating of human flesh. It is not any physiological, biological difference, some difference in the lining of the stomach say, which accounts for this fact : it is the difference of early suggestion, imitation, habit. It is significant, by the way, that the different groups, with such different feelings about things, not only belong often to the same race, but are subject to the same climatic conditions, the same economic

circumstances, the same economic system ; living in the same village, all their lives, side by side. If in accounting for at least some differences of behaviour in things which touch profoundly the feelings and the emotions we have to exclude any difference of physical conditions, climate and soil ; any difference of economic condition ; any difference of race, we may realise how very powerful a few factors in the realm of ideas, education, suggestion may be in provoking differences of behaviour.

The foregoing should suffice to indicate the importance of distinguishing between "unchanging human nature" and a very changeable human behaviour, conduct.

But that is related to an even simpler fallacy, common in the war and peace argument. "The advocates of the League of Nations forget," said a Rear-Admiral the other day, "that man is a fighting animal, irrational, pugnacious, little subject to reason." Well, man is certainly that kind of animal. That is why it is so necessary to have a League of Nations, or some international machinery. It is, fundamentally, the only reason. For if man were "naturally" reasonable ; always social in his instincts ; always capable of being his own judge in his own cause ; always able to see fully the other's point of view ; never "lost his temper and called it patriotism," never shouted "my country right or wrong"—we should not perhaps need an international Constitution. But neither should we need national Constitutions, codes, Parliaments, laws, courts, police, churches, commandments, or the other social institutions or conventions by which naturally disorderly men may live in a relatively orderly society. Those institutions, in large part, are the instruments with which we get over the shortcomings of human nature. We have those institutions *because* human nature is pugnacious, needs these disciplines, guides. The Rear-Admiral has got the argument turned exactly upside down. And it is certain that many millions go their lives through without being clear as to this relationship between human nature and human institutions.

Curiously enough, war itself can only be carried on by

the organisation of disciplines, habits, designed to "change human nature"—correct, that is, human behaviour. It would not be possible for men to behave as they do on the battlefield without severe previous training. It is as little "natural" for men to behave in certain circumstances of war as in fact they do, as it is for the horses not to bolt at the infernal clangour of battle. We cannot even play tennis or golf without checking instincts—the "instinct" to run into the ball at tennis, to stop looking at the ball in golf.

Man has learned—and this is the first great fact which must be fully comprehended in this connection—that in a hundred circumstances of life his "natural" instinct, even the instinct of self-preservation, will destroy him if he obeys it. If, at the cry of "fire" in a theatre the whole audience so far obey their "instinct of self-preservation" as to rush in panic to the doors, many of them may well perish. And it may prove that there was no fire—that the cry was a false alarm. But the same situation managed with discipline, checking the first thought by the second, may prove entirely without danger. The amateur yachtsman of small experience, when a gale comes up, has an urge to run for land; the sailor with more experience may tell you that his "instinct" in that particular circumstance is to run for the open sea. The second act is just as "instinctive" as the first; just as "satisfying to the emotional life," to "urges," fears, wishes.

What accounts for the difference of behaviour? How do we explain the fact that the same instinct of self-preservation prompts in one case one action and in another case, of exactly similar circumstances, an entirely contrary one? Not any difference of biological make up, of "human nature." Not any difference of wants.

The panic-stricken audience does not *want* to be crushed to death; the golf-player does not *want* to fizzle his shot; the yachtsman does not *want* to lose his boat and his life. The difference is accounted for by the fact that (e.g.) the yachtsman does not really believe (what the more experienced sailor *knows*) that to pass a dark night on a stormy sea in a tiny cockleshell of a boat is, in the circumstances of the

particular case, a much safer thing than to attempt to run into a harbour only a few miles away.¹ The knowledge, experience, perception, cause the same instinct to result in different conduct.

It is as true of the more complex and difficult situations of human society, as of the simpler situations I have mentioned, that the conduct which instinct suggests will depend upon the way in which our intelligence prompts us to read a given situation in the light of experience, and in the light of ends which we desire : to weigh one want against another. (We don't *want* to spend a night in the open sea ; but still less do we want to be battered to death on the rocks to leeward.)

A clear foreknowledge of results alters completely the way in which a given instinct will manifest itself in conduct ; not by suppressing the instinct, or frustrating it, but by causing it to take another channel. It is certainly true that very often the instinct of self-preservation causes us to do things likely to destroy ourselves : two homely instances have just been given. But it is just as certain that there is nothing inevitable in such self-destructive courses ; that intelligent reading of experience may lead instinct to operate in ways more effective to conscious ends.

Let us apply those analogies to certain problems of war and peace. The instinct of self-preservation in nations has heretofore prompted them to arm individually one against the other. It is almost a panic impulse, like that of the theatre audience which rushes for the doors at the cry of fire. In that case too, each tries to save himself by his own force, each trying to oust the other. So long as it is this "each for himself" none can count on safety in the case of fire. The defence of each here can only be assured by disciplined common action. The same is assuredly true in the case of the defence of nations. It is a physical impossibility,

¹ Mr. Weston Martyr, the well-known small yacht sailor, writes : "Many small craft have been lost through running to harbour for shelter from heavy weather. Given sea-room, it is far safer to heave-to and ride out the storm. Voss asserted that he never felt really safe aboard the *Tilikum*—unless he was fifty miles distant from land."

a crude defiance of arithmetic, to make general defence effective by each acting individually, without reference to others.

Can men be brought to see that truth and do for the safety of their respective nations what they manage to do for the safety of their persons when they take precautions for the case of fires and similar situations? Can the first panic impulse of self-preservation which makes self-preservation impossible be made to give way to a more disciplined response to that impulse?

There may be reasons, of course, which make it impossible to apply to international relations that principle of common collective action for the defence of each which is the characteristic of all organised society of persons. But, if in truth it is thus impossible to do for international relationships what we have managed to do for inter-personal relationships, it is not, as so often alleged, because experience and intelligence can have no effect upon the way in which an instinct or impulse may manifest itself. To say that the perceptions, the intelligence, can never influence the way in which instinct operates is to fly in the face of commonplace daily experience.

But if some of the phrases used with such assurance in this discussion prove on examination to defy everyday experience, there are others that prove on examination to be nearly meaningless. An eminent English man of letters wrote the other day: "Given the nature of man, war is inevitable." It sounds exceedingly impressive. But what does it mean?

Does it mean that any war proposed at any time by any interested party—silly or irresponsible newspapers, demagogic politicians, armament firms, concession mongers—is inevitable? Of course not. Then which war is inevitable and which avoidable?

Most of us who can carry our minds back to certain war scares of the nineteenth century can recall more than one "inevitable" war—a war declared absolutely inevitable by politicians, writers, great sections of public opinion—which

did not take place. The history of Anglo-American relations is particularly full of such incidents. The war of 1812 would never have taken place if communications had been more rapid : one battle in that war was actually fought after peace had been signed because the fact could not be conveyed to the combatants. Had we then possessed the telegraph that part of the war would have been prevented by that one invention. Sometimes the "inevitable" war has been stopped by the influence of just a few persons. Mr. Lytton Strachey in his *Victoria* describes how the Prince Consort exercised an influence which may have been decisive in preventing one of the Anglo-American conflicts which arose at the time of the North and South war from developing into a situation in which "honour" would have demanded war. President Cleveland's message over the Venezuelan boundary produced a situation still more significant. It was an exceedingly provocative message, raising questions of rights of interference based upon an extremely vague and—for Americans—semi-religious theory of the Monroe Doctrine.¹ The matter was full of explosive material. The public in the United States suddenly flamed into passion. Men as eminent as the late President Roosevelt joined in the hue and cry. Men were saying that the long series of irritations lasting for more than a century, must at last result in "having it out." A very little more and the two countries *would* have "had it out—once for all." (All wars are to settle the questions involved "once for all," like the war which was to end German militarism, vindicate the democratic principle, and "knock sense into the heads of the German nation.") But rather unexpectedly certain forces stood for peace. While most of the popular Press of America was screaming for war, the *New York World*, at

¹ The late General Horace Porter, U.S. Ambassador to France, used to tell a story of that time. One American meeting another says : "What's this I hear, Jones, about your not believing the Monroe Doctrine?" Jones retorts : "It's a wicked libel. I never said I do not believe in the Monroe Doctrine. Of course I believe in it and would go to war with Britain to vindicate it. I would enlist myself : I would die on the battlefield for the Monroe Doctrine. What I did say was that I don't know what it means."

that time having perhaps the largest circulation of any paper upon the American continent, became as active for peace as the others were for war and gave a platform for individual friends of peace. This was an unexpected check to the war fever, caused demagogic politicians to hesitate, and helped to turn the balance. But suppose the *New York World* had been as rabidly against any conciliation or agreement as most of the other papers were? The "inevitable" war might have happened. It is suggestive in this connection that the newspaper proprietor who threw the whole of his influence on that occasion against war was not a "hands across the seas" Anglo-Saxon, but a Hungarian Jew whose mother tongue was not English; just as on the British side in the previous generation one of the personal influences preventing war was a German whose labours for peace (probably at the cost of his life since he was extremely ill at the time) helped to prevent explosion.

The "inevitable" war between Britain and America is still being freely prophesied by quite a considerable school of writers on both sides of the Atlantic. Marxians declare that it must "inevitably" arise out of the conflict of economic interest between the two countries. Trotsky in his book *Whither England?* declares that economic rivalry between the two countries makes war "absolutely certain."

Some of these writers are very positive that this particular war is inevitable. A good many will dissent. But about their proposition we can at least say this: that though it may be wrong it is not meaningless. Whereas the proposition that "war" in the abstract is inevitable has in reality no meaning since many kinds of war are obviously not included. There is not included for instance war between states that used to be continually at war: Scotland and England; or England and Wales. These nations may fight in the future as they so often fought in the past, if certain of the nationalists have their way and each nation within the British Islands becomes once more a completely independent and sovereign state. But it would be a bold man who would say that war between Scotland and England was now

"inevitable"—though doubtless many on both sides used to talk of the "inevitability" of those old fights. We doubt the inevitability because we doubt the return of the particular political conditions, the independence of the nations concerned, which produced the wars. In any case we know that this "reversion to the Heptarchy" is not unavoidable, as rain and earthquake are unavoidable; that if it comes it will be the outcome of human wills, of active argument and discussion by certain persons pushing their ideas as against other ideas.

For again, the factor which enabled the separate nations of England and Scotland to pass out of the condition of "inevitability of conflict" between them was a change in political relationship. The units which are now (for the most part) in men's minds as constituting the parties to war are no longer the units which they used to think of as "inevitably" fighting. Whereas originally it was Scotland v. England, it is now Britain or the British Empire v. Some Other World Power.

These changes which we recognise as due to conscious policy are obviously important as bearing upon the question of "inevitability" and human nature. Formerly it was not merely nations which fought, but clans, tribes—and religions. The religious wars in which the units were constituted, not on the basis of nationality at all, but upon the basis of religious belief, were the bitterest of all. As late as the 17th century most authorities were convinced that religious difference must be an "inevitable" cause of war. It was argued, moreover, on very plausible grounds. Differences about property, money, could be settled by courts, earthly judges; but the spread of beliefs which—in the then widely held view—condemned a man's children and loved ones to the risk of eternal torment were not things which he would consent to arbitrate.

Yet this deep, obstinate cause of war of the bitterest kind has disappeared, not as the result of any change in man's biological nature, but as the result of a change of ideas largely the work of a few individual minds, as the political

changes which account for the disappearance of war where once it raged was due to the change of ideas. The process by which several states heretofore independent, making part of that "international anarchy" dealt with in a former chapter, unite under some federal bond, or become one state and so put an end to war between them, has again and again been due to the work of a very few men, setting in motion certain political ideas. It was to that kind of influence that we owe the unity of the states which to-day make the United States of America. That we should fight is perhaps part of our nature ; what we fight about is part of our nurture.

The "instinct of the herd" may be a biological fact, but what we come to regard as the herd is a fact of tradition, custom, education.

These very simple facts make a great deal of rather elaborate and obscure psychological discussion irrelevant to our main problem.

Dr. Glover¹ would have us approach the problem of war as a problem of personal psychology, "a manifestation of conflict between human impulses . . . a mass insanity . . . provided you remember that insanity is simply a dramatic attempt to deal with individual conflict, a curative process initiated in the hope of preventing disruption." The failure to recognise this fact is the "fundamental flaw in the technique of peace propaganda." If you would avoid war, says Dr. Glover in effect, "study human beings ; study in particular the impulses of aggression, and study them first where they are most readily open to inspection in yourself." If he were to formulate a commandment for pacifists, it would be "Know thine own (unconscious) sadism."

Mr. C. E. M. Joad has summarised in non-technical terms Dr. Glover's thesis thus :

"The impulses that make for war are primal in human beings. Two groups may be distinguished, the second

¹ In *War, Sadism and Pacifism*, George Allen & Unwin.

derivative, from the first. First there is sadism ; this is not itself simple, but is a mixture of aggressive or destructive impulses ('in all individuals a stage of development occurs in which the infliction of some sort of pain becomes an aim in itself. In this respect man is almost unique among animals') and of love impulses. Babies bite, worry and otherwise mishandle their toys ; the sexual pervert hurts the person he loves. These impulses are normally repressed, with varying degrees of effectiveness, but the repression is never complete, and the impulses are always looking, as it were, for chinks in its armour through which they may escape and discharge themselves. Now war-mongering provides an admirable channel for their discharge, admirable because society not only does not disapprove and penalise, but on this occasion actually approves. Thus war 'is not merely an economic or self-preservatory necessity. It serves to divert impulses which, left unsatisfied, are potentially sources of familial or tribal disintegration.'

"The channels along which the sadistic impulses operate to promote warfare are many and varied ; a few only have been charted. There is, for example, the sadistic pleasure that even the most humane of us may discover in ourselves when we hear of sufferings we need not share."

The second group of impulses is masochistic. We continue to prepare for war although we know it will injure us because we like injuring ourselves.

Masochism turns the mixed impulses of aggression and love which constitute sadism inwards upon the self. The extreme masochist enjoys flogging himself or being flogged by those he loves ; the more moderate masochist enjoys humiliating himself, endangering himself, being subjected to drill and discipline, being bullied by sergeants, enduring discomfort and hardship ; he also likes "friendly, helpful and self-sacrificing association with his Brothers in Arms."

In a somewhat different vein we all enjoy saying that the next war will see the end of our civilisation, that human affairs have passed beyond the limits of human control ; we like, in a word, to gloat over gloom in the present and prophesy increasing gloom in the future. War provides the occasion *par excellence* for gloating.

Two typical instances of such " gloating " can be quoted from recent writing : Major Yeats-Brown wrote recently in the *Spectator* :¹

" I do not believe in the possibility of eliminating the desire to fight from humankind because an organism without fight is dead or moribund. Life consists of tensions : there must be a balance of opposite polarities to make a personality, a nation, a world, or a cosmic system such as God planned. I believe that He planned war, just as He planned electricity or the force of gravity, but left it to man to canalize and regulate these powers so that they should be beneficent rather than destructive. We can support a League of Nations, but we must not, in our arrogance, imagine it superior to the Will of Creation : we might as well try to do away with gravity because of aeroplane accidents as think of abolishing war because good women suffer and brave men die. . . .

" The flower of patriotism has been watered by the blood of heroic men and women, whereas the weedy hothouse plant of Geneva has been nourished chiefly on talk and self-interest. For the desire of nationhood is the germ of life itself. Perfect and perpetual peace seems to me to lead to stagnation, sterility and psychic suicide."

A little later Lord Dunsany writes in the same journal :

" We have no record that when Newton discovered the law of gravity he incurred any hostility from angry folk saying : Now we shall have everything falling on our

¹ December 30, 1932.

heads, apples and everything else. So I hope my theory will cause no annoyance either . . . war comes from tides in human affairs, and depends little on human precautions. Shall we stop it by keeping the birth-rate down to the level of the death-rate, thus preventing its logical cause? I think not, for that is only to invite invasion. War has been hitherto the method whereby the blood of people was blended, always with a strong tincture of adventure, and whereby races were made. It has been the method whereby those races held their own so long as they were worthy to hold it, and whereby they were overthrown before they cumbered the earth and lowered the average human standard. I like it less than Newton liked being hit on the head by an apple, but I recognize it as one of the conditions under which we live on the planet. . . . Yet let us hope that the court of King Canute now sitting by the shores of Geneva will stop these tides for ever."

Now Dr. Glover's analysis is doubtless a perfectly valid explanation of the psychology of, say, Major Yeats-Brown and Lord Dunsany; it tells us why such writers write as they do. But it is in no sense evidence that all men or even most men must in all times and in all circumstances react to innate impulses in just that way, or so as to produce those particular political opinions, or prompt a policy which leads to war; or even that these men, placed in different circumstances, subject to different early suggestion and education, would have felt as they do. As we have already seen, the same fundamental impulse which in the case of a man of one kind of experience or knowledge will prompt one policy (to run a boat to harbour, say) will in the case of a man of different experience or knowledge prompt a diametrically opposed policy.

If Scots no longer go to war with the English nor the Bavarians with the Prussians, nor one Italian city with another, it is not because of much change in the psychological make up of individual Scots, English, Prussians,

Bavarians or Italians, but by reason of political changes which cause the same individual impulses to manifest themselves in a different political fashion. Psychological knowledge—investigation of the unconscious—is extremely valuable in this connection, but it should not be set up as the alternative to political change, to “pacts and agreements.” It may help in the making of the necessary political changes; but to that task must be brought above all intelligence directed to conscious ends.

Dr. Glover’s analysis would doubtless have been just as valid in explaining the hates, ferocities, cruelties, which marked the Inquisition and the religious wars. But the method by which we emerged in some measure from those evils was not by means of the somewhat intricate psychological technique which Dr. Glover seems to urge in the case of war, but by a clearer perception of the nature of truth, a realisation that there was small intellectual virtue in credulity and that doubt was a form of honesty and sincerity which could not be visited by a just God with ferocious punishment.

One frequently reads that “the power of reason and the conscious will is so feeble compared to the power of the emotions and innate impulses.” Which is as much as though one were to say that the power of a ship’s compass is extremely feeble compared with the power developed by the engines, so that one might as well throw the compass overboard. Yet whether the engines drive the ship to destruction or its proper destination may well depend upon the compass. Neither does it mean, of course, that you could dispense with the engines, nor navigate the ship without them.

An illustration used by the present writer in another connection may help to clarify the point it is here desired to make; to clear up the confusion so often manifest when we say that appeals to reason can have little effect with irrational and passionate men.

Across the street I see a man who many years since did me a great injury; I have long nursed the thought of murder. I raise my pistol to kill him. A friend with me tries to

deter me ; urges all the considerations of expediency, interest, career, utility of my life to society . . . all to no effect. It is a case in which rational considerations are of no avail in that I am obeying motives beyond logic, beyond reason.

Yet pure logic and pure reason in the end turn me from murder. My friend points out, as my intended victim raises his hands, that both have five fingers ; my enemy had one missing. Plainly it is a case of mistaken identity.

Because my mind can still go through a process of logic, and for no other reason whatever, my passion, whatever its nature, falls from me ; not as the result of suppression of emotion, nor of any difficult disciplines, but because of my perception of a certain external fact.

Now something like that has actually been taking place in the world in the matter of warfare : the identity of enemies has been changing. Rival clans hated each other bitterly ; they became amalgamated into tribes ; the tribes hated and warred ; the tribes became nations which now constituted the mutually hating units ; nations became Federations, or single states (like Britain, which combines English, Scotch, Welsh, Manx " nations "). These nations have managed to eliminate war by transferring the emotions, whether of loyalty or of hate to other objectives. If we accept the hypothesis of an innate " herd instinct," once so popular, we may say that we have completely altered the effect of that instinct in practical politics by changing the identity of the herd. But the herd need not be a nation at all : it was not until recently in history. For long, as we have just noted, it was a religious group (and still is in much of India and other parts of the East) ; for very many to-day it is becoming a class : the Bourgeoisie or Marxians as the case may be. How easily the transfer of hates can be made, Herr Hitler, among others, has of late abundantly shown.

But if it has been possible for the loyalty of the tribe to be enlarged to include the nation, the nation the larger states, there is no reason (indeed already there are at least signs that in an increasing number of cases it is already taking place) why loyalties should not be enlarged to include

such conceptions as the League of Nations. No one who is familiar with such organisations as the League of Nations Union can doubt for a moment that with some at least a new loyalty—and consequently new enmities—are emerging in the minds of many. No one familiar with such groups of young men as those responsible for the Oxford Union resolution affirming the intention in no case to fight for King or country can doubt that new loyalties are emerging among *them*.

Now this choice of loyalties, the task of determining whether the person that we see across the street is really the old enemy or merely someone resembling him, is a task of perception, reason, logic, knowledge, experience. It does not repress the emotional life ; it gives to emotions and impulses new channels in which to run. Whether we decide that the enemy pointed out really is the enemy, will depend in part at least upon the way in which we have interpreted human experience ; upon our notions of what are workable methods in human society.

At the time of Cleveland's Venezuelan message a large part of the people of the United States felt that "the British" were the enemies of their country ; attributed to "the British" all sorts of nefarious plots for injuring America, and spoke of them much as Hitler writes of the Jews in his book. But a smaller number of Americans, with perhaps a somewhat fuller knowledge of Britain, and also perhaps with an understanding of the way in which the early suggestion carried by school history books can create pictures of that kind, did not see the external facts in that way at all ; did not conceive of Britain as the enemy to be feared. They realised at that time that the enemy to be feared was the unscrupulous demagogues ; and some who saw the possibility of an Anglo-American war and its consequences had a hatred of the demagogue as deep as that which the victims of the demagogue felt for "the British."

Once, during the war, on the morrow of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, an Englishman was put the question : "Don't you loathe Germans ?" To which he replied : "Don't you

loathe the people living along the London and North-Eastern Railway? A season-ticket holder has just been found guilty of an outrage upon a little girl." The retort was, of course, that people living along the line of the London and North-Eastern Railway didn't make an entity—a "moral unit" that can be held responsible—any one member of which can be held responsible for the behaviour of the rest.

But that particular Englishman had so interpreted the facts of the modern world as to see in these great political aggregations—American, British, German, French—groups hardly more responsible collectively and severally than the season-ticket holders would be in the circumstances mentioned. Whether that intellectual conception was sound or not, its existence in his mind made plainly an immense difference in the direction taken by his hates.

Psychological knowledge has, of course, a very direct bearing upon the problem of the kind of social or political institution that can be worked by fallible men. It has been pointed out above that institutions—law, constitutions, courts—have arisen, in part at least, as means of disciplining human nature, because of the manifestly anti-social character of many of our impulses; of our inability to be just judges in our own causes. The disciplines which will in fact work and those which ask too much, and why, are questions upon which psychology can throw most useful light. But the psychological knowledge is not the alternative to the institutions political or other; it is one of the means by which they may be made successful.

Dr. Glover declares that we do not possess the necessary psychological knowledge, and seems to suggest that until we have this information, action to stop war would be futile or disastrous, as disastrous as the attempts of surgeons in the last century to deal with organic diseases by dropping drastically upon the incidental symptoms, opening up abdomens, stitching kidneys, or applying body-belts. The rush "to do something" must, he thinks, be suspended until we know more.

One can only reflect that it is fortunate that men who laboured to create political conditions which have in fact prevented war—as did Alexander Hamilton when he fought the separatist and isolationist tendencies of the revolted American colonies and prevented the formation of many separate republics where now there is one—were not guided by the principle that it was no use attempting to create those political conditions which are the means of preventing war until we had the appropriate psychological knowledge.

Presumably Dr. Glover is indicating how not to do things when he says :¹

“ Let us suppose for the sake of argument, not only that the Great Powers applied themselves seriously to problems of war and peace, but that they were temporarily converted to a psychological viewpoint. They would then instruct their central organisation—that League of Nations or whatever—to set about establishing Research Institutes in all countries. The League of Nations would doubtless appoint Psychological Advisory Committees to assist in organisation, and would feel justified in referring to a Central Advisory body any problems that appeared to be capable of immediate solution. . . .

“ A flock of Academic Psychologists would gather from Upsala, Oxford, Greifswald, St. Andrews, Yale, Warsaw, Paris, Padua and Salamanca. Now whatever may be said about ‘ new ’ (that is to say modern) psychology, it is certain that they were never spawned in academic waters. So the League would feel bound to invite representatives from various ‘ clinical schools.’ It is possible but by no means certain that these would include a psycho-analytical delegate. Anyhow the list would be rounded off with a few distinguished freelance psychologists, i.e. individuals who on the strength of earlier interests in metaphysics or humanism have

¹ *War, Sadism and Pacifism*, Edward Glover (George Allen and Unwin, pp. 84, 85, 86).

developed psychological systems of their own. The whole Body would of course be leavened by the inclusion of a few biologists, invited under the misapprehension that biologists have 'something to do with' psychology."

Coming to the problem of preventive measures and having before them the question "Should children be allowed pop-guns?" Dr. Glover sketches what he thinks would happen at the meeting of the psychological board :¹

"This issue would raise the most acute dissension. Even those representatives who appeared to agree would do so for different reasons. Thus it would be maintained by the 'humanists' and the 'environmental stimuli' school that to avoid inculcating or educating warlike tendencies, children should *not* be allowed pop-guns. The 'behaviourists' would join with the 'play psychologists' in protesting that a child who has never seen a pop-gun will point his finger at his nurse and utter the magic monosyllable 'pop.' In so saying they merely emphasise the fact that the inventors of the pop-gun, to say nothing of the water-pistol, the howitzer and the gas-shell, must have been themselves children. Or more technically, that the child in his manipulation of external objects, both animate and inanimate, projects on to them his bodily functions and endows them with his own instinctual strivings. The 'active cathartic' school would then chime in to say that such being the case, it is clearly advantageous for children to be given 'fire-arms' to play with. But some 'suggestionists' would at once disagree. Favouring a system of defence by the 'reinforcement of antithetical ideas' they would insist on the contrary that all children should be given corked bottles and corkscrews. Their colleagues, the 'suggestionists by direct displacement' would enter a protest here. They would say : there is no need to invert the situation : by all means let the child have his pop-gun,

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 87, 88.

but substitute as soon as possible the game of tiddley-winks, and then divert his attention as soon as possible from tiddleywinks to crossword puzzles or to practical chemistry. This recommendation would immediately cause a small war between various 'fixation' schools. Seizing on the phrase 'as soon as possible,' the 'constitutional factor' group would say that a short period of gratification would be liable to induce traumatic 'fixation,' to make the child a secret and permanent addict to pop-gunners. On the other hand, those interested in 'individual factors in fixation' would argue that it was risky to allow too long a period of gratification lest it should induce fixation to the gangster phase.

"It is unnecessary to labour the point farther. The Central Board would be unable to reach agreement."

This is a very severe indictment, not, it may be of the psychological method, but the methods of psychologists in the present condition of that science.

Another psychologist, Professor William McDougall, is hardly less severe. He says of psychology as a "science":¹

"It remains a chaos of dogmas and opinions diametrically opposed, a jangle of discordant schools and sects; a field exploited by quacks and charlatans of every sort, preying upon the ignorance of a deeply interested public which knows not which way to turn for authoritative guidance. This is not merely because psychology is the most difficult of the sciences; nor altogether the consequence of the uncertainty of its biological foundations. The chaos is largely due to the neglect of the field by our universities and is likely to continue until some time after they shall have fully accepted their responsibility in the matter. The proper study of mankind is man; on this we are all agreed. But, though our leading universities have long devoted themselves to the study of man's

¹ *World Chaos: The Responsibility of Science* (Kegan Paul, pp. 67, 68).

works, they have been very slow to make any effort to study man himself."

He goes on to point out that until very recently there have been no chairs of Anthropology and of Psychology in the British Empire ; " and our neglect to take advantage of the unequalled opportunities offered by its multitudes of peoples of all grades of culture will for ever remain a serious reproach to us." He thinks that, if we had not grossly neglected these studies, we might have avoided the present difficulties in India and China ; and our Indian Empire might not have been lost. " Even at the present day the number of university chairs in these two subjects together is only half a dozen, and nowhere in the British Empire is there a department of either subject with any but most scanty and inadequate equipment and personnel."

Professor McDougall insists upon two points : That the exact physical sciences cannot help us in our present world trouble (they are indeed in a sense responsible for getting us into it) and that men must be guided by aims much more conscious, preconceived, than has been the case hitherto :

" In all former ages the relations of man to man and group to group (the civilised no less than the savage) were governed by custom and tradition, law being merely the formal recognition of custom and tradition. The family, the clan, the tribe, the kingdom, the feudal system, the parliament, all such institutions expressed and were adequately governed by old traditional loyalties. Under the vast complexity of modern conditions, this old traditional wisdom is utterly inadequate to regulate our relations. We are compelled to try to live by the light of Science ; and alas ! we have no Science to guide us. *The physical science which has produced this new complexity can give us no guidance whatsoever in our difficult task of coping with it.*"

Professor McDougall insists again and again that in order to " restore the balance of our civilisation," in order

to "adjust our social, economic and political life to the violent changes which physical science has directly and indirectly produced, we need to have far more knowledge (systematically ordered or scientific knowledge) of human nature and of the life of society than we yet have."

Yet, some of the social sciences are the oldest of all and even that science of economics, which in its present form Professor McDougall so severely criticises, has been the subject of investigation by some of the greatest of thinkers, particularly the greatest of English thinkers, for at least a century and a half.

When Dr. Glover asks for a fifty year period of psychological research before anything can be done, or Professor McDougall demands a science of the imponderables, one wonders whether certain obvious facts in the situation have been taken sufficiently into account. They are these :

(1) Our trouble is not, as Dr. Glover and so many others would seem to imply, the absence of any general will to peace. The great mass of men everywhere genuinely want peace. With the perfectly conscious object of securing peace they pursue or sanction policies which lead to war, which make it at times inevitable. Plainly they do not see the relation between the war-inducing policy they pursue and the end which they desire ; or they have not learned to choose between two mutually exclusive objectives.

(2) While our knowledge is assuredly incomplete, it is also true that war and the dire catastrophies that have resulted from it, could have been avoided, if men had applied to their problems the knowledge they already possess, the kind of knowledge which is indeed of almost universal possession, or self-evident in the facts of daily life.

(3) If the millions do not in their direction of public policy use the knowledge they already possess, it will serve little purpose to endow them with more knowledge : they can disregard the new as readily as they disregard the old.

(4) What is needed as the main element of popular education is the development of the particular skills by which already known facts can be applied to new situations,

political and social, as they arise. In the deliberate development of such skills in our school children, psychological knowledge would play a very important rôle.

(5) It is vital to develop first of all a clear consciousness of what we want of governments, political parties and endeavours, organised society generally : whether we want welfare and prosperity or (say) preponderance over foreigners, the satisfaction of pride of national place. It is certain that most of our people have not settled in their minds the question of what they want, what governments are for, or have not learned to choose between wants.

(6) The fact that experts in economics and sociology differ on many points, is less important than that the few conclusions upon which all economists (for instance) are agreed, and which happen to be the most important conclusions, are not grasped by the public and not applied to public policy.

Let us take the significance of this last point first, by applying an analogy used in another connection.

We know that doctors of medicine differ bitterly on many points : the medical dogmas of one decade are the derided fallacies of the next. Does that mean that the science of medicine, in its present state of knowledge, has done nothing, can do nothing for the world ?

Medicine has transformed our society by abolishing ravages—Black Deaths, bubonic plagues, cholera, leprosy—which used once to scourge us. It has done this by enabling the layman, members of sanitary boards and so forth, to understand one of the few truths upon which all medical experts are completely agreed : that those diseases are transmitted by micro-organisms ; and that while the diseases cannot be cured they can be prevented by keeping sewage out of drinking water, infected vermin from our houses.

Similarly, very much of the economic pestilence which has come upon us this last ten years could have been avoided if the layman had understood certain conclusions in economic

science from which no qualified economist in the world would venture to differ, as, for instance, that sums of the size involved in Reparations and Debts claims can only be paid in goods or services. If this point—to take one of several—had been fully grasped by the lay publics of the Allied nations in 1919 in the matter of Reparations ; were grasped to-day by the American public in the matter of Debts, a large part of the financial dislocation and chaos which has marked the post-war international economic situation would have been avoided. Yet that agreed truth of the economists is not at bottom more difficult to see than the microbic theory of disease. We have not seen it because it has been obscured by nationalist passions which themselves have largely arisen because we have not developed the trick of readily seeing the almost self-evident truth : the real nature of these abstractions which excite our anger “ America,” “ Britain,” “ France,” “ Germany.” (We say commonly of the Versailles Treaty-making that we could not see the plain facts because we were so angry. It would be truer to say that we were angry because we could not see the plainest fact, as that, e.g., the “ Germany ” we desired to punish was not a “ person ” but an aggregation of little children going to school, old women picking up sticks in the woods, tired artisans, Socialists, Junkers, Catholics, Protestants. . . .)

Our problem is to see that truths in the science of society, no more difficult to grasp by laymen than the microbic theory, the understanding of which has done such wonders, shall become the current coin of the millions turned out by our schools. But before any knowledge whatsoever can be of use—and this brings us to the next point on our list, starting from the bottom—we must be clear as to what it is we want ; what is the purpose of the knowledge which we desire. Until we know that, we cannot know what it is we need to know.

Now the truth is that the ordinary citizen and voter in his political activities and principles does not ask himself what he wants of governments ; what they are for ; and the

educationalist has not asked himself very clearly—it is to be feared—what education is for, so far as its social purpose as distinct from its individual purpose, the development of the personality, is concerned.

Let us take first the case of the voter.

If you ask a man point blank what he wants of politics, he will, of course, consciously taking stock, tell you that he wants economic security, high wages, national prosperity. But his behaviour as a voter proves again and again that, while he professes to direct his policy to the end of making those things secure, he is not in reality guided by those considerations at all.

Here is an election going on. One of the candidates is a great economic expert, equipped by training and study to deal with problems of trade, industry, wages, housing, administration. Any election agent will tell you that that is no particular advantage. In this particular case his rival is a very popular local figure, with a brilliant military record, a great athlete. The latter simply walks away with the election. The economic expert is nowhere. That sort of phenomena is one of the commonest in politics. Were the voters thinking mainly of their economic distress? Then why did the winning candidate stress so much his military record, why did his friends talk so much of his prowess as a great local athletic hero? Did the voters make use of the knowledge which they possessed? They might be forgiven for not understanding difficult questions of currency, the price level, and the international exchanges. But there was one fact which was perfectly plain to all the voters, this fact: That the capacity to kill Germans, or kick goals at football matches, excellent doubtless in its place, is no qualification for dealing with problems of trade, industry, unemployment. It was the one fact which most of the voters ignored in the use of their vote.

In Germany, at a time when the country was going through the gravest economic suffering, the appeal which had the greatest effect upon the voters was the demand for equality of armament with the Allies. As these lines are

being written the morning paper contains, among the Berlin dispatches, one which describes how Herr Heines, Police Chief of Breslau and "one of the most feared and vigorous revolutionary leaders, fanatically revered by his followers," excited frenzied enthusiasm by the following speech :

"I had the good fortune to reach military age as the German nation in 1914 was called to arms. From that day I have been a soldier, that is for twenty years. If I have a wish to-day, my birthday, it is that I remain a soldier until I die. That is my point of contact with you. You are soldiers, I am a soldier, and we must all fight and make sacrifices, now that the inner revolution has been close, for one aim—namely, that the outer revolution can be organised, against bondage, against those who think our people can permanently be degraded to the rank of a second-class nation. It is the life's work of the S.A. (storm detachments) to free the German nation from bondage. The younger generation has only just begun its life work. The 2,000,000 dead of the world war shall not have fallen in vain."

Since most of the sixty nations of the world, including some of the most highly civilised of all like the Scandinavian states, Switzerland, Holland, are "second-class nations," and do not seem to find the fact synonymous with "bondage," and since the victors in the last war are not in the least able to use their victory for the purpose of solving fundamental economic problems like unemployment and monetary instability, it is quite evident, if the followers of Herr Heines were thinking mainly of welfare, that they would be relatively unmoved by appeals which, as it is, provoke frenzied enthusiasm.

But this is in keeping with the motives of Nationalism everywhere. Its passions have extremely little relation to welfare. The patriot everywhere is prepared to sacrifice the people and their welfare for the Fatherland ; its power

and glory ; the subjugation of its jealous enemies. The hectoring old colonel who regards all efforts to improve the lot of the people as " damned socialist nonsense " really would " die for his country," as readily as he would starve and enslave the millions to maintain its power. The motive which thus animates nationalism the world over is not less strong because it happens to be difficult to define or describe : it has perhaps been the dominating force of European politics this last fifty years. In the long run these motives are less dangerous perhaps when erected into a definite theory, after the German fashion, than when we obey them without knowing that they are determining our conduct.

The dangers of political nationalism arise mainly from its psychology : what it does to the mind and spirit. There are perfectly explainable reasons for this. Nationalism is an assertion of independence, the right to be sovereign, to do that is what we please nationally without reference to the rights of others. We don't want to have to consider those others at all. We want, at least in one relationship, to be free of those social disciplines which civilisation imposes upon us in our daily lives ; to let the slumbering savage in us have his fling ; we want a day off. Nationalism, with its brag and boastings and fist-shaking, with its " sacred egoisms," " ourselves alone," " ourselves above everybody else," enables us vicariously to have that fling.

But when we let that play any large part in our tempers, a whole nation can get Hitlerism, and, what is worst of all, think it fine and splendid, unconscious of what is really happening. There is such collapse of all sane judgment that suddenly, for millions of the most educated people of the world, evil becomes good, and good becomes evil. When highly educated Germans can take pleasure in violence and cruelty for itself, can laud mean bullying as the sure sign of virility and racial superiority, one begins to get a hint of what this temper may do.

It is not merely a matter of preferring certain " moral " to material ends. There is the same failure to decide what we really want in moral ends. We entered the war for the

ends of political freedom, "to make the world safe for democracy." When the war was over the conduct of those who proclaimed that aim proved that in fact they were relatively indifferent to it. A veritable epidemic of dictatorship breaks out, of dictatorships and autocracies often approved by those who "fought for democracy and freedom." In a way perhaps they were sincere when they adopted the slogan about freedom and democracy, but they caught up these suggested objectives without really putting it to themselves whether they attached in fact much importance to them.

This first question, which must be asked before we can even know what it is that we want to know, is, of course, in another form the old Platonic question: What is the good life?

The fact, of course, of asking the question, would be to promote further questions: Why do all the great states of the world struggle with each other for preponderant power? To what end can the power be used?

This writer has asked that question a great deal in the past, and the first answers that he got were, of course, to the effect that power was desired because it was the means of wealth, or the instrument by which a nation insured its proper share of the limited resources of the world. The fact is, however, that power cannot be used to those ends; that it cannot be used in order to achieve political security, defence, since by the method of preponderant power, as we have seen in a previous chapter, the security of one is the insecurity of the other. More and more, therefore, are we driven to the conclusion that power, political power over other nations, is desired for itself. And this is supposed to end the discussion.

But having got that far, the next question will inevitably arise: Is it worthy conduct for our nation to ask others to accept a position which we refuse to accept for ourselves? (For, of course, if we are preponderant, the rival cannot be.) Would not ordinary decency, social instinct, prompt us to desire to get away from such a situation?

An aptitude for that type of introspection which would make us aware of what we want, prompt us to weigh values with some sense of responsibility, could be developed by methods of teaching (say) history other than those usually employed. That aptitude so developed would help us to apply what we already know to the problems we want to solve ; to get our everyday philosophy of life a little straighter and clearer.

As illustrating the way in which the plain truth related to such things as the relation of human nature to human conduct and institutions gets turned completely upside down, I have taken six examples of those current "axioms" which determine that public attitude to war and peace which, if modified, would alter the situation so enormously. As will be seen, the true reading, as distinct from the false, in no way demands further knowledge ; only the right use of the knowledge we have already.

The cases cover some ground already touched upon, but it clarifies this important point to group them together.

(1) *Human nature is so quarrelsome that nations naturally fight.* That is why international, like national institutions, are so necessary : the fact is an argument *for*, not against an organised international society. The point has been covered in what precedes.

(2) *You cannot change human nature.* No one proposes to change human nature (whatever that may mean), but to change human behaviour. That point also is dealt with in what precedes.

(3) *War has biological roots ; marks the need of expanding populations for room ; is the ultimate "struggle for bread."* Compare this theory, paraded so often as "realism," with the facts of the world about us, a world in which every nation is trying its utmost, not to seize the food and resources of other nations, but to *keep them out* by insurmountable tariff walls, a fantastic world in which we go in terror, not of scarcity, but of plenty ; where a considerable proportion of its population stands idle by idle machines, because it has not yet learned how to distribute the food it already

produces. Brazil burns coffee, Canada burns wheat, but neither burns the coal of the British miner, who goes without both the coffee and the wheat. The trouble is plainly due to dislocation, a failure of world co-ordination, and co-operation, a failure caused mainly by war, and the spirit which underlies war. The truth is not "Fight or Starve," but "Stop Fighting or Starve"; a truth which even Japan will not be able to ignore. The cure for insufficiency is better co-operation; war makes better co-operation impossible. Half a million Indians, divided into numberless tribes, perpetually at war, found the whole of what is now the United States inadequate for sustenance, and often starved. The same territory later supports two hundred times that population at an infinitely higher standard—because the new population managed to keep peace among themselves. If a dozen nations within the British islands had gone on fighting each other, the population to-day would enjoy the standard of life of the Heptarchy or the Red Indian. The killing of the Indians by the Whites was only inevitable in the sense that Al Capone or lynching is inevitable; the experience of Penn, Las Casas, and a host of others, to say nothing of the Canadian Government of to-day, proves that old and new populations can live side by side without war. Because Queen Elizabeth financed piracy and the slave trade, it is not "inevitable" that King George V should in opening Africa.

(4) *War is necessary to change the status quo.* If and when Mr. de Valera proclaims his Republic, shall we declare war? I venture to doubt it, for "unchanging human nature" behaves very differently in 1933 from what it would have done even in 1913. The same people who for two generations had passionately, bitterly resisted Home Rule, many of whom would have resisted Asquith to the point of civil war, grant only a few years later the vastly greater autonomy of Dominion status without turning a hair. It constitutes a change in the *status quo*. The *status quo* has been changed again and again without war. Canada gets readily what the thirteen colonies had to fight for.

(5) *War is productive of many fine qualities.* So is a small-pox epidemic. But we have decided, on balance, against the pestilences of the past. Whatever the advantages of the Black Death may have been (and they were many) we have decided that we don't intend to have a repetition. That decision, that we don't want pestilence, and are prepared to pay some price for preventing it, was the first indispensable step to its abolition. But the militarist has not decided what he wants. He *says* he wants peace; and then immediately disparages it. ("Psychic suicide.") Which brings us to the practical importance of this fatalist philosophy, embodied in the final dogmatic assertion that

(6) *War is inevitable.* Perhaps. I do not know. Nobody knows. Not a few historians and statesmen have declared that the existence of a League of Nations in 1914 would have prevented the Great War. If we cannot be sure of that neither can we be sure of the contrary.

Though we do not know whether "war" is inevitable, we do know that disease is inevitable. Yet in the West plague, cholera and leprosy have been wiped away. Is that no gain? It is a gain which we could not possibly have made if men had said: "Pestilence is inevitable. It is fate. What can our poor human wills do against fate—and perhaps Providence? These scourges must be accepted as one of the conditions under which we live on the planet. And, who knows? They may be a cleansing tide." I say that we could never have fought pestilence if that fatalism had dominated us, because where that philosophy does dominate, as in certain areas of the East, these pestilences still rage. They rage because many Orientals look upon sanitary precaution exactly as the militarist in the West looks upon the efforts of Pacifists and internationalists: the tiresome interference of fussy busybodies, professing with their chatter to hold back tides that have poured over the world since the world began. In the face of that fatalism Western sanitation is impotent to do what with another philosophy can be done; as the facts of the West prove.

A similar fatalism in the presence of the ancient pestilence

of war will produce a similar impotence. But it will not be an inevitable impotence, as in the presence of storm or earthquake. Men do not make the earthquake and have no responsibility for it. They do make war. Army budgets do not get voted and battleships built by "nature," nor by "fate." Men do the voting and the building and the firing, and must not shunt off the responsibility to "fate" or "destiny."

No one pretends that it will be easy to conquer war. It will be impossible if we have not even made up our minds whether we *want* to win ; if every effort to that end is disparaged, treated with contempt and sneers. If that is the attitude we shall fail, fail because we so willed it. But the responsibility will be man's, not nature's.

Education as commonly given should enable the ordinary man to grasp as almost self-evident such elementary truths as the foregoing. Perhaps the heaviest item in the indictment of education as we know it, is that such social truths are not self-evident even to the educated. The management of the world, which went smash, was for the most part in the hands of highly-educated people, belonging to classes which had possessed special advantages in that respect. To be highly educated did not mean to be politically wise. One thinks of pre-war Germany. The schoolmaster had been very much abroad in the land for the best part of a century before the catastrophes ; its universities had philosophised over history and politics for longer still ; its bureaucracy was the most intensely schooled in the world. The conduct of the relationship of States, European diplomacy of the pre-war era, was in the hands of a highly educated specially trained order. And to-day, in Germany as elsewhere, some of the most disturbing and disruptive of the movements which push Europe nearer to chaos find their main impulse in the youth of the universities.

Dr. J. J. van der Leeuw, of Leyden University, has recently indicated the main educational need thus :

- "If I were to describe the change that is taking place, I would characterise it as the transition from a world of anarchy, of chaos, of separateness, to one of organic unity, of co-ordination. But this world unity is not willingly entered upon by man ; he is forced to unite or go under.
- "There was a time when man could live in a self-sufficient life, when the family, tribe or nation could live selfishly, with utter indifference as to the fate of other tribes or nations. Nations might suffer or prosper, be destroyed or destroy : their fate did not necessarily involve others.
- "With the progress of science and of modern technique, with the advent of the machine or power age, all this changed."

Up to this point there will be general agreement. Much less agreement, however, when we come to re-cast educational values and methods, to decide precisely in what way the new education should differ from the old. Dr. James McDonald, Chairman of the American Foreign Policy Association, in a recent address pointed out that "by the magic of science and invention we have been transformed almost unawares into a world society," and asks :

- "What has progressive education to offer toward the solution of this problem of building institutions to meet the needs of a changing world order? Unless nations can create international institutional relationships that will harmonise their conflicting economic and divergent political interests, no domestic reforms anywhere can be more than palliative. Science, by minimising space and eliminating time, has made all nations members of one community. Intelligence must now, while keeping open the opportunity for change and growth, establish law and maintain order within the community. The alternative is catastrophic. If we cannot maintain peace, all our civic and cultural gains

will merely prepare a finer host of men, and of women and children too, for the indiscriminate wholesale slaughter that science will enable."

And he asks that education shall (a) inculcate the principle of the essential unity of mankind ; (b) teach the interdependence of interests of all people ; (c) give a less national bias to history ; (d) teach the realities of war.

All of which is to the good, of course, as far as it goes. And yet it is almost certain that educational reform which merely made children familiar, or more familiar, with the external aspects of our international world, taught them more about the life of other countries, made known to them the facts of interdependence, might well fail to enable them to avoid a repetition of the disasters of the last twenty years.

For the real indictment of our educational method of the past lies in the fact already emphasised : the worst disasters which have come upon us could have been avoided if the ordinary man had grasped the social meaning of the facts he already knew ; if education had developed in him the skill or habit of applying to social problems simple truths inherent or self-evident in common facts of daily life. The world has drifted to chaos, not because it needed to know more facts, as it needs to know more facts if it is to split the atom or cure cancer, but because we have not applied to our urgent problems conclusions which are to be deduced from facts already known.

What has been the main difficulty in our attempts to live together and to manage society ? Where our main failure ? Where have we proved weakest ? If we can agree in the answer to those questions, we shall be able to see where our education on the social side has been defective.

Take certain typical difficulties of the last ten years. The economic restoration of Europe has been rendered impossible by, among other things, the refusal to grapple promptly with, and to wipe out of the way, the difficulties

of Reparations and the big inter-governmental debts. For years the experts have been indicating one course, and governments, under the pressure of general popular feeling, taking another. American economists and bankers, for instance, have for long been saying to the public : Cancel the debts or lower your tariff ; if you cannot receive European goods then the debts cannot be paid. The proposition is quite self-evident, and a hundred million of the most universally schooled people in the world have been quite unable to understand it. One does not have to read a single page of technical economics to know that as all the gold in the world only represents a fraction of the debts owed to America, she must be prepared to receive something other than gold : and that as the paper money of foreign countries is quite useless to her (except for the purpose of buying foreign goods) she must receive goods or nothing.

It is certainly true that that could be made completely clear to an intelligent child in ten minutes. The educated publics of great modern states have been unable to grasp it after ten years of prolonged, learned, technical debate accompanied by mountains of blue books, oceans of talk. At this moment in America, after ten years of discussion, politicians are talking as though the self-evidently true were self-evidently false. For years in Britain, for more years in France, politicians, journalists, denied something which a child or a savage—anyone, that is, whose mind had not been bemused by our educational methods—would have recognised almost instantly as plainly true.

This is not an isolated case. If you say to the average stockbroker or city man in Europe or America : " The object of foreign trade is to increase our imports of foreign goods ; unless our imports increase we lose by foreign trade "—if you make that self-evidently true statement, it will be denied flatly by ninety-nine business men out of a hundred. The result of this failure to see something which the Zulu (since his mind would not be bemused by the money illusion), would see instantly, is the strangulation of the world's trade, the creation of a world condition which,

if it goes on, must ultimately make the economic position of Britain quite impossible.

At the root of many of these confusions is, of course, the deeply ingrained tendency of the human mind to confuse symbols with the things they represent, to speak of a nation as a "person" and then think of it economically as a real person; to misapply analogies, to slip into "unilateral illusions." But if that is a natural tendency, then it is surely the business of education to create in the minds of those apt to tumble into these pitfalls an awareness of their presence, to give the skill which will enable the ordinary man to be on the alert. And the danger goes deeper than tariffs or mercantilist fallacies.

The war came, not because men were wicked, still less because one particular nation was much more wicked than any other, but because the nations as a whole, in constant and daily contact, with the views of one nation as to its rights in conflict with the views of another as to those rights, facing all the familiar difficulties of the human community, refused to create common rules of conduct and institutions for their enforcement, refused, that is, to apply to international relations the commonest, the most universal, the most conclusive human experience.

The commonest daily experience teaches us that if each is to be, in his relations with another, judge of his own rights—which means being judge of the rights of that other as well—there must be conflict. For each is demanding a right which he denies the other. Equally there must be conflict if each, in order to be secure, demands to be stronger than the other: arithmetic intervenes. These are the familiar paradoxes of social anarchy, which no sane person would think of urging as a workable method in closely packed civilised communities. And of war—so nearly related in its effects, and probably in its causes, to the present disintegration of our society—one can say this: It may have many causes, it may have one, which may be

unknown, but this much is certain : it will inevitably arise so long as we have international anarchy. The abolition of anarchy may not cure war, but its presence will inevitably cause it.

Yet the net result of our education, of all our history teaching, our academic philosophising, was a practically universal belief in or acceptance of anarchy as the normal condition in international relationship. Educated men everywhere accepted the international anarchy as the natural relationship of states ; strenuously defended it, passionately resisted projects which would modify it. Let us be frank as to the nature of that acceptance. The public as a whole did not say : " Of course, the absence of international institutions, the method by which each is his own defender, must end in conflict, but we accept war as the price we pay for certain other advantages attaching to national sovereignty and independence." They said in effect : " War need not arise from this situation if other nations behave as well as we do. War does not inhere in this particular system, it is the result of the misbehaviour of foreigners." That is not merely what most of the educated world said before 1914, it is what most of that world says to-day. Certainly the ordinary man does not see in the demand for the maintenance of peace and of national sovereignty a contradiction of the principles upon which all organised society is founded. He does not see that contradiction because he has not been made familiar through his education with the necessary mechanism of society (as he has been made familiar, for instance, with the fundamental mechanism of the heavenly bodies, the rotundity of the earth and so forth) and he has not had developed in him the habit of applying the conclusions of common experience to new social situations.

Our education has usually completely failed to leave any awareness of what on the one hand human nature is really like, and on the other any perception of the principles which must be applied if any society is to work at all, of how man can be fitted to society and society to man. It is

doubtful whether most of these who come out of our schools are even aware that what they are supposed to have been learning all those years is the nature of man, and the nature of society. In any case, most of those who have been produced by our education have not been able to distinguish between the relationships or attitudes which are anti-social, which make society completely unworkable, and those which do not.

A curious standard of values is revealed. Co-operation can only take place between men, society can only exist at all, if certain principles are applied. It becomes entirely unworkable if certain other principles (e.g., that each shall be his own judge of his own rights) are applied. Most of those who emerge from our schools are quite incapable of distinguishing between one group and the other; their operation, nature, meaning have never been brought home. But while the mechanism of human society—the nature of which will depend upon the ideas its members apply to it—has not been explained, every child has been given some notion of the mechanism of heavenly bodies, of the movement of the earth round the sun, though his ideas about the phenomena are not going to affect them very much. That the earth is as flat as a pancake might be a common idea, and the ships would still navigate; the common view that foreigners ought not to send us their goods and ought to pay for ours and settle their debts to us in “Money,” has put about half the ships of the world out of business and has helped to reduce millions to the miseries of unemployment.

The world seeks for the “plan” that will save it; give it recovery. But in view of what fifteen years of European popular judgment about Reparations reveals, and the similar exhibition threatened by American popular judgment on the debt question, what assurance is there that even if the perfect plan of recovery were drawn up, the world would pay the slightest attention to it? Yet that aspect of the problem is curiously neglected. Several men of wealth in America this last twenty years have offered

great prizes for the expert who would produce a "plan" for world peace—the right kind of League or Court or what not. But the prize ought rather to have been offered for a "plan" whereby the public could be brought to recognise the right plan when they saw it. And the two are entirely separate problems involving entirely separate techniques. Yet the two are very commonly confused. "Although I have been to the very tip-top men on the subject," said the editor of an educational publication not long since, "I have been quite unable to get a clear statement of the nature of the monetary problem." He was asked, "To whom did you go?" and in reply gave names famous in the world of monetary research. Whereupon a friend retorted: "You went to the wrong experts. You wanted experts in explanation, and you went to experts in currency."

We see, the world over, the public utterly unable to grasp even the simplest rudiments of a problem like that of Reparations or Debts. After fifteen years of discussion, it is still a profound mystery, not merely to the average sensual man, but to the average newspaper editor, the clergyman, and university professor (unless he happens to be a professor of economics), why in the long run those payments must be made in goods or services, or not at all. "If we don't have to take beefsteaks from the butcher; if he can pay his debts in money; why cannot Germany or Britain pay theirs in the same way?" The most popular argument to-day in America in connection with the Debts is "If the European countries can spend money on armaments, as they do, they can pay what they owe us." Ninety-nine leading articles out of a hundred, and nearly all the popular cartoons, reflect that view. The essence of the problem simply has not sunk in.

Yet it is those people who will have to choose as between the rival plans, to permit, or refuse to permit, governments having agreed upon a plan to put it into operation. And one recalls past experience in that matter, not merely in

respect of Debts and Reparations : Wilson fighting at the cost of his life for his League of Nations and tripped up by a party opposition exploiting an obsolescent isolationism; his successors fighting for a world court met by the same popular opposition ; the efforts of the governments, faced with the nervousness of French opinion, to secure acceptance of some plan of guarantee which would placate it—the three-Power guarantee of the Peace Conference repudiated by the public ; the British guarantee repudiated at home ; the efforts of statesmen like Lord Cecil, years of patience-breaking labour with a Treaty of Mutual Assistance brought to naught ; Mr. MacDonald's Protocol, meeting the same fate. The story might be almost indefinitely prolonged.

Take one other detail in our educational scale of values.

What preparation does the education of the ordinary citizen constitute for understanding, for instance, this thing money ? We deem it necessary to let our scholars know about the structure of the earth, its movement round the sun, facts of geography, botany, zoology, something of the stories of kings and queens, snatches of dead languages, and much else, but in all that strange medley of information not one word, from the day that he enters school to the day he leaves, about the most indispensable, the most powerful and most frequently used of all the devices of our daily lives : the money in our pockets and in our banks. The thing about which—or about matters intimately related to it—we are all of us in some measure called upon to make vital and far-reaching decisions, decisions of public policy which effect enormously the distribution of wealth and the lives of millions is one about which we are, speaking broadly, taught nothing whatsoever.

Now that is, when you come to think of it, an astonishing fact. The thing which, of all things, in human society, concerns us most insistently every day, almost every hour of our lives, and about which man has made some of his worst mistakes and developed his worst understandings—

something which has grown into an elaborate system and around which our whole civilisation rotates—is something which our popular education completely neglects.

We have seen the post-war economic reconstruction of Europe held up for half a decade by the crassest ignorance of the most elementary economic truths. We see Europe to-day unable to achieve the degree of economic unity which is indispensable to the welfare of its dense populations, because its peoples everywhere are dominated by fallacies which have been exposed by economists a thousand times. We suffer perpetual difficulties of unemployment, commercial depressions, industrial maladjustments now in the coalfields, now in cotton factories ; we face as a result movements for “nationalisation,” for economic experimentation of all kinds ; proposals for the revolutionary overthrow of the whole system. Yet this is the one department of knowledge omitted from the education of all but a microscopic minority.

The contrast between the magnitude of the issues involved in this matter and character of the knowledge brought to bear on their decisions is comic. And tragic.

The general conclusions to which these observations point is now perhaps sufficiently indicated. They are intended to prompt, not so much the introduction of new “subjects”—economics, social organisation, ethics, internationalism—as such method of teaching all the social sciences, and some subjects not ranked as “social” like mathematics and language, as to give scholars a lively sense (a) of the dangerous anti-social side of human nature as well as its great social potentialities ; (b) of the way in which man has used his intelligence increasingly to shape his impulses to social ends ; (c) of the essential insecurity, vulnerability, precariousness and imperfection of human society, the fact that man is always experimenting with it, and some of the conclusions to which those experiments of the past and present seem to point ; what hope and what warning they embody ; and the principles of social action

which seem to emerge ; and (d) make the whole process a means of developing the skill for seeing the meaning of facts, of drawing the socially useful conclusion from them.

Any detailed illustration would lead us too far : I see anthropology merged into history as part of the story of the way early societies and social rules were formed ; as part of the story of how men began to think, which would bring us to include psychology, and that, as part also of the explanation of man's infinite cruelties, his massacres, tormentings, burnings, inquisitions. And in deciding the relative importance of events, I would revise rather radically existing scales of value. To an event like the battle of Waterloo in a history text-book I might give perhaps a paragraph or two ; but to events like the coming of money, with its consequent mercantilism, to certain steps in the development of law, to the story of the growth of the inductive method of reasoning, to the laws abolishing torture and slavery, to the story of the coming of religious toleration, of the notion of human equality ; of democracy ; the coming of nationalism—to that part of history which explains these events and helps to make them intelligible to the ordinary mind, I would devote many, many pages.

And finally I would assume that they *can* be made intelligible to the ordinary mind. The task is obviously difficult, but we should act on the faith that it is not impossible ; that we can, even by the instrument of the parable, the Robinson Crusoe story of the formation and failure of certain pocket-edition societies, make sufficient of these things intelligible to the minds of children to set up an increasing realisation that what they are engaged upon in their education is a preparation for understanding on the one hand themselves, their natures, and on the other hand their society, the world which later they will have to live in, and help to manage.

" Education " suggests efforts in terms of generations ; conversion of the public from archaic standards of value in education, training of adequate teachers. . . . And long before that, civilisation may well have foundered. And every

plan or measure of the right kind rejected, every one of the wrong kind adopted, means making the ultimate problem worse.

But a great deal can be done without having to wait upon changes in the mass mind. While it is true that the plain man has the last word, and that no plan can really be accepted if faced with his hostility, the expert, the technician, particularly the social theorist, can himself advance things a great deal by taking this truth into consideration, by making due allowance for the slowness of change in ideas and values. It will mean in practice a wise eclecticism ; the readiness to combine different plans, to accept a League of Nations even though it be imperfect, and then to work for the elimination of the imperfections ; a readiness to attach to capitalism any of the elements of control which may help to correct the dislocations and maladjustments that now devastate it ; a readiness to recognise that the fact of some measure being indispensable is not proof that it is all-sufficient ; a care always to see that the best is not made the enemy of the better.

CHAPTER VIII : THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE

By PROFESSOR HAROLD J. LASKI

1. The Fundamental Causes of War
2. The Modern State
3. Economic Imperialism at Work
4. The League's Weakness
5. The Economic Road to Peace
6. The Sovereign National State
7. A World Order of Socialist Societies

§ 1. THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF WAR

The Precarious Peace. Most civilised men now realise the infinite tragedy of war ; and those to whom it presents itself as a desirable instrument of national policy have certainly neither the authority nor the prestige they possessed in the period before 1914. There is a far wider recognition than at any previous period of history that war and civilisation are mutually exclusive terms ; and the effort to win assent to institutions which minimise the danger of war has elicited a response which would have seemed unthinkable a generation ago.

Yet no one can say that security against its advent has been attained in any final way. Hardly a year has passed since the Peace of Versailles in which nation-states have not been willing to fight ; and, important as have been the achievements of the League of Nations, no realist who scans the plain implications of the Sino-Japanese dispute would

deny that the barriers against war are still inadequate. It is not only that the legacies of past error have left grave injustices which their victims will, under circumstances they deem suitable, fight rather than condone. It is not only, either, that the concept of state-sovereignty still leaves the hinterland between states one of an anarchy into which the rule of law has no ultimate right to penetrate. It is not merely, finally, that the mysterious alchemy of national emotion seems able, in the dramatic preludes to the conflict of states, still to triumph over the obvious claims of reason to pacific settlement.

The Remedies Prescribed. All these are difficulties enough against which, as yet, no satisfactory remedies have been found. But the problems they create do not really go to the root of the matter. It is not inconceivable for instance that the exercise of a wise statemanship in the coming years may in large measure repair some of the grosser injustices of such a peace as that of Versailles; the history of its reparations clauses suggests that, at long last, the pressure of grim fact drives passion to the recognition of sanity. It is possible, also, that by such devices as the Optional Clause and the General Act,¹ even, it maybe, by a method built on the concept of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, some of the more patent and ugly gaps in the Covenant of the League of Nations may be closed. Nor is it illegitimate to suppose that a profounder experiment in educational possibilities will make popular common sense, in the coming years, less abjectly the slave of ignorant patriotism than it has been at previous moments of crisis.

Progress in these directions is possible, without the certainty of the foundations of a system which makes war appear either necessary or desirable being attacked at the root. They would diminish the prospect of its occurrence; they would not destroy its inevitability. For we have got to make up our minds to the realisation that war is a natural

¹ See on these the discussion by Viscount Cecil in Chapter V of this book.

expression of the social and political system under which we live ; and we cannot prevent its occurrence without removing the causes which make it natural. We have to realise that all the causes out of which it springs are not traceable to the folly or ill-will of men. They are the consequence of an inherited framework of society which, when we reach its fundamentals, leaves us in the presence of competing wills which have no alternative but to fight for mastery on the battlefield. We can increase security positively, by a technique of mutual assistance against an aggressor. We can increase security negatively, by a system of international disarmament. We can seek by the intensive and widespread training of intelligence to inoculate men against the baser sort of patriotism which obeys so inertly the orders of the state as to abdicate, if, indeed, it has grasped, its profounder obligations to mankind. It is yet a crude Utopianism to believe that any of these achievements is more than a partial safeguard against war ; they are an assurance against its symptoms rather than a treatment of its causes.

Main Causes of War Economic. For while the roots of war cannot be traced to any single habit, its main causes lie in the economic field. Its chief object is a search for a wealth obtainable by its means that is deemed greater by those who push the state to its making than will be obtainable if peace is preserved. That object may not appear obvious to the citizens of the state in whose name the war is waged. They may deem themselves, with perfect sincerity, to be fighting for liberty, or national rights, for the vindication of their national honour, or the maintenance of democracy. The declared objects of the combatant states may seem to their citizens antagonistic even while, to a neutral observer, they appear identical ; and it may only be when the peace terms are made known that the margin which separates the declared and actual purposes may become manifest to informed scrutiny. Men live for the most part enfolded in their private lives ; and the real, as distinct from the formal,

foundations of social power do not reveal themselves to those who do not engage in search for them. So long as the power of the state can be exploited for the differential advantage of a few, so long it will be exploited ; and so long, also, as one of the essential forms of exploitation is the making of war, will war be regarded as a natural instrument of state-policy.

Not merely, moreover, its exploitation, as state-power, in a few mens' interest. A state is conceivable which is organised for the common welfare, in which the equal interest of men in its results is recognised as its essential principle. There is no *a priori* reason why such a state, if it were confronted by the prospect of a great addition to its common welfare, which it believed, for one reason or another, to be desirable or necessary, might not, if it thought the circumstances propitious, embark upon war in order to obtain that addition. It is even possible that such a state might embark upon war with a patriotism more extravagant, a loyalty more profound, than one in which its authority was exploited by a few. For the very fact that all citizens might share equally in the benefits expected would provide an incentive to victory far more intense than is likely in a state where these are confined to a small number of bondholders or a single industry battling for the domination of a market. The division of the world, that is to say, into a system of socialist states which retained the substance of sovereign authority would not, of itself, solve in a final way the problem of war. Until we recognise that an interdependent economic world, whatever the internal organisation of its constituent parts, is incompatible with a system of political units which bear no relation to that inescapable unity, we shall have left untouched the central cause of war. Our methods of governance must fit the facts to be governed. Until we achieve that correspondence, we cannot be said to have grappled with the heart of the problem.

§ 2. THE MODERN STATE

Contradictory Political and Economic Principles. Any consideration, then, of the nature of war must begin with an analysis of the nature of the characteristic modern state. Its essential feature is its division on different principles for economic and political purposes. In the latter, in the main, it is built upon the principle of universal suffrage ; each citizen retains an equal fragment of political power. But in the economic sphere its essence is the ownership of the means of production by a few, the many being dependent upon those few for an access to livelihood. They are employed for the profit to which their labour gives rise ; and it is the inherent nature of the economic system that they should cease to be employed so soon as their engagement fails to result in profit. For this search for profit is the whole motive-power of a capitalist society ; and its well-being as a capitalist society is dependent upon a minimum interference by the political government with the processes of that search. For a capitalist society inspires a conception of property in which recognition is given by the law to the widest possible title to the benefits it involves ; and it therefore seeks in any direction the prospect of the highest profits attainable by the exercise of skill and ingenuity.

Capitalism : First Stage. In the infancy of modern industrial processes, the return to capital was mainly secured by the exploitation of the domestic market. To satisfy the native consumer in an expanding society leaves to the capitalist the prospect of a profit with which he is well content. What he saves, over and above his standard of consumption, is capable of being put to profitable use for the most part within the frontiers of the society to which he belongs. But as competition develops, profits tend to a diminishing equilibrium ; and the entrepreneur begins to look abroad for fresh fields of exploitation. So long as the character of this investment is confined to the development of states of similar character to that by whose subjects the

capital is provided—as when Englishmen helped to develop the American continent by their investments in American railways—little but benefit results from the process. There is what may be termed a reciprocal interchange of benefits ; and the comparative equality of the publics involved gives to the system something of that beneficent quality which enabled men to look, as Cobden and Bright were able to look, to the mechanisms of commercial intercourse as themselves a vehicle of peaceful relationships.

Capitalism : Second Stage. If we date modern industrialism from the close of the Napoleonic wars, the system as beneficent may be said to have lasted for some sixty years. It was destroyed by the coincidence of a number of separate factors which altered the whole character of its operation. The development of science enormously increased the power of the machine ; and the new productivity which resulted therefrom demanded an ever more intense cultivation of new markets to make profit attainable. The new countries, moreover, became increasingly protectionist in character. They developed native industries of their own ; and these sought to exclude, and largely succeeded in excluding, rival national products from their own markets exactly at a time when they became more obviously necessary. The opening up of the Near East, of Africa, and China, moreover, the discovery that they possessed immensely valuable natural resources, led to a growing effort by capitalists to exploit the opportunities they offered ; and this introduced new terms into the economic equation because the investments there made were in territories which lacked the authority to compete on equal terms with their exploiters. It was discovered that the national state could put its power behind its investors in such a way that once they had forced their entrance into a profitable market, its armed forces could be used, either potentially or actually, to dominate the market so secured. When this phase had come, capitalist society entered into a decisively new phase.

Economic Imperialism. It was one in which the nation-state ceased to be merely concerned with the peaceful penetration of markets by the simple offer of superior benefits by one set of traders over another. To gain a profit which had become increasingly difficult of access in the normal way, it began to search for special concessions largely gained upon unequal terms from those with whom the bargains were won. To protect them, it then sought the assistance of the state; and the latter was driven, by the inherent logic of the system, to have at its disposal an adequate amount of armed force to give its assistance the properly authoritative character. But since each state followed, as it grew to maturity in internal economic development, quite inevitably in the same path, it followed that the process of foreign investment ceased to be pacific in character. Competing cliques of business men, each searching for exceptional profits, jockeyed for position against one another. To assure success, they identified their aims with the national well-being; and they were able, by the resources at their disposal, so to exploit the emotions of nationalism, as to identify their states with their effort. When that had been effected, the pacific nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century was transformed into imperialism; and it was the essential nature of the latter to employ the military resources of the state for its protective armament. But, since each imperialistic state was pursuing the same policy, each, inevitably, had to strain every nerve to become stronger than its rival. Foreign investment begat imperialism; imperialism begat militarism; militarism begat war. The struggle of 1914 was the natural outcome of a capitalism which, once it had passed beyond the phase of domestic exploitation, was bound to use the machinery of national government for the conquest and consolidation of special economic gains. Once the imperialistic phase had arrived, the relationship between capitalism and war was inescapable.

Nothing, perhaps, illustrates this evolution so well as the history of the British Empire during the nineteenth century.

Within the last thirty years of the nineteenth century Great Britain acquired one-third of its territory, and one-fourth of its population beyond the seas. Mostly, the new lands thus obtained were in the half-known regions of the African continent ; though the steady process of annexation on the Indian frontier and in the Malay peninsula must not be forgotten. But, if less remarkable, the overseas expansion of France and Germany has been upon precisely similar lines. Italy entered the field in 1880, the United States after the Spanish-American war ; and even Portugal and Belgium were not exempt from the passion for colonial empire.

It must be emphasised that this type of dominion was in principle different from the older conception of colonisation. It was not a process of white settlement upon which, sooner or later, the institutions of self-government could be conferred. It was the exploitation of vast areas for commercial profit, the white man in residence being either an administrator, whether military or civil, or a planter dependent on native labour ; and there was no evidence of any intention that, over any practicable vista of time, the majority of the inhabitants should control the Government. The whole purpose of white dominion lay in the special economic benefits expected from the passage of the territory into the control of the mother country.

But the evolution of this economic imperialism has not been confined to areas actually annexed. Alongside the colony, there has been the protectorate ; alongside the protectorate there has been the sphere of influence ; and it may be said without injustice that alongside the sphere of influence there has been the sphere of legitimate aspiration. The struggle between France and Great Britain has been an example of the first ; the control of Persia by Great Britain and Russia before the war exemplifies the second ; and the economic domination of South America by the United States is an illustration of the third. In each case, the fiction of independence is overtly preserved. But, in each case also, the economic life, and the foreign policy which

expresses it, of the state concerned, is so dominated by the nationals of the exploiting state that, for all intents and purposes, the independence of the exploited community has ceased to be effective. And once this prehensile imperialism has taken hold of the subject-state, any attempt at challenge to its authority leads to a diplomatic conflict which may well issue in war. The atmosphere of international relations is poisoned by the knowledge that if the financiers engaged in exploitation are interfered with, their national state will regard that interference as a blow to its prestige. Because, therefore, it must be in a position to defend its prestige, it is driven to militarise itself. This produces a position in which fear and envy pervade the relationships of states ; and these, in their turn, lead to a temper of developing insecurity. States come to stand in the posture of gladiators to one another ; the armed forces become their essence. From this there emerges that dangerous and unsteady equilibrium of threat and counter-threat, alliance and counter-alliance, which, sooner or later, emerges into conflict.

§ 3. ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM AT WORK

The Armed State behind the Capitalist. There is no space here to trace in detail the history of this economic imperialism. But it is worth while to recall some of its more striking features. No one now denies that the British occupation of Egypt was undertaken in order to secure the investments of British bondholders ; and that the South African War was simply a sordid struggle for the domination of its gold-mines. The French invasion of Mexico under Napoleon III was an effort to protect the interest of French investors in that ill-fated state. Nicaragua, Haiti, San Domingo, to take only the most notable cases, have all been reduced to the position of American provinces in the interest of American capitalists. The Russo-Japanese war

was, in the last analysis, the outcome of an endeavour by a corrupt Government to defend the immense timber-concessions in Manchuria of a little band of dubious courtiers. The savage cruelties of the Congo ; the struggle between British and American financiers for the control of Mexican oil ; the fight between Germany and the Entente for the domination of pre-war Turkey ; the reduction of Tunis to the position of a French dependency ; the Japanese strangulation of Korean nationalism ; all these are merely variations upon an identical theme. Men have sought a specially profitable source of investment. They have been able to utilise their Government to protect their interest ; and, in the last analysis, the Government becomes so identified with the investor, that an attack on his profit is equated with a threat to the national honour. In those circumstances the armed forces of the state are, in fact, the weapon he employs to guarantee his privilege.

What it is here important to realise is the underlying implications of this evolution. Once, after the 'eighties, the drift towards economic imperialism had begun, it brought with it inescapable consequences. The discovery that the exporters of capital could use the state as the collectors of the interest on their debt transformed the whole psychology of trading relationships. It necessitated a strong state ; and this, in its turn, involved a state whose physical power was adequate to its pretensions. It is not accident that the enormous increase in military and naval expenditure occurred *pari passu* with the need to protect investments abroad. But this increase, in its turn, involved an immense capital investment in the manufacture of armaments. The interest of the manufacturers made them press and intrigue for a spirited foreign policy. Their inventiveness, whether in the psychical or the scientific realm, is too well known to need expanded discussion ; activities like those of Mr. Mulliner, of the famous naval "scare" of 1909, or of Mr. Shearer at the Conference on Naval Disarmament of 1927, are merely classic examples of a considered and undeviating policy. And because each state was behind its

own investors, it naturally sought for alliances to insure itself against possible conflict. To settle our difficulties with France in 1904, we were necessarily drawn into alliance with Russia in 1907. It was our loans which then assisted her to the wanton destruction of her nascent parliamentarism and so made certain the Revolution of 1917. We become involved in a network of relationships each part of which is built upon the assumption that might is the parent of right. And this might becomes translated into terms of national prestige which the common people is called upon to defend as the price of their well-being. A million of our dead lie buried in foreign graves to testify that the price is sufficiently heavy.

The Argument for Economic Imperialism. Here we must take account of the argument by which the evolution is defended and then measure it by its theoretic truth, on the one side, and its social consequences upon the other. The economic imperialist puts forward a simple case. He points out that we live by our power to export manufactures and capital ; we must therefore have markets as the condition of our survival. We need them the more because our productive powers, through scientific discovery, continually expand, competition grows ever more keen, and if we cannot sell abroad, the dependence of our people on foreign supplies of food would mean an inability to maintain our population at its present level. To secure markets must therefore be the essential objective of our policy. All modern states are engaged in the same process ; to let ourselves fall behind in the race is to lose the most profitable opportunities for the investment of our surplus capital and the sale of our own manufactures. By pressing forward, we increase the national wealth ; and our standard of living advances by the opportunities of which we take advantage. It may be true that the process involves a threat, only too often, to the maintenance of peace ; but this is the price of empire. It may be true, also, that there is a seamy side to the commercial exploitation of backward races ; but, in the

struggle for survival, the weaker must go to the wall. Economic imperialism is the necessary result of competition for trade between states equipped with the modern industrial technique ; its avoidance would gravely impair the general standard of life among their populations. To develop along this path is not, therefore, a decision which an industrial nation can either make or refuse to make ; it is an unavoidable obligation of the position in which it finds itself.

Nothing is gained by denying that the argument is a powerful one ; and still less is gained by denying that economic imperialism has considerable achievements, as in the development of the Sudan, to its credit. It is true that the standard of life of a modern state is largely a function, as it is now organised, of its power to export ; and it is further true that if it did not press forward to the continuous capture of new markets it would be unable to employ its capital to the highest advantage. It is undeniable, also, that a decision by Government not to support its capitalists in an imperialist adventure would merely mean the annexation of the territory, or the attainment of the concession, by some alternative power. That the push towards imperialism is, on the assumptions of the system, an irresistible one, the history of the United States and, still more recently, of Japan, would appear to make manifest. Once the power to produce outstrips the power to consume in any given community there must either be the conquest of new markets, or a condition, obviously involving grave economic loss, in which large masses of capital will be unable to find profitable employment.

Economic imperialism therefore presents the modern state with a dilemma which, upon its assumptions, is an obviously formidable one. No statesman would be so unwise as to refuse to the citizens of his own country that protection upon which its economic well-being depends. In any case, the pressure for protection has always been so intense that, even where there have been hesitation and resistance, in the end the statesmen have always

succumbed. Bismarck embarked with difficulty upon the imperial adventure; Gladstone went unwillingly into Egypt; it was only divine guidance which permitted McKinley to annex the Philippines. But no statesman could hope to retain office who deliberately refused the opportunity of economic expansion to his people. Its organisation may rather be defined as the test of his quality as a statesman. That he may encounter conflict in his progress is part of the rules of the game; and his skill in the field of international relationships consists precisely in his dexterity in getting, if he can, the results of conflict without the necessity of imposing by violence the will of his people upon a foreign competitor.

The League of Nations and Economic Imperialism.

Upon this analysis, therefore, economic imperialism uses the state as its instrument, and evaluates the state in terms of the power of which it disposes. The war of 1914 was the outcome of this conception; and the League of Nations was born of the war as an instrument intended to minimise as far as may be the use of war as an instrument of national policy by reason of the danger to civilisation that it implies. But, fully to understand the implications of economic imperialism, we must consider its relation as a body of principles to the League before we can fully examine the premisses upon which it is built or the consequences of those premisses. For no small part of the discussion upon the means of preventing war assumes that, without any re-assessment of the validity of its principles, it is possible, either through the League, or some alternative instrument, to control the relation of economic imperialism to war in such a way as to deprive it of its dangers.

The League System. For what does the League attempt?

It binds its members, by a system of pledges reinforced by sanctions, either to refrain from making use of war to realise their objectives, or so to delay the decision to make war as to minimise, by the opportunity for conciliation

provided by delay, the prospect that it may occur. It finds the flaw in the international system in the concept of state-sovereignty ; and it seeks to empty this concept of its right to irresponsible action by binding it, under sanctions, to pacific purposes. In realistic terms, the League, and all similar instruments, like the Kellogg Pact, endeavour to force upon economic imperialism the peaceful habits of international trade characteristic of the half-century before its advent.

League Failures. It is clear enough that the League has definite and considerable achievements to its credit. That it minimises the prospect of war, no one acquainted with its record can possibly deny. But the problem remains, nevertheless, of whether the creation of the League can definitely be regarded as transforming the inherent nature of economic imperialism. Those who so regard it, even in a potential way, as having effectively created the basis of such a transformation, have obviously much to explain. There is not only the grave fact that, in the Sino-Japanese dispute, the League proved powerless to utilise the sanctions at its disposal. There is not only, also, the not less grave fact that the history of the Disarmament Conference shows how little confidence the Great Powers yet possess in the effectiveness of those sanctions where a serious dispute among them becomes possible. There is also the absence of Russia and the United States from its membership, and the significant defection of Japan when the League united to denounce her use of the normal weapons of economic imperialism. There is the inability, as the experience of the Geneva Protocol made clear, to close the gaps in the Covenant of the League. There is the weakness of its effort to reduce, as at the World Economic Conference, the causes of economic friction between states. It is significant that in all major matters, the Great Powers would not consent to the abandonment of the rule which requires unanimous agreement to League action ; the teeth of sovereignty are not drawn so much as polished. Everyone

knows that the injustices of the Peace Treaties of 1919 are a potential cause of conflict ; but no one seriously supposes that in any near future their revision, under Article XIX of the Covenant, could be safely raised. Those who have accepted the Optional Clause have done so with significant reservations ; they will not submit disputes to arbitration where their vital interests are concerned, and they remain the judges of their vital interests. The Covenant calls for the registration of all treaties with the League and no treaty is binding unless so registered ; but it is a matter of common knowledge that this has not ended the making of those secret agreements between states which have been so fruitful a cause of war.

Nor is it insignificant that things like the Kellogg Pact and the Four-Power Treaty of June 1933 should follow upon the Treaty of Locarno and similar instruments. The obligations to which they give rise, so far as the member-states of the League are concerned, merely reaffirm the obligations of the Covenant. The sceptic may be pardoned for observing that the Kellogg Pact legitimises wars of self-defence ; no state regards itself as embarking upon any other kind of war. The Four-Power Pact protests the desire of the High Contracting Parties to act upon the basis of the Covenant ; is it illegitimate to infer that the signatories, like the play-queen in *Hamlet*, protest somewhat too much their benevolent intentions ? Is it insignificant that there exist conceptions of the nature of the League so widely different as those of France and Great Britain ? Or that France has, so to say, assured herself against the failure of Geneva by her system of alliances with states like Poland and Czechoslovakia ? Or that the League's affirmation of the desirability of a maximum freedom of trade should have coincided with the most intense period of economic nationalism so far known to history ?

The League fails to deal with Economic Causes of War. It is not necessary to disagree with the view that the League is the best instrument against war we have so far devised to

doubt whether it has yet seriously sought to deal with the basic causes of war. For so long as the economic well-being of nations is held to depend upon finding suitable markets for their surplus capital and manufactures access to those markets they will have ; and, as the habits of Japan make manifest, if they cannot get them by peace they will get them by war. The peace of the world was not assisted by phenomena like Ottawa ; it was widely realised that any effort to make the British Empire a closed economic system would add to the disruptive possibilities of the international situation. Oil, gold, iron, coal, wheat, these have not ceased to be invisible empires for which, in the crucial instance, men will still be constrained to do battle. And there will be brought into their service all those profound and tragic emotions of nationalism before which neither the claims of reason nor the sanctity of international agreements seem able to secure effective recognition.

Anyone who considers in a realistic way the implications of the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria will find it difficult to avoid this conclusion. The League will prove effective just so far as it is not in conflict with the ultimate purposes of any economic imperialism which is embodied in the pretensions of a first-class power. When this occurs, the League may investigate and even publish its findings of fact with the recommendations based thereon ; but its members will hesitate to act upon any recommendations of which the consequence may be conflict. The result is to confirm the aggressor in the possession of the illegal gains it has seized, and the principles of economic imperialism have their result very largely as though the League did not exist at all. And so long, it may be argued, as either undeveloped or disorganised territories await the possibility of exploitation this is likely to be the case. The principles of the Covenant and the logic of economic imperialism are in patent contradiction to one another. If the first are to prevail they involve the definite and deliberate use of sanctions against any state which denies them in action. To affirm principles without giving them the force

of action is plainly to invite their violation in any case where the offender is convinced that it may count upon the paralysis of the League before the momentous consequences of applying the sanctions ; and it appears likely that this will be the case wherever a powerful state confronts a weak opponent and is determined to see its policy through.

For the root of the difficulty remains, despite the principles laid down by the Covenant or analogous pacific instruments. The investors remain able to send their capital abroad ; and they remain able to secure the protection of their national states for the benefits they presume they are likely to obtain. Once the issue involved is of sufficient magnitude to enable an adequate exploitation of national feeling to be organised, the necessity of prestige will compel any Government to offer them the requisite protection. The handling of the Anglo-Russian dispute of 1933 shows how easily that feeling can still be aroused. The grim history of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations since 1919 shows clearly enough how little of its inherent habits economic imperialism has abandoned. The colonial pretensions of Italy and Germany are only special variations upon a similar theme. To give substance, in short, to the principles of the Covenant it is essential to destroy the presumed advantages of economic imperialism to those who benefit by them ; for, otherwise, the conflict between their incompatible assumptions means either a war to ensure the victory of the Covenant or a situation, like that in Manchuria, in which the Covenant remains an empty declaration of faith in ideas it proves impossible to enforce in practice. It is difficult to believe that the League would survive another experience like its failure in the Sino-Japanese dispute.

§ 4. THE LEAGUE'S WEAKNESS

Surplus Capital and War. We are therefore driven back to consider the foundations of economic imperialism as the rock upon which the technique of pacifism may be destroyed.

The situation which confronts us is the existence in the more powerful states of a mass of idle capital awaiting the prospect of profitable investment and using the authority of the state to protect the privileges it obtains when that prospect is fulfilled by investment in weak or backward communities. Why is it that the owners of capital are continually seeking for opportunities of this kind?

The answer raises some of the fundamental questions of economic theory and practice. The root fact from which we have to start is the accumulation in states of a developed character of surplus capital more rapidly than the opportunity of its domestic employment. It emigrates because it cannot find the security or the rate of profit which foreign investment offers; and, when it emigrates, it looks to the state to protect it from risk as best it can. The reason why accumulation takes place more rapidly than the power of domestic absorption at a profitable rate lies in the maladjustment of production and distribution. The consuming power of the public is not equal, by reason of the nature of economic distribution, to its producing power. The wants of consumers in the modern wage-system are not "effective" wants in the technical sense of that term. The emigration of capital arises because the incidence of wealth is too unequal in any given community to enable its capital permanently to be employed profitably at home; it is a way of seeking to prevent the phenomena of trade-crises which otherwise occur. Had distribution been more clearly equal, it is obvious that the demands of the wage-earners being "effective" would have resulted in a greater demand for the domestic employment of capital. In the absence of greater equality, its owners accumulate far greater resources than they can spend even in terms of the luxurious display involved in an acquisitive society. They therefore look abroad for the chance to place their capital profitably. They are not seriously concerned with the purposes to which it is devoted. It may be for armaments, or for the sterile pleasures of an Oriental autocrat; it may be, as

with the famous French loans to Russia, to prop up the foundations of a decaying despotism. So long as there is the prospect of profit, the investor does not enquire too nicely into the objectives to which he lends his support.

The root fact, in short, of that rapid accumulation of capital in advanced countries which results in the need for its export is the existence there of a markedly unequal society. Were the wage-level higher, it is obvious that the demand for commodities would create a greater demand for the domestic employment of capital; houses for the working-classes might be built instead of an extra palace for a bankrupt ruler. The situation, in fact, of a working-class whose income-limit is set by the very margins of subsistence is necessarily a search by capital for quantitative rather than qualitative expansion since the latter method does not involve the creation of equivalent purchasing power for the commodities produced. And wherever capitalist expansion is quantitative rather than qualitative in character, the risks it runs involves the technique of conquest, whether direct, as in India, or indirect, as in South America, for the protection of the investments made. For the risks run are, as a rule, so high, the concessions so valuable, the rates of interest charged so high, that only the contingent pressure of military power can guarantee their security.

There is another reason, also, why the domestic position makes the export of capital both profitable and attractive. The existence, in the less advanced states, of great reserves of ill-paid native labour makes possible a lucrative return on the capital employed largely inadmissible under the more sternly regulated conditions of Western civilisation. Long hours of labour, poor wages, little necessity to pay attention to the modern demands of sanitation and safety, the absence of any well-organised trade-unions, even, at the worst, a condition of contract-labour which is sometimes hardly distinguishable from slavery—these offer prospects of profit of which the investor is naturally inclined to take full advantage. In this respect, all the phenomena

of sweated labour present themselves for exploitation ; and the history of industry in Egypt and India, in the factories of Shanghai and the plantations of Africa, show that they are utilised to the full. And the danger that the profit may not be secured is always obviated by the fact that behind the effort of private enterprise are diplomacy and military power to see that its ingenuity does not lack its reward.

Profitableness of Economic Imperialism. It is worth noting, moreover, that economic imperialism offers other prospects by no means negligible in character. The requirements of trade involve a well-settled territory ; and this necessitates civil and military administration. So there have grown up the civil services of India, Egypt, and our African dominions, to take only the most notable examples, in which a large number of the sons of the middle and upper classes have found the opportunity of dignified and financially adequate careers. This development has had a number of important effects. On the one hand it has bred a real hostility to self-government in the territories involved ; for every nationalist movement among the subject-peoples necessarily attacks the foundation of a system which enables a number of young men to find employment not otherwise easily open to them. On the other hand it has involved the necessity, in these territories, of adequate military occupation, itself involving further employment ; for public opinion at home, naturally enough, demands proper safeguards for the security of Englishmen against revolt or revolution. No one need doubt that much of this service is both necessary and valuable. But no one can doubt, either, that it creates a vested interest against progress in self-government, of which the power, very notably in India, has been remarkable indeed. The failure of Great Britain to attempt even, in the last generation, to lay the foundations of an Indian army officered by Indians is inexplicable save in these terms. For if the martial qualities of the so-called " fighting races " are what they

are so consistently described as being it is impossible to understand why their members have, with equal consistency, been excluded from the commissioned ranks.

Economic Crisis. One further characteristic of this economic imperialism makes an important impact upon first principles. So long as competition for markets was largely confined to the Western industrial nations, it was competition between peoples of not dissimilar industrial standards of life. With the entrance of the Far East into the industrial field, new factors have entered into the situation. The factory standards of Japan, for instance, have enabled it to beat the Lancashire cotton manufacturer out of the Indian field ; and the intense nationalism of India and soon, it may be, of China, involves the growth there of protective tariffs devised to secure a predominant share of the markets for their own nationals. The result of the first development is either grave unemployment in the industries of the defeated competitor, or the intervention of the state to mitigate by legislation the force of an unequal competition ; and the reaction of this latter alternative upon the disadvantaged state is to oblige it to take measures in its own defence. That is the result, also, of the development of protective tariffs. The economic autarchy it encourages dries up the stream of international trade just at a time when its increase is fundamental to the full employment of a capital which, through scientific progress, has so enormously enhanced a productive capacity. The whole economic machine then gets out of gear ; and the depression of 1929 and the subsequent years, with its grave disturbance of the whole social equilibrium, is the necessary outcome. And it is a commonplace which now hardly needs discussion that in the conflict of interests produced by this situation it is certainly difficult, and perhaps impossible, to avoid an ultimate catastrophe.

Impotence of League to deal with Imperialist States. Such an analysis reveals, it may be argued, the basic

incompatibility between the purposes of our pacific institutions and the purposes of the dominant economic system in which they are expected to function. We aim, by international organisation, less at removing the inherent causes of war than at seeking to arrest them before the stage is reached where such arrest has little chance of success. Experience suggests the inadequacy of this procedure ; for to organise it successfully means binding the great states to a surrender of the authority implied in their sovereign power. This they have shown themselves unwilling to abandon, and the driving force behind that unwillingness has been the massed economic privilege which has become almost an alternative expression of state-sovereignty. The fact is that the power profitably to export capital, when the power of the state is available to protect its results, is the new form of conquest in the modern world ; and the exporter prefers the risk of war to the surrender of profit. The whole psychology of the pre-war period is here on all fours with that of the post-war epoch. Acquiescence in the tyranny of Czarist Russia is matched by acquiescence in the imperialist designs of Japan against China. To compare the active Victorian sympathy with the liberation of Italy, or with the nationalist enthusiasm of Kossuth with the temper engendered by economic imperialism is to move into a meaner world. The Victorian trader was at least concerned about the well-being of his customer ; the financier of our own day can substitute authority for well-being as the guarantee of profit and be equally protected whatever the fortunes of his client.

Emotional Appeal of Imperialism. The importance of this temper from the angle of maintaining peace is hardly capable of exaggeration. This economic imperialism uses the state as the safeguard, even the collector, of its profits ; and it does so regardless of either their source or their character. To see to it that the state remains at its disposal it harnesses all the passionate emotions of national feeling to its effort. It penetrates the political parties, it influences

the Press, it sends its propaganda into schools and universities. The task of combating the half-conscious background it thus creates is formidable indeed. For what Englishman, for instance, can view with detachment the changed fortunes of Lancashire in its Eastern markets when he is assured that the restoration of "strong" rule in India or China will mean the recovery of her former prosperity? How can he acquiesce in the logical implications of the Covenant when these may mean that the sovereignty of the state is abandoned to a pooled authority in the making of which Great Britain's share may not only be partial, but count for no more than that of other people's with whose ways he is not acquainted and in whose traditions he does not share? He has never been taught to analyse the conceptions of "honour" or "prestige" or "vital interest" for which he is asked to do battle. He accepts them at their face-value, at least in the moment of crisis, and when he begins, if he does begin, to be a little sceptical of their validity, the possibility of the price defeat may entail is an assurance against his scepticism being pushed too far.

The Problem for the Pacifist. If this analysis be valid, it follows that the pacifist is presented with a two-fold problem. On the one hand, he is faced with the fact that so long as the economic system can find in the export of capital a fundamental source of profit, so long, also, as it can exploit the machinery of the state to protect that export, so long it will continue to do so. And, while it does, no pacific mechanisms will be adequate to control this form of imperialism unless the state which supports it has reason to fear the consequence of a challenge to its activity. From this angle, therefore, the pacifist is confronted by the necessity of mastering imperialism or being mastered by it.

On the other hand, it is clear that the transformation of imperialism into a system subdued to the needs of peace is a long and difficult process. From this angle, therefore, the pacifist needs to reinforce, as best he may, the mechanisms of such bodies as the League in order to minimise the

possibility that some particular experiment in imperialist exploitation may escape its preventive categories. If a reckless loan to the Khedive can result in the occupation of Egypt, it is obvious enough that some method is required which will prevent loans of this character being made. If investments in South Africa can result in so sordid a transaction as the South African War, means must be taken to prevent the state from being related to such investments as a protective agency. Until techniques of this kind have become part of our normal mental environment, all the efficient causes of war remain as profoundly rooted in our social system as they were before 1914.

Disharmony among the Pacifists. For it is necessary for the pacifist to admit the comparative feebleness of the authority to which he can appeal as against that to which his critics can go. Pacifism is not a single and united army agreed upon its objectives and its methods. Its exponents vary from the Communist to whom war is the expression of capitalism, to the Quaker to whom it is, regardless of its character, an immoral method of settling disputes. It is easy to preach as a principle ; it is extraordinarily difficult to expound as a system of concrete propositions upon which wide agreement can be attained. Contemporary British opinion was united in urging support for the League of Nations over the Sino-Japanese dispute so long as the League confined itself to resolutions about which action was unnecessary. The situation would have been widely different if the League had proposed the application of economic sanctions to Japan ; and it is a fair inference that it would have been split into uninfluential fragments had Japan announced that the use of such sanctions against her would be followed by a declaration of war. Some pacifists believe in disarmament by example ; others insist that the process must be mutual. Some favour the general strike against war ; others insist that the weapon is either futile or dangerous.

The Imperialist's Strength. There is little of such disharmony on the other side. The interests they defend are real and concrete and measurable. The forces they can deploy are enormous. Pacifism touches the armed forces of the Crown, the city, all the families to whom imperialism means a career for their sons, those who depend, whether for income or employment, upon the manufacture of armaments. They defend a system in being, with its powerful psychological hold upon public opinion. They represent traditions which are well understood and instinct with memories of achievement which are dear to the majority of men. They constitute, in short, an organised army which hardly requires more than to remain on the defensive to prevent its positions from being endangered. How skilful are its depositions, how massive its powers of obstruction, the first eighteen months of the Disarmament Conference have made clear. It is widely agreed that the pacifists are right in insisting that without disarmament there cannot be security, and that without security there must be war. Their opponents admit the adequacy of the equation ; it is only when it comes to the detail of its application that they display their remarkable powers of coherent opposition to specific proposals. In the present conjuncture of circumstances it is at least a possibility that their solidarity will prove successful.

§ 5. THE ECONOMIC ROAD TO PEACE

A Frontal Attack. The realistic way to the prevention of war lies, therefore, it may be argued, in a frontal attack upon that economic imperialism which is its root. With conflicts between the smaller states we are in a position to deal. It is when the great power, or the alliance which the great power has brought into being, insists upon the realisation of its will, that we seem helpless before its determination. And the substance of this will is economic in character. It is the spoils of Africa or Asia, the abundant

prizes of the Near and Middle East, the prospects of South American exploitation, which are the objects of the conflicts that develop. Until we can make the basis of international relations as naturally instinct with peace as they appeared to the age of Cobden no system of pacific mechanisms will enable us, in any really grave antagonism of interest to resist the drive to war.

Answer to Imperialism in Social Reform. If this be true, it follows that the main hope of peace lies in the re-organisation of the economic systems of the Great Powers. The answer to imperialism is social reform. That accumulation of capital which cannot find a satisfactory outlet in the domestic market is the outcome of the defective purchasing power of the working-classes. The maldistribution of wealth divides the nation into a small class of investors to whom the export of capital is a necessity, because the other class, the consumers, cannot afford that volume of consumption which would make its domestic employment profitable. The problem for the pacifist is therefore to secure such a redistribution of income as will prevent the flow of capital into sources which require the state-power for its protection. The future of peace depends upon the intense development of the home-market as a means of preventing the competition for markets abroad by capitalists who use the pressure of diplomacy, with all that it implies, to effect their entrance and establishment at the expense of their rivals.

The way to this end lies in two directions. On the one hand, it implies a consistent increase in the standard of wages paid to the working-class; the increase in their purchasing-power then means that they can afford more and better food and clothing, more and better houses, more of the amenities of life. On the other, it means the deliberate taxation of large incomes for such public necessities as education, maternity and child-welfare, parks and open spaces, which require state intervention for their adequate provision. The redistribution of income, by either of these means, looks definitely towards a more equal society. And

upon this analysis it is implied that the forces of trade unionism, on the one side, and of Socialism on the other, as they work for that more equal society are definitely serving the cause of peace. For the more their success renders impossible the achievement of those surplus incomes which are the basis of the imperial adventure the more the pressure for foreign markets, of that kind in which economic imperialism has specialised, becomes mitigated.

The Socialist Solution. It is no answer to this argument to urge that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, its dependence upon foreign trade renders impossible adventures of this kind. This only appears to be true by reason of the character of our economic history since the Industrial Revolution. An artificial and undesirable specialisation for certain types of market in which great profits were readily available when other countries were less industrially developed than ourselves has led to foreign trade and investment assuming a wholly disproportionate place in our national economy. The system worked in a period of expanding returns ; it has slowly ceased to work since other industrial powers came to technical maturity and challenged our supremacy. We have thereby become confronted by the dilemma that we cannot expand in the old way either by production for foreign trade or by securing special privileges abroad ; since the one is stopped by the growth of protective tariffs, and the other involves, if it be pursued, the kind of competition which led to the war of 1914. We are therefore driven to cultivate the home market. But this, in its turn, we cannot do unless there is a constant increase in wage-standards in order to absorb our productive capacity. Yet that increase in wage-standards is contested at every stage by the owners of capital because, by cutting into profits, it endangers their privileged position in the community. The owners of capital therefore look to imperialist adventure as a means of safeguarding themselves from the power inherent in a rising working-class. It is this divergence of interest between capital and labour which

Socialism seeks to bridge by achieving the national ownership of the means of production.

Antagonism of Socialism and Imperialism. It has been, in fact, a sound logic which has always made the Socialist an opponent of imperialism. For the latter cannot operate except in terms of military power ; and it is the cost of this—in England five times as great as it was sixty years ago—which is the main barrier against expenditure on social reform. More, it may be argued that since imperial adventures take the national mind away from social reform, the vested interests, like slums and the drink traffic, which social reform must seek to attack, find the best screen for their protection in the development of imperialism ; our African adventures diverted us from social questions at home for over thirty years. And the poison is more subtle than this. For the more profound the imperialist interests of a people, the less secure is its democracy likely to be. Its problems are rarely susceptible to the technique of popular control, as has been made manifest when Governments of the Left have sought to liberalise the operation of our policy in Kenya or in India. It becomes difficult to avoid continuity, whether in men or in ideas, from the fear that a break in tradition may cripple the prestige of the nation abroad. But the avoidance of a break in tradition has, as its result, the practical withdrawal of important public questions from popular control in the legislative assembly. This in its turn, narrows the ground between parties and increases the authority of the executive by freeing it from the danger of criticism of principle.

In these circumstances, two results follow. On the one hand party government is weakened, and, with its weakening, the energising principle of representative government. Mr. J. A. Hobson has shown, in a classic book, how the effort of Liberalism to find terms of accommodation with imperialism cut at the root of its identity as a separate creed. That made possible the fusion of its party with Conservatism, and the pursuit of common imperialist aims ; from

1906 onwards there was little effective difference between those parties on matters either of colonial or foreign policy. And the stronger the continuity, the smaller the public criticism ; with the result that parliamentary control of both became little more than a polite fiction. When, in the second place, the Socialists became the second party in the state, they were driven, in their turn, either to accept continuity and, thereby, to acquiesce in the technique of imperialism, or, by challenging it, to attack at the root the main safeguard of the domestic vested interests of which their policy was the antithesis. By thus associating Socialism with democracy, and the latter with a refusal to accept the pretensions of imperialism, they have driven the vested interests to doubts of the democratic hypothesis. For the development of autocratic habits in imperial and domestic affairs, where the will of the vested interests has had its way with little challenge, has naturally had its repercussions in the domestic sphere. If democracy means the end of imperialism it is natural for the imperialist to contemplate the end of democracy.

Antagonism of Democracy and Imperialism. These affiliations are significant. They reveal how deep is the cleavage driven by the habits of imperialism into the national unity. For the polity it needs for its defence is one that denies equality which is the affirmation of its own essence by the democratic system. And a society which denies equality within itself is bound by the logic of its nature to deny it also abroad. So to deny it is necessarily to weigh the claims of other peoples differently from one's own ; and, in the long run, to weigh them unequally is to disregard them. That this has been the practice of imperialism its treatment of the native races makes manifest ; and it is not a large step to take from contempt for the human rights of the native to contempt for the common folk in general. It is significant, for example, that a pseudo-scientific biology which began by insisting on the superiority of the white race, has continued by a general affirmation of the biological superiority of the white rich

over the white poor. It uses this affirmation to attack their claim to social reforms ; for the cost of these, as also their consequence, very notably in the field of education, is a threat to their own privileged position. And the more fully the pressure of imperialist forces is free from the menace of democratic control with its drive to social reform, the more free it is to drive forward to further aggression in which it sees the prospect of profit. But the more it drives forward the less opportunity there is for competing imperialisms, the greater, accordingly, the chance of conflict between them. And as conflict approaches, as we learned in the years before 1914, the more ardent are the preparations for its coming, whether military, economic or psychological. No matter how warm one's faith in the League of Nations or the Kellogg Pact, it is difficult to feel that their framework is strong enough to resist such pressure as this implies. For peace itself, in this context, is no more than a troubled breathing space in which the men who protest their devotion to it, some of them, no doubt in all sincerity, are driven to make the preparations for inevitable war.

This may be put quite briefly in a series of affirmations. Imperialism requires militarism to protect its conquests. The conjuncture of these things deflects the national attention from urgent domestic issues and spends the revenues of the state upon objects of unproductive expenditure. More, the preservation of the conquests requires continuity of policy in the spheres of imperial and foreign affairs ; these cease in increasing degree to be the objects of popular control. But this, in its turn, develops an impatience with the wants of democracy in the domestic sphere ; and insistence by the latter upon its wants leads to increasing doubt of the validity of the democratic hypothesis. When the latter begins to gain ground beyond the formal territory of politics, it is challenged ; and the outcome of the challenge, where the circumstances are favourable to reaction, is autocracy in one or other of its varied forms. This autocracy, freed from the hampering influence of democracy, is then more free to pursue its imperialist aims, and, indeed, is tempted to do

so to draw attention away from domestic grievance. But its imperialist aims, as they grow in intensity, clash with those of some competing power ; and the states involved, as a rule with their satellites also, move irresistibly upon the path to war.

All this, it may be suggested, is illustrated not less by the history of the post-war years than by that of their fore-runners. The conflicts of imperialism with democracy in Germany and Italy are only the most dramatic examples of the deliberate sabotage of equality in the economic sphere to preserve the privileges of a small class ; and the latter, once it has assured itself of power, begins immediately to think of the riches upon which it may lay its hands if a spirited foreign policy is only strongly enough backed by armed force. Nor is the history of other peoples in essence different. Even England and the United States, where the Liberal tradition is still most firmly rooted, find in their midst profound suspicions of democracy because, as the proportionate increase of their exports declines, the threat of democracy to economic privilege becomes more manifest. In each of them, the control of the state by imperialist interests poisons the international atmosphere ; as is evident, for example, in Anglo-American naval rivalry, the difficulties of the Disarmament and World Economic Conferences. An imperialist society being devoid of moral principle, it is only natural that it should assume that its rights are a function of its power to get its will obeyed. That is the only logic it is able to understand. But that also is the logic the premisses of which the League of Nations exists to deny.

Equality as the Foundation of Peaceful Society. To make the League a hopeful experiment, therefore, its own premisses must be rooted in the internal constitution of its member-states. So to root them demands a reorganisation of their character in the continuous direction of equality. For this prevents that maldistribution of income which is the source of imperialism in the first instance. It attacks directly the need for surplus income to look abroad for profitable

investment. And the more complete the control by the state of the process of investment the less likely is there to be the feverish search of the last two generations for dubious opportunity of the kind we have known. By owning, therefore, the instruments of production within itself, a Socialist state has already taken a large step towards realising the prospect of a permanent peace. It has then rid itself of a class of wealthy citizens who, being unable to spend what they receive in income, are the main source of the imperialist fever, who, also, are the more urgently driven to invest abroad that the larger profits which accrue may safeguard their special advantages from the demand for expensive social reform. A state thus built upon an equal interest in the common stock of welfare can develop its own productive capacity to the maximum in a planned and orderly way not open to the competitive and individualistic societies we have so far known. Nor has it the interest of those societies in aggression save as its own internal arrangements are threatened from without.

It is not, in fact, an accident that Great Britain showed a greater devotion to the ideals of the League during the years when its Labour Governments held office than either before or since. For that devotion was inherent in the necessity of Labour to secure the international atmosphere in which it would become possible to pursue its programme of domestic reconstruction without interference from external forces. Nor is it accident that the process of domestic reconstruction should have been so sharply challenged by exactly those imperialist interests whose authority and prestige are threatened by the purposes of economic democracy. There is hardly an item in the programme of the National Government of 1931 which is not a definite attack upon those purposes. The move towards a closed economic system, whether insular or imperial, the embargo against Russia, the economic war on Ireland, repression in India, the drive to economics in those social services the development of which jeopardises the economic position of privilege, the attack on League expenditure, the willingness to

endanger an agreement on aerial bombing by insistence upon retaining it as a weapon against the semi-civilised, the conscious use of a depreciated currency as a manoeuvre in trade expansion, all these are of the very essence of the imperialist technique. And all of them cloud the international atmosphere with those prospects of insecurity, those threats to establish expectation by the use of power to create right, out of which war in the past has so inevitably emerged.

It is the implication of this analysis, therefore, that the attainment of peace involves an equal society as its primary condition. Any alternative places the state-power at the disposal of economic privilege ; and those who possess it are driven, by the inherent logic of the capitalist system, to those imperialist adventures which result in war. The whole atmosphere of an unequal society becomes adjusted to this necessity. National emotion is utilised quite shamelessly by Great Britain in South Africa, by the United States in the weaker countries of South America, by Japan in Manchuria, for the economic advantage of the investing class. Literature, the Press, even the educational system, are exploited to provide the requisite psychological situation which imperialism requires. Expansion as such becomes an ideal without regard to its costs or consequences. Expansion, quite logically, is held to involve an increase in naval and military expenditure. This, in its turn, becomes a barrier against intensive social development at home. And since all the great powers are treading a similar path, their convergence in a world where the prospects of conquest are limited becomes simply a matter of time. To choose peace rather than war where the convergence threatens powerful vested interests is to abandon the right to employ exactly the weapons which have been organised for their protection. It involves, too, a threat to the prestige of imperialism which, were it cumulative, would nullify all the advantages of power. Against the prospects of choosing peace, the motives to war are tragically strong. For they prove the validity of the whole organisation built by the vested interests for their own safeguard. To abandon war is to

cast doubt upon the whole evolution they have sponsored. It would make unnecessary the basic institutions of imperialism. It would require fundamental readjustments in the drive of national psychology.

To the pacifist, no doubt, the choice of peace is the way of reason ; and, for him, there is no moral alternative. But it may be doubted whether he has adequately considered the assumptions upon which he is working. He is, in fact, appalled at the consequences of a system which uses war as simply one, even if the final, instrument in its armoury. But instead of attacking the system, he seeks to arrest it exactly at the point where it conflicts with his own vital convictions. The effort, it may be suggested, is an impractical one. For to arrest the technique of imperialism at the point where its logic issues in its fullest expression is an idealistic adventure merely. It has not faced the consequences of its own major premiss. If war is the real evil, the way to deal with war is not to deal with the occasions out of which it comes but the deeper causes of which those occasions are merely the expression. For he cannot otherwise successfully tackle at the source either the psychology or the institutions of imperialism. He can indicate, and even organise, alternatives ; but he has no assurance that these will work at the moment of crisis. And once they fail to work in any serious situation, as in the Sino-Japanese dispute, the axe is laid at the root of pacifist technique. The imperialist, not unnaturally, takes the failure as an indication of the truth of his own assumptions ; and he proceeds to safeguard their opportunity of expression.

§ 6. THE SOVEREIGN NATIONAL STATE

The Sovereign State and Economic Power. This may be usefully put in another way. A world divided into sovereign states cannot, by reason of their sovereignty, successfully organise their relationships upon any basis which can

reasonably assume that peace is permanent. For the character of our economic system makes sovereignty the protective rampart of exactly those interests in society to which war and peace are no more than alternative ways of securing their special ends. In any state where there is an unequal interest in the economic process, the power of the state will be at the disposal of those who own the instruments of economic power. If these have been used for the characteristic purposes of imperialism then sovereignty will be used to protect those purposes ; and a sovereign state whose effort to protect them is challenged by any international body will refuse to accept its findings if the purpose it seeks to protect is regarded by it as in any way fundamental to its life. It cannot abandon its sovereignty without risking all the profit believed to be involved in the enterprise it is pursuing.

And behind that insistence on its sovereign rights there lie habits and ideas which can live only by their exercise. An imperialist system is bound to give the armed forces of the state a special place in its life ; and the history of Germany, Japan, and France shows clearly that this is hardly compatible with the atmosphere of security which peace requires. It may even be argued that the special English doctrine of the freedom of the seas is simply another instance of the imperialist tradition refusing to consider the implications of internationalism ; and it is notable that, at the Naval Conference of London in 1929, the Labour Prime Minister could speak in accents hardly distinguishable from those of his Conservative predecessor. At every point, in fact, where peace requires the surrender of sovereignty, the vested interests it supports make that surrender—as at the time of the Geneva Protocol in 1924—an impossibly difficult adventure.

That is why Mr. H. G. Wells has been unquestionably right in insisting that there are really no effective middle terms between the anarchy of the pre-League world, and a world-state in the full sense of the term. For so long as the League is a body of sovereign states, their action at any

critical point is a function of their discretion ; and their discretion will be wholly self-regarding whenever the problem involved is one which touches what they regard as essential to their power. That is the significance of the special phrasing of the Kellogg Pact, and the important reservations to it of the signatory powers ; it is the significance, also, of the British reservations to the Optional clause. These are nothing so much as the expression of the inherent inability of the great imperialist states to control the vested interests by which their policy is directed. For were they to pledge themselves so to do they would be bound to a contingent alteration of their own inherent logic ; and this they are not willing to accept. They are prepared to take steps to enforce the Covenant upon the lesser powers. But they will not pay the price of subjecting their own authority to a possible interference with the path they may propose to tread.

Anachronism of Sovereign State. For as soon as they confront the problems of the new world created by scientific discovery, it is obvious that the national state is an impossible unit of final discretion. That world has become an inescapably interdependent unit. An alteration of the price of wheat on the Chicago exchange may alter the whole way of life of an Hungarian peasant ; and the abandonment of free trade by Great Britain may affect the social economy of all the Scandinavian countries. Anyone who considers the impact of the American departure from the gold standard in April 1933 upon the commercial habits of Western Europe and Asia will realise that the sovereign right of a congeries of competing states to take fundamental economic decisions without regard to their impact upon the rest of the world has become an international danger too great to be endured. Control over currency, tariffs, the right to lay embargoes and quotas upon the entry of foreign commodities into the domestic market, the policy of subsidising domestic production against external competition, all these imply the power to ruin the economy of

other states while professedly acting for one's own protection.

Nor is this all. The problem of differing labour standards, raised in an acute form by the rapid development of the Japanese textile industry, threatens with extinction the productive power of other states where the standard of life is seriously higher than that of its competitor. The means taken for its own safeguard by the state so threatened becomes, quite inevitably, a serious source of international friction ; and the ill-feeling engendered by such measures may well lead in the future, as in the past, to conflict. The division of the world into independent states means a world of international economic anarchy ; it is impossible to plan an orderly course of production for the international market when each state is driven by the pressure of its own citizens continually to invent new rules of the game which gravely affect the position of its rivals. It then becomes true of them, as Hobbes said of men in the state of nature, that each is a wolf to its neighbour. The result is seen in a record like that of the World Economic Conference of 1933. The experts may, as in 1927 and 1932, agree upon general principles out of the application of which some order may emerge ; but no state dare adventure their application for fear of the effect upon its vested interests as these have come to maturity by their ability to exploit the state-power. Economic nationalism brings with it a Nemesis as significant in its intensity as the Black Death or the Napoleonic wars. It condemns whole peoples to poverty ; and it leaves them with no outlet, save internal or external conflict, through which they may, half-blindly, seek to find some means of possible salvation.

This, moreover, is not the end. Nothing is more characteristic of the imperialist process than the relation between Great Britain and India ; it is merely the outstanding example of a wider development in the technique of empire. The control of one community by another gives rise invariably to the growth in the controlled people of a desire for autonomy. This, in its turn, expresses itself as a demand

for statehood ; and one of the first forms in which statehood expresses itself is a demand for economic independence. That was the root, of course, of the Anglo-American struggle of the eighteenth century ; and it has been the natural history of the British dominions. With India, the development of its nationalism follows a similar course. To safeguard itself from foreign competition, it demands control of its fiscal system ; and one of the consequences of that control is to challenge the predominance of Great Britain in its markets in the interests of domestic production. The realisation of Indian freedom, that is to say, involves one more addition to those economic nationalisms which deny the whole logic of an international community. It inflicts injury upon Great Britain by throwing its productive system out of gear ; it inflicts injury upon India by sacrificing efficiency to a vested interest which uses national emotion to protect itself from external competition. The demand for Indian autonomy, once it assumes the search for statehood, involves the whole apparatus of tariffs, a separate currency, control of immigration, independent labour legislation, and so forth, and thus strikes one more blow at that fabric of international trade which is the basis of world-prosperity.

Imperialism, in a word, always gives birth to nationalism in the subject-peoples under its control ; and nationalism always lends itself to the protection of every vested economic interest which can creep under its wing. But the protection of these interests, in its turn, involves the whole panoply of sovereignty ; and at the base of sovereignty, above all in the international sphere, is the idea of armed force to realise the result at which it aims. Anyone who considers the history of Great Britain in Africa will find it inevitable to assume that once the protection of these vested interests becomes a serious threat to their competitors, the outcome is conflict. An international world, in short, if it desires peace, cannot be built upon a system of separate sovereign states the reality of whose sovereignty is simply a function of the power of which they dispose.

Necessity for non-Sovereign Units. The necessity, therefore, to build an international society upon the basis of constituent members which are non-sovereign units is the plain lesson of our experience. For so long as the state is, in the last analysis, the irresponsible judge of its own discretion, it is bound to equate power with right ; and its conception of its right will be a function of the strength of the vested interests which shape its policy. Here it has been argued that the more unequal the society, the more likely, from the logic of its situation, is *machtspolitik* to shape its habits ; and it has been suggested, therefore, that a world-community of Socialist states, by reason of their natural inclination to concentrate upon domestic well-being, is more likely to pursue a pacific policy than any other form of social organisation. For every emphasis upon equality denies the affirmation that the characteristics of imperial expansion are valid ; and these, it has been urged, are the root causes of war.

Socialism by itself not a Guarantee of Peace. The Limitation of Sovereignty. That is not to say that a community of Socialist states is itself a guarantee of peace. A Socialist society is conceivable which lives by its capacity to exploit less powerful states ; and the equal share in the result which would then accrue might sharpen, rather than diminish, the zest for equality. It is conceivable, also, that a Socialist society which was denied access to some fundamental want, raw materials, for instance, would fight with a heightened emotion for their possession. The implication of this prospect is, therefore, the clear one that only in an equal world-community of which the economic life is deliberately planned as a whole is there any serious chance of a lasting peace. To leave any of the sources of international friction at the discretion of a single state is to risk the possibility that this discretion will be exercised for selfish purposes incompatible with the maintenance of peace. To limit this discretion is, therefore, essential to any technique of pacifism.

Within the limitations of a capitalist society, it is obvious from our experience of the League that no rapid or profound change can be expected. The working of the International Labour Office illustrates the difficulty of obtaining agreement even upon minor matters when the vested interests of its members press their Governments to think first of themselves and only, as a very secondary matter, of the coherent action of a unified society. The things we need, united action upon currency, tariffs, international investment, production of raw materials, the free movement of peoples, are unlikely to be achieved within the period that peace demands. This is not less the case when planning in the economic sphere has to move in dependence upon the attainment of an attitude of confidence and security in the political. For the intensification of economic nationalism, which is itself an expression of the contradiction between the logic of a capitalist society and the needs of an international community, has brought in its train Fascism as the expression of the effort of democracy to rid itself of the burden of vested interests in each national state.

And Fascism is deliberately militant in temper. It seeks to preserve the vested interests it expresses against the assault upon them which has come, in the period since the French Revolution, in the name of Socialist equality. To do so effectively, it has to discover the secret of economic recovery without disturbance of those vested interests ; and that drives it, by the mere fact that it is capitalist, to a feverish search for markets abroad. For only imperialism can give to the vested interests the economic leeway within which to make concessions to the masses whom they must somehow satisfy. The foreign policy of both Mussolini and Hitler is impossible to explain upon any other hypothesis ; even their lip-service to peace contradicts the plain meaning of their acts. The demand for colonies, the exaltation of war as the supreme embodiment of the state-power, the eager search for prestige, the development of the armed forces of the state, are all an announcement that behind the policy adopted is the power, if necessary, to enforce it

by conflict. Every Fascist state is a threat to peace ; and every Fascist state is the necessary outcome of the attack on privilege. Wealth is sought abroad to prevent an attack on privilege at home. But by remaining an association of sovereign states, the League of Nations is powerless to arrest this development. It is stopped by its nature from interference with the domestic arrangements of its members ; and it can therefore handle only the results of this militarist evolution, instead of attacking its causes. But by the time those results have reached the stage when they can become a matter of discussion at Geneva, it will be too late to arrest their natural outcome in war.

An instrument like the League fails, in this background, to deal with the basic assumptions upon which the existing order rests. It is not difficult, at least in abstraction to point to modifications in the existing system which would largely reduce the prospects of war. To put all international loans under the control of the League ; to agree, through its machinery, upon a unified policy for the central banks of the world ; to reduce tariffs, and to stabilise them for a definite period at the reduced level ; to co-ordinate, again by international agreement, the volume of production of basic raw materials ; to act similarly against the dumping of commodities produced by sweated labour, and that policy of subsidies to industries which, like the beet-sugar industry in Great Britain, live only, as they live unnecessarily, by artificial stimulus of this kind ; here is a policy within the framework of capitalism which, granted a satisfactory political atmosphere, offers it the prospect of a long-continued peace. It might even, by these means, recover the proportionate increase of prosperity it experienced in the nineteenth century and thus postpone its internal erosion by its power, through that prosperity, to satisfy the masses by an increasing standard of life.

But it is clear from our experience since 1919 that such agreements are not open to our competitive capitalist structures. The vested interests involved will not make the necessary sacrifices ; and they count upon their power to

utilise national emotions to preserve them in this outlook. It has been said by Sir Arthur Salter that a World Conference of Governments, seeking the basis of co-ordinated economic action might well do more harm than good ; and his prevision of 1925 was only too amply confirmed by the experience of 1933. The fact is that we seek to handle the problems of an international society with a technique derived from a wholly different epoch. It is not really remarkable that the technique and the objective should fail to achieve an harmonious relationship.

For the problems of an international system require the subjection of the discretion of each individual state to the common good. That subjection cannot be realised so long as discretion expresses a policy designed to preserve and even to extend the claims of privilege. For if discretion may come into play, it must have the means at its disposal to give effect to its purposes ; and this really means that, on any realist view, disarmament and the existing system are radically incompatible ideals. The enthusiast who can see that no nation really wants war, who, therefore, assumes that the path to disarmament is, or ought to be, a straight one, forgets the important fact that while no nation wants war, its economic system is organised to secure advantages many of which cannot, in the long run, be obtained without conflict. So long as this is the case, the military and naval experts in every state must demand the instruments they deem essential to securing these advantages. Nothing else can explain the long drawn out hypocrisies of the Disarmament Conference of 1932. What, in brief, it revealed is that while the state is prepared to insist on its zeal for an abstract disarmament, it is not seriously prepared to relinquish any weapon which, in its considered judgment, is of special value in the struggle for power. To disarm is to trust in the power of reason to convince ; and to trust in the power of reason is to surrender irresponsible discretion and the power-politics by which this is enforced. The international society requires this surrender ; but it is a contradiction in terms of the postulates of the existing order.

A contradiction, indeed, both on the internal and on the external side. On the internal side because, by denying the claim to equality, it must search for alternative means to satisfy the democracy, and this it can only do by exploitation abroad. On the external side also ; for to protect its claims to exploit, it must maintain its title to sovereignty which denies, whenever its prestige is threatened, the right of reason to precedence. A capitalism might be conceivable, of international scope, which surmounted the barriers of nationality ; but, limited by history to alliance with the national state, it is incapable of making the necessary adjustments in its assumptions.

An international society requires economic world-planning ; nothing less than this can now utilise our resources to the maximum effect. But economic world-planning means that the greater interest must prevail over the less, that, accordingly, reason is used as the master-key to the solution of our problems. But men do not give whole-hearted allegiance to reason, when their interest is associated with a denial of its claims. For them, in such a situation, the little platoon takes precedence over the great regiment of mankind. An organised privilege which is asked to abdicate appeals from reason to the passions which its institutions have created ; and reason is impotent before their expression. Impotent because, in an unequal society, those who prevail are the men who shape the contours of policy ; and, in such a society, these are always the holders of the instruments of economic power. Reason cannot defend their position unless it can be shown that their special privilege is a function of the common good ; and there are few economic privileges in the modern state which can be defended upon this ground. They are therefore driven to the exploitation of ignorance, passion, and prejudice to maintain themselves ; and there is no atmosphere so conducive as war to the success of this exploitation.

Men give heed to reason when they have an equal interest in the result of its operations ; so soon as these threaten a social structure from which they derive a special advantage

they deny its title. That has been the history of all great social reforms in the past—the establishment of religious toleration, the admission of the masses to the franchise, the recognition of an equal status for women. The same is true of the effort to give institutional form to the implications of the international community in which we have become involved. It can only function as it enjoys peace ; it can only enjoy peace so long as this is the patent interest of its members. But they will not believe that it is their patent interest if its consequences threaten some special privilege to which they attach importance. There is then no ingenuity of which they will not be capable to defend their right to make war. They may say that their national interest or honour is at stake. They may argue that they are protecting the claims of civilisation against barbarism. They may insist that they are preserving the obligation to observe an historic contract. They may deny even that the war is a war at all ; and it will emerge for them as a punitive expedition, or the restoration of order in the interest of the very state with which they are in conflict. We have known all these things in our time ; and so long as our society remains an unequal one, there is no reason why we should not know it again. But in each case the ingenuity, when the effect of passion has been dispersed, does not conceal the fact that it is a special economic interest which uses the state-power to safeguard or extend its privileges.

It has been suggested, as in the Draft Treaty of Economic Assistance, that institutions like the League may apply economic sanctions, both positive and negative, to effect their purposes. But their use raises all the problems of unified action we have already considered in an acute form. It is difficult, for instance, not to feel that their employment against Japan in the Manchurian dispute would have been regarded by her as an act of belligerency against which she would have taken such measures as she could. It is not easy to visualise France or Italy enforcing such sanctions against their respective satellite allies ; for so to employ them would destroy the purposes for which their alliances have been so

carefully made. That the weapons involved are of enormous importance is clear ; but it is their very importance which makes their use so doubtful within the confines of the present system. Their employment would imply an agreement upon the purposes of international organisation, a will to make peace the supreme object of policy, which is denied by all the habits of the present social order. Could we expect, in a German-Russian war, that Poland or Rumania would apply economic sanctions against an opponent whose power, even granted the protection of the League, might well be fatal to her own well-being ? And is that not the less likely when a policy of neutrality might have the economic benefits which accrued to the United States and Holland during the last war ?

§ 7. A WORLD ORDER OF SOCIALIST SOCIETIES

The Movement towards Equality. Upon this view, the high road to peace lies in the reconstruction of the present social order in the direction of equality. The more effectively this is achieved the less interest states possess in the pursuit of an imperialist policy. To develop the productive power of the community so that men share equally in its results is to prevent the perversion of its political authority in the interest of a small number of its members. Its sovereignty is then no longer a cloak for that interest. Its direction of capital investment is no longer a technique of exploitation abroad which pays no adequate attention to domestic need. Its foreign relations express a commercial connection which does not require the inherent militarism of a policy built upon the ideal of economic empire. A society of Socialist states is in a position, to which no other order of life can pretend, to consider its economic problems upon a basis of genuine mutuality and goodwill. For such a society can plan its life in a deliberate and coherent way.

It is not pressed by those problems of prestige which are inherent in the structure of capitalism. Its interest in peace is the more direct since it is not perverted from allegiance to peace by the peculiar psychology of patriotism which a capitalist society is driven to invent for its own preservation.

It has been argued that the movement towards equality cannot succeed save as the institutions of internationalism are effectively organised.¹ But this is to assume that a capacity for such organisation is possible within the framework of the present order. If the analysis here made is correct, it follows that the assumption is an impossible one. Capitalist peace is only, by its nature, a breathing-space between wars ; for the relation between capitalism and the national state is one in which conflict is necessarily, in the long run, involved. Our task, therefore, if our will to peace is a genuine one, is to seek the transformation of capitalist society as the essential pre-requisite of an international community with the prospect of seriously functioning. Such a transformation alone makes possible the abandonment of sovereignty in the form which strikes at the root of peace. It places the total interest of the international community on a plane where it begins to have meaning. For an equal society does not need the technique of imperialism ; this has been the logical outcome of the property-relations inherent in the capitalist structure. That this is the case is evident not less from the economic history of the United States, France and Germany, than from that of the classic model of the British empire. Imperialism comes always as a means of protecting privilege from assault by making the offer of concessions to the masses an easier adventure. Once that necessity is obviated, the process of capital investment abroad becomes genuinely conceivable on a plane where the common well-being can receive serious consideration. So, also, with tariffs and currency and migration ; so, also, with the grave problem of raw materials. A world order of Socialist societies, by the logic of its equal interest in the

¹ Professor Zimmern in the *Political Quarterly*, Oct., 1932.

result of planning is able to approach their solution with a real determination that reason shall prevail.


One need not minimise the difficulties of the task. But what it is important to emphasise is the fact that no other foundation offers the prospect of attaining either the ideology or the psychological habits in which alone peace has some prospect of permanency. Even a militarily Communist state like Soviet Russia becomes definitely pacifist as it encounters the opportunity of economic success ; and the danger that it may become militarist in temper is far more a function of the uneasiness caused by its stability to capitalist states than of its own inherent purposes. So, also, a Socialist Great Britain would be far too amply engaged in the task of internal development to seek for the opportunity of external aggression. And it is notable in comparison that only the direct opposite can be said of the Fascist states which deny the claim of freedom in equality to recognition. Each has suppressed democratic institutions to safeguard that denial ; and each is driven towards adventure abroad to escape from the consequences of this suppression. The recognition of this tendency is at least as old as Aristotle ; and it has only been confirmed by subsequent experience.

Economic Democracy the Road to Peace. The way of peace is the way of economic democracy ; for there is no other method of building social organisation upon the basis of reason and justice. In any other form of society, it is the power of the privileged class which determines the habits of the state ; and they are bound to use that power in the international field both to consolidate and to reinforce their authority. Desire then becomes the parent of principle, and reason the servant of prestige. Such a society may even will to do justice ; but it cannot help equating its substance with the maintenance of its own authority. The character and technique of international institutions then become adapted to the needs of this atmosphere. The international community cannot find the unity that it requires to plan its life coherently ; its power to

act rationally is constantly frustrated by vested interests which control the discretion of its individual parts. The result is to intensify the claims of the centrifugal factors in such a society. It may declare its unity, as in the Covenant of the League, but in the decisive instance it lacks the necessary will to realise it. The consequence is the inherent inability of instruments like the League to secure an allegiance from its more powerful members which makes observance of peace the highest consideration they can desire.

In an equal society, the emphasis is a different one. Its interest in imperialism is not integral to its life ; for it has not developed to support a privileged class which lives by its economic results. Because it is not wedded to imperialism, it does not find the same need for *machtpolitik* as alternative forms ; and this makes its attitude to disarmament wholly different again in character. It is able, moreover, by reason of its egalitarian atmosphere, to develop psychological habits among its members which recognise and sharpen the relation between peace and well-being. For such a society, pacifist institutions are a guarantee of progress ; where, in an unequal society, they are always a contingent threat to privilege. An economic democracy, moreover, by reason of its control of the instruments of production, and the equal disposal of their results, is able to plan its commercial relations with foreign communities from a far more creative angle than is possible in alternative forms of state. It is not looking to individual or class enrichment without regard to its total impact on the community ; it regards it as part of its own plan of domestic development. This puts it in a position where its advantage lies in the organised planning of international life. The conception of a world state is directly related to its own interests as a society. It can see that while war, as an instrument of policy, may benefit a few, it means nothing but material and spiritual loss for the kind of society it is. In an economic democracy there develops, therefore, as the natural outcome of its principles, the psychological habits of which a genuine international community has need.

And because it develops such habits, an economic democracy may reasonably hope to develop the appropriate international institutions also. It can give meaning not only to the technique we already realise as appropriate to peace ; but it can, directly to its own advantage, extend it to fields it has not yet won. For the interest of such a democracy is the maximum use of the economic resources at its disposal ; and the greater the facilities for this use which international organisation can supply, the greater the prosperity it is likely to attain. It is free from the inherent vices of the competitive system, above all from that acquisitive foundation which regards profit as an end in itself. We need not conceive of economic democracy as in itself a guarantee of peace ; we need argue only that the wider its frontiers, the more profoundly have we attacked the system which makes war a necessary function of the present social order. And from this we can at least infer that when war ceases to be a necessary function of the social order, it will be possible to regard it as an obsolete weapon of social policy. It may still occur, but it will not occur as something to be regarded as a natural phase of human experience. It is only when we have reached that position that we shall be entitled to optimism about the future of mankind.



APPENDIX : THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security,

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations
between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of
international law as the actual rule of conduct among
Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect
for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE I

1. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

ARTICLE 2

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

ARTICLE 3

1. The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

4. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,* together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council.

2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the

* The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are the following :—the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan (see Preamble of the Peace Treaty with Germany).

Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be Members of the Council (a); the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council (b).

2 bis.† *The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and conditions of re-eligibility.*

3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a Member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

ARTICLE 5

1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

(a) In virtue of this paragraph of the Covenant, Germany was nominated as a Permanent Member of the Council on September 8, 1926.

(b) The number of members of the Council selected by the Assembly was increased to six instead of four by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Third Assembly on September 25, 1922. By a resolution taken by the Assembly on September 8, 1926, the number of members of the Council selected by the Assembly was increased to nine.

† This Amendment came into force July 29, 1926.

2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 6

1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

2. The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the Annex ; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

3. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.

4. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

5.* *The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly.*

ARTICLE 7

1. The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

2. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

3. All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

* This amendment came into force on August 13, 1924; the paragraph originally ran : " The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union."

4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

ARTICLE 8

1. The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

ARTICLE 9

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.

ARTICLE 10

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE 11

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE 12*

1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or *judicial settlement* or to inquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by

* The Amendments in italics came into force on September 26, 1924.

the arbitrators *or the judicial decision*, or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators *or the judicial decision* shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE 13*

1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration *or judicial settlement*.

2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*.

3. *For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.*

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award *or decision* that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against any Member of the League that complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award *or decision*, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE 14

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a

* The Amendments in italics came into force on September 26, 1924.

Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

ARTICLE 15*

1. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or *judicial settlement* in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one

* The Amendments in italics came into force on September 26, 1924.

or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE 16

1.* Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13, or 15, it

** When sufficient ratifications have been received this paragraph will be replaced by the following four :—*

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its

shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting

covenants under Article 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, and to prohibit all intercourse at least between persons resident within their territories and persons resident within the territory of the covenant-breaking State and, if they deem it expedient, also between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse at least between persons resident within the territory of that State and persons resident within the territory of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not, and, if they deem it expedient, also between the nationals of that State and the nationals of any other State whether a Member of the League or not.

It is for the Council to give an opinion whether or not a breach of the Covenant has taken place. In deliberations on this question in the Council, the votes of Members of the League alleged to have resorted to war and of Members against whom such action was directed shall not be counted.

The Council will notify to all Members of the League the date which it recommends for the application of the economic pressure under this Article.

Nevertheless, the Council may, in the case of particular Members, postpone the coming into force of any of these measures for a specified period where it is satisfied that such a postponement will facilitate the attainment of the object of the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, or that it is necessary in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience which will be caused to such Members.

from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

ARTICLE 17

1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of Membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 18

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE 19

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 20

1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE 21

Nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE 22

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and

which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

["A"
Mandates]

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

["B"
Mandates]

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of

military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

["C"
Mandates]

6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

ARTICLE 23

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League :

(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations ;

(b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control ;

(c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs ;

(d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest ;

(e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind ;

(f) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

ARTICLE 24

1. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

2. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

3. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

ARTICLE 25

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

ARTICLE 26

*Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

**When sufficient ratifications have been received this Article will read :—*

Amendments to the present Covenant the text of which shall have been voted by the Assembly on a three-fourths majority, in which there shall be included the votes of all the Members of the Council represented at the meeting, will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives composed the Council when the vote was taken and by the majority of those whose Representatives form the Assembly.

If the required number of ratifications shall not have been obtained within twenty-two months after the vote of the Assembly, the proposed amendment shall remain without effect.

The Secretary-General shall inform the Members of the taking effect of an amendment.

Any Member of the League which has not at that time ratified the amendment is free to notify the Secretary-General within a year of its refusal to accept it, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

INDEX

NOTE: In this index the word League is used as an abbreviation for League of Nations

- Aaland Islands, 144, 298, 353
 Ad-el-Krim, 228
 Abyssinia, 227, 240
 Adams, James Tristram, 25 & n. 26
 Afghanistan, and U.S.S.R., 158 f., 164, 226
 Africa, a Continental Sub-League for, 231 f.
 — European penetration of, 227, 228
 — Europeanised States in, 226 f.
 — Internationalism in, the principle of, 231 f.
 — Mandated areas of, 131, 227
 — and prevention of war, 199, 226 f.
 — relation of to the League, 200, 209, 226 f., 232 f.
 — Summary, 241
 — What the League might do for it, 227 f.
 — Trade and investment in, 229 f.
 — War, 227, 228
 Aggression and the Aggressor, definitions of, 214, 215 & n. 215
 — and the League, 202 f., 278 f.
 — weapons of, definition of, 419
 Aguinaldo, —, 41
 Air Force, International, French proposal on, 445
 Air menace, the, 268, 440 f.
 Albania, League settlement re, 298
 Albert, Prince Consort, 462, 463
 Alexiev, General, 60
 All-Union, Congress of Soviets, comprehensive representation in, 180
 Alliances, 14, 81, 207
 — defensive, 49 f.
 — Russian avoidance of, 158
 — War of, 65
 Allied and Associated Powers, Note of, indictment in, of Germany, 82
 Allied Control Council, League for, 447
 Allied Governments, acceptance by, with qualifications, of the Fourteen Points, 72 f., 74
 Alsace-Lorraine, restoration of, to France, 58, 103
 Amanullah, Ameer of Afghanistan, 164 f.
 America, U.S., see United States of America
 American Civil War, 24; peace after, 71
 — colonies, unification of, 22 f.
 — Constitution, the, and its framers, 26 & n.
 — Continent, the, an American League for? 248 f., 254
 — U.S.A., "exploitation" of, 246
 American Federation of Labour, refusal of, to recognise U.S.S.R., 175
 Anarchy, International, cure of, 28 ff., 465
 — defence in relation to, 37 ff., 43
 — war resulting from, 21, 492
 Anzell, Sir Norman, 19, 260, 269, 457
 Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty of 1908, 330, 331
 Anglo-Boer War, peace of reconciliation after, 71
 — European opinion on, 85
 Anglo-Egyptian relations since 1919, lesson of, 515
 Anglo-Italian secret Treaty (1915), 59, 62, 104
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1892, 215
 Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, 165
 Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 165
 — dispute re, settled by the League, 299, 325
 — influence of, on Persian daily life, 212
 Anglo-Russian trade Agreements, 1921, 171; 1936, 172; and the League, Metropolitan Vickers trial, 172; 1936, 515
 Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, 50
 Annexation, considerations which should govern, 108
 Anschluss, the, 107, 130
 Anthropology, suggested teaching of, 497
 Appendix: The Covenant of the League of Nations, full text, 510 f.
 Arabian Peninsula, remodelling of, 220
 Araki, General, 84
 Arbitration, or third party judgment, 43, 64, 65, 66, 311 f., 341 f., 361 f.
 — existing rights and peaceful change (g.v.), 327 f.
 — grounds of, 315 f.
 — International, pioneers of, 249, 260
 — Russian attitude to, 191, 194 f.
 — Wilson's provision for, 273
 Arbitration Treaties, bilateral, 329 f.
 — furthered by the League, 305
 — multilateral, 332 f.
 — as traditions, 216
 Arce, 247, 248, 171, 177
 Ardahan, retrocession of, to Turkey, 163
 Armament competition, prevention of, 421
 — equality, German clamour for, 480 f.
 — reduction, 72, 421
 Armaments, post-war situation of, 366, 403
 Armed State behind the capitalist, some features of, 507 f.
 Armenian massacres, 118, 141
 Armistice, the imposed, 375
 Arms, embargo on, U.S.A. attitude to, 252 f.
 — manufacture of and trade in, omission of from provisions of British Draft Convention, 451 f.
 Army, national, definition of, 193
 — or Navy, function of contrasted with that of a police-power, 41, 47
 Arnold-Forster, Prof. W., 314, 333n.
 Asia, Communist activities in, 158, 172
 — Eastern, Japanese designs on, 214
 — general situation in, 211, 219 f.
 — fundamental needs, 224 f.
 — Nationalist Revolt, the, 158, 220 f.
 — remedies for, 222 f.
 — and prevention of war, 199, 210 f.
 — relation of, to the League, 200, 209, 210, 226
 — relation of, to the world, 210 f.
 Asiatic immigration, U.S.A. views on, 249
 Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., 32, 54, 58, 84
 Attack, weapons of, 418
 Austria, British policy on, 62; past of, black pages in, 85
 — financial aid of the League to, 353
 — reparation payments of, 82
 — Treaty Articles, declaring Independence of, 107
 — and the ultimatum to Serbia, 87
 Austria-Hungary, the offer to, in the Fourteen Points, 103
 Authority, agreed, and imposed, 22
 — a common, substitution of, for local authorities, 21
 Autocracies, Members of the League, 287
 Aviation, civil, control of and internationalism of, 377, 441, 443 ff.

Azerbaijan, Republic of, 163n.

BAGHDAD RAILWAY, 151, 268

Baku, Congress at, of the Peoples of the East, 162; oilfields of, 163n.

Balance of Power, the, 34 ff., 60 f.

— definition of, 52

— Hitler on, 270

— matters subsidiary to, 60

Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley, 440

Balfour, Earl of, 420

Balkan States, minority oppression in, 118

— Treaties signed by, on achieving independence, 119

Balkan Wars of 1912-13, 268

Baltic States, 79

— break away of, from Russia, 189

— communism in, 167

— Polish ambition as to, 160 f.

— Russian treaties with (1920), 160

— Soviet Russia recognised by, 169. *See also under names*

Bank of International Settlements, 309

Batum, 163

Bavaria, and the *Anschluss*, 180

Belgium, *see* its methods of, 133

— German invasion of, 32 ff., 81

— reparations received by, 90, 91, 93

Benes, E., 415

Berlin Act, 235, 240; abrogation of, 286 f.

— Article VI of, 236

Berlin Conference (1885), on trade and civilisation in Africa, 235

Berlin, Treaty of, 175

Bernhardi, —, 32

Bessarabia, 161 f., 174

Bismarck, Prince, 70, 78, 511

Blockade, continuance of, after surrender, 76

Blum, Léon, 193

Bolivo-Chilian Treaty, 358

Bolivo-Paraguayan dispute, 299

Bolsheviks, the, 156n.

— and Anti-Bolsheviks, mutual fears of, in Poland, 161

— policy of, cardinal points of, 159, 174

Borah, Senator, 46n.

Border States, conference of, on reduction of armaments, 180

Borodin, Michael, 168, 170

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Austrian seizure of, 85, 258

Boudin, L. B., 211

Boundary problems, post-war, 111 ff.

Boycotting wars by the peoples, 311 f.

Brailsford, H. N., 211, 239

Bread, struggle for in relation to War, 484

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 183

Briand, Aristide, 84, 159, 175

Briand-Kellogg Pact and Treaty, 251, 252

British Commonwealth, view of importance to, of Peace, 269

— Draft Disarmament Convention. *See under Disarmament*

— Empire, economic imperialism of, 505 ff.

— French and Russian efforts to avert the War, 33 f.

British guarantees given at Locarno (*q.v.*), reaffirmation of, desirable, 424

British Monroe Doctrine, 281

Brüning, Dr., 414, 418, 439

Brusilov, General, 60

Brussels Act, 1890, 235 f.; abrogation of, 236

Bryan Conciliation Treaties, 272, 276, 380, 381

Bucarest, Treaty of, 109

Buell, —, 366

Bukovina, 60, 105

Bulgaria, reparation payments of, 92

— and War guilt, 81

Bulgarian invasion of Serbia, 87

— massacres, 118

Burgenland, the, 300

CANADA, American invasion of (1812), 40

— and Asiatic immigration, 248-9

Capital, migration of, 515, 516 ff., 520

Capitalist hatred, Russian views on, 177 f.

Capitalist Powers, Communist distrust of, 195

— and disarmament, fears impeding, 188

— and Socialist States, deep-rooted antagonism between, 191

— Soviet cooperation with, 156

Capitalist system, present position of, 36 f.

Cartagena, as cause of war, Soviet declaration of, 154, 181

Catalonia, 166

Caucasian frontiers, treaty settling, 163 *q.v.*

Cecil of Chelwood, Viscount, 61, 256, 495, 500n.

Ceylon, and the Ottawa Agreements, 231

Chang Tso-lin, 169, 176

Chinese gangsters of, 342

China, Peaceful, 327 ff., 342 ff.

— Article XIX and the League's Powers, 358 ff.

— exaggerations of the League, 345 ff.

— Agents of, 346 ff.

— — voluntary agreed, 354 ff.

Chemical formulae, cession of by Germany, 93, 94

Chiang Kai-shek, 169

Chicherin, —, 162, 180

Chile and Peru, wars between, 24

China, chaotic conditions in, 216 f.

— collapse in, 177

— Communism in relation to, 157, 170

— foreigners in, 216

— and the League, 223 f.

— and the Nine Power Pact, 215

— Open Door policy in, U.S.A. support of, 259

— revolution in, 158, 226

— Russian relations with, 158, 159, 167 ff.

— unequal treaties in, 157

— U.S.A. relations with, Chinese with Japan, 169, 170. *See also* Sino-Japanese dispute

Chinese Eastern Railway disputes, 166 f.

Civil War, Socialist attitude to, 155

Class loyalty, extension of to national, 470

Class struggle, as caused by Communism, 155, 156n.

Clausewitz, —, 259

Clemenceau, Georges, 61

Cleveland, President, Venezuelan Boundary, speech of, 432, 471

Closed Empires, modern tendency to, 251, 241

Cobden, Richard, 524

Collective or co-operative system, nature of, 87

Colonial administration, 240

— claims, principles of settling, 72

— provisions of the Fourteen Points, 72, and of the Peace treaty, 78

Colonial pretensions of Italy and Germany, nature of, 515

— rivalries as causes of war, 208

Colonies, former German, 85, 130 f., 227

Comity of nations, the, Russia an alien element in, 154

Comintern, the, 166n.

Communism, Is it a World Menace? 187 f.
Communist activities in Asia, British anxiety
over, 158, 172

NOTE, SEE ALSO MARSHALL

- Montenegro and reparations, 91
 Moerselt, cession to Belgium, 93
 Morocco, and the Anglo-French Treaty of 1904, 44, 50, 51
 — nationality question, League settlement of, 300
 — revolts in, 228
 Morris, Robert, 26 & n.
 Mosul, League settlement re, 228
 Mulliner, —, 508
 Murray, Prof. Gilbert, 67
 Mussolini, Benito, 84
 — foreign policy of, 528
 — and Russia, 158, 171
 Mutual Assistance Treaty, fate of, 455
 Mutual understanding between East and West, ways of promoting, 224 ff.
 NADIR KHAN, AMEER, 165
 Nansen, Dr. Fridtjof, 189, 181, 276, 325
 Napoleon I, 81, 155
 National Arms, purpose and result of, 49
 National Defence, adequacy of, 63 ff.
 — definitions of, 39 f., 42 ff.
 — the right to, admitted, 35
 National rights, surrender of, the price of peace, 272
 National sovereignty, modern encroachment on, 28
 Nationalism, 27 f.
 — born of Imperialism, 536
 — non-co-operating, folly of, 30
 — Russia and, 188 f.
 Nationalist passions in relation to welfare, 481 f.
 Nationalist revolts in Asia, 226, 226
 Nations, small and weak, and the balance of power, 60, 61
 Naval Conference of 1927, 453
 Naval reductions, agreements on, 215
 Nazi government. *See under Germany*
 Near East, resources of, part-cause of the Great War, 208
 Neutralisation, 226; weakness in, 237
 Neutrality, 395 f.
 — future of, 250 ff.
 — U.S.A.'s change of attitude towards, 255
 Nicaragua, 300
 Nicholas II, Czar, 58, 59, 83, 84
 Nietzsche, —, 38
 Nine Power Pact, scope of, 215
 — U.S.A. adherence to, 250
 Non-aggression pacts, signatories to, 160, 161
 Non-interference policy, 62 ff.
 Non-Magyars in Hungary, 113, 114
 Non-recognition, doctrine of, 250
 Non-self-governing Colonies as a closed preserve, 231
 Non-Sovereign Units in International Society, necessity for, 537
 Non-Turkic peoples of the Ottoman Empire, and the Fourteen Points, 103
 North Africa, Italian banking interests in, 208
 OPEN DIPLOMACY, 71, 226
 "Open Door" policy, *See also Free Trade*
 Optional Clause, the, and some reservations, 275, 319 ff., 329, 346, 390, 506, 513, 531
 Oriental Exclusion Act of the U.S.A., effects of, in Japan, 166
 Oriental tyrannies, 210
 Osoaviachim, the, 197
 Ottawa Agreements of 1932, 231, 371, 514
 Outer Mongolia, conditions in, 168
 Oxford Union resolution (1933), 471
 PACIFIC ISLANDS, Japan's Mandate for, 131, 134 f.
 Pacific Settlement, Draft Treaty of, proposals of, 537 f.
 Pacifists, assumptions of, 522
 — disharmony among, 522
 — problem before, double aspect of, 522
 Pan-American Union, the, 219
 Pan-Russian Chauvinists, 189
 Papen, Chancellor von, 407, 415, 417
 Paraguay and Bolivia, war between, 214
 Paterson, William, 26 n.
 Paul-Boncour, —, 173 f.
Pax Britannica, the, in India, 21
Pax Romana, the, 20, 21, 22
 Peace in Asia, possibility of, question of, 221 f.
 — inter-continental, 199 ff.
 — how long it will last, 45
 — and the League of Nations, 220
 — machinery of, 216
 — movements towards, pre-war, failure of, 260 ff.
 — of Nations, 396
 — in concern of the League, 295
 — as pre-war organization of, 249
 — coming into the League's orbit on, 296 ff.
 — the President's, 404 ff.
 — price of, 261, 275, 299
 — President Wilson's aims in, 70
 — roads to, 314 ff., 545 ff.
 — securing of, educational and psychological factors of, 456 ff.
 — Socialism as guarantee of, 154 f.
 — insufficient alone, 537 ff.
 — Soviet Russia as an obstacle to, 154 ff.
 — the ties of, strengthening of, 313.
 — U.S.A. contribution to, 249 ff., 255
 — the will for, 256 ff., 304
 — greater than before the war, 35
 Peace Conference, a history of, on the nature of the war, 81
 — and minorities protection, 119 f.
 Peace Treaties, the, 344
 — admittedly penal in character, 55 f.
 — colonial provisions of, 78
 — departures from, 35 and effect on self-determination, 241 and enclosed list, 71.
 — defects of, 260 ff. and enclosed list, 390
 — disarmament clause, 104
 — — observance, not revision of, needed, 79
 — economic clauses, 75 ff., 83
 — German views on, 45 & n., 69, 79, 80, 81
 — inconsistent with the Fourteen Points, 75
 — injustices in, 45 & n., 74, 82 f., 269 f., 513
 — menaces of war after, 499
 — modern indictments of, 348 f.
 — revision of, less necessary than full observance of, 67 ff., 79, 143
 — — partly effected, 144 ff.
 — — whole revision as yet to be desired, 547
 — territorial clauses of, 79 ff., 104
 — — unjust, 104
 — — promises made in, invalidation of, 101
 — — revision of, results of, 129 f.
 — U.S.A. dislike of, 245
 — war criminals clauses in, 88
 — war guilt clauses in, 80 f.
 — — German campaign against, 80, 81
 Peaceful change, 342 ff.
 — and existing rights, 327 ff.
 — and the Optional Clause, 340

- Russia, Soviet (U.S.S.R.) conventions embodying its definition of an "aggressor," 188 & n.
- *de jure* recognition of, 159, 171
- desire of, to accrete other nations, by assimilation, 191
- diplomacy of, nature of, 162
- efforts for renewal of Diplomatic relations, 159
- federal character of, peculiarity in, 191
- Five Year Plans, 187, 190, 188
- danger to, of war, 177, 191
- model for, 175
- foreign, international, policy of, 157 ff., 162
- fear conditioning, 178
- formation of, 189 ff.
- Jews in, oppression of, 118
- lack of informed opinion in, 261
- manifesto of, to "The Chinese Nation," 167
- and Nationalism, 188 ff.
- pacifism of, and *Karl's* attack, 176 ff., 185, 188, 190, 191
- potencies, etc. in, 85
- and Prussia, 88
- problem of, 154 ff.
- recognition of, by Italy, 174
- relations of, with Afghanistan, 157 ff., 164 ff., 220
- with neighbouring States and with the Great Powers, 158 ff., 160, 161, 162, 163 & n., 166, 167, 172 ff., 174 ff., 175 ff.
- with the League but non-membership thereof, 159, 178 ff., 192, 200, 202, 572
- with Persia, 165
- with Turkey, 158, 159, 162, 163 & n., 164
- relationship of, with Asia, 223
- Republic of, 190
- sceptic as to pacts of mutual assistance and collective sanctions, 183 f.
- signatory of the Kellogg Pact, 186 ff., 293
- trading agreements of, 159, 164, 174
- treaties of non-aggression made by, 160, 178
- war guilt of, 83
- Western frontier of, Agreement on, 59 & n.
- and a World Community of Socialist States, 190
- Russia, Tsarist, 119
- debts of, Soviet repudiation of, 171, 172
- Russian definition of the aggressor, 184 ff., 378 n.
- Russian Social Democratic Party, right of national self-determination proclaimed by, 189
- Russo-American trade, 176
- Russo-Chinese Agreement (1924), 168
- Russo-Finn dispute, attempt to settle by arbitration, 164
- Russo-German conciliation convention (1929, 1933), 175
- Russo-German Treaty of 1881, 49
- Russo-Japanese War of 1904, 160, 208
- Ruthenes, the, 105
- SAAN VALLEY, and the French, 58, 93 f.
- Sacred egoism, 60, 91
- St. Germain, Conventions of, 1919, 236
- Salandra, Signor, 59
- Salisbury, Marquess of, 213
- Salter, Sir Arthur, 268, 340
- San Domingo, 250
- Sassorov, General, 82, 84
- Schleicher, General von, 417-18
- Second-class nations, 481
- Secret agreements still alleged to be made, 513
- Security, 191 ff., 362 ff.
- Security, British Draft Convention on, 423 ff.
- collective, 421 f.
- collective, League Code on, 295
- Disarmament and
- (a) Military, 367 f.
- (b) Economic, 368 f.
- Domestic, principle on which Germany was disarmed, 412 n.
- and Freedom of the Seas (*q.v.*), 366 f.
- Mandates and, 371
- means towards
- Armistice, imposed, 375 f.
- aviation, C.I.B. in relation to, 377
- Conference in the of, 372
- control of Arms Trade, 377, 425 ff.
- Financial assistance, 376 f.
- military and naval forces, as contributing to, 376
- and the rights of, in, 371 f.
- and the rights of, in, 372 f.
- of, and the rights of, 373, 402
- potential settlement and change in relation to, 367
- positive and negative, 364 ff., 378 ff., 381, 382 ff., 402, 501
- provisions for, in the Convention and co-ordinating treaty, 367
- and the prohibition of, 371, 372
- and the prohibition of, 371, 372
- and the prohibition of, 371, 372
- and the prohibition of, 371, 372
- Self-determination, 100, 102
- Soviet, and the League, 160, 167, 189
- and the League, 160
- Wilson's doctrine of, the four principles, and some special instances, 192 ff.
- Self-preservation instinct of, disciplined response to, 461
- mistakes made by, 450 & n., 459
- Seneca, 20
- Serbia, Austrian ultimatum to, 59, 87
- Bulgarian invasion of, 87
- and Macedonia, 110
- provision for, of access to the sea, 103
- reparations received by, 90, 91, 93
- Sèvres, Treaty of, Turkish outcome of, 201
- Shanghai, international relations at, the prohibition of, 100, 105
- and the League, 201, 202
- Shannon, Rt. Hon. Sir, 100, 105
- Shannon, Rt. Hon. Sir, 100, 105
- Sino-Japanese Agreement, 1911, and the League, 182, 187, 188, 189, 190, 306, 390, 397 f., 412, 413, 414
- and economic sanctions, 397, 402
- implications of, 220, 208, 199 ff., 514, 532
- Sino-Japanese War of 1894, cause of, 208
- Slavery, Abyssinian, 240
- Slavery Convention of the League, 134, 235
- Slavs, Southern, British action regarding, 62
- Smith, Rev. Sydney, 28
- Social Reform, the answer to Imperialism, 524 f.
- Social sciences and readjustment of human life to changed conditions, 476 f.
- Socialism, building of, in the State, Stalin's success in, 169
- and Imperialism, antagonism of, 526 f.
- as guaranteeing peace, 155
- insufficient alone, 537

Socialist Solution, the, foreign trade as obstacle to, 525 f.

— States, a World Community of, 537

— Soviet Russia and, 190

South Africa, 8, 10, 11

South America, the, 129

Sovereign National State, the, 532 ff.

— anarchy in, 531

— and economic power, 532 ff.

— and the League of Nations, 537 ff.

— Soviet of, and the League, the, 190

Soviet Russia, Treaty of, 1925, 166

Soviet Russia, Treaty of, 1925, 166

Spain, political situation of, anarchy in, 23 f.

States of Asia, the, 222

Stalin, —, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180

States, members of the League, vote of Peace for, none for non-members, 279 ff.

Stans quo, the, 265

— change in, instance in Ireland, 485

Stimson, P. M., 177, 250, 251, 395

Strachey, L., 177, 178

Struseman, Dr., 179

Submarines, proposed abolition of, 436, 438 f.

Syria, risings in, 220

Swiss-Italian Treaty of Conciliation, 1923, 341, 357

Szeklers, the, 123, 130

TADJIKISTAN, Republic of, 190

Tait, President, 316, 332

Tanganyika Territory, mandate for, suggested

surrender of, to Germany, 125

Tanks, present position of, 432

Tann Tuva, Republic of, 138

Tardieu, —, 348, 414

Tariff convention between Italy and U.S.S.R., 174

Tariffs, protective, forbidden to Germany, 78, 95

— tragedies of waste due to, 481 f.

Tawney, —, 285

Temps, Le, 370

Territorial revision. See Change, dangers of

Territory, German sessions of, 58, 79, 93, 103, 116

— retrocession suggested, 147

Tertullian, 20

Thomas, Albert, 368

Thomas, Rt. Hon. J. H., 281

Three Power guarantee, fate of, 495

Times, The, on the Balance of Power as

bringing Great Britain into the war, 55nn.

— on essentials to Peace, 32 f.

Tiza, Count, 81

Townbeec Prof. Arnold, 28

Trade barriers, erection of, against Germany,

not forbidden, 95

Trade conditions, equality of, 71

Trade in Africa, 230 f.

Trade interests, alleged, of the Peace treaties,

77, 94

Transcaucasia, independent republics in, fate

of, 168n.

— Republic of, 190

Transvaal, the, 51

Transylvania, 60

Treaties which have become inapplicable,

advice on, from the League, 358

Treaty Ports, the, 216

Treitschke, —, 32, 33

"Triple Entente," the, British accession to,

49 f.

Tripoli, political revolts in, 235

Trotsky, —, 167, 168, 169

— and World Revolution, 15, 160

Trusts and monopoly, question, League settlement

of, 17

— periodical revolts in, 238

Turkestan, and the League of Nations, 164

Turkey and the League of Nations, 164, 165

Turkey, definition of, and Treaty of Sports,

226

— revolutions in, 220

— Russian relations with, 158, 159, 162,

163 & n., 164

Turkmenistan, Republic of, 190

UKRAINE, the, and Poland, 161

— Republic of, 190 & n.

Ukraine, the, 163, 169

Undeveloped areas, importance of to-day, 206

Union of South Africa, membership of, in the

League, 227

— present status of, 227

— and the League of Nations, 227

U.S.S.R., and Russia, Soviet

Union, status of America, 190

— and an All-American League, 248 f.

— attitude of, towards breach of Peace, 251 f.,

252, 253, 254, 372, 373, 380, 420

— British Note to League, reservations regarding

the Kellogg Pact, 161 f.

— contribution to Peace, 249 ff., 255

— dislike of, for the Peace of Versailles, 245,

254

— and the Disarmament Conference, 250, 291

— entry of, into the Great War, 244

— the Federal Bond in, peace secured by,

23 & n. ff., 465

— foreign policy of isolationist, 25, 40, 241,

244, 245, 246 ff., 251, 255

— foreign wars of, 41, 246

— in relations with, 163 f.

— and the League of Nations, 279 f.

— and the League, non-membership of, but

co-operation with, 178, 260, 241, 245 f., 250,

253 f., 290 ff., 312

— naval opinions in, on armed forces as pre-

ventive of war, 362

— Oriental Exclusion Act of, and Japan, 166

— a pioneer of arbitration, 249

— policy of, as to China, 250, 301

— as to the Sino-Japanese dispute, 250,

281

— popular judgments in, on the debt question,

498, 499

— and prevention of war, 241 ff.

— refusal to adhere to the Permanent Court

of Justice, 248

— and reparations, 291

— Senate of, powers of, over international

engagements made by the President, 244,

252

— Soviet Russia not recognised by, 159, 175 f.

— will of, to disarmament, 419 f., 437. See

also Kellogg Pact, Monroe Doctrine, Vene-

zuela dispute

Unification as making for peace, 21, 23, 465

Universal Society of the Human Race, Roman

anticipations of, 20

Unofficial organisations, aid of, in furthering

peace, 256

Upper Silesian frontier, 130

— League settlement re, 298

Uzbekistan, Republic of, 190

